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ABSTRACT 
FIRE AND THE SWORD: THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE ARME BLANCHE 
CONTROVERSY 1871-1921 
The controversy was over the role of Cavalry 
in future war. The generally held view is that the arme 
blanche charge was obviously obsolete, and that Cavalrymen 
clung to it for social and sentimental reasons; British 
military leaders of the First World War are therefore 
condemned for their belief in Cavalry. This thesis 
questions that view. It offers a case-study of the 
effects of political, economic, strategic and social 
factors on the debate: the link between operational and 
social military history; and the use made by the Army 
itself, of history in forming tactical doctrines. 
After the major wars from 1861 to 1871 a 
movement for reform of tactics and training emerged in the 
Cavalry, questioning the value of the arme blanche. 
Reformers outside the Cavalry pursued a conflicting policy, 
based mainly on the belief that the Cavalry could not re-
form itself, and that an alternative force, the 'Mounted 
Infantry' should be created. Before the end of the 
century the internal reformers gained dominance in the 
Cavalry, but failed to project this to the rest of the 
Army or the public. Their doctrine combined dismounted 
action with limited use of the arme blanche, leading to 
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their being classed with the reactionaries by external re-
formers. 
The crisis of the controversy came in the 
Second Boer War (1899-1902) in which the Cavalry's 
apparent failure resulted from the dogmatic application of 
the non-Cavalry reformers' theories by the Commander-in-
Chief, Lord Roberts. After the war Cavalry reformers 
united briefly with the reactionaries to defeat Roberts' 
version of 'reform i and continued their own progrrurune after 
his retirement. The First World War showed the correctness 
of including the arme blanche in their doctrines • 
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Hart Centre for Military Archives, King1s College, London; 
the Home Headquarters of the XVth/XIXth The King1s Royal 
Hussars; and in particular the Wolseley Librarian at Hove 
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Wolseley to his brother, General George Wolseley, before 
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I also wish to thank the following individuals: 
Dr Philip Towle and Dr Richard Holmes for giving me per-
mission to cite from their own dissertations; Professor 
D E D Beales; Dr Hew Strachan; Brigadier Shelford Bidwell; 
Susan Coker of the Sherburton Pony Stud, Dartmoor; Phil 
Barker of the Wargames Research Group; Sylvia Smither for 
typing the final draft of this dissertation; and my parents 
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for putting up with it all. My greatest thanks must, of 
course, go to my supervisor, Correlli Barnett. 
A major source for this dissertation has been 
the military journals of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In many cases the piece cited has been 
not an article but the transcript of a lecture, an editorial 
comment, a book review, or similar type of printed work; in 
most cases the piece is untitled or anonymous; and in nearly 
all cases the journal of publication is of greater signi-
ficance than the name of the author. There is no provision 
for this type of printed evidence in the History Faculty's 
approved style for annotating evidence, and it has there-
fore been necessary to invent a method of annotation. In 
footnotes, the full title of each piece, along with the 
name or pseudonym of the author, is given. If the piece is 
untitled a descriptive phrase such as 'Note' or 'Editorial 
Comment' has been used. Tpis is followed in all cases by 
the fullest possible reference to the relevant page or pages, 
in the style of the journal cited, a.L.olng- wi th the name of 
the journal in abbreviated form. ' The explanation for these 
abbreviations is given in the bibliography. In order to 
avoid the confusion of two conflicting systems, all articles 
from these journals have been treated in the same manner. 
To avoid glaring anachronisms, units of 
currency and measurement have been left in the form in which 
they appeared at the time, usually the old British system. 
A note on conversion is provided immediately before the 
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bibliography. 
The ~ blanche controversy was an emotional, 
as well as a technical affair. Drama, tragedy and farce are 
all part of war, and it cannot be understood without them. 
The occasional dramatic passages in this dissertation are 
as essential to it as the statistical tables it also con-
tains. 
--............................................ .. 
Arme Blanche 
Horsemen 
Cavalry 
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DEFINITIONS 
The steel weapons of the Cavalry in-
tended for use on horseback, usually 
the sword and lance. 
A general term for all types of 
soldiers who ride horses, regardless 
of their weapons or tactical doc-
trines. 
Soldiers of a professional army who 
ride horses, and who are capable of 
reconnaissance, outpost duties, 
attack and defence on foot with a 
firearm and the mounted charge. 
Hybrid Cavalry who have achieved a degree 
of competence in all their four main 
functions such that it has ceased in 
practice to matter which, in theory, 
they regard as their primary duty. 
Mounted infantrymen Soldiers who are trained exclusively 
to fight on foot, but who are mounted, 
not necessarily on horses, as a 
temporary expedient entirely for 
transport . 
Mounted I nfantry Soldiers of a professional army who 
fight exclusively on foot, but who 
have horses and are theoretically 
capable of mounted reconnaissance 
and outpost duties. 
Mounted riflemen Mounted troops of an irregular nature, 
able to reconnoitre and do outpost 
duties, who may carry the l~ blanche 
but usually fight dismuunted and 
regard their firearm as their prin-
cipal weapon . 
Mounted Rifles Soldiers of a professional army who 
ride horses, and are trained for re-
connaissance, outpost duties, and 
attack or defence on foot with a 
firearm . They may carry the ~ 
blanche, but are not trained for 
the charge. 
These definitions, although closely adhered to, are not 
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absolute. Although generally in favour by the end of the 
p~riod under consideration, they were not in any sense 
official. In war, such distinctions tended to break down 
altogether. 
'It has also to be said that with a few exceptions, when 
an invention is first introduced, its advantages over 
established traditions are not always very obvious. The 
first European field guns were certainly not conspicuous 
for their efficiency. The attitude of the Turks towards 
early field artillery, as the attitude of the Venetians 
towards the early galleons, cannot be simply discarded 
as a piece of human stupidity. At their first appearance, 
innovations are less valuable for their actual advantage 
than for their potential of future developments and this 
second quality is always very difficult to assess.' 
- Carlo M Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase 
of European Expansion 
'Cavalry have always been vulnerable to infantry attack 
and throughout history have been a grossly overestimated 
and overwritten arm.' 
- Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare 
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INTRODUCTION 
GUILTY AS CHARGED 
'''Consider your verdict," the King said to the jury. 
"Not yet, not yet 1" the Rabbit hastily interrupted. 
"There's a great deal to come before that 1'" 
- Lewis Carrol, Alice in Wonderland1 
'The trouble with a university education is that 
it makes you see both sides to any question l' 
- Professor Michael Howard2 
In 1864 Captain C C Chesney, Professor of 
Military History at the Staff College, wrote of the use 
by both sides in the American Civil War of horsemen who 
fought on foot as well as on horseback that 'Improvements 
in the organisation of armies have caused this arm of the 
service to disappear. Yet of such are the American 
cavalry on both sides chiefly composed specially in the 
West, where they carry neither sword nor lance.,J For 
Chesney saw these men as 'dragoons', an anachronism which 
had vanished from European armies in the eighteenth 
century, and proof of the primitive nature of the American 
armies. However, when in 1867 Major- General Sir Henry 
Havelock wrote his book Three Main Military Questions of 
the Day, he considered these to be conscription, the 
defence of India, and 'Cavalry as affected by breech-
1 . Carrol, Alice in Wonderland, p 115 
2. Quoted in discussion after Trythall and Bond, 'The 
Fuller- Liddell Hart Lecture', p 28, JRUSI, vol 124 , 
no 1 
J . Chesney, A Military View of the Recent Campaigns in 
Virginia and Maryland, vol II, p 227 
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loading arms'. He emphatically declared that 'increased 
precision, and notably and especially the rapid fire of 
breechloaders, have, once and for ever, set aside the sway 
1 that the lance and sabre formerly held', and called for 
2 these 'dragoons' in large numbers. Contradicting this, 
Colonel Clery's Minor Tactics, the standard subaltern's 
text book of 1875, stated: 
The force of cavalry lies in the combined action 
of man and horse. This is represented in its 
fullest form by the s40ck of collision with the 
enemy. Hence, although cavalry is armed with 
fire and hand- to- hand weapons, the latter remains 
always the principal, the former being the 
accessory.3 
In contradiction to thelTI both, Garnet Wolseley, then 
Commander- in-Chief in Ireland, told a group of his 
officers in 1891: 
I ce~tainly do not believe that you can get a 
good cavalry soldier to be a good infantry 
soldier at the same time ••• My idea is that he 
is intended to fight on horseback. If you 
intend to make him fight on foot, well, you 
will make him into a very bad mongrel, to a 
bad dragoon. 4 
Reviewing the whole debate at the end of the century, the 
then Professor of Military History at the Staff College, 
Colonel G F R Henderson wrote: 
In what manner the cavalry of the twentieth 
1. Havelock, Three Main Military Questions of the Day, 
p 35 
2 . ibid, P 36: Havelock's original is in capital letters. 
3. Clery, Minor Tactics~ p 87 
4. Quoted in Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, 
Lecture 5, p 26 
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century will differ from the hussars and 
cuirassiers of the nineteenth is undoubtedly, 
from a military point of view, one of the ' 
most interesting and momentous questions of 
the day. 1 
This was the arme blanche controversy. From the end of 
the Franco-Prussian War to the end of the First World War 
it formed a major topic of debate both inside and outside 
the British Army . Apart from its perennial value as a 
chestnut for junior officers studying minor tactics, it 
involved, before it was over, two Kings, several members 
of Parliament, and nearly all the high commanders of the 
First World War; and produced literally hundreds of books 
and articles, including some best sellers. If only its 
scale, the amount of time and energy it consumed, is con-
sidered, it was clearly of the first importance to the 
British Army of the period . 
The term l'arme blanche is, of course, 
French, an idiom meaning, roughly, 'cold steel' . It is 
also ambiguous . Although usually applied to the steel 
weapons of the Cavalry, the lance and the sabre, it could 
also be used as a synonym for Cavalry itself. Both facts 
are appropriate . Throughout the debate the British 
theorists were influenced, even dominated, by continental 
practice; while at the same time their arguments were 
plagued with ambiguity, and disagreement was often only a 
matter of the misuse of wor ds . Although chiefly about 
1 . Henderson, The Science of War, p 51 
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what role Cavalry might play in the future, the debate 
b~gan and ended with the question whether Cavalry had a 
future at all . 
Any controversy which occupied so many 
people, including some of the best military brains of the 
time, for more than fifty years seems unlikely, even with 
hindsight, to have an easy solution. The clarity and 
simplicity needed for such sureness is seldom present in 
the confusion of war. At basis, the controversy was a 
problem in minor tactics . It questioned what the Cavalry's 
response would be to the major increase in the destructive-
ness of firepower which occurred during the last half of 
the nineteenth century . Was the mounted charge with the 
~ blanche still valid, and if so what importance should 
it have Z Also, what importance had the Cavalry's own 
firearms, scarcely inferior to those of the Infantry? 
From 1871 to 1914 there 'vas no major war against which to 
test any hypothe$is . Most of the techniques of analysing 
tactics 1 and psYChology2 required even to approach the 
problem were not developed until the Second World War ; even 
as a tactical problem the arme blanche controversy could 
be complex and confusing . But the debate did not exist in 
a vacuum. It was affected by considerations of cost and 
defence str ategy, the social composition of the Army, the 
1 . See Marshall, Men Against Fire 
2 . See Moran, The Anatomy of Courage; Bidwell, Modern War-
~; Richardson, Fighting Spirit; Dixon, On the PsychoT 
logy of Military Incompetence 
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realities of British military strength, and a formidable 
series of personality clashes. It is therefore remarkable 
that, virtually ~hout exception, modern historians have 
found the issue straightforward. They condemn the defenders 
of the arme blanche as fools, and praise the advocates of 
the firearm as prophets; the debate is seen as nothing more 
complex than reform challenging reaction. 
Except to historians, it no longer matters 
who, if anyone, found the correct solution to the problem 
of the ~ blanche. What people think about it matters 
very mu~h indeed. One of the most important functions of 
historical research is the examination of popular myths of 
the past, which can be potent political weapons~ But the 
trail from a discovery, a research paper, a scholarly book, 
through, to the school text book or the ordinary man is 
tortuous, and can take decades. Military history is unique 
in that its link with popular culture is direct and 
immediate. Learned books on warfare reach best-seller 
lists; there are many plays, films and television pro-
grammes on military matters; wargaming is a rapidly ex-
panding adult hobby, as well as the recreation of most 
children. In addition to academic military historians, two 
other broad groups satisfy the public demand for military 
history: popular writers who are at least concerned to pro-
duce books which are as entertaining as accurate, and pro-
fessional officers, often writing with first-hand knowledge 
of the event. No other form of history has the same 
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popular appeal. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the increased 
academic respectability which has come to military studies 
in the last two decades, the main themes of academic 
military works are strategy as an aspect of politics, and 
military life as a mirror of society. Little attention is 
given to operational warfare. Even so, the belief that 
Cavalry were, in operational terms, obsolete, permeates 
such works. One writer on strategy states that Douglas 
Haig's pronouncement whi le Director of Staff Duties in 
1909: 
Cavalry, of itself, cannot produce [a] state of 
moral and physical decadence in the enemy in a 
general engagement ••• It must, therefore, keep 
close to the other arms who attack the infantry 
and prepare the way for the decisive action of 
the cavalry1 
shows 'an' ominous faith in the effed2veness of cavalry 
attack', and 'served to cement into strategic thought an 
outmoded doctrine'. Such judgements affect any assessment 
of the strategic plans themselves, and of men like Haig 
who developed them. But they are understandable, since 
even those academic historians who write on operational 
matters take the uselessness of Cavalry and the arme 
blanche for granted. One eminent historian wrote of the 
American Civil War: 
Here was a valuable lesson for the European 
armies. Horsemen could still be used to telling 
1. Quoted in Gooch, The Plans of War, p 117 
-7-
effect as long as it was realised that their 
prime asset was their mobility on the battle-
field and that is was no longer possible 
physically to pit rider and steel against 
modern weaponry. 1 
Another, more eminent still, wrote of the French Cavalry 
of 1870: 
All that their courage had done was to prove 
that there was no place for cavalry on a 
battlefield dominated by breechloading rifles 
••• On this battlefield, as henceforth on all 
others in western Europe, the only choice 
before horsed cavalry lay between idleness and 
suicide. 2 
A third sees as one of the lessons of the Second Boer War: 
As shock troops, cavalry no longer had any 
place on a modern battlefield, though when 
employed as mounted infantry they still had 
immense potential value in any theatre of 
operations where there was plenty of room 
for manoeuvreoJ 
Yet another has concluded that: 
Haig and French convinced themselves 'that 
only the old knee to knee cavalry charge with 
lance or sword would decide wars of the future'; 
it would take the machine gun and the trench 
of the first World War to prove conclusively 
that they had placed their bets on the wrong type 
of horse. 4 
Finally, writing a little later, the second eminent 
historian declared t~ in 1914 'In western Europe a few 
weeks were enough to make it clear, t _o all except some of 
their own commanders, that heavy cavalrY 1was now an ex-
1. Ellis, Cavalry: a History of Mounted Warfare, p 146 
2. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, pp 115, 119 
J. McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons, p 241 
4. Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War, p 199. 
No source is given for the quotation. It is neither 
French nor Haig. 
b 
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. 1 
pensive anachronism'. 
It can be seen that, while there is an over-
whelming consensus that Cavalry and the arme blanche were 
obsolete, there is some confusion as to when in the years 
between 1861 and 1914 this became so obvious. Neverthe-
less, popular writers have taken up the theme with 
enthusiasm and even wit: 
The ~ blanch~ with its arch-apostles French 
and Haig, was to bedevil cavalry operations 
throughout the 1914-18 war.2 
The charge of von Bredow's dragoons at Mars-la-
Tour in 1870, and the death-or-glory (both, in 
fact) ride of the Marquis de Gallifet's Chasseurs 
d'Afrique at Floing in the same year were con-
sidered more perfect examples for cavalry to 
follow ·than the less showy but more effective 
lessons given by Sheridan and Stuart on the wrong 
side of the Atlantic.J 
In the expeditionary force [of 1914J it seemed 
that there were nearly as many regiments of horse 
as~oot. In troop and squadron strength they 
trotted about the autumn countryside, pennants 
fluttering from the tips of their lances. 4 
Naturally, professional soldiers have taken the same line. 
Sir Brian Horrocks has written that 'It seems quite in-
credible that the lance, whbh was proved to be obsolete as 
1. Howard, War in European History, p 104 
2. James, Lord Roberts, p 442 
J. Smithers, The Man Who Disobeyed, p 92. Von Bredow's 
charge was made by one regiment of cuirassiers and one 
of lancers Q 
4. Clark, The Donkeys, p 15. By Clark's own calculations 
there were 17 Cavalry regiments in the line that day and 
42 Infantry battalions. The full B E F was 18 Cavalry 
regiments and 78 Infantry battalions. A Cavalry regi-
ment was about 600 men, and an Infantry battalion about 
1,000; and the proportion of Cavalry to Infantry in the 
full force was less than one to eleven. Only four of 
the Cavalry regiments were Lancers. The carrying of the 
pennon in war had been abandoned in 1899. 
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a weapon of war in 1645, was still being carried by the 
t~oopers in lancer regiments in 192J'. 1 Major-General 
Sixsmith has seconded the view of Captain Liddell Hart that 
2 Haig 'was handicapped by being a cavalryman', and Briga-
dier Peter Young also feels that 'as a Cavalryman' Haig 
'was perhaps somewhat slow to grasp the tactical factors 
on the Western Front,.J More sympathetically, but not 
less critically, Lieutenant-Colonel R.L.V. ffrench Blake 
has summarised the indictment against the Cavalry: 
The argument was, at heart, between those at 
one extreme who visualised cavalry as mounted 
infantry and at the other by those who pre-
ferred shock action with the arme blanche. 
Within these two main divisions lay other, more 
subtle, causes, each championed by its ex-
ponents - rifle or carbine - lance or sword -
cutting or thrusting. Far too much time and 
thought was expended upon these details, and 
upon matters of dress, rather than upon a 
cleClr policy of the correct role of cavalry. 
When such a policy did appear, the cavalry 
seldom carried it out in practice, preferring 
at the slightest opportunity to charge at the 
gallop, regardless of consequences. 4 
Thes e are serious charges. It is asserted that for a long 
(if undefined) period the British Cavalry clung to an ob-
solete tactical doctrine, out of stupidity and blind con-
servatism, in the face of official opposition and a 
mounting body of evidence. These shortcomings are held to 
have affected the Cavalrymen who commanded in the First 
1. Horrocks, introduction to ffrench Blake , The 17th/21st 
Lancers, p 7 
2. Sixsmith, British Generalship in the Twentieth Century, 
p 161 
J. Young, The British Army 1642-1970, p 199 
4. ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p 79 
J 
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World War. So widespread is this belief, often couched in 
tpnes of deepest sarcasm, that Haig's most sympathetic bio-
grapher has sought to deny the charge (there is no other 
1 
way of putting it) that he was a Cavalryman. In popular 
usage, the term 'cavalryman' has become a symbol of foolish-
ness, arrogance, and lack of vision. 
As the basis of these charges a solid body of 
evidence, in the form of studies of the arme blanche contro-
versy, might be expected. In fact only two such studies 
have been published. One, a twenty- five page survey - of 
British Cavalry doctrine from 1870 to 1914, concluded that 
the most progressive thinkers on the matter had not been 
senior officers, and therefore that their opinions had 
b . d 2 een 19nore • The second, even shorter, and concerned 
only wit~ the period 1902 to 1914, expressed the opinion 
that the Cavalry 'entered the First World War as wedded to 
shock tactics as it had been in 1899,.J Both begged the 
fundamental question in assuming that the champions of the 
arme blanche were in error, and attributed opposition to 
their views to the familiar motives, stupidity and 
emotional conservatism & 
While it is rare to find such a consensus 
among historians, this in itself should be grounds for 
10 Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, pp 
115- 19; Terraine, Haig: The Educated Soldier, p 21 
2. Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry 
1870- 1914', in Howard, ed, The Theory and Practice of 
~, pp 97- 125 
J. Spiers, 'The British Cavalry 1902- 14', pp 71 - 9 
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suspicion; and the almost total neglect of operational 
h~story - of what actually happened in war - in making this 
assessment is clearly a serious error in method. It would 
be justified in one case only: that, as has been generally 
assumed, the obsolescence of the arme blanche was so 
blatantly obvious as to require no further comment. This 
is po~ble; but there are many things obvious to the layman 
and not in fact so, as that the earth is flat and the sun 
goes round it. It also produces a paradox: senior Cavalry 
officers of the time, who studied the problem closely, kept 
a belief in the ~ blanche; modern historians, who have 
given the problem considerably less study, cannot share 
this belief. This thesis investigates the controversy, 
examining the charges made against the British Cavalry . 
It also explains how this paradox came into being. , 
- 12-
CHAPTER ONE 
THE USES OF CAVALRY IN WAR 
'It is a question open to consideration, whether 
the days of cavalry, constituted as at present, 
are not numbered.' 
- Major Edwards, R.E., 'A National Army', 18701 
'To say that the day of cavalry on the field of 
battle is past, is merely another way of saying 
that the knowledge of how to use it is wanting.' 
- Major Home, R.E., 'Precis of Modern Tactics', 
18712 
In 1861 the United, Service Magazine reviewed 
a recent book by Baron d'Azemar, Colonel of the French 6th 
Lancers. The Baron put the hypothetical case of 500 
Cavalry charging two Infantry battalions, each 1,000 strong, 
from a distance of 1,000 metres. By French regulations, 
the Cavalry would take four minutes to trot 700 metres, 
gallop 200 metres and charge the last 100 metres . In this 
time 2,000 rifles would fire at least 24,000 bullets. If 
only one shot in forty-eight were effective, the Cavalry 
would be annihilated. The Baron could only protest that 
in actual practice such things did not happen . J This 
difference between the mathematical and historical ap-
_proaches to the study of war was summarised thirty years 
1 . Edwards, 'A National Army', pp 19- 20 
2 . Quoted in Some Notes on Cavalry Tactics, Organisation 
and Training by a Cavalry Officer, hereafter, Notes ••• 
by a Cavalry Office~ p vi 
J . 'The Future of Cavalry', USM '1861, Pt II, pp 569- 75. 
Equally, any 'Cavalry charging four times their number 
of steady Infantry might expect annihilation in any 
period of history. 
- 1J-
later by Colonel Henderson: 
Theory is of two kinds. First there is speculative 
theory, which in default of great campaigns fought 
with modern materiel, endeavours, from a study of 
ballistics, of new inventions, of results on the 
ranges, of the incidents of manoeuvres and field 
days, to forecast the fighting of the future. 
Second, there is theory based on the actual ex-
periences of war; theory which does not neglect 
to consider the modifications which new arms and 
appliances may produce, but puts in the fore - ground 
the conditions which ruled the last great battles 
between civilised armies • •• for it is only by 
studying the records of the past that we may acquire 
a true idea of what we may face in the future . How, 
where death reigns supreme, human nature is affected; 
to what extent training, discipline and habit may be 
relied upon to counteract the instincts of self-
preservation; how leading is to be carried on amid 
the excitement, the losses and the din of battle, 
are questions of paramount importance, and no mere 
effort of imagination will help to solve them . If 
we would learn what men can do, and what they can-
not do, under the stress of fire, we must turn to 
history. 1 
The opponents of the arme blanche turned instead to science . 
They appl~ed the results of the Musketry School at Hythe, 
or of Woolwich Arsenal, directly to the field of battle ~ 
A Hythe experiment was cited to Federal troops in the 
American Civil War in which an Enfield - 577 muzzle - loading 
rifle scored 58 per cent hits between 820 and 550 yards on 
a target representing 700 men in column . 2 Henry Bracken-
bury (a member of the 'Wolseley Ring') told the RUSI that 
'at J,OOO yards range seven artillery [nine- pound rifled 
cannonJshots out of ten would hit a battalion column, at 
1,000 yards ten out of ten in a quarter of the space . ' 
1 . Henderson, The Battle of Woerth, introduction (no pagi-
nation) 
2 . Roemer, Cavalry, Its History, Management and Uses in 
War, p 110 
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He produced a Hythe table showing the Snider rifle scoring 
59 per cent hits on a battalion in line at 800 yards and 
96 per cent at 200 yards . (He was, however, aware that 
this did not represent the reality of battle . )1 Another 
officer flatly declared that no troops in battle would be 
safe from the Enfield rifle up to half a mile. 2 Over two 
decades, the Enfield was replaced by the Snider, then the 
Martini- Henry · 45 breechloader, with (according to tests) 
a mean deviation of just 21 inches at 1,000 yards, which 
could fire twenty-five rounds a minute . One enthusiast 
wrote that 'If an infantry regiment reserve their fire 
till advancing cavalry are within 500 yards and aim always 
low, they may pour in a storm of bullets numbering at 
least thirty per man',3 a rate of fire not achieved even 
on ranges o But even this rate was to be exceeded by 
machine- guns, about which there was much speculation ~ A 
Gatling gun" under test in 1872 managed 400 rounds in 54 
seconds at a target 12 by 24 feet at 1,300 yards, of which 
200 were hits . 4 The new rifles were also thought of as 
'effective at 1,000 yards, . 5 
Defenders of the arme blanche retorted that 
1 . Brackenbury, 'The Tactics of the Three Arms as Modified 
to Meet the Requirements of the Present Day', JRUSI, 
vol 17, P 620 
2 . Tyler, 'The Rifle and the Spade, or the Future of Field 
Operations', JRUSI, vol 3, pp 170- 94, especially p 175 
3 . 'The Newly Proposed Service Arm, or , the Martini- Henry 
Rifle', USM 1869, Pt II, p 106 
4 . Rogers, 'The Gatling Gun', USM 1872, Pt I, P 248 
5 . 'The Dragoon, his Horse and their Training' . USM 1864 , 
Pt III, pp 329- 42, especially p 330 
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in practice such results had no meaning. One Cavalryman 
1 
remembered the Snider as inaccurate above 400 yards. 
Another thought Martini-Henry fire above 6-700 yards un-
. 2 
aimed. This had little to do with the weapon - it is 
simply the maximum range at which the unaided human eye 
can see to shoot. Hythe itself in 1904 gave the upper 
limit of aimed fire with the S.MoL.E. Mark II rifle as 600 
yards, despite its maximum range of 2,400 yardsa J Equally, 
in battle conditions, maximum rate of fire was neither 
achievable nor even desirable. Some American Civil War 
commanders even preferred the muzzle-loading rifle to the 
breechloader, since by forcing the man to pause between 
shots it encouraged steady firinga 4 A British observer of 
the Austro-Prussian war thought that, in practice, the 
breechloader fired only three shots to themuzzle-Ioader's 
two,5 and ~n anonymous 'Cavalry Officer', writing in 1878, 
that Infantry lying down with breechloaders fired at the 
same rate, three rounds a minute, as when standing with 
muzzle-Ioaders~ Wolseley's dictum, 'fire low, fire slow,7 
1. Younghusband, A Soldier's Memories in Peace and War, p 50 
2. Notes ••• by a Cavalry Officer, p 9 
J. WO/16J/9 No 1JJ Army Council Decisions, pp 281-J for 
18.10.1904 
4. Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p 177; Denison, 
Modern Cavalry, p 54; for other opinions on the breech-
loading carbine see Starr, The Union Cavalry in the 
Civil War, p 25 
5. Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, vol I, p 221 
6. Notes ••• by a Cavalry Officer, p J7 
7. Quoted in Lehman, All Sir Garnet, p 185 
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has stood the test of time. Five aimed rounds a minute is 
the normal rate of fire in battle with modern semi-automa-
tic rifles, and since 1939 an estimated 96 per cent of 
Infantry engagements have been fought between men at less 
1 than 400 yards. 
All rifle bullets rise slightly on leaving 
the barrel until gravity pulls them down in a curve. For 
the Martini-Henry this rise was eight feet at five hundred 
yards: to hit a Cavalryman's head at this range, aim had to 
2 be taken at his horse's feet. Any error in estimating the 
constantly changing range and speed of charging Cavalry 
would send the bullet too high, or into the ground in front 
of the horse. This range-judging ~ould be affected by wind 
resistance, optical illusion, any slight flaw in gun or 
ammunitio~, and, finally, the excitement or fear of battle. 3 
It was common in war for inexperienced or shaken troops to 
fire into the Major-General Michael Smith, a Cavalry 
officer, wrote in 1865 that 'in practice, the result of 
improvements like the present is often found to fall far 
short of the anticipations founded on theoretical reasoning'~ 
Three years later, the Assistant Superintendent at Woolwich 
agreed that such 'scientific' arguments failed to allow for 
1. Hobart, Jane's Infantry Weapons - 1975, pp 19-20 
2. 'The Newly Proposed Service Arm, or, the Martini-Henry 
Rifle', USM 1869, pt II, p 106 
3. Roemer, Cavalry, its History. Management and Uses in War, 
pp 120-9 
4. Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, vol 1, p 226; Holmes, 'The 
Road to Sedan', p 378 
5. Smith, Drill and Manoeuvres of Cavalry, p xviii 
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1 psychology, battlefield conditions or the friction of war. 
In fact, -they were hopelessly crude. Had they wished to, 
defenders of the ~ blanche might have reconstructed 
'models' of historical charges showing that, in practice, 
Infantry might score less than 10 per cent hits on Cavalry 
at eighty paces. 2 But they preferred history: nearly every 
book and lecture on the controversy of the time began with 
a detailed account of Cavalry from the earliest days. 
Major- General Smith saw nothing odd in opening a chapter on 
'Modern Tactics' with Xenophon and Alexander the Great. J 
Neither statistical methods of predicting the li~ely effect 
of firepower, nor detailed records of minor tactical en-
gagements, the standard tools of modern military analysis, 
4 
were available to these men. They divided into 'scien-
tists' who argued what must happen, and 'historians' con-
~ 
cerned only with what had happened. Before the American 
Civil War provided fresh historical data, the 'scientists' 
had it all their own way. British theorists believed that 
'for the future battles will be chiefly decided by artil-
lerY',5 and that Cavalry would be Tendered utterly useless 
1 . Maj.endie, 'Military Breechloading Small- Arms', JRUSI, 
vol 11, p 205 
2. See Appendix One 
J. Smith, Modern Tactics of the Three Arms, p 1 
4 . For examples of these techniques see: Bidwell, Modern 
Warfare, pp 67- 9; Moran, The Anatomy of Courage; 
Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914- 1918: the Live and Let 
Live System; Dixon, On the Psychology of Military 
Incompetence; Richardson, Fighting Spirit; Marshall, 
Men Against Fire; Keegan, The Face of Battle 
5 . 'Cavalry Tactics and the New Armament', USM 1860, 
pt III, p 192 
$ 
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by the all - devouring rifle'. 1 Indeed, it was thought 
'very little mort of high treason,2 to hold other views. 
In all three major wars of the decade from 
1861 onwards, on which subsequent theories of the ~ 
blanche were based, this belief among senior officers 
handicapped the Cavalry. According to Philip Sheridan 
(later commander of the Federal Cavalry Corps) the Federal 
Commander- in- Chief, Winfield Scott, predicted 'that the 
contest would be settled by artillery and thereafter 
refUs[ed] the services of regiment after regiment of 
mounted men,.J The 40,000 Federals who lost First Bull 
Run had only seven companies of Cavalry with them when the 
American Civil War's first battle was fought. 4 In the 
Austro- Prussian war of 1866, until the crucial battle of 
Koniggra t z, both First and Second Prussian Armies marched 
their Cavalry behind their Infantry divisions, and on the 
evening before the battle had identified only four of the 
eight Austrian Corps opposing them . The Austrians also 
held three of their five Cavalry divisions in reserve, for 
use in the charge rather than patroTIing, and the attack 
1. Steinmetz, iMusketry Instruction for the Cavalry Carbine 
and Pistol', JRUSI, vol 5, p 466 
2 . Editorial, USM 1860, pt I, p 18 
J . Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, vol I, p J55 . Strictly and 
constitutionally speaking, President Lincoln, and not 
Scott, held the post of Commander- in- Chief, but Scott 
exercised its function in war . 
4 . Denison, Modern Cavalry, p 19; Chesney, A Military View 
of the Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, here-
after, A Military View ••• , vol I, p 17 
p 
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against their right flank which decided the battle took 
them by complete surprise. 1 At the start of the Franco-
Prussian war of 1870-1 the French Cavalry also marched be-
hind their Infantry and did little scouting. 2 All three 
wars proved the need for mounted troops with the new mass 
Armies. With such great forces, to obtain information on 
the enemy's position, to deny him the same information, and 
to manoeuvre in any way became major skills of warfare. 
Intelligence and mobility were badly needed to use the mass 
to the greatest effect. Reconnaissance, strategic pene-
tration and therefore the ability to fight unsupported by 
other arms became essential duties for horsemen. The 
tactics these men would need, in advance of or on the 
flanks of their own Army, encountering hostile Cavalry, or 
even Infantry and Artillery, brought the ~ blanche 
debate to prominence. 3 
European Cavalry who charged with the arme 
blanche were the product of a distinct cultural and geo-
graphical area. The sword had been the weapon of the 
social elite for centuries, and the comparatively undu-
lating, open lands of Western Europe gave space for the 
massed charge while providing enough cover to shield 
1. Von Wright and Hozier, The Campaigns of 1866 in Germany, 
pp 163, 216; Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, 
p 54 
2. Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 70 
3. Rawley, The American Civil War: An English View, pp 44, 
80, 97; Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p 182; 
see also Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War 
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Cavalry from hostile Artillery. Neither of these con-
ditions existed in America. The Cavalry of the United 
states (two 'Dragoon' regiments, one of 'Mounted Rifles', 
and three of Cavalry, all with the same tactics) had 
evolved in fighting a guerrilla war with Indian tribes. 
Like the Indians, they fought on foot or charged mounted 
as required, preferring pistols and carbines to the sabre. 
Their mounted drill was, compared with European Cavalry, 
1 poor, and British officers in 1862 and 186J found the 
riding standards of Federal troopers comical. 2 The main 
theatre of war, in Virginia, was by European standards 
heavy ground, hilly, sparsely populated, with large virgin 
forests. J This was scarcely ideal for the charge. The 
Western Theatre, far larger, saw considerable variation in 
terrain, b~t even there, so Colonel Duke of the Confederate 
Cavalry wrote: 
The nature of the ground on which we generally 
fought, covered with dense woods or crossed with 
high fences, and the impossibility of devoting 
sufficient time to the training of the horses, 
rendered the employment of large bodies of 
mounted men to any good purpose very difficult. 4 
British observers attributed the small use made of the 
arme blanche in the war to the closed cOlliLtry, the in-
creased fire power of rifles and cannon, and the horsemen's 
1. Brackett, History of the United States Cavalry, pp 160-1 
2. Rawley, The American Civil War: an English View, p 44; 
Freemantle, Three Months in the Southern States, p J08 
J. Chesney, A Military View ••• , vol I, p 8 
4. Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p 175 
1 k f t .. 1 ac 0 raJ.nJ.ng. 
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But commanders on both sides insisted 
tpat the terrain, rather than fire power or inefficiency, 
was chiefly to blame for their failure to charge, and 
pointed to the many occasions on which successful charges 
had been made. At Shiloh in April 1862 the Confederate 
J.H. Morgan, who later pioneered new dismounted tactics 
for his horsemen, routed some of Sherman's Infantry by a 
mounted charge with fire support, despite the ground being 
'miry and covered with fallen timber,.2 Morgan's men were 
part of Bragg's Army, whose Inspector-General of Cavalry, 
an English soldier-of-fortune, encouraged orthodox European 
tactics. According to Duke, 'If permitted to form, dis-
cipline and drill such a brigade of regular cavalry after 
his own fashion, he would have made gaps in many lines of 
battle, or. have got his "blackguards well peppered" in 
trYing~3 The existing traditions of the American Army, 
the familiarity of most westerners with firearms, and the 
lack of training meant, however, that the pistol, shotgun, 
carbine and even rifle were preferred to the sword. 
But this did not mean abandoning the charge. 
The Confederate guerrillas of Colonels Mosby and Gilmor, in 
the Shenandoah valley in 1863 and 1864, carried only pistols 
(and the occasional sabre) rather than carbines, charging 
1. Fletcher, History of the American War, vol II, p 439 
2. Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, pp 148-50; Fletcher, 
History of the American War, vol I, p 387 
3. Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p 181; Freemantle, 
Three Months in the Southern States, pp 149- 59. 
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mounted from ambush. 1 On a larger scale, the two leading 
C~valrymen of the war, JeE.B. Stuart and Philip Sheridan, 
both favoured the mounted charge. One of Stuart's staff 
remembered: 
Stuart was forced, by the necessities of the 
struggle, the nature of the country, and the 
all-work he had to perform, to depend upon 
sharp-shooting. But he preferred pure cavalry 
fighting. He fought [i.e. employed] his dis-
mounted skirmishers with skill and obstinacy ••• 
But it was in the legitimate sphere of cavalry 
work that he was greatest o 2 
Another, the German mercenary Heros von Borcke, described 
Brandy Station, where in August 186J Federal Cavalry held 
their own for the first time against Confederates, as 'a 
genuine Cavalry fight, with sabres crossing and single com-
bats - incidents that very rarely occur in modern warfare.,J 
Sheridan claimed that prior to his taking command of the 
---Cavalry Corps in April 1864: 
From the beginning of the war the enemy had 
shown more wisdom respecting his cavalry than 
we. Instead of wasting its strength by a 
policy of disintegration he, at an early day, 
had organised his mounted force into compact 
masses ••• I also gave [his commander] my main 
idea as to what the cavalry ought to do, the 
main purport of which was that it ought to be 
kept concentrated to fight the enemy's 
cavalry. 4 
To this end he deliberately fought the battle of Yellow 
1. Gilmor, Four Years in the Saddle, p 14.5; Mosby, The 
Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby, p 1.52 
2. Cooke, Wearing of the Gray, p JJ 
J. Von Borcke, 'Memoirs of the Confederate War for Inde-
pendence', Blackwoods, vol 98, pp 281, 421 
4. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, vol I, p J.54 
- 23-
Tavern in the following month as a mounted action, with 
complete success . When in August 1864 his force was moved 
to the Shenendoah valley he fought, again deliberately, 
mounted in open country to dominate the Confederates . The 
victory was so complete that Sheridan's pessimist i c 
opponent, Jubal Early, advised that his Cavalry was so 
badly demoralised that it should be disbanded. 1 Sheridan's 
use of dismounted Cavalry in a blocking position at Five 
Forks to trap Lee's Army in the last days of the war became 
a classic of such tactic~ and he was certainly not a blind 
arme blanche enthusiast; but he believed the fastest way to 
achieve Cavalry superiority, with all the advantages it 
implied in reconnaissance, protection and manoeuvre, was 
2 the arme blanche charge. 
Sheridan began the war as an Infantry Lieu-
tenant, spent six months in the commissariat of an Army 
Department, and went on to command a regiment, then a 
brigade, of volunteer Cavalry; in September 1862 he was 
transferred to first a brigade, then a division of Infantry; 
when he took command of the Cavalry Corps only one of his 
three divisional commanders had spen~ most of his career in 
the Cavalry . 3 The American Army, with its flexibility and 
guerrilla traditions, absorbed a hybrid between Infantry 
and Cavalry, troops who fought readily mounted and dis-
1 . Sherida~ , Personal Memoirs, vol I , pp 377- 8; vol II, 
pp 57-9 
2 . ibid, vol I, p 453 
3 . ibid, vol I, pp 121, 124, 126, 144, 153, 183, 189, 352 
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mounted, without much difficulty. But British observers 
had no word to describe such troops. The term 'dragoon' 
(referring to seventeenth century mounted infantrymen) 
enjoyed a brief vogue, but clashed in meaning with the 
existing Dragoon regiments of Cavalry, and the common use 
of the word as a synonym for Cavalryman. Most commenta-
tors called the Americans 'light horse' (which was closest 
to the truth), 'mounted riflemen' or 'mounted infantrymen'. 
This led to endless confusion. Both sides in the war 
occasionally mounted rifle-carrying Infantry for transport 
purposes, in addition to their carbine-armed Cavalry. 
Further, the Federals had a few regiments with the title 
'Mounted Infantry' or 'Mounted Rifles', who spurned both 
the description and uniform of the Cavalry, but nonethe-
less carried, and used, 1 the sabre. The British Army's 
reaction to this was an attempt to rigidly define as 
Infantry o~' Cavalry horsemen who were neither o In 1874 a 
British Artilleryman summarised the problem: 
I venture to suggest that there is too general 
a tendency to regard the subject from one of 
two opposite points of view ••• those of the 
cavalry and infantry officer; the first is prone 
to look too exclusively at the mounted portion 
of a solder's duty; to suggest, in fact, that 
the cavalry soldier if somewhat more carefully 
instructed in dismounted skirmishing, will, 
without any important alterations to arms or 
equipment, fulfill all the requirements of the 
case; the last is apt to fall into the even more 
fatal error of assuming that, so long as the 
horse is to be regarded as a roadster, not a 
1. Chesney, A Military View ••• , vol I, p 52; starr, The 
Union Cavalry in the Civil War, p 59 
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charger, but little skill in horsemanship 
need be expected from a mounted rifleman ••• 
The first or Cavalry system must infallibly 
fall to the ground from the same causes 
which have converted the dragoon of former 
days into the horseman pure and simple of to-
day. The second, or Infantry system would, 
I believe, equally fail, but from far different 
causes, which may be summed up in those two 
pregnant syllables, 'sore backs,.1 
The whole question of sore backs for horses, horse care and 
supply in the war, received far less attention than the 
arme blanche. Yet even in 'horse country' poor feeding and 
horsemastership radically affected the war's outcome. When 
Major-General Pope took command of the Federal Army of 
Virginia in June 1862 he found his five thousand Cavalry 
'badly mounted and armed, and in a poor condition for 
service'9 2 At the battle of Chantilly in September there 
were not five horses in a company fit to trot . Between 
May and October 1863 the 12,000 Cavalry of the Army of the 
Potomac required over 35,000 horses o3 Not until the middle 
of the war did Federal horsemen begin to practis e the 
elementary horsemastership the Confederates took for 
4 granted . Duke believed that while the Federals improved 
over three years, the chief reason for their success after 
1863 in the Western Theatre was that Confederate Cavalry 
were expected to find their own equipment and forage, and 
1 . 'Mounted Riflemen', USM 1874, pt I, p 331 
2 . Brackett, History of the United States Cavalry, pp 2 47-8 
3 . Chesney, A Military View ••• , vol II, p 108 
4 . Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p 232 
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1 
could not keep their horses in good condition as a result. 
In Virginia, Confederates at first brought their own 
horses, trained to jump fences and obstacles of the battle-
fields; but these were irreplaceable. On the ride to 
Gettysburg, one of Stuart's staff remembered gathering 
fresh horses: 
These,as I saw them pass in great numbers were 
large, sleek and apparently excellent . I was 
not long, however, in discovering that they 
were worthless as riding- horses, one of the thin, 
wiry, rawboned Virginia horses, half the weight 
of one of these Conestogas, would wear out a 
dozen . 2 
By mid- 186J even some of Stuart's staff were without 
horses due to death and 'exhaustion', often a euphemism for 
starvation. J 
Such was the evidence available to British 
military t heorists by 1870 (with the exception of 
Sheridan's memoirs, published 1888) . Allowing for the 
shortcomings of American repor ting, and the prejudice of 
British observers, it was clear that, even in close 
country, large numbers of horsemen, of some kind, were 
needed . The Army of the Potomac was more than 10 per 
cent Cavalry by the war's end ~ while in the Western Theatre 
in 186J Bragg had 24,000 cavalry to 45,000 Infantry . 
Theorists pointed out that the most telling defeats of the 
war, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, fell on Armies 
1 . Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p 396 
2. Rawley, The American Civil War: an English View, p 44; 
Cooke, Wearing of the Gray, p 250 
J. Freemantle, Three Months in the Southern States, p 278 
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1 
without horsemen to scout for them. Captain Chesney at 
tpe Staff College felt too much reliance on firearms pro-
duced timidity in Cavalry. He described Brandy Station as 
a series of skirmishes 'of the undecided character pre-
valent wherever cavalry take to using their firearms', and 
attributed the lack of a clear victory to 'the practice of 
cavalry on either side, in avoiding any attempt to take 
their place in the line of battle, or even to keep near 
enough to influence its results'. Proof seemed to come 
from Gettysburg, where one Army was ready to fight with no 
Cavalry at all, and the other made no effective use of a 
o C lOO t 2 massJ..ve ava ry superJ..orJ.. y. In the Western Theatre 
Confederates told British observers the same story. They 
did not form square since 'the country did not admit of 
cavalry cDarges, even if the Yankee cavalry had stomach to 
attempt it,.3 Other British observers criticised the lack 
of aggression shown by Cavalry on both Od 4 SJ.. es. This was 
often due to inexperience. On the Federal side alone 227 
new mounted regiments were created during the war.5 The 
1. Rawley, The American Civil War: an English View, p 165; 
Chesney, A Military View ••• , vol I, p 220; vol II, p 104 
This is fervently disputed by Mosby, The Memoirs of 
Colonel John S. Mosby, p 246 
2. Chesney, A Mili tary View ••• , vol II, pp 17, 1 Ol~ 
3. Freemantle, Three Months in the Southern States, p '157 
4. ibid, P 291; 'The Battle of Gettysburg and the Campaign 
in Pennsylvania', Blackwoods, vol 94, p 367; 'A Visit 
to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, 
1863-4', Blackwoods, vol 97, p 28 
5. Brackett, History of the United States Cavalry, pp 327-
337 
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mounted rifleman did not need the long and difficult 
training for an ~ blanche charge, and there was a strong 
temptation for commanders (always short of troops) to 
employ badly trained Cavalry as mounted riflemen. Such 
partially-trained troops were in practice only a liability 
until they gained battlefield experience. At this date, 
no-one thought ofiUlly trained Mounted Rifles: firearm 
tactics and poor training went together. 
The Austro-Prussian war, fought with Cavalry 
more familiar to the British, promised more lessons. The 
Prussian Armies in the main theatre of war had both more 
Cavalry than their Austrian opponents and a higher pro-
portion of Cavalry to Infantry (11.8 per cent compared with 
8 per cent)1 but on neither side was it fully employed. 
The Cavalry Corps with the Prussian First Army was kept 
concentrated, and unused, until the day of K~niggratz, 
when it was, virtually by accident, 2 split in two. Little 
use was found for Cavalry in the heavily wooded Elbe basin; 
while after K~niggratz, when the Prussian Cavalry led the 
march into Austria, the Austrian commander sent his Cavalry 
by rail to cover Vienna, leaving the rest of his Army to 
follow on foot. As a result, to the Prussians
' 
surprise, 
their supply trains, railways and telegraphs went un-
molested . J Despite their breechloading Dreyse rifles (the 
1. Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, Vol I, pp 122, 1JJ 
2. Von Wright and Hozier, The Campaigns of 1866 in Germany, 
p 205 
J . ibid, P J01; Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, vol I, p 207 
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other combatants carried muzzle-loaders) the Prussians 
still formed square to receive Cavalry, and at the war's 
opening there were a number of occasions on which the 
1 Cavalry of both sides broke squares. At the battle of 
Gitschin in July, however, the Prussian 2/2nd Infantry 
Regiment improvised a new tactic: 
As the ground offered no shelter whatsoever 
the battalion lay down, and ~ts leading ranks, 
and skirmishers that were throvm out on both 
flanks, returned the enemy's fire with great 
coolness. A charge of cavalry, coming from 
Ober-Lochow, was repulsed at a distance of 
200 paces. 2 
The practice of receiving Cavalry by a firing line, based 
on confidence in the Dreyse rifle, spread rapidly. But its 
success depended also on the reputation of the Dreyse, which 
caused the Austrians to avoid charges which would otherwise 
have succe~ded. At Koniggratz a charge, in regimental 
column, by an entire Cavalry Division against a mixed 
force of four Prussian companies sheered off after taking 
fewer than two hundred casualties. The Prussians fired at 
200 yards, scoring about one hit for every six rounds fired, 
instead of their theoretical range of 600 yards. J The 
badly- fitting gas seal on the Dreys~s breech led to 
soldiers firing from the hip for safety, and made it 
1. Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, pp 14J- 91; Von Wright and 
Hozier, The Campaigns of 1866 in Germany, pp 54, 89; 
Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, vol II, p 16 
2. Von Wright and Hozier, The Campaigns of 1866 in Germany, 
p 140 
J. ibid, p 225 
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1 inaccurate at long ranges. Far from producing a hail of 
fire, the Prussian Infantry averaged just one shot per man 
for the campaign, few firing more than sixty, almost none 
more than ninety rounds. 2 British commentators concluded 
that if Cavalry were told they could never charge breech-
loaders, they would never try, even on occasions when it 
was possible. The reluctance to attack Infantry contrasted 
oddly with the successful Cavalry charges made against 
guns in the campaign.] 
In Cavalry against Cavalry actions, the 
Austrian tactic of shooting down a charge with mounted 
carbine or pistol fire failed completely.4 In contrast, 
at Koniggratz the value of the arme blanche charge was 
clearly shown. The Austrian commander, having held his 
Cavalry inactive most of the day, sacrificed it to cover 
his Army's retreat when the battle was lost, ordering it 
to charge the Prussian centre. The advancing Prussian 
Infantry, who had lost formation as they pursued, were 
thrown back, and the Prussian Cavalry joined in a complex 
series of melees of which the Prussian General Staff com-
mented: 
The resolution of [the Austrian Cavalry com-
manders] and the meritorious bravery of their 
1. Majendie, 'Military Breechloading Small Arms', JRUSI, 
vol 12, p 196 
2. Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, Vol I, p J4J 
J. Von Wright and Hozier, The CampaignS of 1866 in Germany, 
p JJ9 
4. ibid, pp 77, 95. This tactic was tried at Trautenau 
and Czerwenahaora. 
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troops, very materially assisted the retreat 
of the Infantry and Artillery of the Austrian 
centre. 
On the other hand, the want of Cavalry 
was principally felt on the right flank of the 
Austrian Army, which was so immediately menaced 
by the advance of the Prussian VI Corps, and 
where the nature of the ground was particularly 
favourable for the action of large bodies of 
this arm. 1 
At the 'end of the battle: 
The Cavalry combat ••• had only delayed the 
general advance for a short time. The course 
of this action, however, and the obstinate 
melees, in which the regiments had been in-
volved and mingled together, precluded all 
possibility of General Haun's Division 
following immediately in pursuit of the 
enemy as one compact body of Cavalry, and to 
have advanced otherwise than in perfect order 
would have been to no avail. 2 
Chesney complained that the Prussians did not give the 
Austrian Cavalry sufficient credit. They had disrupted 
the advance in a way that dismounted fire could never have 
achieved. J 
There was virtually no dismounted fighting 
by Cavalry in the war. But the need for reconnaissance, 
and the speed of the Prussian advance, meant that their 
Heavy Cavalry, Cuirassiers and Uhlans, formed advance 
guards and scouted like the Light Cavalry, despite having 
no carbine. A British officer with the Prussians saw that 
in minor actions success in the charge usually went to the 
1. Von Wright and Hozier, The Campaigns of 1866 in Germany, 
p 284 
2. ibid, p 288 
J. Chesney and Reeve, The Military Resources of France and 
Prussia, p 122 
I 
I 
d 
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heavier Cavalry, regardless of their weapon. 1 This was a 
major paradox. The charge needed big men on big horses; 
reconnaissance needed light men on small, hardy horses. 
Yet if Cavalry were to play its new independent role, it 
must be equally proficient in both. Only if there were a 
tactic to overcome the charge would the problem disappear; 
the needs of the charge, fit strong horses, and the need to 
use those horses in scouting, pulled in opposite directions. 
In the first week of war a Prussian Hussar regiment aver-
aged nearly fifty miles a day for three days without ill-
effects. On the fifth day of the campaign a Cavalry 
brigade trotted 7,000 paces over stony and hilly ground 
without difficulty to come into action. Eight campaigning 
days later, the strain on horses produced by such efforts 
was so se~ere that to provide 700 horses for a pursuit, the 
best from four regiments had to be taken. By the Armistice, 
two weeks later, the Prusffian advance had been noticeably 
slowed by horse exhaustion, lack of forage, and sore backs~ 
In the Franco-Prussian War, for the first 
time, the Prussians used independent Cavalry Divisions 
(although their Heavy Cavalry still had no carbine). The 
French Cavalry, all but the Cuirassiers, carried the 
Chassepot carbine, which far outranged its Prussian equi-
valent, but they held only a limited doctrine of dismounted 
1. Hozier, The Seven Weeks War, Vol I, p 241 
2. ibid, Vol I, p 205; Vol II, pp 86, )10 
~~------------------------..... f 
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fighting. 1 The French also neglected scouting. The 
Prussian Prince Kraft zu Hohnelohe-Ingelfingen (who 
commanded an Infantry Division in the war, and whose 
writings had considerable circulation in Britain) wrote 
that 'it never happened that a French Cavalry Division was 
sent far in frort of the Army for the purpose of recon-
"t" , 2 noJ.. rJ..ng • A French veteran agreed that on one occasion 
'we never sent out a single scout or vedette, but were 
content to follow the main roads and simply accomplish the 
march,.3 The Prussian Cavalry was for all practical 
purposes unopposed when scouting: their 4th Cavalry 
Division lost only six killed and four wounded up to Sedan. 
Of 65, t 60 German casualties in the war, only 6 were killed 
and 218 wounded with swords, lances and clubbed rifles. 4 
In retrospect, the severest French critics 
condemned 'the folly of our old notions that the sole 
use of Cavalry is to charge,.5 French charges were made 
without orders, without clear objectives, without re-
connoitring the ground, over impossible ground, in column 
rather than line, and sometimes as a form of deliberate 
1. Bonie, The French 
Results, pp 37, 5 , 
actions. 
1870 With its Tactical 
few dismounted 
2. Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 95 
3. Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870, With its Tactical 
Results, p 33 
4. Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 70; 
Childers, German Influence on BrttEh Cavalry, p 6 
5. Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870, With its Tactical 
Results, p 80 
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o Od 1 su~c~ e. At W3rth two Cuirassier brigades charged over 
2 ground covered with hop poles. At Beaumont another 
Cuirassier regiment charged over boggy ground broken by a 
deep ditch} At Sedan the dying General Margueritte 
launched his brigade against Prussian batteriE on high 
ground in little more than defiance. 4 In contrast, when 
the Prussian General von Steinmetz ordered a Cavalry 
charge at Gravelotte against French Infantry behind a high 
stone wall, he was (according to Philip Sheridan, an eye-
witness) severely reprimanded . 5 Several Prussian charges 
of regimental strength, with definite objectives, over re-
connoitred ground, in line, aiming for a flank, were suc-
6 
cessful . A charge of two Prussian regiments produced the 
most dramatic incident of the war. Seven hundred and fifty 
Cuirassier~ and Lancers of von Bredow's 12th Brigade 
charged against the centre batteries of Bazaine's Army at 
Mars - la-Tour in a desperate attempt to gain time for the 
Prussian III Corps while the rest of the Army arrived . 
1 . Howard, The Franco- Prussian War, pp 112- 5 , 176, 202, 
215; Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870, With its 
Tactical Results, pp 22, 80- 6; Hozier, 'The Employment 
of Cavalry in War', JRUSI vol 16, pp 172- 7; Lehautcourt, 
'Studies in Applied Cavalry Tactics', JRUSI vol 52, 
pp 236 ..... 135"9 (se t'\.. CLU.sed) 
2 . Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870, With its Tactical 
Results, p 23 
3 0 ibid, p 79 
4. Howard, The Franco- Prussian War, p 215 
5 . Sheridan, .Personal Memoirs, vol II, p 373 
6. Lehautcourt, 'Studies in Applied Cavalry Tactics', 
JRUSI vol 52, pp 236 - 13 5 9 (ser-La.L i. sed) 
- 35-
Under flanking fire for most of the way, they galloped 
1,800 yards into massed guns with Infantry and Cavalry 
support. There was much argument over how much fire they 
received; six German batteries drew some of the French 
Artillery, while four French batteries were changing over 
and appear not to have fired at all. Regardless, the 
impact of the charge, on Bazaineor his men, was such that 
the French did not advance for two hours. The rest of the 
Prussians arrived to cut them off from Paris, which led 
directly to the surrender at Metz; all this from a charge 
1 
of less than six squadrons. Even at the time, opinion 
differed widely on the 'deafuride' at Mars-la-Tour: some 
2 theorists called it 'useless, objectless and resultless'; 
others ~he boldest charge of the war,.3 At the end of the 
century Ev~lyn Wood of the IWolseley Ring' summed up: 
Contradictory deductiomhave been made from von 
Bredow's charge by partisan writers, one side 
claiming that the two cavalry divisions, if 
properly handled, might have' wrecked all Canrobert's 
Corps, while others urge that the heavy loss of 
the 12th Brigade [about 54 per cent] proves the 
folly of thus employing horsemen. 4 
1. There are numerous accounm of this charge in the 
literature of the arme blanche controversy. Almost 
every writer on Cavalry after 1870 had something to 
say about it, and many contradictory assertions were 
made about exactly what happened, especially the range 
at which the Prussian Cavalry came under fire from the 
French batter~ and the amount of fire they received. 
For the clearest a~d most balanced view in English, see 
Wood, Achievements of' Cavalry, pp 205- 38. 
2. Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 25; Bonie, The French 
Cavalry in 1870, With its Tactical Results, p 47 
3. Denison, A History of Cavalry, p 408 
4. Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, p 238 
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In the British Army the charge was cited repeatedly not as 
the 'norm' but as the exception: a proof of what Cavalry 
might achieve if prepared to risk the casualties. 1 
Interest in the ~ blanche, rather than 
wider considerations of the organisation or strategic em-
ployment of Cavalry, dominated debate on the arm's future 
after the war . Cuirassiers, heavily laden and with no 
carbine, were generally thought obsolete, although there 
was some evidence that their cuirasses were bullet-res is-
taht. 2 Prussian Cavalry fighting Franc-Tireurs late in the 
war were themselves seriously handicapped by the lack of a 
good firearm. Some carried captured Chassepot rifles, 
others had to be escorted by Infantry, at walking pace. 3 
'It shows an entire misapprehension of the nature of 
Cavalry' , ~concluded Prince Kraft, 'to require that they 
shall be self- sufficient and entirely independent. To 
think so is a mere Utopian fantasy. ,4 The Germans felt 
their conscript system allowed insufficient time for com-
plete training of Cavalry to fight on foot as well as on 
horseback in three years' service . Cavalry Divisions were 
1. Howard, The Franco- Prussian War, p 157 suggests that 
this was perhaps the last successful Cavalry charge in 
western Europe, and that it was to be cited by 
historians for the -nex t forty years as the norm . 
2 . Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870, Wit,h its Tactical 
Results, p 26; Hozier, 'The Employment of Cavalry in 
War', JRUSI vol 16, pp 173-4 
3 . Chenevix- Trench, 'Progress in Developing the Capabi-
lities of Cavalry', JRUSI vol 21, p 998 
4 . Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 244 
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instead reorganised to include one Jager Infantry battalion 
1 for fire support. This belief led, in 1870, to Sheridan's 
annoyance, to the Cavalry Divisions screening the Army, 
rather than raiding deep into France. 2 But in so small a 
theatre of war, the information from patrols twenty-five 
miles ahead of the Infantry was of greater value than a 
distant raid. Moreover the rapid collapffi of the French 
forces meant that, although the Prussian Armies used up a 
million horses in eight months? the inevitable deterioration 
in horse fitness did not affect the campaign, despite a 
4 large number of sore-backed horses in the Cavalry. 
From the evidence of these three wars, and 
such as they judged significant from earlier conflicts, 
British theorists tried to build a doctrine of the relation 
between firearms and the ~ blanche. The evidence, 
although massive, was often vague in precise detail. Before 
the end of the next decade improvements in firearms would 
cast doubts on the value of many conclusions. But it was 
a vast improvement on theory without data. 'It might be 
supposed,' wrote one Cavalryman, 'that a Cavalry attack' 
1. Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 242 
2. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, Vol II, p 449 
3. Tylden, Horses and Saddlery, p 26; Kraft, Letters on 
Cavalry, pp 108-20; Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870, 
With its Tactical Results, p 74 
4. "A"501 'Extracts from the Reports of Military Attaches 
who accompanied the French and Prussian Armies during 
the Campaign of 1870-71', Report of Captain Hozier 
(War Office) 
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such as at Mars-la-Tour, 'would be attended with fearful 
loss, but such in reality is not the case' • 1 'It is no 
longer necessary,' another asserted, 'to listen to vague 
theories as to the future of cavalry,' for 'the circum-
stances under which it can or cannot be used are now fully 
determined.,2 There was an understandable smugness from 
believers in the ~ blanche that, in the face of the 
'scientific' arguments, it had not proved obsolete at all . J 
Having been once bitten, Cavalrymen had in future a degree 
of immunity to such arguments. The more historically 
erudite pointed to similar declarations of the obsolescence 
of Cavalry in the eighteenth century, before its revival 
under Seydlitz. 4 Most became highly sceptical of 'scienti-
fic' ideas without historical examples to support them. 
The anon~ous 'Cavalry Officer' wrote in 1878: 
It has been frequently denied that cavalry can 
[exercise a decisive effect on the field of 
battle] and too often this dictum is acquiesced 
in by cavalry officers themselves, who accepting 
without examination what is termed 'the logic of 
facts', are content to see their arm relegated 
to what is, however we may seek to deny it, a 
position of inferiority.5 
Another officer, writing in 1882 of Mounted Infantry, 
sneered "that 'The idea is considered "advanced" and 
1. Spencer, 'The German Cavalry', USM 187J, pt I, p 220 
2. 'Our Cavalry System', USM 1871, pt III, p569 
J. For examples of this see 'The Cavalry of the Future', 
USM 1871, pt I, p 219, and 'The Future Tactics of 
Cavalry', USM 1872, pt III, P 70 
4. Russell, ~Cavalry', JRUSI vol 20, pp 180-1, 186- 7 
5 . Notes ••• by a Cavalry Officer, p 76 
d 
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"scientific", and these, to the wisdom which directs our 
m~litary affairs, are quite sufficient recommendations. ,1 
This attitude could be, and was, mistaken for thoughtless 
conservatism or stupidity. In fact, 'sentiment' played 
very little part in the controversy's beg innings . Few 
Cavalrymen were directly concerned with the threat to the 
~ blanche, and many of its defenders were not Cavalry 
officers. Unfortunately, early opponents of the arme 
blanche were openly hostile to the Cavalry, often confusing 
the deficiencies of the British Cavalry regiments with 
those of the arme blanche in order to condemn both . Major-
General Havelock, in particular, sought to pre- empt 
criticism of his theories by writing that he expected it 
'from all b~ the more enlightened, reflecting and observant 
of the ca~alry officers of the old school',2 while laughing 
at 'the British lancer with his flag and pole,.3 In 1875 
a writer on Cavalry manoeuvres took up the theme . 'Many 
cavalry officers are inclined to think that the sabreur 
must give way to the mounted rifleman', he wrote, 'and, if 
so, no sentiment arising from ancient services should 
prevent the changes it may be required to introduce . ,4 
1 . 'Notes of an Egyptian Campaigner', Blackwoods, vol 132, 
p 809 
2 . Havelock, Three Main Military Questions of the Day, 
p 38 
3 . ibid 
4. 'Lessons from the Recent Summer Manoeuvres', Blackwoods, 
vol 18, p 377 
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The Regiment was the ' primary focus of loyal~in the British 
Army, particularly so in the Cavalry; and as the RUSI was 
warned, 'No healthy reform can be introduced from without, 
before the necessity for it has been recognised from within. 1 
This treatment of the anti-~ blanche view as the 
Emperor's New Clothes, branding all who believed in the 
sword as fools, therefore produced only increased hostility 
from Cavalrymen proud of their regiments. 
Even before the American Civil War there was 
a school of thought, represented by a small minority in the 
British Cavalry, which argued that Light Cavalry for 
scouting should completely replace heavier riders. 2 After 
hearing of Sherman's campaign in Georgia the Duke of Cam-
bridge, Commander-in-Chief of the Arm~ observed: 
Wher~as it was considered in past years that 
cavalry should be of a very heavy calibre, they 
ought now to be made as light as possible. 
Probably the day of heavy cavalry has somewhat 
passed by ••• [but] heavy cavalry at a critical 
moment may be very useful and necessary.J 
This represented for the time a conservative view. In con-
trast, a visiting American General told the RUSI in 1867 
that 'it is scarcely conceivable that cavalry will ever 
again charge infantry in order,.4 With so much argument 
1. Stovell-Jones, 'The Present Condition of Our Cavalry', 
JRUSI vol 6, p 426 
2. Baker, The British Cavalry, p J1; see also Nolan, 
Cavalry. Its History and Tactics 
J. Quoted in the discussion after Chesney, 'Sherman's 
Campaign in Georgia', JRUSI vol 9, p 220 
4,. Morris, 'On the Best Method of Arming, Equipping and 
Manoeuvri~Infantry', JRUSI vol 10, pp 216-7 
d 
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about the charge, more than one writer felt compelled to 
stress that the charge of more than a regiment had. always 
been a rare event, and that no Cavalry charge against 
steady Infantry had, by definition, ever succeeded. 1 Some 
theorists argued that Cavalry must be held beyond Artillery 
range (about 3,500 yards) for safety. 'Cavalry can no 
longer manoeuvre on the field of battle,' wrote one, 'it 
must be there without allowing itself to be seen, and 
appear only when it is to act.,2 Prince Kraft pointed out 
that this restriction of Cavalry to the second line3 meant 
that it would take nearly twenty minutes to reach a point 
where immediate action was required. He and other writers 
argued that small bodies of Cavalry should be concealed by 
the ground, in depressions or behind obstacles, close to 
4 the enemy.~ Von Bredow had managed to conceal his brigade 
in this manner until within 1,500 yards of the French line? 
but; as had been predicted before 1870,6 his horses had 
been tired and blown before contact. One British theorist 
1. Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 89; Bonie, The French 
Cavalry in 1870, With its Tactical Results, p 59; 
Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 122. This 
became a standard point in the controversy. 
2. 'Tactics on the Battle-field', USM 1875, pt II, p 374 
3. Stovell-Jones, 'The Present Condition of our Cavalry', 
JRUSI vol 6, p 424 
4. Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, pp 71-6; Notes ••• by a 
Cavalry Officer, pp 27-41 
5. 'The Charge of Bredow's Brigade', CJ vol 5, no 20, 
p 462 
6. Steinmetz, 'The Pa:?t and Future of Cavalry', USM 1865, 
pt II, p 468. Lieutenant Steinmetz was British, an 
Infantry Officer. 
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complained: 
No cavalry officer who knows his business ••• 
will pretend that it requires 1,000 paces or a 
quarter of that distance to put horses to their 
speed, or that they can keep it up for anything 
like that, and therefore this doctrine of long 
charges is in this respect a mere fallacy. 1 
For others, history supplied the answer: both Frederick the 
Great and Marshal de Saxe had demanded charges of 2,000 
2 paces from their Cavalry. The German Cavalry regulations 
of 1875 called for a gallop of 2,000 metres at J75 metres 
a minute. J Such a charge would leave a mass of Cavalry 
exposed to fire for five minutes; British theorists 
doubted the feasibility of such 'chimerical action of 
4 great masses'. This left only the possibility of a 
squadron or regiment concealed close to the enemy line. 
Clery's Minor Tactics considered: 
-.. 
Modern warfare has reduced the role of cavalry 
on a battlefield to very insignificant proportions. 
It has ceased to be used in great masses, or rather 
the attempts to use it in this manner have as yet 
scarcely produced satisfactory results. Employed 
in small bodies it can seldom produce effects 
other than temporary and indecisive.5 
Added to this, the problem of how large the Cavalry force 
charging should be, was an even greater problem: the 
1. 'Military Studies, No J, Cavalry', USM 186J, pt III, 
p 17 
2. Frederick, quoted in Von Schmidt, Instructions for the 
Training, Employment and Leading of Cavalry, p 11; de 
Saxe, quoted in Notes ••• by a Cavalry Officer, p 94 
J. 'Tactics on the Battle-field', USM 1875, pt II, p J75 
4. ibid, p J71 . 
5. Clery, Minor Tactics, p 145 
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timing of the charge. As Prince Kraft wrote: 
The greater the range of firearms, the less 
chance have the cavalry in the pursuit of 
judging the condition of the enemy, since by 
reason of this the two combatants will remain 
very far apart, and thus it becomes most 
difficult to obtain any idea as to the 
situation of the enemy army . 1 
Another theorist, this time British, also observed: 'Con-
sidering the long range of rifles now in use, it is clear 
that if cavalry charges it must give up all idea of a re-
treat', and that 'victory or death must henceforth be the 
2 
motto of the cavalry'. 
Six hundred yards or so not only limited a 
rifleman's eyesight but also that of a (avalrym~ looking 
for something far less obvious than a simple target: 
symptoms that the enemy were unsteady . This was the 
greatest paradox of the arme blanche controversy . A 
Cavalry charge could only succeed under certain rare con-
ditions, notoriously difficult to judge . But the Cavalry 
must be committed to the charge, and to heavy casualties 
if it failed, when its leaders were too far from the enemy 
to know absolutely if these conditions prevailed, on the 
basis of a decision taken in an instant , at a gallop of 
fifteen miles an hour . But at the same time, to abandon 
the charge as a tactic seemed a sure way to produce poor 
Cavalry at a time when more, and better, Cavalry were 
1 . Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 90 
2 . 'The Future of Cavalry', USM 1860, pt III, p 46 
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required in war . 
The charge, both in close order against enemy 
Cavalry and in a looser order against Infantry and Artillery, 
was a highly specialised tactic, requiring years to learn 
properly and needing strong horses . Reg iments that scout e d 
might reasonably expect to lose over a quarter of their 
horses from exhaustion before battle was joined. 1 This was 
the origin of the old division between Light and ~eavy 
Cavalry . But, as the 'Cavalry Officer' pointed out: 
Certainly, if the duties of cavalry are in 
future to be confined to scouting and outpost 
work, and the collection of intelligence, 
infinitely important as they are, the days of 
cavalry proper would be numbered, as such 
duties may as well or better be performed by 
mounted infantry on the American model - a far 
cheaper arm, and one that can be turned to a 
variety of uses . 2 
Through a general misunderstanding of the nature of Ameri-
can Civil War horsemen, the idea came to be widely accepted 
that mounted riflemen were Infantry, not Cavalry. The 
logical conclusion from this was that they s hould be formed 
by the Infantry in the British Army, and that the fate of 
the Cavalry should be tied to the arme blanche: should one 
prove obsolete, so should the other . This mistake was 
shared by a number of Cavalry theorists, who claimed that 
'the Americans had no real cavalrY',J and that therefore 
1 . Steinmetz, 'The Past and Future of Cavalry', USM 1865, 
pt II, p 467 
2 . Notes •• oby a Cavalry Officer, p 1 
J . Thomson, in introduction to Bonie, The French Cavalry in 
1870, With its Tactical Results, p vii; see also Notes • • 
by a Cavalry Officer, p 11J 
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their experience was irre,levant to European war. A major 
co~sequence of this was to rob the Cavalry of their status 
of experts in the controversy. One Cavalryman, claiming 
this status, had written that 'Just as an Englishman can 
know but little of the German "Lanzknechts" or the Swiss 
"Reiters" so no more can an infantry soldier write about ••• 
the uses of cavalry in war.,1 However, if mounted rifle-
men were not Cavalry, this clearly gave Infantrymen as much 
right to their views as Cavalry, or even more. 
Apart from Havelock, 'an infantryman of 
infantrymen',2 the principal advocate of Mounted Rifles at 
the time was Colonel George Denison, who in two books in 
1868 and 1877 argued the need for Heavy Cavalry for the 
charge, and 'dragoons or mounted riflemen' for scouting, 
armed with~ carbines, revolvers and a sword carried on the 
saddle for the few occasion it might be needed. J Denison, 
commanding the Governor-General of Canada's bodyguard, 
based most of his arguments on his view of the American 
Civil War. He claimed all American horsemen as 'mounted 
riflemen', (including Mosby and Gilmor's men, who carried 
only sabres and pistols, and Sheridan's troopers, most of 
whom carried carbines4 ) arguing that in some respects 
1. 'A History of Cavalry', USM 1877, pt III, p 16; see also 
'Practical Essays upon Cavalry, II Dismounted Dragoons} 
USM 1876, pt II, p 2J1 
2. 'Practical Essays on Cavalry, II - Dismounted Dragoons', 
USM 1876, pt II, p 2J2 
J. Denison, Modern Cavalry, especially pp 10, Jo-48, and 
Denison, A History of Cavalry, pp 415-22 
4. Denison, Modern Cavalry, pp 22-J, 29 
-46-
these troops were superior to Cavalry as the British under-
1 
stood them. The main advantage of such troops, according 
to Denison, was that they could be improvised. The lack of 
training, which had seemed such a liability at the time, 
was offered as a benefit, since 'the same time is not re-
quired to create the same skill in the use of the rifle 
[as the sword] and under any circumstances it is not as 
important,.2 Deni9 0n favoured the revolver over the 
sword, but admitted that it was a feature of American, not 
European, society. Most British theorists thought it -too 
inaccurate and dangerous. 3 The lance in Europe was be-
lieved to have a great morale effect but made dismounting 
4 difficult and needed a very experienced user. The main 
concern of most Cavalrymen was to avoid clutter. 'The idea', 
wrote one, ~ 'of giving a lance, sabre, carbine and pistol to 
one man, one of whose hands is occupied in guiding his 
horse, is so perfectly astounding as to be scarcely 
credible.,5 The German Cavalry, before the end of the 
1. Denison, A History of Cavalry, p 394; see also Denison's 
opinion of Sheridan 'as poor an officer for the popular 
reputation he had as ever lived, except perhaps General 
Grant', Denison, Modern Cavalry, p 107 
2. Denison, Modern Cavalry, pp 13-14 
3. ibid, pp 31-40; Baker, 'Organisation and Employment of 
Cavalry', JRUSI vol 17, pp 375-97; 'The Dragoon, His 
Horse and His Training', USM 1864, pt III, p333. In 
Modern Cavalry, pp 23-32, Denison cites the achieve-
ments of Colonel Gilmor as typical of the effects of 
mounted pistol fire. Gilmor, however, describes him-
self as one of the best pistol shots in the Army. See 
Gilmor, Four Years in the Saddle, p 7 
4. Nolan, Ca~ry: its History and Tact±S, p 126; Baker, 
The British Cavalry, p 43; Denison, Modern Cavalry, p 39 
5. 'Military Studies, No 3, Cavalry', USM 1863, pt III, 
p 20 
1 
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century, tried to compromise on the ~ blanche problem by 
doing just that. 
Denison wanted the Regular Cavalry armed with 
swords, pistols, perhaps lances, but no carbines . His idea 
was that they should be taught only the arme blanche 
charge, 'and the moral effect of thS training would have a 
wonderful influence, not only on themselves, but on the 
1 
enemy' . He believed that providing no obstacles inter-
vened, Cavalry so trained would always succeed,2 apparently 
even against steady Infantry . This placed far greater 
faith in the morale effect of the arme blanche than most 
Cavalrymen were prepared to show. Further, these ideas put 
Denison in alliance with the prevailing view in the British 
Cavalry that fire action was, for them, a waste of ammu-
nition. 3 One retired lancer argued in 1870 that: 
Teach a mounted soldier to depend on his rifle 
or rifled carbine, to be an accurate shot, and 
without he should be a man of ten thousand, he 
will ride his horse no more for you, to pull up 
and 'pot' will always be his game • •• train your 
i 
cavalry to be marksmen, and they will cease to 
be cavalrY •• • I hope th~ the National colour, 
scarlet, may always be retained ••• if your
4
t r oop s 
be in the open, you do not want them hid . 
This last point took the debate far outside the realm of 
minor tactics . If Cavalry were only to charge, for which 
1 . Denison, Modern Cavalry, p 73 
2 . ibid, p 163 
3 . Smith, Drill and Manoeuvres of Cavalry, p 269 
4 . 'Thoughts on Cavalry by an Officer Lately in the 
Cavalry', USM 1870, pt I, p 476 . The author later 
identifies himself in correspondence as Roger D. Upton , 
late Captain, 9th Lancers . 
~--------------------------~ 
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morale of the highest order was vital, they could be big 
men on heavy horses, colourfully dressed and trained like 
fanatics . But all this depended on another, larger, force 
assuming the scouting role . Believers in Mounted Rifles 
and in charging Cavalry agreed that a hybrid that could 
fight as well dismounted as mounted was ridiculous. 'It 
is a sheer impossibility for good cavalry soldiers to be 
good infantry men,,1 declared one of the former . 'There 
can be no advantageous amalgamation', stressed one of the 
latter, 'between horse and foot soldiers, for they are as 
2 
unmixable as oil and water.' Evelyn Wood, a rare trans-
fer from Cavalry to Light Infantry, suggested in 1873 that 
while he did not believe in the hybrid, the difficulties 
involved in training 'mounted riflemen' might be too great . 
He suggest~d employing Infantry in 'irish jaunting cars' to 
be as fast and manoeuvrable as Horse Artillery . 3 But again 
this idea depended on the conversion of existing Infantry, 
or the expansion of the Army to accommodate a new force . 
Against this alliance, there was another 
small minority in the British Cavalry who believed in dis -
mounting a proportion of a regiment for fire support, while 
keeping the ~ blanche as the main weapon . The wars be-
tween 1861 and 1871 gave a great boost to this view, parti-
cularly among Cavalrymen who saw the only possible future 
1 . 'The Future of Cavalry', USM 1861, pt II, P 571 
2. 'Practical Essays on Cavalry, II - Dismounted Dragoons', 
USM 1876, pt II, p 359 
3 . Wood, 'Mounted Riflemen', Lecture to RUSI on 4 March 1873 
rl 
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for their arm in some response to the new problems of fire -
power. In 1873 one Lieutenant wrote that 'the horse, the 
sword and the carbine are all three the weapons for 
cavalry, and any two of them are incomplete without the 
third, . 1 The 'Cavalry Officer' agreed . 'Let it be 
granted then,' he wrote, ' that the use of firearms by 
cavalry is not normal, but exceptional, it must in turn be 
allowed that the occasions on which they may be resorted 
to are numerous, 2 and in their way neglected . ' From its 
beginning there were three main views of the arme blanche 
controversy . Traditionalist Cavalrymen clung to the 
charge alone, believing their men could not be taught 
dismounted fight.ing. Other Cavalrymen sought to introduce 
a 'hybrid' horseman willing to fight on foot or charge as 
appropriat@. While reformers outside the Regular Cavalry 
dismissed any possibility of its ever learning dismounted 
tactics, displaying at times as g~eat a belief in the arme 
blanche as the most reactionary Cavalryman, and argued for 
an entirely new force to fill the role of scouts in the 
Army. 
In the absence of further evidence, once 
these main positions had been stated, there was little to 
1 . Nolan, Cavalry: its History and Tactics, p 272; Baker, 
The British Cavalry, p 60; Thomson, in introduction to 
Bonie, The French Cavalry in 1870: With its Tactical 
Results, p vii 
2. Notes ••• by a Cavalry Officer, p 114 
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do but repeat them ad nauseam. As early as 1863 the 
United Service Magazine received complaints about this 
repetition; and in 1872 and again in 1874 writers observed 
that a controversy first begun 'six years ago' was no 
I t " 1 nearer a so u 20n . As each fresh generation of Lieu-
tenants and Captains discovered the controversy there was 
a cycle of enthusiasm, contradiction and boredom in the 
military journals. But although the major problems of 
the controversy had all been stated by 1879, it remained 
a minority interest until the next decade. Henry 
Brackenbury saw nothing unusual in ending a talk in 1873 
'although my lecture is on the tactics of the three a1?ms, 
2 I do not propose to speak of cavalry'. The 'Cavalry 
Officer' claimed that tacticians, absorbed in the problems 
of the Infantry and Artillery, had ignored the Cavalry 
altogether. 3 In 1880 Captain Chenevix- Trench complained 
to the RUSI of the neglect of the Cavalry's firearm and 
of its continuously increasing value in war: 
We may not like the idea, we may resent it as 
being opposed to our prejudices, traditions and 
ideas; we may ignore it theoretically in our 
regulations or only faintly acknowledge it, but 
1. 'Military Studies. No III. Cavalry', USM 1863, pt III, 
P 11; 'Horses and Horsemen for the British Army', USM 
1872, pt I, p 369; 'Suggestions for Training Mounted 
Infantry', USM 1874, pt III, p 185 
2. Brackenbury, 'The Tactics of the Three Arms as Modified 
to Meet the Requirements of the Present Day', JRUSI 
vol 17,p 630 
3. Notes .o .by a Cavalry Officer, pp 45- 6 
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in spite of that, the signs of it are everywhere 
apparent . 1 
The problems of a new system of mounted close- order drill, 
and as to whether a charge should be delivered in one rank 
or two, occupied at least as much interest in the Cavalry 
. t 2 regJ.men s. In fact the vast majority of officers were 
content to ignore the ~ blanche controversy and all 
other tactical problems. Major-General Smith defended 
this attitude: 
Military works, in a technical form, meet with 
little favour in England. To the unmilitary 
reader they must of course be altogether devoid 
of interest; and although our officers, in the 
intervals of the time devoted to field sports 
and other amusements, find quite sufficient 
opportunities to make themselves master of the 
details and duties of their profession, still, 
they naturally expect that their duties should 
be ready to hand, and consider that the res-
ponsibility of determining whether such drill is 
suited to the times or not rests elsewhere, and 
that they are only called upon to acquire it 
theoretically and practically as it exists - and 
this is quite reasonable, it would be absurd to 
suppose that an officer should be expected to 
analyse and study the elements of the tactics of 
that branch of the service to which he belongs.J 
Before the First World War, the only books commonly read by 
1. Chenevix- Trench, 'Progress in Developing the Capabili-
ties of Cavalry', JRUSI vol 21, p 998 
2 . A 'non-pivot' system of drill whereby the Cavalry regi-
ment did not pivot around one troop when turning was 
introduced in the 1860s. At the same time there was 
some argument that the charge should be delivered by a 
regiment in a single line of horsemen, the 'rank entire' 
rather than two ranks as remained the case . See for 
example: Nolan, Cavalry: its History and Tactics, Appen-
dix; Smith, Drill and Manoeuvres of Cavalry; 'Volunteer 
Cavalry Movements', Blackwoods, Vol 87, pp 371 - 80 
J . Smith, Modern Tactics of the Three Arms, pp iii- iv 
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most subalterns were the numerous revisions of Clery's 
Minor Tactics and Hamley's Operations of War. Unfortunately, 
in the early 1870s they disagreed, the former advocating 
the hybrid Cavalryman, the latter the separation into 
charging Cavalry and Mounted Rifles . 1 On such confused, 
and confusing, views the next generation of Cavalrymen was 
raised. 
The theorists of the ~ blanche were not 
even of great interest to each other . Chesney thought 
Smith's book widely read,2 but Denison had not read it, 
and a year after publication his own first book was un-
reviewed. 3 Denison himself thought the only works of value 
on Cavalry in English to be Captain Nolan's work, from be-
fore the Crimean War, and an even earlier paraphrase of 
4 Count von Bismarck, a Prussian Cavalry officer of the 1820s . 
British theorists were undoubtedly heavily influenced by 
first French and then German writers on the ~ blanche, 
as repr esenting allegedly the best military system in 
Europe, although both countries' writers laid far more 
stress on the ~ blanche than the British Cavalry re-
1 . Clery, Minor Tactics, p 87; Hamley, Operations of War, 
pp 433- 6 . For the use of these books by most subalterns, 
see Spears, The Picnic Basket, pp 67, 72; Gough, Sol -
diering On, pp 29, 34, 127; Chisholm, Sir John French, 
p 24 suggests that it was unusual to read much else . 
2 . Chesney and Reeve, The Military Resources of France and 
Prussia , p 46 
3 . 'Characteristics and Organisation of Modern Cavalry', 
USM 1869, pt III, p 337 
4 . Denison, Modern Cavalry , p xv 
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1 formers. But such influence seldom extended to pure 
emulation. It was common practice for subalterns, unable 
to get their own ideas into print, to insert them as foot-
notes or asides to a translation or review of a foreign 
military author,2 without necessarily sharing his views. 
In contrast, after the initial great enquiry, 
the theorists of the 1870s lost interest in America as a 
source of ideas on Cavalry. This was, however, at least re-
ciprocated. Federal Colonel Brackett wrote in his own 
book on the war, intended in part for European readers: 
The English, as a general thing, are most 
wretched riders, and it is no wonder that they 
are almost universally whipped whenever they go 
into battle ••• Poor Nolan himself lost his life 
while charging at Balaklava, where the English 
horse was entirely cut to · p~eces by the Russians.J 
The semi-official account of the Russo-Turkish War of 
~ 
1. The most extreme statement of the traditional view of 
the arme blanche can be found in Ardant du Picq, Battle 
Studies, p 179. 'Cavalry always has the same doctrine: 
Charge l' However, when the United Service Magazine 
reviewed in 1877 a new book by Colonel Bonie, which 
suggested that Cavalry must be equally proficient on 
foot as mounted, the reviewer drew on prevailing doc-
trine in France to condemn ito See Knollys, 'The 
Fighting of Cavalry on Foot', USM 1877, pt III, pp 
40J-10 
2. Spears, The Picnic Basket, p 7J, describes the practice 
and believes he invented it. Examples, however, go 
back to the 1860sand 1870s. See for example: 'The 
Future of Cavalry', USM 1861, pt II, pp .569-7.5; 'The 
Future Tactics of Cavalry, USM 1872, pt III, pp 70-8J; 
'The German Cavalry', USM 187J, pt I, pp 217-2.5; 
'Tactics on the Battle-field', USM 187.5, pt I, pp 
.509-16; 'The Fighting of Cavalry on Foot', USM 1877, 
pt III, pp 40J-10 
J. Brackett, History of the United States Cavalry, p 164. 
See also Chevenix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 166; 
'History of the American Civil War', USM 1871, pt III, 
pp 22-8 
1877-8 by a Lieutenant in the American Army commented on 
C~valry: 
The employment of large bodies of cavalry on 
the field of battle belongs to the order of 
'shock tactics' whose day is wholly past. 
There has been but one instance of it in the 
last twenty years, viz. at the battle of 
Gravelotte [Mars-la-Tour] where, under very 
peculiar circumstances, the Prussians sacri-
ficed a division [sic] of cavalry in order to 
obtain a result which could be gained in no 
other way, the infantry not yet having arrived 
on the field. The true use of cavalry in 
modern warfare was developed in our civil war, 
viz. in scouting and reconnaissance, in inde-
pendent raids against lines of comnlunication 
and supply, in following up a retre~t, and in 
doing its fighting always on foot. Since 1865 
there has been nothing new on the subject.1 
Compared to this mixture of error and pomposity the honest 
self-criticism of the French and Germans had much to attract 
British writers. 
The theories voiced in the 1860s and 1870s 
bore very little relation to British foreign policy or 
strategic needs and expectations. It was not especially in-
tended they should. Havelock wanted his 'dragoons' for the 
defence of India, not European war.2 Denison wrote his 
first book thinking of the defence of Canada against the 
Americans, 3 and his second as a winning entry in a compe-
tition held by the Czar of Russia. 4 Unfortunately, the 
Russo-Turkish War, the nearest thing to a fair trial 
1. Greene, The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey 
1877-8, p 453 
2. Havelock, Three Main Military Questions of the Day, 
p 112 
3. Denison, Modern Cavalry, pp xviii-xx 
4. Denison, A History of Cavalry, author's dedication to 
the Czar 
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Denison's Mounted Rifle theories ever got, produced little 
ac~ion by horsemen, and most British writers thought the 
Russians, 1 like the Am~ricans, unadventurous Cavalrymen. 
At the same time the blithe assumption that a new force of 
Mounted Rifles could be created in the Army bore no res em-
blance to a reality of Cavalry regiments that were in them-
selves badly understrength. In 1871 about 13,000 soldiers, 
2 
or one in every eleven in the Army, were Cavalrymen, 
whereas a field army was, by the theories of the day, re-
quired to be at least one-sixth Cavalry.3 There were no 
Cavalry reserves, no remount depot, barely one trained 
troop horse for every two men, and a total Army reserve of 
fewer than 15,000 horses for all purposes, while the horse 
population of the country was declining at more than 7,000 
4 
a year.Jn practice few regiments could field more than 
three hundred men and horses, and officers said openly the 
5 Cavalry was unfit for war. It was asking much of these 
weak regiments to dismount a third or more of their men for 
1. Knollys, 'What We Have Learned from the War', USM 1878, 
pt I, P 142. See also Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern 
War, p 66 and Greene, The Russian Army and its Campaigns 
in Turkey, 1877-8, p 183 
2. See Tables, Part One, Tables 1 and 2 
3. Verner, The Military Life of H.R.H. George Duke of 
Cambridge, vol II, p 41 
4. See Tables, Part One, Table 3, also 'Horses and Horse-
men for the British Army', USM 1872, pt I, p 370, and 
'The Horse Supply', USM 1873, pt III, p 88 
5. Baker, 'Organisation and Employment of Cavalry', JRUSI 
vol 17, pp 375- 97; 'Colonel Baker , on Cavalry Organis-
ation', USM 1873, pt II, p 76; Notes ••• by a Cavalry 
Officer, p 252; Thomson, in introduction to Bonie, The 
French Cavalry in 1870, With its Taotical Results, p v 
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1 fire support for a charge. Many theorists argued that 
this support should come instead from close-supporting 
Horse Artillery, or machine- guns.2 With their own expensive 
regiments (costing about £25,000 a year each) so ludicrous-
ly weak Cavalrymen looked with incredulity at the sugges-
tion of a new mounted force. 'Every sixpence which the 
country will consent to spend on our cavalry', declared 
one angry Major in 1876, 'should be devoted to increasing 
the strength of our skeleton regiments. ,3 This weakness 
made a mockery of any discussion on tactics . In 1876 when 
an eight Army Corps organisation was proposed, one writer 
observed: 
There being only 21 regiments of cavalry at 
home, while 24 are required for the eight 
brigades of the active army, besides one re-
tained for special duties in London and thr ee 
attached to Infantry divisions in Ireland • •• 
the 2avalry of the 6th and 8th Corps is com-
posed entirely of yeomanry . 4 
The Yeomanry, or volunteer Cavalry, were even weaker than 
the Line Regiments . 
In 1871 there were 15,773 Yeomen on the 
muster rolls, a number which dropped by more than a thousand 
1 . Notes ••• by a Cavalry Officer, p143 
2. ibid, pp 107- 11; Smith, Drill and Manoeuvres of Cavalry, 
p 250; 'Combined Action of Horse Artillery and Cavalry', 
USM 1863, pt I, pp 354- 60; 'Some Remarks on Cavalry 
Skirmishing and How that Arm Acts When Attached to 
Artillery', USM 1866 , pt I, pp 431 - 6 
3 . Russel, 'Cavalry', JRUSI vol 2 0, p 189 . See also 
Steinmetz, 'The Past and Future of Cavalry', USM 1865, 
pt II, p 160 
4 . 'The First Steps in Army Reform', Blackwoods, vol 119, 
p 105 
d 
1 
over the decade. 
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In 1878, when a check of those re-
po.rting to muster was made, only 10,508 actually showed up~ 
Their training per iod was just eight days a year,3 and in 
1860, 1861, and again in 1880 they were not mustered as an 
4 
economy measure. The thirty- nine regimen ts , based on a 
county structure, had nine different types of organisation, 
and a minimum strength of two hundred men to a regiment was 
not fixed (even in theory) until 1875. 5 Their theoretical 
role, in addition to acting as an internal police force 
(which was increasingly unnecessary) and as a ' c onstitu-
tional force' in opposition to the Army, (which was ana-
chronistic)6 was to assist defence against invasion; but 
they were not obliged to serve outside their own regional 
areas. 7 In 1861 a suggestion that they might be replaced 
by mounte~ units of Rifle Volunteers prompted the United 
Service Magazine to point out that there were only 500 
8 
such mounted Volunteers in the country, while the founder 
of the Volunteers remained opposed to their being used 
1 . See Tables, Part One, Table 8 
2. See Tables, Part One, Table 9 
3 . 'C.G. E.', 'Yeomanry Cavalry ' , p 23 
4 . 'Yeomanry Cavalry', USM 1860, pt II, p 26; see also 
Tables, Part One, Table 9 
5 . Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, p 375 
6. Verner, The Military Life of H.RoH. George Duke of 
Cambridge, vol II, pp 363- 4 
7 . Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, p 375 
8 . 'Yeomanry Cavalry', USM 1860, pt II, p 376 
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mounted, fearing they would (as the 'histori~~g predicted) 
1 turn themselves into Cavalry ~ This process was already 
visible in one unit of Mounted Rifle Volunteers in 1873. 2 
The Yeomanry were therefore the obvious candidates for 
conversion from the charge (which they spent ins ufficient 
time training to learn properly) to the role of Mounted 
Rifles, and this was suggested in a number of pamphlets 
and articles. In 1871 Cambridge himself mentioned the 
idea to the Secretary of State for War, but took no posi-
tive action to achieve it. 3 
The largest Cavalry formation recognised by 
British regulations was a brigade, and even these were not 
created permanently until 1871-2 . 4 There were few chances 
to practice the tactical evolutions with which the arme 
blanche controversy was chiefly concerned . 5 Both Aldershot 
and Cannock Chase were too small for real Cavalry man-
oeuvres, and Major Percy Barrow of the 19 th Hussars re-
membered the Curragh Camp in Ireland as the first place he 
1 . Acklom, 'Mounted Riflemen', USM 1873, p 376 
2 . Wood, 'Mounted Riflemen', Lecture to RUSI on 4 March 
1873, p 22 
3 . Verner, The Military Life of HoR ~ H . George Duke of 
Cambridge, vol II, p 57; see also 'C.G eE o ', 'Yeomanry 
Cavalry,' p 36; Acklom, 'Mounted Riflemen', USM 1873, 
p 377; 'The Army', Blackwoods, vol 101, p 264; 
'Yeomanry Cavalry', USM 1861, pp 339- 47 
4 . Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, p 204; Compton, A King's Hussar, p 56; Bond, 
'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry 1870- 1914' 
in Howard, ed . , The Theory and Practice of War, p p 101 
- 2 
5 0 'Thoughts on Cavalry', USM 1870, pt III, p 37 
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1 had seen a brigade with space to deploy. Nevertheless, 
Bl.ackwood's Magazine congratulated the Cavalry on the 1872 
manoeuvres,2 and in 1875 singled out the Duke of Cambridge 
for his encouragement of scouting rather than charges with 
the arme blanche. 3 Percy Barrow's diary told a different 
story: 
Consulted with Colonel Baillie and Pearce ••• 
as to a Cavalry fight for tea next day - the 
ground is so bad all round here, and the Duke 
was so keen upon a Cavalry fight that it was 
necessary to cook up something for his edifi-
cation. 4 
The 'Cavalry fight' meant a massed charge, brigade against 
brigade, pulling up just short of actual contact. In 
training it had many of the characteristics of a ritual, 
and other ranks called manoeuvres 'ladies' days' for this 
reason . 5 It was in addition a powerful emotional ex-
perienc e. One Cavalryman felt there was 'nothing on earth 
to equal it',6 and even the future Earl of Dundonald, a 
firm opponent of the ~ blanche, agreed with this . 7 The 
tight, knee- to- knee manoeuvre was also the supreme visual 
1. Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry 
1870- 1914' in Howard, ed . , The Theory and Practice of 
War, p 102; Barrow, Diary entry for July 1877 (a 
summary without precise dates) 6009 - 14 Barrow 
2 . 'Our Autumn Manoeuvres', Blackwoods, v0l 112, p 636 
3. 'Lessons from the Recent Summer Manoeuvres', Blackwoods, 
vol 118, p 371 
4. Barrow, Diary entry for 14 July 1875, 6009- 14 Barrow 
5 . Compton, A King's Hussar, p 56 
6 . Younghusband, A Soldier's Memories in Peace and War, 
p 64 
7 . Dundonald, My Army Life, p 11 
-a.-------------------------
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expression of regimental solidarity and professional com-
petence, where the slightest error in positioning or pace 
showed as a glaring mistake . Its importance to regimental 
morale can hardly be exaggerated. 
Regiments wer e of- eight troops, each com-
manded by a Captain or Major. An attempt to combine these 
into four squadrons in 1869-70, as in other countries, 
failed through the British error in not adopting the under-
lying principle of making squadrons virtually autonomous 
within the regiment, and by 187J the system was defunct . 1 
The individual level of men and officers in these troops 
was not outstanding. A private in the 14th Hussars in 
186J was surprised to find his Troop Serjeant- Major and 
fourteen members of his hut were all illiterate. 2 William 
Robertson ; the future Field Mars~ , found barrack room life 
at the time equally primitive . J Lord Dundonald and Evelyn 
Wood, both Cavalry subalterns, found officers ignorant and 
over- obsessed with ritual. 4 It was to such regiments that 
1 . Thomson, introduction to Bonie, The French Cavalry in 
1870 With its Tactical Results, p v; Notes • • • by a 
Cavalry Officer, pp 206, 251 
2 . Compton, A King's Hussar, pp JO- JJ 
J . Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal, pp J - 5 
4 . Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol I, pp 112- J; 
Dundonald, My Army Life, pp 5-7 . Wi th the exception of 
Troop Serjeant- Major Mole, the subject of Compton's book, 
these men all became highly successful senior officers, 
and were inclined to ' contrast the shortcomin~ of their 
predecessors with their own achievements o Similarly, 
the generation of senior officers who fought the Second 
World War were inclined to disparage their predecessors, 
who included Wood, Dundonald and Robertson . Their 
accounts therefore merit caution, but are generally 
reliable o 
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the arme blanche controversy came, and the reformers within 
the Cavalry were conscious that far more than its tactics 
needed reform; generally there is justice in Henderson's 
view that for the Cavalry the years between 1854 and 1878 
r epres ent 'the climax of incompetency' . 1 The controversy 
was to have a major part to play in changing this. 
Before tactics might be improved, there was 
one key area of reform on which all else depended . The 
primary cause of sore backs and horse exhaustion, and there-
fore the main obstacle to solving the arme blanche prDblem, 
was the crushing weight carried by Cavalry horses . Reasons 
of economy in the Army had meant the development of Light 
Cavalry heavy enough to charge, and Heavies prepared to 
2 
scout . Whereas a pack horse might be expected to carry 
220- JOO pounds at a walk on a good road for twenty- four 
miles,J a troop horse, of Light or Heavy Cavalry, carried 
over JOO pounds, and was expected to trot all day and 
charge when reQuired . 4 Most of t h i s weight was unnecessary . 
Officers preferred tall men, and Dundonald recalled that 
until Colonel Marshall, his commanding officer in the 
2nd Life Guards, lowered the max imum height, the 
1 . Henderson, The Science of War, p 52 
2 . 'The Dragoon, His Horse and Their Training', USM 1864, 
pt III, p JJ1; Stovell- Jones, 'Present Condition of our 
Cavalry', JRUSI Vol 6, p 425; Notes • • oby a Cavalry 
Officer, p 212 
J . 'Military Studies, No III, Cavalry', USM 186J, pt III, 
p 16 
4 . Denison, Modern Cavalry, p 92 
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1 
shortest man in his troop was over six feet tall. Recom-
mended weights varied only from 151 pounds for the lightest 
2 Hussar to 160 pounds for a Dragoon. The balance in weight 
was made up to 300 pounds in uniform and weapons, saddle, 
tack, valises and extra equipment. In words that would be 
repeated through the century, one Cavalryman claimed that 
with all this weight, in war 'our present light cavalry 
would be rendered ineffective in a week,.3 But, as he also 
admitted, 'with every pack of hounds in England men of six-
teen stones are to be seen superbly mounted on horses fully 
capable of carrying them, even through the exertions of a 
trying run,.4 If Cavalry were specially equipped for the 
charge, with heavy breeds of horse, there would be no 
problem, providing they did not scout. Conversely, in 
scouting eyery extra ounce was a handicap, and if lance, 
sword, helmet, cuirass or pistol could be proved useless, 
there was a good case for giving it up at once. 
The same was equally true of the carbine, and 
more than once believers in the ~ blanche suggested its 
abolition. 5 There was a 'soldier's story', at least 
1Q Baker, The British Cavalry, pp 31-4; Dundonald, My Army 
Life, p 7; 'The British Cavalry and its Organisation', 
~1862, pt I, P 181 
2. Wolseley, Soldier's Pocket Book, p 14 
3. ibid; Baker, The British Cavalry, p 94 
4. Baker, The British Cavalry, p 19 
5. See for example: 'The British Cavalry and its Organis-
ation', USM 1862, pt I, pp 182, 534; ' Notes ••• by a 
Cavalry Officer, p 116, which suggested a few specialist 
riflemen in each squadron, and no firearm for the re-
mainder; and 'The Efiiciency of British Cavalry', USM 
1868, pt III, p 95 
,.... 
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symbolically true, that a Lancer regiment in the 1870s, 
receiving its first carbines, dumped them on the regimental 
midden. 1 Most other ranks, according to Robertson, found 
2 
musketry 'a degra dation and a bore', and according to one 
Colonel most officers felt it 'a very great nuisance,.3 In 
1879 the 13th Hussars had only 45 qua~ified marksmen out 
of 351 rank and file. 4 A common view of musketry was ex-
pressed by one Cavalryman: 
All officers who have served with cavalry in 
the field, will allow that the men are far too 
fond of applying to their carbine buckets and 
holsters, even when they know, or ought to do, 
that the arms they contain will scarcely hit a 
haystack, and there is surely some reason to 
dread that this tendency of the Dragoon to place 
too much reliance on his firearm will be increased 
by supplying him with a superior weapon of that 
kind.5 
Less sympathetically, the Assistant Superintendent at 
~ 
Woolwich told the RUSI that most Cavalry officers believed 
'the efficiency of the hussar or the dragoon would be best 
assured, by providing him with a sharp sword and a not too 
efficient fire-arm,.6 Two British Cavalry regiments were 
1. This is sometimes stated as a proven fact. However, the 
earliest published reference to it is in 1912, in 
Rimington, Our Cavalry, p 17, who says it was generally 
known when he joined the Army. He was commissioned in 
the 6th Dragoons in 1881. 
2. Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal, p 15 
3. "A" 849, 'Report of the Committee on Musketry Instruction 
in the Army', 1881, Evidence, Question and Answer 2339 
(War Office) 
4. 'Results of Annual Course of Musketry, 1879-80', 7612-20 
Dukes 
5. Stovell-Jones, 'Present Condition of Our Cavalry', JRUSI 
vol 6, p 426; see also Notes.o.by a Cavalry Officer, pp 
158-9 
6. Majendie, 'Military Breech-loading Small Arms', JRUSI 
vol 12, p 192 
I ' 
d 
- 64-
in 1857 given the Sharps breechloading carbine, and in the 
1860s there was a general issue of the Westley- Richards, 
which fired six or seven rounds a minute with a theoretical 
range of 800 yards, but a mean deviation of fifty- four 
1 inches at 500 yards o This was replaced in the n ex t d ecad e: 
by the Martini- Henry, amorter version of the Infantry 
rifle, which was slightly more accurate o But the 1869 
Cavalry Drill Book envisaged dismounted action only when 
moving through defiles and across bridges, and saw the 
charge, 'made with the greatest velocity and regularity 
possible', as the Cavalry's one real tactic . 2 Its successor 
in 1876 was a considerable advance, giving official recog-
nition to dismounted action in many situations, although 
it felt unable to lay down definite rules for its employ-
ment, and insisted that the charge remained the supreme 
Cavalry action . J There was no suggestion that the firearm 
might dominate the ~ blanche in importance, but there 
was no military reason for b elieving that it should . 
There was however a sense in wh{ch the arme 
blanche, and indeed the Cavalry, were obsolete . Charging 
Cavalry were the product of social and geographical con-
ditions which no longer existed in Western Europe . Its 
1 . Majendie, 'Military Breech- loading Small Arms', JRUSI 
vol 12, pp 199- 200 
2 . Re lations for the Instruction 
of the Cavalry, 18 9, especially pp 
Office) 
J . Re lations for "the Instr uction and Movements of Cavalr 
~, especially pp 1 2 - 7 . A provisional version was 
i s sued at Aldershot in 1874 . (War Office) 
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countries were increasingly industrialised, and few re -
cruits came to the Cavalry knowing how to ride, or to care 
for horses. The sword was no longer the weapon of the 
elite, 'no longer a weapon or an idea', as was written in 
1881, 'we no longer fight with it, we no longer think with 
it, we no longer respect it . ,1 In 1874 the first patent 
on a barbed wire making machine was accepted; five years 
later 25,000 tons a year were being produced in America . 2 
Used as a weapon against Cavalry, this, more than any 
othe r single factor, would end the ~ blanche charge . 
In 1876 the first four- stroke gas engine was patented, and 
ten years later the internal combusion engine . J This would 
provide an alternative to the horse, and unlike the horse 
it could be bullet- proofed . Europe, increasingly enclosed 
with cana~s, wire and the marks of industry, had few of the 
undulating plains where Cavalry could hide and charge left~ 
Not thirty miles from the fields of Waterloo, the British 
would nex t fight in Europe on the slagheaps of Mons. These 
factors, hard to detect or predict, scarcely impinging on 
military thought, were none the less crucial. From 1871 
the Cavalry were living on borrowed time . 
1 . 'The Sword', Blackwoods, vol 129, p 572 
2 . Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 edition, entry under 
'Barbed Wire' 
J . Bird, The Motor Car 1765- 1914, pp 26, JJ 
4 . Cipo~a, The Emergence of Industrial Societies, vol I, 
pp 7- 75, J29 - 55 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RINGS OF POWER 
'When we see mounted infantry sent to the front 
.and cavalry kept back, it seems time for cavalry 
officers to ask themselves what is the reason, 
and what is likely to be the result to their arm.' 
- Henry Brackenbury (1884)1 
'Well come ! is it professional to throw a 
regiment of cavalry on a battery of machine guns, 
with the dead certainty that if the guns go off 
not a horse or man will ever get to within fifty 
yards of the fire 7' 
- G.B. Shaw, Arms and the Man (1894)2 
Between 1861 and 1870 Colonel Garnet Wolseley 
served in Canada, briefly visiting both sides in the 
Eastern Theatre of the American Civil War. During the 
Fenian Invasion scare in Canamin 1865-6 he worked with 
the Govern-9r-General's Bodyguard, the Mounted Rifle corps 
under George Denison, and was impressed by their patrol 
work. 'No similar number of regular Cavalry,' Wolseley 
recalled, 'could have done that duty as effectively.,J In 
the first of the campaigns which would make his own re-
putation, the Red River Expedition of 1869, Wolseley him-
self experimented with mounting a few Infantry on horses, 
and was pleased with the result. 4 He returned to Britain 
1. Brackenbury in preface to Chenevix- Trench, Cavalry in 
Modern War" p vi 
2. Shaw, 'Arms and the Man', in Plays Pleasant, p JO 
J . Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life, vol II, 
pp 148- 9 
4 . Wolseley, indisoussi~n of Hutton, Five Lectures on 
Mounted Infantry, Lecture Four, pp 25- 6 
• 
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in 1871, to play an influential role in Cardwell's Army re-
fQrms, convinced of the correctness of Denisonis views. 
Crucial to these reforms was the abolition 
of the purchase of officers' commissions to open the career 
to a wider social group. This action did not, of course, 
remove from the Army officers who already held their ranks 
by purchase; the last claim for compensation by one such 
1 
officer was well into the twentieth century. But it did 
remove one of the two main methods of gaining accelerated 
promotion; the other being the death of superior~ and-
winning of a reputatio~ in war. Purchase and war permitted 
officers who were rich (or had a patron) to reach high rank 
before they reached old age. The combination of purchase 
and war made the Duke of Wellington a Field Marshal at 
forty- six;, Sir John Moore was only forty-eight when killed 
2 
at Corunna. But even in peacetime, and despite stiff com-
petition from Napoleonic veterans, the Earl of Lucan quali-
fied as commander of the Cavalry Division, formed at the 
start of the Crimean War, aged fiftY-four. J Comparison 
with eqUivalent ranks in the French and German armies, very 
much larger than the British, is difficult. But under the 
stress of war in 1870 the French produced Corps commanders 
1. WO/J2/8644 'Report of the Army Purchase Commission on 
the Abolition of Purchase in the Army', 1909 
2. Young, The British Army 1641-1970, p 191; Longford, 
Wellington, the Years of the Sword, pp 10, 144, 171, 
J2J; Woodall, 'The Abolition of Purchase in the British 
Army', pp 676-84 
J. Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why, pp 27, 1J6 
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averaging fifty-nine and the Prussians sixty-one years old, 
both through a system of seniority tempered by selection. 1 
In the 1890s in the German Army the age of Corps commanders 
stretched to sixty-seven on average, with Division com-
manders averaging fifty- nine. 2 In the Indian Army, which 
practised strict seniority, Major- Generals under sixty- nine 
were rare. However, although a committee pointed out in 
1876 that if nothing but strict seniority in future guided 
promotion in the British Army, the average age of Major-
Generals would be sixty- four,J still in 1895 Major- Generals 
averaged only fifty- seven years old, and Lieutenant-
Generals, the approximate equivalent of Corps commanders 
(in fact including a number of staff officers) sixty years 
4 
old. This was achieved by the last effects of purchase 
working th~ough the system, and by an entirely unofficial 
means of accelerating promotion . 
Promotion examinations, introduced for regi-
mental officers in 1870, were dismissed by Wolseley as 'a 
farce,.5 Taking their lead from the Duke of Cambridge, a 
firm believer in seniority alone, most officers felt paper 
examination unnecessary or unfair and selection another 
1 . Holmes, 'The Road to Sedan 2 , p 98 
2 . Swaine to Wolseley, n . d., 1890? Autograph Swaine 6, 
Wolseley 
J . Quoted in Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol II, 
p 9J 
4. See Tables, Part Two, Tables 1- J 
5 . SSL 10/1 P xxxvi manuscript, Wolseley 
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word for jobbery. 1 Not until the end of the century, in 
Br~tain or India, was the Staff College course an aid to 
promotion;2 while a Promotion Board, intended to select 
two-thirds of the Major-Generals, proved ineffective 
against Cambridge's opposition. 3 Not until 1895, when 
Wolseley succeeded Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief, were 
confidential reports instituted on officers. 4 Theoreti-
cally, seniority alone determined promotion. 
Purchase had meant wealth and exclusivity, 
and it was the most exclusive, or 2smart', units of the 
Army which felt its abolition most; it had never existed 
in the Artillery or Engineers. 'Smartness' in this sense 
implied nothing about efficiency for war, but was closely 
connected with excellence at drill or display, particularly 
the Cavalry's peacetime demonstration of the charge. While 
in 1870 two-thirds of Infantry commissions were held by 
purchase, in the Cavalry it was ninety per cent, and in 
the Guards and Household virtually all commissions were 
1. Knollys, 2Promotion in the Army by Selection', USM 1881, 
pt I, p 364; Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, 
vol II, pp 64, 93; Charteris, Douglas Haig, p 21 
2. For evidence of this, see for example: The British 
Army, p 97; Smith-Do~en, Memories of Forty-Eight Years 
Service, p 72; Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 41; Young-
husband, A Soldier's Memories in Peace and War, p 115; 
and for recent commentary on it see: Harries-Jenkins, 
The Army in Victoriqn Society, especially p 159, Bond, 
The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp 144-8 
3. Wolseley to George Wolseley, 15 June 1893, uncatalogue~ 
Wolseley; Wolseley to Campbell-Bannerman, 9 February 
1894, 41233 f 182 Campbell-Bannerman; The British Army, 
p 199 
4. SSL 9/2 P ccxc, manuscript, Wolseley; Wolseley to 
Roberts, 4 September 1896, 7101-23-89, Roberts 
I [ 
! 
I 
'! 
1 held in this way. 
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The Cavalry sought to keep their ex-
clusivity by duplicating the effects of purchase. Where-
as in 1870 Cavalry subalterns needed a private income of 
around £300 a year, the cost of their social life, uniform 
and other aspects of display jumped so that well before 
2 the century's end £500 or £600 was needed. The Household 
Brigade and smarter regiments required £1,000 a year. (For 
comparison, the Commander-in-Chief1s salary was £4,000 a 
year. 3 ) Evelyn Wood, a Lieutenant-General at the time, 
turned down the honorary Colonelcy of the Royal Horse 
Guards in the 1890s because he could not afford the dress 
uniform. 4 Unofficial purchase reappeared in such regi-
ments before the end of the century, whereby an officer 
was asked his Vterms', a cash transaction, to exchange into 
1. Glover r 'The Purchase of Commissions', p 235; Cairnes, 
Social Life in the British Army, pp 35-46. 'Smartness' 
is not something that is easily quantified, but, in 
rough descending order, the smartest regiments in the 
Cavalry, apart from the Household Brigade, were the 
10th Hussars, 1st (Kings) Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, 
and 13th HUssars. Smart regiments in the Infantry were 
headed by the Guards and the two Rifle Regiments. 
2. 'Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Edu-
cation and Training of Officers in the Army' (Akers-
Douglas Committee) 1902 (War Office) Appendix 42, p 134, 
and Evidence of Lawley, q.8166; Cairnes, Social Life in 
the British Army,p xi; Robertson, From Private to Field 
Marshal, especially p 29; Hillcourt, Baden-Powell: The 
Two Lives of a Hero, p 40 
3. Ponsonby to Wolseley, 3 March 1884, Autograph Ponsonby 
6,Wolseley; Cairnes, Social Life in the British Army, 
p 35; Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, 
p 34l.j· 
4. French, A Life of Field Marshal Sir John French, First 
Earl of Ypres, hereafter A Life of ••• John French, First 
Earl of Ypres, p 40 
t 
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th . t 1 ano er reg2men • 
In the Infantry, or in India where a private 
income of £100 sufficed, and it was even, just, possible 
to live on a Cavalry subaltern's pay, abolition of pur-
h . f 2 case was a genu2ne re orm. In the Cavalry at home it 
produced a quite different result: officers became volun-
teers, holding their positions by choice, paying for the 
privilege with no financial stake in the Army, and often 
leaving to take up the business interests which supplied 
their fortune. J Turnover of officers, and so promotion 
prospects for competent juniors, therefore appeared better 
than in any other branch. Consequently, while the stand-
ards of the Cavalry officers as a whole declined, its 
1. Churchill, My Early Life, p 12J suggests that this 
practice was' common enough for his own regiment, 4th 
Hussars) to be angry when it was flouted . Henry Wilson, 
serving in a Rifle regimen~ was pleased and surprised 
to be allowed to exchange without terms in 1894. See 
Wilson Diary entry 2J August 1894, Wilson. 
2. Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal, p 29; Hill-
court, Baden-Powell: The Two Lives of a Hero, p 40; 
Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier, p 29; for an 
example of a poor Infantryman, see Harrington, Plumer 
of Messines, p 7 
J. Horrocks in preface to ffrench Blake, The 17th 21st 
Lancers, p 8. The 17th, and later 17th 21st, Lancers 
have produced five Field Marshals since the early nine-
teenth century, which they claim as a record. See also: 
Gough, Soldiering On, pp J1-2 for expenses in a moderate 
regiment, the 16th Lancers o The two most significant 
examples of Cavalry officers leaving the Army for finan-
cial reasons are Colonel Charles a Court and Colonel 
Herbert Lawrence, both of whom left shortly after the 
Second Boer War on coming into an inheritance. A 
Court's inheritance required a name change to Charles 
a Court Repington, and he becrune the influential mili-
tary correspondent of The Times. Lawrence rejoined the 
Army in 1914 and rose by 1918 to be a Lieutenant-General 
and Haig's Chief of Staff. 
I 
~------------------------~ 
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posts limited to men of considerable wealth who saw the 
Army as a temporary diversion, a group of quite outstanding 
and highly professional officers emerged from the Cavalry 
1 in the early years of the next century. 
Immediately after the abolition of purchase, 
accelerated promotion could be obtained only through war. 
In the absence of a major conflict, service in colonial 
campaigns became of paramount importance to ambitious 
officers, dependent on the patronage of the General en-
trusted with each campaign. The most overt and succes$ful 
example of this was Garnet Wolseley's 'Ring' which domi-
nated British colonial wars in the 1870s and 1880s.2 Its 
apparent membership was large, if completely unofficial, 
but mostly temporary, since as its reputation grew, member-
ship of 'The Mutual Admiration Society' as it was dubbed3 
could be a mixed blessing. As Wolseley himself acknow-
ledged in 1884, its closest ties were of mutual self-
interest. 4 Wolseley became a Major- General at forty, and 
his most successful subordinate, Evelyn Wood, reached the 
1. See Western, Reminiscences of an Indian Cavalry Officer, 
p 137 and Chapters Three and Six below. 
2. For the activities and careers of Wolseley and his Ring, 
see in particular: Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's 
Life (up to 1873); Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal; 
Lehmann, All Sir Garnet 
3. This phrase appeared in The Times, the author apparently 
being William Howard Russell. See Wolseley to Lady 
Wolseley, 20 January 1880, WP 9/1 Wolseley 
4. Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p 127 
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same rank at forty-three. Redvers Buller, another Ring 
member, succeeded Wolseley as Adjutant-General in 1890, 
aged fifty-one. others did not survive this route to pro-
-
motion. Herbert Stewart died of wounds in 1885, just be-
fore Wolseley could push his promotion from Captain to 
1 Major-General in six years. George PomeroY- Colley, 
having just achieved this- rank, was killed at Majuba in 
1881,2 the first British General killed in action since 
Waterloo. The Ring was primarily a fighting organisation -
Wood gave up the chance to command the Staff College in 
order to see more actionJ - and its approach to war a 
mixture of expedients and efficiency. The exception in its 
membership was Henry Brackenbury, a staff officer rather 
than a field commander, who shortly after receiving pro-
motion to Major-General in 1885 (aged forty-eight) largely 
through Wolseley's efforts, transferred to the Staff of the 
4 Indian Army. 
CoTonial campaigns, though varied, possessed 
common features which made their validity as precedents for 
European war doubtful. The main problems were the supply 
and movement of a usually small European~yle army in non-
European climate and terrain. The enemy was invariably 
inferior in organisation and discipline, and even if 
1 . Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p 159 
2. Lehmann, The First Boer War, p 262 
J. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol I, p 294 
4. Brackenbury to Wolseley, 1J August 1885, Autograph 
Brackenbury 5, Wolseley 
-74-
equipped with the latest firearms lacked fire-control and 
an understanding of trajectory. Arab tribesmen in parti-
1 
cular were notoriously bad shots. As the Official Hand-
book said, 'tactics favour the regular army while strategy 
favours the enemy - therefore the object is to fight, not 
2 to manoeuvre'. Tactics for Infantry were the advance in 
widely separated columns and the battle in shoulder-to-
shoulder squares of battalions; and for Cavalry the close-
order charge against irregular footsoldiers whose forma-
tions possessed intrinsically the unsteadiness required 
for a charge to succeed. 
Although not in South Africa when the Zulu 
war began in January 1879, Wolseley had served there for 
three previous years, and Wood and Buller were still in 
Natal. 3 According to Wolseley, there was insufficient grass 
in Zululand between August and May to feed the 7,600 horses 
and oxen which Lord Chelmsford's five columns, totalling 
16,000 men, required for its invasion. 4 Although the basis 
of Chelmsford's force was eight regular Infantry battalion~ 
1. Younghusband, A Soldier's Memories in Peace and War, 
p 100; Smith-Dorien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years 
Service, pp 40-2. For evidence of the Zulu also as poor 
shots see Wolseley to Stanley, 18 July 1879, SA2 pp 26 
-35 Wolseley. 
2. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principle and Practice, 
especially p 72 
3. For the general course of this war see Morris, The 
Washing of the Spears, from which the figures for 
Chelmsford's force, other than those which appear in 
Wolseley, are taken. 
4. Wolseley to Stanley, 16 February 1879, CYP 1 pp 72-7 
Wolseley; Morris, The Washing of the Spears, p 295 
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he had no regular Cavalry; Wolseley recommended that 
lancers especially would be useless in the war, and local 
mounted riflemen would suffice. 1 There were 1,000 of these 
men in Chelmsford's force. Those with previous service in 
the numerous bush wars, colonists and natural riders, were 
of very high quality, particularly Buller's Frontier Light 
2 Horse, riding at just 13i stones. A hundred were genuine 
Mounted Infantry, British regulars with horses, who Wood 
found alarmingly poor riders and horsemasters. 3 Chelms-
ford's force was actually short of good scouts, and the 
absence of any scouting horsemen at all from the main 
column for several hours resulted in the just twenty 
minutes' warning of a Zulu attack which led to the disaster 
at Isandhlwana. 4 
After Isandhlwana, Wolseley was sent to take 
command, and Chelmsford received reinforcements, including 
a regular Cavalry brigade of two regiments, from Britain. 
Their commander, however, was put on Line of Communications 
duties and the regiments broken up to provide scouting 
1. Wolseley to Stanley, 16 February 1879, CYP 1 pp 72-7 
Wolseley. Minute No 52, NAT 1 pp 96-9 ·Wolseley 
2. Morris, The Washing of the Spears, p 295; "A"833, 'Zulu 
War 1879 Veterinary Department General Report', (War 
Office) 
3. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol I, p 318; 
vol II, p 24 
4. Morris, The Washing of the Spears, pp 270-1, suggests 
seven hours from 3 a.m. to 10 a.m. It is not suggested 
that surprise was the sole cause of this disaster, but 
it was certainly a contributing factor. If Chelmsford 
had known the precise location of the main Z:ulu force 
on the evening before Isandhlwana, he would not have 
split his force. 
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1 patrols. Only one squadron, of the 17th Lancers, was 
pre~ent at the decisive battle of Ulundi, where it deli-
vered a final charge against already shaken Zulu who did 
2 
not stand. Thereafter the war's main object became the 
capture of the Zulu King Cetshwayo and the rounding up of 
small parties in the bush. To deal with these frightened 
men even the mounted riflemen took to carrying lances. 3 
But the regular Cavalry horses, arriving unfit from a long 
sea voyage, had been given no time to acclimatise, but put 
to work carrying their usual twenty stones~ while Chelms-
ford, unable to solve his supply problems, had in late 
May, two months after their arrival, cut their corn ration 
from ten to eight pounds, the balance to be made up by 
grazingo 5 The full ration for peacetime training in Britain 
for these b~g horses was ten pounds of oats, twelve pounds 
of hay and eight pounds of straw, and even this was some-
1. Wolseley to Cambridge, 18 July 1879, SA2 pp 52-61, 
Wolseley. The brigade commander was Major-General Fred-
erick Marshal, late reforming Colonel of the 2nd Life 
Guards, who had received praise for his use of scouting 
in manoeuvres. See above, Chapter One, pp 59, 61. 
2 . Morris, The Washing of the Spears, pp 270-1, the Zulu 
poor shooting and charging tactics made it possible for 
the Cavalry, waiting inside the British square, to see 
clearly when they became unsteady. 
3. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, 
p 223 
4. Morris, The Washing of the Spears, pp 500-01, suggests 
that the Cavalry took 'several weeks' to recover from 
the voyage. However, he also states (p 497) that the 
Cavalry arrived shortly before the 9th of April, and 
first moved off up country on 17th April. This is borne 
out generally by the account of the war in Marter, who 
is weak on dates. 
5. "A"833, 'Zulu War 1879 Veterinary Department General 
Report' (War Office) 
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1 times not enough. Wolseley, blaming Chelmsford, argued 
that Indian corn, or 'mealies t , could be obtained locally, 
and there was enough grass at Ulundi (in April) to feed the 
whole brigade. 2 Even if this had been true, British horse~ 
normally manger fed, would not eat mealies, and grazing in 
the presence of the enemy was dangerous . J Many horses 
died, and the rest were left so weak from starvation and 
overwork that after three months only one regiment could be 
horsed. Wolseley chose the smarter and heavier of the two 
from an astonishing motive: 
The 17th [Lancers] was the regiment I should 
have preferred making use of; but as they had 
had their turn, and as the poor 'Heavies' were 
down on their luck, having a useless Colonel, 
and never having seen a shot fired, I thought 
it would be more in accordance with your Royal 
Highness' wishes to let the King's Dragoon 
Guards have their innings. 4 
Such was Wo lseley's opinion of the value of Cavalr y . 
Major Marter of the King's Dragoon Guards, seeing numerous 
Mounted Infantry and mounted riflemen's patrols sent out 
1 . The British Army, p 2J7; Verner, The Military Life of 
H.R.H. George Duke of Cambridge, Vol II, p J67. SO much 
food seems exces s ive compared to that given to an 
average riding horse in present times, but reflects both 
the amount of work the horse was required to do, and the 
weight it had to carry . 
2 . Wolseley to Cambridge, 28 September 1879, SA2 122- J5 
Wolseley . This of course contradicts his earlier state-
ment that there was insufficient grass in Zululand in 
summer (August - May). Also, if any small area is inten-
sively grazed by a large number of animals, the grass 
will not grow again for some time. 
J . "A"8JJ, 'Zulu War 1879 Veterinary Department General 
Report' (War Office) 
4 . Wolseley to Cambridge, 28 September 1879, SA2 122- J5 
Wolseley 
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under members of Wolseley's staff while his own men were 
held in camp, believed: 
The capture of the King being a 'plum' yet to 
be gained in the war, such credit as would be 
gained thereby was to be reserved, not for 
regimental soldiers who had borne the toil and 
hardships of the campaign with little chance of 
distinction, but for some member of that illus-
trious body the 'Mutual Admiration Society' , 
recently arrived from England. 1 
This, although unjust to Wolseley, who was impressed by 
2 Marter and recommended him for promotion, shows the 
Cavalry's view of the threat posed by the Ring's use of 
Mounted Infantry. In the event, one of Marter's patrols 
caught Cetshwayo. 
Wolseley stayed in South Africa until 1880, 
encountering the mysterious 'horse sickness', a lung 
disease endemic to the Transvaal, which killed horses in 
hours. 3 Although foreseeing the likelihood of war with the 
Boers, he recommended that the Dragoon Guards be sent home 
in October 1880,4 and when the First Boer War did break out 
two months later, again neither he nor any British Cavalry 
regiment was in the country. The Boers, farmers and game-
hunters, even more than the Natal colonists natural mounted 
1. Marter manuscript autobiography written in the third 
person, no pagination, 6408-87-12 Marter 
2. Wolseley to Cambridge, 29 January 1880, SA2 pp 229-32 
Wolseley 
3. War Office Report 116/Cape/35, 'Report on African Horse 
Sickness', Nunn, 27 October 1888 (British Library); 
Wolseley to Richard Wolseley, 14 October 1879, 163/v/20 
Wolseley 
4. Wolseley to Hicks Beach, 19 December 1879, SA1 pp 225-35 
Wolseley 
d 
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riflemen, developed their battle tactics from fighting 
Zulu and other tribes of charging foot warriors: defending 
a strong position by rifle fire, and prepared to ride away 
if defeat threatened . Wolseley, in an unconscious adoption 
of the view that morale derived from the arme blanche, 
1 
attributed these tactics to lack of ipluck'. Pomeroy-
Colley, left in command, believed that an arme blanche 
charge threatening their flank would cause the Boers to 
rout from their defences . There was some basis for this 
belief, later endorsed by the Official Handbook on colonial 
2 
war. One Boer, watching British Cavalry soon after the 
war, was heard to say that 'if you had only had four hun-
dred men like that, with swords, who would gallop at us 
without caring if a few were shot, we should never have 
risen,.3 That was one opinion; Natal colonists felt in-
stead that Mounted Rifles were of more value against the 
4 Boers . Regardless, having no Cavalry, Pomeroy- Colley 
improvised a charging force from retired Dragoons, the 
Army Service Corps and Infantry volunteers, all given 
horses. At the tiny battle of Laing's Nek seventy of these 
charged, to be narrowly repulsed with seventeen men and 
thirty- two horses killed and wounded . 5 Even this 
1 . SSL 8/2 p cclxii manuscript, Wolseley 
2. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, 
p 217 
3 . 'The Boers at Home: Jottings from the Transvaal', 
Blackwoods, vol 130, p 768 
4 . 'Bonne Esperance', iIs Cavalry the Arm for South 
Africa?' USM 1886, pt II, pp 311 - 17 
5. Lehmann, The First Boer War, pp 136, 152 
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improbable force had come close to success, and Pomeroy-
C911ey was convinced regular Cavalry would have won the 
1 battle. Again reinforcements were sent, including three 
Cavalry regiments. But in order to bring these up to war 
strength, nearly 550 men and horses each, other regiments 
had to be depleted. The Inniskilling Dragoons, for example, 
had to take 164 horses from four different regiments. 2 
Again there was, in the emergency, no attempt to acclima-
tise, and the horses refused the local food;J Evelyn Wood, 
leading the reinforcements, was unimpresssed by the 
Cavalry's scouting and horsemastership,4 but did recommend 
three weeks' acclimatisaion for horses in South Africa in 
future. 5 He took fifty Cavalry to Pomeroy-Colley, and was 
leading a hundred more when, in another skirmish, on the 
rocky Maj~ba hill, the Boers completely outshot their oppo-
nents. Pomeroy-Colley was killed, and his small Army 
routed. The Cavalry were never employed. Captain Ian 
Hamilton survived with a smashed hand and a conviction that 
in future individual shooting would dominate 6 war. 
After Majuba, Wood was ordered to make peace, 
1. Pomeroy-Colley to Wolseley, 21 February 1881, Autograph 
Pomeroy-Colley J, Wolseley; SSL 8/2 clcxxxi manuscript 
Wolseley; Pomeroy-Colley quote in Verner, The Military 
Life of H.R.H. George Duke of Cambridge, Vol II, p 190 
2. Jackson, The Inniskilling Dragoons, p 189 
J. Compton, A King's Hussar, pp 2J8-49, 255 
4. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol II, pp 111, 
114 
5. ibid, vol II, p 1J5 
6. Lehmann, The First Boer War, pp 2J6-48 
, 
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and the Cavalry fraternised with the Boers while waiting. 
The 14th Hussars, who organised a shooting match at 300 
and 500 yards, were surprised to find their men consistently 
outshot the Boers. 1 Four years previously the regiment had 
gained a new Colo~el, a believer in dismounted action. The 
complete transformation this could effect in a regiment was 
remarkable: 
We wore [khaki] serge coats and khaki pants, 
with Indian puttees, or long strips of cloth 
bound round and round the leg, in lieu of jack-
boots: they were far more comfortable and sup-
porting. Our helmets and belts were rubbed 
over with red clay to harmonise with the colour 
of the ground, and our steel was all dulled. 
The squadrons of the Inniskillings and the 15th 
Hussars adopted quite a different style; they 
were as spick and span as could be, with helmets 
and gloves white and clean, and steel and brass 
work all sparkling in the sun. It was a queer 
contrast altogether, and represented two widely 
different schools of military opinion. 2 
So much depended on the individual regimental commander, 
since there was no general doctrine of dismounted fighting. 
At about the same date, one Colonel was telling his men not 
to march on foot in step, since this Infantry habit des -
troyed their value as Cavalry.3 Although khaki became 
general for war in 1885, some regiments would not reach the 
standard of the 14th Hussars for thirty years. 
Meanwhile in India, as a consequence of the 
Second Afghan War of 1878- 80, a group of officers emerged 
1. Compton, A King1s Hussar, p 270 
2 . ibid, p 285 
3 . Western, Reminiscences of an Indian Cavalry Officer, 
p 247 
k 
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headed by Sir Frederick Roberts, and known, inevitably, as 
the 'Roberts Ring'. It was, however, an altogether diffe-
rent association to Wolseley's, who met most of his leading 
Ring members while still in his thirties, and was their 
senior by less t~an five years. Roberts rose to fame at 
forty-seven, and the men of his Ring were Captains and 
Lieutenants in their twenties. Nicholson (a future Chief 
of Imperial General Staff) Pretyman and Pole-Carew all 
served as aides-de-camp to Roberts in Afghanistan. 1 An-
other leading Ring member, Ian Hamilton, was adopted hy 
Roberts through a chance meeting in the war.2 Another, 
Henry Rawlinson, was the son of an old friend and was given 
an aide-de-camp's job at his entreaty in 1885;3 while 
Rawlinson's close friend Henry Wilson, who never met 
Roberts in, India , was introduced at a cricket match in 
Britain in 1893. 4 Roberts' relation with these men was 
paternal, including in Rawlinson's case, as he himself 
admitted, the tolerance of inferior work. 5 They were his 
1. For the Roberts Ring and its activities see: Roberts, 
Forty-One Years in India; James, Lord Roberts; Hamilton, 
Listening for the Drums and The Happy Warrior. See also 
The Second Afghan War, Abridged Official Account 
2. Hamilton, The Happy Warrior, pp 38,. 46 
3. Rawlinson (snr) to Roberts, 27 March 1885, 7101-23-60 
Roberts; Morris, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of 
Trent, pp 11-12 
4. Wilson Diary, 26 May 1893, Wilson 
5. Rawlinson to Roberts, 9 January 1890, 7101-23-61 Roberts. 
Rawlinson was applying to Roberts for a letter to show 
the Staff College saying he would make a good staff 
officer, and apologising for his poor staff work. This 
letter was apparently provided, since Rawlinson entered 
the Staff College in 1891. 
~"""""" ______________________ E 
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supporters, never his rivals. 
Wolseley, like most British officers, claimed 
to be above politics, and failed to recognise the profound 
conservatism this view reflected. 'You and I as soldiers', 
he t old a Ring ,member in 1886 , '.have nothing to do with 
political questions. ,1 He saw changes of government large-
2 ly in terms of their effect on his own career. Roberts 
was considerably more politically sophisticated; the pro-
blems of India resembled those of the European land powers, 
with a threatened main frontier and a large permanent Army, 
and his concerns were chiefly with grand strategy and 
organisation, into which politics automatically entered . 
Although no less brave than Wolseley's men, the Roberts 
Ring was basically a Staff; one member, William Robertson, 
rose to prominence in the Simla Intelligence Branch and 
saw virtually no regimental service after being commissioned? 
Hamilton in particular claimed 'all the difference between 
amateur and professional separates England and India' in 
1 . Wolseley to Butler, 1J May 1886, W/PLB/1/69, Wolseley; 
Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, pp 47, 
219 
2. Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p 60 
J . For Roberts' involvement with politics, particularly the 
'Forward Policy' in India, see: Roberts, Forty- One Years 
in India . Se~ also Robertson, From Private to Field 
Marshal. Robertson was exceptional in that, although 
aided by Roberts, he never adopted the same filial 
attitude as the other Ring members, and when working at 
Simla once complained that he had 'no friends, no 
interests and not a bob in the world', the importance 
of all three of which in securing promotion he recog-
nised. Younghusband, A Soldier's Memories in Peace and 
War, p 2J7 
r 
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pI arming for 1 war. He also possessed his own view of 
future conflicts, expressed at its most visionary in 1885. 2 
Increases in rifle ranges and accuracy would make Cavalry 
and Artillery obsolete, and battles would consist of mass 
ho rdes of widelY ,dispersed sharpshooters picking each 
other off at extreme ranges, with victory depending on 
individual cunning and steadiness. More prosaically, 
Roberts and all his Ring regarded musketry as the most 
important duty of the Army, and lost no chance to improve 
"t 3 l • 
Two of the Cavalry regiments which served in 
the Afghan War were among the smartest in the Army. The 
10th Hussars, which four years previously had developed its 
own system of dismounted work (later generally adopted) 
proved Very, efficient. 4 But Roberts concluded from the 
performance of the 9th Lancers that the lance was obsolete, 
and eventually ordered them to give it up and carry carbines 
slung on their backs. 5 He took with him ever after a 
vivid picture of these men, in tight uniforms, swords 
hanging from waistbelts, trying to skirmish on foot in 
1. Hamilton to Lady Dilke, 5 July 1887, 43908' f 139 Dilke 
2 . Hamilton, The Fighting of the Future, especially p 22 
3. Roberts, Forty One Years in India, p 499; Hamilton, The 
Happy Warrior, p 51 
4 . Brandes, The 10th Royal Hussars, p 57 . For an account 
of the war, see The Second Afghan War, Abridged Official 
Account 
5. Roberts, Forty One Years in India, p 4.37 
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rocky terrain against Afghan riflemen. Indeed, as another 
officer observed some years later, describing a training 
exercise: 
To see a hussar trussed up in a skin-tight 
tunic, white belts, white gloves, tall busby, 
long boots, carbine in one hand, sword in the 
other, one foot in a rabbit hole, the other 
hung up on his 'swagger appendage' [sabretacheJ 
falling face forward into a prickly furze bush, 
is a sight for the gods. 1 
Roberts also ordered the Cavalry to carry their swords on 
the saddle so as not to impede dismounted action. This 
practice, becoming common in reformed regiments, was 
generally adopted in 1891.2 He also formed an experimental 
force of Mounted Infantry.3 Baker Russell, a Wolseleyite 
commanding his own 13th Hussars in Afghanistan, believed 
Cavalry should be 'able to act on foot as well as the best 
4 Infantry'. Certainly there was considerable dismounted 
fighting from both British and Indian Cavalry regiments in 
the war, while charges, usually successful, were of squadron 
or regimental size. 5 Russell felt most of the Cavalry's 
problems were due to an incompetent brigade commander. He 
was also annoyed at the high reputation won by Roberts in 
the war, describing the decisive battle of Khandahar to 
1. Graves, 'Cavalry Equipment, Organisation and Distri-
bution', JRUSI Vol 34, p 704 
2 . Roberts, Forty One Years in India, p 437 
3. The Second Afghan War, Abridged Official Account, p 380 
4. Quoted in Baden- Powell, Cavalry Instruction,p 128 
5 . The Second Afghan War, Abridged Official Account, espec -
ially pp 60- 1, 66, 74, 124, 162, 222 - 3, 410- 11 
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Wolseleyas 'a most ill-managed scramble'. 1 
Roberts' reputation was due in large part to 
exploitation of the Press. Whereas Wolseley, despite his 
. 2 
own use of newspapers to spread his v~ews, shared the 
common Army dislike of reporters and delighted in mis-
leading them on campaign,3 Roberts actively encouraged re-
porting of his expedition - on condition that the reports 
were censored by his own staff. He felt betrayed when one 
reporter smuggled out a highly critical despatch without 
censorship. Despite a brief outcry at this innovation, 
there was little the newspapers could do but accept- Roberts' 
4 terms; the result of the campaign was a peerage and public 
adulation. In Britain at the time of Majuba, Roberts was 
sent out to take command in South Africa, only to arrive 
and find pe~ce had been made. According to one account he 
swore to live an abstemious life so as to live long enough 
to avenge the 'Majuba surrender,.5 Wolseley was equally 
furious, both with Wood for making peace at the Government's 
insistence, and with Roberts for being sent instead of him-
1. Russell to Wolseley, 15 January 1881, LW/p/7/7/2, 
Wolseley 
2. Minute No 49, NAT _1, pp 90-1, Wolseley; Wolseley to 
Frere, 9 December 1879, SA1, pp 188-91, Wolseley. See 
also Preston, 'Wolseley, the Khartoum Relief Expedition, 
and the Defence of India 1885-1900', p 254 
3. SSL 8, P clxxxviii, manuscript Wolseley; Arthur, The 
Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p 73 
4. Roberts, Forty One Years in India, p 374; Forbes, 'War 
Correspondents and the Authorities', 19th Century, Vol 
VII, pp 185-97 
5. Lehmann, The First Boer War, p 281 
1 
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Wolseley's next war was the invasion of 
Egypt in 1882 . But althoughms force was nearly 40,000 
men, only three Cavalry regiments could be sent with it. 
Even then the regiment next in line for overseas service 
gave up just under 200 horses and 100 men to the expedition~ 
Wolseley obtained more Cavalry by making up a Composite 
Regiment of picked men from the Household Brigade, which 
did not usually serve abroad. The experiment proved 
successful, the Household delivering a crucial charge at 
the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. 3 In addition, each Infantry 
battalion produced forty 'MoI.' (as Mounted Infantry were 
coming to be known) and for his march into the desert 
Wolseley took every mounted soldier from Evelyn Wood's 
reserve bri~ade, assuming that Wood was 'sure to find some 
4 
more'. Left holding a front of five and a half miles 
with no scouts, Wood entrusted this task to an Infantry 
Captain, Horace Smith-Douien, who scoured Alexandria for 
horses and equipment, and in two days produced a patrol of 
seventeen Mounted Infantry.5 It was the kind of initiative 
1. SSL 10/1, p xxxix, manuscript Wolseley; Arthur, The 
Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p 154 
2. Whyte and Atteridge, A History of the Queens Bays, 
p 183; Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the 
British Empire, p 193; Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in 
Modern War, p 39 
3. 'Notes of an Egyptian Campaigner', Blackwoods, Vol 132, 
p 799; Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, 
p 75 
4. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, Vol II, pp 150-1 
5 . Smith-Donien, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
pp 38-9 
y 
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and improvisation which appealed to the Wolseley Ring. The 
M.I.. with Wolseley, a picked elite with a high proportion 
1 
of officers, did well as advance guards and scouts. But 
within two weeks problems of overloading, starvation and 
failure to acclimatise destroyed the Cavalry horses . 'They 
melted away', wrote one veterinary officer, 'like ice in a 
2 
summer sun.' 
For the Gordon Relief Expedition of 1884 
Wolseley furthered his practice of selecting elite troops, 
with a Camel Corps of men from Infantry and Cavalry regi-
ments. 3 This not only, as Cambridge protested, ran counter 
to the principle of the regiment as the basis of morale 
and discipline, it also left the home regiments quite 
ludicrously weak. Cambridge would have preferred to send 
Wolseley a Q extra battalion and a full strength Hussar 
regiment, but after five years of borrowing horses and men 
in the Cavalry no such thing existed. 4 One regiment in 
Egypt, however, was the 19th Hussars, for which Percy 
Barrow had gained a high reputation as scouts while still 
in Britain. Mounted on local arab horses (having lost their 
English mounts two years before) they led the scouting for 
1. 'Notes of an Egyptian Campaigner', Blackwoods, Vol 132, 
p 809 
2 . Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 
1899- 1902, p 235 
3 . See Preston, 'Wolseley, the Khartoum Relief Expedition 
and the Defence of India 1885- 1900', pp 254- 80 for this 
campaign . 
4 . Verner, The Military Life of H.R . H. George Duke of 
Cambridge, Vol -II, p 267 
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Herbert Stewart's desert column, and lost only three horses 
to ?xhaustion. 1 They performed notable dismounted service 
at Tamasi,2 and after the battle of Abu Klea and Stewart's 
death, when Redvers Buller took command of the column, 
they shepherded it out of the desert to safety. Finding 
(as did other regiments in Egypt ) that the arab tribesmen 
on foot flung themselves to the ground to avoid swordpoints, 
the Hussars took to carrying arab spears as lances;3 but 
there was little point in a close-order charge, since the 
arabs, both horsemen and footsoldiers, fought in such a 
loose formation that they could be ridden through without 
4 
much effect. Fighting instead consisted of a series of 
skirmishes. The column's rearguard, twenty Hussars under 
Major John French (a protege of Barrow) excelled in this 
and drew b~th Wood's and Buller's attention. 5 The success 
of the Hussars also broke the cycle of weak Cavalry regi-
ments with unfit horses doing badly in war resulting in an 
1. Newspaper cutting of 11 July 1882 preserved in Barrow 
diary, 6009-14 Barrow; Dundonald, My Army Life, p 29; 
Dormer to Wolseley, 10 February 1882, Autograph Dormer, 
Wolsele;y; SSL 9/1, p ccvii, manuscript Wolseley; French, 
The Life of ••• John French First Earl of Ypres, p J2 
2. Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 191 
J. Ferguson to his parents, 21 March 1885, 6807-269 Fer-
guson, also mentions this practice. His regiment, 20th 
Hussars, took over the horses of the 19th Hussars when 
replacing them in Egypt in 1885. 
4. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, pp 
219, 22J; Dundonald, My Army Life, p 41 suggests that at 
Abu Klea Stewart wanted the Cavalry to charge, but the 
horses were too exhausted to attempt it. In view of the 
Arab tactics this seems unlikely. 
5. French, The Life of ••• John French First Earl of Ypres, 
pp 18, J2-5 
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increased demand for Mounted Infantry . In contrast the 
2,200 riding and baggage camels of the Camel Corps nearly 
all died from overwork and underfeeding . 1 There was nothing 
of the affection between them and their riders which existed 
. 2 
between men and horses in the Cavalry. This, according to 
one officer, acted as a powerful bond within the regiments, 
promoting group unity and horse care. 3 But,as had been 
repeatedly shown, horse care was inadequate and horses 
overloaded for the conditions they would inevitably meet in 
colonial war . 
The accusations of jobbery generated by his 
Ring's Sl~ccess led Wolseley deliberately to employ as staff 
officers in 1884 men who had not previously served with 
him,4 and to bring forward younger officers who had sought 
his patronage and that of his Ring. He arranged directly, 
for example, for Lord Cochrane - the future Earl of Dun-
donald - to command the Life Guards camel contingent in 
Stewart's column. 5 Seeing the arab horsemen fail to break 
into his square at Abu Klea, Dundonald concluded that the 
days of the ~ blanche were over, 'that if men on foot 
armed with a magazine rifle do not flinch, men on horseback 
6 
with cold steel have but a poor chance of success'. This 
1 . Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, Vol II, p 175 
2 . Hills, The Royal Horse Guards, p 69 
3. Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p 90 
4. Verner, The Military Life of HoR oH. George Duke of 
Cambridge, Vol II, p 273 
5. Dundonald, My Army Life, p 20 
6 . ibid, p 39 
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was questionable. Cavalry had seldom broken squares in the 
days . of flintlocks, and the irregular swarms of horsemen 
were scarcely comparable to the disciplined arme blanche 
charge. 
Other junior officers were also brought for-
ward by the Ringo Following the expedition, Major Edward 
Hutton, a leading specialist on Mounted Infantry, was 
brought from Aldershot to organise, with Smith-Dorien as 
Adjutant, an M.I Q contingent for the Suakin Field Force of 
1 the Egyptian Army, now under the command of Evelyn Wood. 
The Suakin M.I. represented the triumph of the belief that 
good scouting horsemen could be readily improvised from a 
selected elite: its men came from thirty-five different 
units, including the Royal Marines. But nearly all were 
2 
also already veterans of Egypt. Meanwhile in India Baker 
Russell spotted in his own regiment a promising Lieutenant, 
Robert Baden-Powell (who had taken the Hythe musketry 
course) and when offered a temporary brigade in 1883, took 
Baden-Powell as his Brigade-Major. 3 
That French, Hutton, Smith-Do~en and Baden-
Powell held widely divergent views on the value and function of 
Cavalry and Mounted Infantry mattered nothing to Wolseley 
and his men, who were chronically short of mounted troops 
1. Stephenson to Wolseley, 6 May 1884, Autograph Stephenson 
1, Wolseley; Smith-Dorien, Memories of Forty Eight Years 
Service, p 53 
2. Smith-Don2en, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, p 55 
3 . Hillcourt, Baden-Powell: The Two Lives of a Hero, pp 56-
60 
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and good men to lead them. From the 1870s onwards, the two 
strands of tactical doctrine, Mounted Infantry or hybrid 
Cavalry, were transmitted less by the works of theorists 
than by personal contact and example. In particular, of two 
men who commanded Cavalry Brigades in the BoEeF. of 1914, 
1 Philip Chetwode served in the 19th Hussars under French, 
and Beauvoirde Lisle in the Suakin M.I. under Smith-Dorien~ 
For junior Cavalry officers the small scouting columns pro-
vided the independence and exercise of initiative which 
the inoperative squadron system was meant to supply; for 
Infantrymen the chance to gain a reputation so hard to come 
by serving in a battalion. The new doctrines were unoffi-
cial and uncodified, and in practice successful Cavalry and 
Mounted Infantry both employed much the same hybrid tactics. 
While these wars were fought, the first steps 
to codify their lessons, and fit the new hybrid into the 
Army's structure of Cavalry and Infantry, were made. Fol-
lowing the experiences of South Africa and Egypt, Cambridge 
recommended in late 1882 that a full company of M.I. should 
be trained by every battalion. 3 At an enquiry into 
musketry standards a year earlier, Roberts, insisting his 
own experimental M.I. had been 'most perfect', put forward 
1. French, The Life of ••• John French First Earl of Ypres, 
p 40 
2. Smith-Donden, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
p 64 
3. Verner, The Military Life of H.RoH. George Duke of 
Cambridge, Vol II, p 302 
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his case for the sword on the saddle and the lance as 
inferior to the sword for the Cavalry. Officers of the 
Cavalry stressed their new awareness of the value of 
musketry; one Colonel called it 'the most important thing 
in the world', while another was able to report his regi-
1 
ment had just extended its training course at Hythe. In 
1884 Chenevix-Trench, previously the severest critic of 
the Cavalry's dislike of dismounted action, wrote that it 
had 'only recently begun to meet with the full and frank 
recognition it deserves, . 2 At the same time the Cavalry's 
shortcomings were the subject of a series of committees 
enquiring into the sword, the saddle, the structure of the 
Cavalry and above all its shortage of horses. 3 As unease 
grew Major-General Keith Fraser, late the reforming Colonel 
of 2nd Lif~ Guards (Dundonald's regiment) felt obliged to 
deny publicly the rumour that he had chaired a committee to 
convert Cavalry into Mounted Infantry.4 
For the first time the confused terminology 
of the arme blanche controversy became of crucial importance. 
Participants fought each other over the differences between 
'Cavalry', 'Mounted Rifles V and 'Mounted Infantry', while 
1. "A"849, 'Report of the Committee on Musketry Instruction 
in the Army', 1881, report and evidence (War Office) 
2. Chenevix- Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 164 
3. "A" 86.5 , 'Report of the Cavalry Organisation Committee', 
1882; "A"961, 'Cavalry Reorganisation', 1884; "A"997, 
'Special Committee on Swords and Scabbards in the 
Cavalry', 1884-.5; "A"30, 'Committee on Saddlery', 1886 
(all War Office) 
4 . Editor's note, USM 188.5, pt I, P 78; Hills, The Life 
Guards, p 80 
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the majority of officers, and of the interested public, 
could not see the distinction. Prussian Cavalry carrying 
the Chassepot in 1870 were claimed as 'mounted riflemen', 1 
and this term was used interchangeably with 'Mounted In-
fantry' , even in the RUSI. 2 In 1890 Hutton told a gathering 
at Aldershot: 
I am very anxious to have the distinction made 
very clear between Mounted Infantry and Mounted 
Rifles, because the two have been confused in 
such a hopeless manner by the Press, and even 
by military writers, that a great deal of 
uncalled-for controversy has resulted.3 
In the British Army 'Mounted Infantry' now had a very pre-
cise meaning - members of regular Infantry battalions tem-
porarily given horses - as well as its unofficial, and older, 
meaning as a synonym for mounted riflemen. The threat of 
conversion to Mounted Infantry was henceforth a nightmare 
for even r e forming Cavalrymen , who i nterpreted it to mean 
the destruction of their regiments by absorption into the 
Infantry. So suspicious did the Cavalry become that when 
in 1884 it was recommended that regiments should be per-
manently linked in threes, one abroad, one at home, one 
training recruits and horses, this was seen as an attempt 
to amalgamate two- thirds of the regiments out of e x istence . 
They were 'to lose their identity', wrote one critic, 'and 
1 . Chenevix-Trench, 'Progress in Developing the Capabili-
ties of Cavalry', JRUSI vol 21, p 998 
2 . Lumley, 'Mounted Riflemen', JRUSI vol 25, p 638; Hayes, 
The 3Udents' Manual of Tactics, p 5; Parsley, 'A 
Trooper's View of the Yeomanry', USM vol VI NS, P 58 
3 . Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture 
Three, p 2 
T 
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the halo of glory which attached more or less to all of 
them is to be obliterated,.1 After much protest, Cambridge 
2 
rejected the scheme . 
Wolseley, promoted to Adjutant-General in 
1882, worked to secure Army reform as he saw it . In 188.5-6, 
with war between Germany and France apparently close, the 
War Office implemented a scheme, drawn up by Brackenbury, 
for a Field Army of two Army Corps and a Cavalry Division, 
producing a major increase in the Army Estimates. J With 
the change of Government, the Treasury became committed to 
reducing these estimates again, and Cambridge and Wolseley, 
intent on preserving the Infantry battalions which were the 
basis of Imperial defence, and looking at possibilities of 
reducing the Cavalry and Artillery, began to realise fully 
the extent ~of the shortage of trained horses . When the 
Treasury offered to permit the Army Corps some horses for 
Transport and Mounted Infantry, on condition that an equal 
number were taken from the Cavalry, the Commander-in- Chief 
and the Adjutant General agonised over whether the Cavalry 
could spare just 240 horseso 4 As Cambridge observed: 
we have absolutely not got the full complement 
of Cavalry for the two proposed Army Corps, and 
then there is nothing left to fall back on as a 
reserve for the absolute requirements in Ireland 
and England should the Army Corps be required to 
take the field • .5 
1. 'Cavalry Reorganisation', USM 1882, pt II, p J99 
2. Verner, The Military Life of H.R.H. George Duke of 
Cambridge, Vol II, p JO.5 
J . Hamer, The British Army. Civil - Military Relations 188.5-
12Q2, pp 9J- 111; See also Tables, Part One, Table .5 
4 . W/Mem/J Memo . 1/J1 January 1887, Wolseley 
.5 . W/Mem/J Memo. 1/undated January 1887, Wolseley 
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Wolseley himself repeatedly stated that even to discuss the 
possiblity of reducing the Cavalry was a waste of time, 1 
and that the removal of a single horse would seriously 
° ° th A ' ffo ° 2 lmpalr e rmy s e lClency. 
Although the actual number of Cavalry in-
creased from 13,500 to 14,500 in the decade 1880-1890,3 
mainly through the decision to increase regiments from three 
to four squadrons in 1885,4 the percentage of Cavalry in 
the Army declined in the same period from 10.45 per cent to 
9. 2 5 per cent. 5 Yet even this was almost identical to the 
proportion of Cavalry in the Armies of Germany and France. 6 
Despite appearances, the British Cavalry was not under-
strength, but simply badly organised, split into too many 
small regiments with too few horses. Whereas the Germans 
kept their Qavalry sixty horses and men stronger than war 
establishment (the remainder forming a depot on mobili-
sation) and produced regime~ of 600 men or more, no 
British Government, as Wolseley declared, would sanction 
such extravagance. 7 The Cavalry of Continental powers 
were held at full strength in case of sudden declaration of 
1. W/Mem/1 Memo. 1/12 November 1885, Wolseley 
2. W/Mem/3 Memo. 2/14 March 1887, p 12, Wolseley 
3. See Tables, Part One, Table 1 
4. W/Mem/1 Memo. 20 April 1885, p 5, Wolseley; Verner, The 
Military Life of H.R.H. George Duke of Cambridg e,Vol1Cf331 
5. See Tables, Part One, Tables 1 and 2 
6. Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 19 
7. Goodenough and Dalton, The Arm Book for the British 
Empire, p 192; W/Mem/2 Memo. 8 19 October 1886, Wolseley 
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war and, with no land frontier, there was not the same re-
quirement of instant readiness in Britain. 1 In theory, of 
the sixteen Home regiments, eight were on the 'higher 
establishment' (still short of war establishment) of 542 
men and 400 horses. In reality just two were on higher 
establishment. 2 In one regiment 169 men had less than a 
year's service. J In 1887 a Remo~t Department was founded, 
and a register begun of civilian owners of suitable horses 
4 for Army use, but only by using up all the reservists, re-
gardless of regiment, could the Cavalry for even one Army 
Corps in war be found. 5 The Treasury would scarcely 
sanction an increase in the Cavalry, an arm with doubts of 
obsolescence hanging over it, and regimental tradition 
would not sanction its rationalisation. 
Wolseley's solution was a typical expedient. 
In 1888 he created a Mounted Infantry School under Hutton 
at Aldershot, the first of three in Britain and several 
around the Empire. This was to train a section of thirty-
three first class marksmen from every line battalion as 
6 M.I. Sixty-four Infantry battalions would provide enough 
1. W/Mem/2 Memo. 8/19 October 1886, Wolseley. A copy also 
exists in "A"76 'Papers on Cavalry Reserve Men v , 1886 
(War Office) 
2. W/Mem/1 Memo. 20 April 1885, Wolseley 
J. W/Mem/2 Memo. 8/19 October 1886, p 5, Wolseley 
4. Tylden, Horses and Saddlery, p 24; Goodenough and Dalton, 
The Army Book for the British Empire, pp 182-4 
5. W/Mem/2 Memo~ 8/19 October 1886, p 5, Wolseley 
6. The British Arm b a Lieutenant-Colonel in the British 
Army, hereafter The British Army, p 2 
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sections, with the extra officers, for two complete M.I. 
bat~alions, a thousand strong, one for each Army Corps, 
costing just £700 a year each to maintain in peacetime . 
By 1892 Hutton could maintain a trained M.I. force of 
1 
nearly 4,000 men, more than enough for Wolseley's needs. 
(As well as regulars, trainees included militia and Volun-
teer officers, and Colonials. South Africa and Australia 
had both formed volunteer units of Mounted Rifles, and 
Hutton was eventually to command the military forces of 
. 2 
New South Wal·es . ) Cost was the main argument favouring 
M.I.; as the earliest reports candidly put it, 'we· have no 
experience of Mounted Infantry opposed to a well-trained 
Cavalry,.3 In the Suakin Field Force, under war conditions, 
a Cavalry regiment cost £28,000 a year to maintain, and the 
4 
same number of M.I. just £12,000. Even without their 
horses, Cavalry soldiers cost about ten per cent more in 
dress, training and eqUipment than Infantry,5 and the cos t 
of M. I . was computed only on the basis of the extra paid 
for horses and tack, not for the men themselves. The 
earliest plans for the M.I., therefore, rejected the idea 
of a permanent corps and planned to keep training as cheap 
1 . Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, pp 172-6 
2. ibid, pp 483, 488; Hutton, 'The Tactical and Strategic 
Power of Mounted Troops' , USM Vol X NS, pp 431 - 49 
3. "A"855, 'Report on Mounted Infantry', 1881 (War Office) 
4 . Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', JRUSI I vol 30, p 697 
5 . See Tables, Part One, Table 7 
I 
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as possible o As was explained, 'To be able to keep his seat 
on horseback over rough ground, and not to roll about in his 
saddle sufficiently to give a horse a sore back, is about 
the extent of horsemanship that would be required of a 
mounted infantry ,soldier . ,1 In addition it was fear ed that 
e xpert M.I. would adopt the arme blanche proclivities which 
had ruined the concept of Mounted Rifle Volunteers (who had 
2 taken to carrying a sword on the saddle . ) They were there-
fore deliberately undertrained. The training period was 
just ten weeks; while for the first three years of exist-
ence the school at Aldershot was dependent for horses on 
loans from Cavalrymen on leave. 3 Additional riding ex-
perience was gained by most Infantry officers, although 
not their men, in the sport of polo, just becoming popular 
in India as, MoI became widely used in war . By coincidence 
4 
a polo pony made an ideal M.I mount; the cost of a good 
polo pony jumped in India from £4 in 1880 to as much as £80 
just eight years later. 5 This gave the Infantry as much of 
a social stake in the M.I as the Cavalry (most of whom also 
played polo) had in their own horses through foxhunting . 
Wolseley further sought to involve the 
1 . "A"855, 'Report on Mounted Infantry', 1881, quotinJMemo-
randum by Clery, 1 March 1880 (War Office) 
2 . 'The Best Mounted Arm for Volunteers', USM Vol INS, 
p 305 
3 . Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the ' British 
Empire, p 174 
4 . Tylden, Horses and Saddlery, p 24 
5 . Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier, p 156 
In 
I1 
---...... --------------------------~ 
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Yeomanry in his search for mounted troops, In early 1882 
he pr~posed, at a gathering of the Colonels of all Yeoman-
ry regiments, their conversion to 'Mounted Riflemen', 
arguing on a tactless analogy with the Boers of South 
Africa that this was their natural role. The motive be-
hind this was also cost: Wolseley calculated that whereas 
a Rifle Volunteer, a footsoldier, cost the country 
£1 1Js 1d a year, a Yeoman, who provided his own horse, 
still cost a remarkable £6 7s 5fd a year in uniform, 
equipment and an organisation of thirty-nine tiny regi-
ments. Although he was careful not to use the words 
'Mounted Infantry', the Yeomanry Colonels, who had no doubt 
this was intended, expressed a 'general and decided disin-
1 
clination' to be converted. But, as Cavalry officers 
retired into~ the Yeomanry or were transferred temporarily 
as Adjutants of Yeomanry regiments,2 they began, about ten 
years behind the Cavalry, to take up shooting. In one 
regiment, shooting was started for the first time in 1882 
by the arrival of a new Adjutanto In other regiments 
Colonels actively petitioned to equip some or all of their 
men with rifles. J Generally, however, little shooting was 
done before the 1890s. At the start of the decade, 
1. WO/J2/72J7, War Office Meetings, December 1881 
2. The British Army, p 189 
J. Williams Wynn, The Historical Records of the Montgomery-
shire Yeomanry, p 45; stonham and Freeman, Historical 
Records of the Middlesex Yeomanry 1797-1927, p 69, 
mentioning also the 2nd Prince of Wales West Yorkshire 
Yeomanry 
, 
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Cambridge, knowing Wolseley was planning more reforms, 
advis.ed him: 
I am fully prepared to do all in my power to 
induce the present Yeomanry Regiments to 
attend more to their carbines than their 
swords, but don't attempt to make Mounted 
Infantry out of them; that would simply 
destroy the force, and completely take the 
heart out of them. 1 
Following a critical investigation, an Army Order in 189J 
gave special encouragement to the Yeomanry shooting. 2 
The number of Yeomanry on the muster rolls 
dropped from 16,000 in 1870 to under 12,000 in J 1899, a . 
fact blamed by the regiments on the decline of agriculture 
producing a corresponding decline in the rural class from 
4 
which their men were drawn. The number actually turning 
up to train, however, remained virtually constant from 1878 
onwards, and, the apparent decline was due to rationali-
sation as greater obligations were imposed on the Yeomanry 
by the War Office. 5 In 1888 they were made liable to 
service anywhere in Britain6 and in 189J there was a major 
1. Verner, The Military Life of H.R.Ho George Duke of 
Cambridge, Vol II, p J6J 
2. 'Report of the Brownlow Committee on Yeomanry', 1892, 
p 7 (War Office); Army Order 22 189J (War Office); 
Parsley, 'A Trooper's View of the Yeomanry', USM Vol VI 
NS, p 60; Adderley, History of the Warwickshire Yeomanry 
Cavalry, p 125 
J. See Tables, Part One, Table 8 
40 Adderley, History of the Warwickshire Yeomanry Cavalry, 
p 94; Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the 
British Empire, p J74 
5 . See Tables, Part One, Table 9 
6. Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, p J75. See also, Crichton, 'Yeomanry and its 
Future', JRUSI vol J5, pp 661 - 9J 
-.. .......................................... ~S 
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reorganisation. Regiments were divided into squadrons of 
a hundred men, those failing to produce at least two 
squadrons disbanded, and the remainder brigaded in pairs 
f . t 1 o reglmen s. The requirement for brigades to train to-
gether every three , years proved , however, optimistic and 
was abandoned in 1898. In at least one case it never took 
2 place at all. Against this, the apparent decline in 
numbers produced a corresponding cut in funds to the 
Yeomanry; apparent expenditure on the force declined 
steadily with their numbers, and real expenditure did not 
pick up again until 1885. 3 The major change that was 
taking place, also recognised by the regiments, was the 
shift in recruiting patterns from the rural to the urban 
population as agriculture declined. Increasingly, recruits 
knew little Qf horses or of the countryside they were meant 
4 to defend. Wolseley's analogy of the Boers was quite 
wrong. The creation in 1887 of the Cyclist Companies of 
the Rifle Volunteers, whose cycles cost a third of the 
price of a Yeomanry horse to buy, and a fifteenth of the 
cost to maintain each year, was a reflection of this 
1 . Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, pp 375- 7; Frewen, 'The Yeomanry Force and the 
New Army Warrant', USM Vol VII NS, pp 830- 5 
2 . Army Order 91 1898 (War Office); Verdin, The Cheshire 
(Earl of Chester's) Yeomanry 1898- 1967, p 5 
3. See Tables, Part One, Tables 9 and 10 
4 . stonham and Freeman, Historical Records of the Middle-
sex Yeomanry 1797- 1927, p 65; 'The Best Mounted Arm for 
Volunteers', USM Vol INS, p 335 
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1 fact. The Yeomanry, however, clung to the display of the 
~. blanche, despite their training period being far too 
short to perfect the charge. 
The possibility offered to advocates of 
Mounted Infantry was the perfect weapon for colonial war. 
'With two machine guns', as one expressed it, v the regi-
mental engineers and a squad of Mounted Infantry, which can 
be easily and quickly organised, a battalion, if detached, 
would be complete in itself and independent of other 
branches of the service. ,2 Although, both in Afghanistan 
and Egypt, the early Gatling and Gardner machine guns 
tended to jam, their potential value was clearly consider-
able. J In 1887 Baden-Powell demonstrated the new Norden-
felt gun to Wolseley, who had one issued to each Cavalry 
regiment. 4 ,A year before this, the Colonel of the 10th 
Hussars had bought one privately for his men. 5 In this 
way the smart regiments, under reforming Colonels, were 
1. Editor's Note, USM 1887, pt I, p 557; 'The Best Mounted 
Army for Volunteers', USM Vol I NS, pp J08-9, J25 gives. 
the cost of purchase of a bicycle in 1890 as £12 and 
its maintenance £J a year, and of a horse suitable for 
Yeomanry £J5, and £45 a year to keep it. 
2. Knollys, 'Suggestions - II', USM 1886, pt I, p 105 
J. For the jamming of machine guns, see The Second Afghan 
War, Abridged Official Account, p 22J; Evans, The Story 
of the Fifth Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, p 86. 
According to Editor's Note, USM 1885, .pt . I, p J97, it 
was denied both in Parliament and by the War Office that 
the Gardner guns jammed in the Sudan in 1884-5. Accord-
ing to Wolseley, W/Mem/1 Memo 10, 27.8.1885, Wolseley, 
they jammed 'on every important occasion'. 
4. Hillcourt, Baden-Powell: The Two Lives of a Hero, p 77 
5. Brander , The 10th Royal Hussars, p 72 
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able to exploit their wealth; in 1895 Dundonald, now com-
manding 2nd Life Guards, paid privately for increased 
1 
musketry training for his own men. Machine guns opened 
up even greater prospects, in fact, for believers in 
Cavalry than Inf~try. In 1885, in an official lecture, 
Baden-Powell had stated that 'Cavalry attacking good 
infantry formed up to receive them cannot do much without 
help from artillery or infantry. As a rule, however, they 
would- never be required to do so.,2 But increasingly into 
the 1890s Cavalrymen saw the possibility that, using the 
arme blanche in combination with machine guns and Horse 
Artillery, they might be able to defeat Infantry by them-
selves, becoming truly independent. J This notion was fed 
by another, preached particularly in the writings of German 
authors such. as Prince Kraft. 4 It was believed that the 
next war in Europe would see Cavalry divisions, far in 
advance or on the flanks of the main armies, clash in a 
private contest without interference from Infantry, with 
massed charges deciding superiority. The victorious 
Cavalry would then, its scouting unimpeded, turn the flanks 
1. Dundonald, My Army Life, p 80 
2. Baden- Powell, Cavalry Instruction, p 59 
J. French, 'Cavalry Manoeuvres', JRUSI Vol J9, pp 559-88; 
Maude, 'Cavalry on the Battlefield', USM Vol III NS, pp 
110-Z~ -4. Kraft, Letters on Cavalry, p 96; von Schmidt, Instruc-
tions for the Training, Employment and Leading of 
Cavalry, pp 186-7; Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern 
War, p 69; French, 'Cavalry Manoeuvres', JRUSI Vol J9, 
pp 561-5 
-... ............................................. i
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and raid against the communications of the main enemy 
fo.rces. 
Although German Cavalry, as representing the 
leading military power in Europe, was closely studied by 
the British, there was considerable confusion as to what 
their tactics actually were. In 188.5, one theorist be-
lieved that they were pushing the use of the arme blanche 
1 
alone 'about as far as it will go' while another held 
that they were 'disestablishing their cavalry and turning 
them into mounted infantry, . 2 Ten years later the position 
was no more clear. Lord Roberts, watching German Cavalry 
on manoeuvres, found them disappointing, inept in attack 
or defence, and badly mounted. 3 Douglas Haig of the 7th 
Hussars, one of the emerging new school of Cavalrymen, 
watching .j:he same men, was impressed, and felt their 
4 training in dismounted and shock tactics very thorough. 
The difficulty and confusion arose because, while theore-
tically recognising dismounted action, and training for 
it, the Germans saw their Jagers and Artillery as the main 
source of firepower, and, having no major colonial wars, 
never developed the hybrid tactics in squadron- sized 
1 . Brackenbury, in preface to Chenevix- Trench, Cavalry in 
Modern War, p vi 
2. Derby, 'French and German Cavalry', USM 188.5, pt I, 
p .54 
3 . Roberts to Cambridge, 7 October 189.5, 7101 - 23- 107 
Roberts 
4 . 'Notes on German Cavalry Compiled by Capt Douglas 
Haig', Wo',1896, Acc 31.5.5.74 Haig, especially p 3.5 
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packets, nor the Mounted Infantry, of the British. This 
did not, however, prevent one German theorist from being 
quoted as saying in 1890 that 'if Cavalry can be properly 
organised, trained and handled, they will be able to sweep 
1 from the field all three arms of the enemy'. The French 
view was considerably more straightforward, a total belief 
in the massed arme blanche charge. 'The best reconnoitring 
Cavalry will be one which is dashing and bold, sceptical 
of mathematical calculations', French Cavalry were told at 
manoeuvres in 1897, 'a Cavalry whose men dream of the 
2 
naked sword and the charge'. Haig, at French manoeuvres 
in 1893, noticed that whereas the sword was carried on the 
saddle and the carbine on the man (in the manner recommended 
by Roberts) the Cavalrymen had wrapped cloth covers around 
the lock"bolt and trigger, making the carbine impossible 
to fire without considerable delay. This was, he noted, 
'not altogether satisfactory,.3 
The impact of Continental theorists on 
British Cavalrymen was now overwhelming. Haig's list of 
leading modern writers on Cavalry in his Staff College 
course of 1896-8 consisted of seven French and German 
authors but not one Englishman. 4 However, as with earlier 
1. Altham, 'The Cavalry Revival, A Plea for Infantry', USM 
Vol II NS, p 17 
2. De Negrier, quoted in Talbot, 'Manoeuvres in France of 
Two Divisions of Cavalry and an Army Corps, September 
1897', JRUSI Vol 42, p 1358 
3. Haig's report is preserved in Acc 3155.68 Haig 
4. Haig's 'Cavalry Notes', Staff College notebook, Acc 
3155014 Haig 
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British theorists, the practical result of this influence 
is uncertain. For example, Haig's own view~ expressed in 
1890, were: 
Every cavalry soldier must thoroughly understand 
that his proper place is on horseback, his proper 
mode of action the charge. Only in cases where 
cavalry 'cannot obtain its object by executing a 
charge, should men be dismounted in order to use 
the carbine ••• [but] unless a cavalry force is by 
instruction and practice ready to fight on foot 
its usefulness will be curtailed and it cannot 
be considered efficient. 1 
His own troop of Hussars could score 98 per cent hits with 
2 their carbines on targets at 300 yards. 
This new faith in the value of Cavalry, 
spoken of openly as 'The Cavalry Revival' in the 1890s,3 
owed more to an increased awareness of the achievement of 
Cavalry in the American Civil War than to French or German 
theori~ts. The renewed study of the war in the late 1880s 
was encouraged in large measure by Wolseley himself. 4 
1. Paper by Haig, 'The Dismounted Action of Cavalry', 15 
November 1890, preserved in his 'Cavalry Notes' Acc 
3155.14 Haig 
2. Haig diary entr~ 5 February 1889, Acc 3155.1 Haig 
3. Moreland, 'The Mounted Infantry Regiment as an Integral 
Part of the Cavalry Division', USM Vol XII NS, p 532; 
Altham, 'The Cavalry Revival, A Plea for Infantry', 
USM Vol II NS, pp 17-34 
4. The revival of interest may be said to have begun with 
the publication of Henderson's stonewall Jackson in 1886 
and Wolseley's reviews of Henderson. For Wolseley's 
views see Rawley, The American Civil War, an English 
View. For the whole question of the revival of interest 
in the war, see Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the 
Civil War (especially chapter 8, 'The Henderson 
Legacy', pp 170-202) which places a very different 
interpretation of events to the one outlined in this 
dissertation. 
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From his own experiences, Denison's teaching, and the need 
.to justify the Mounted Infantry's existence, Wolseleyargued 
that the Cavalry could never learn to fight well on foot, 
1 
and must be reserved for the arme blanche charge. This 
brought Wolseley, the leading reformer of the Army, into 
direct conflict with the reforming Cavalrymen, above all 
with Keith Fraser. Wolseley, Wood and Buller all patro-
nised a series of lectures given by Hutton between 1884 and 
1891, to the RUSI and similar institutions, the main theme 
of which was that the American horsemen owed their success 
to being Mounted Infantry. At nearly every occasion that 
Hutton spoke, Fraser or another Cavalryman would rise to 
protest that the Americans had been Cavalry. It was entire-
ly a matter of definition, but except for the Infantry 
mounte~as a temporary expedient in the Western Theatre, 
the balance of evidence was with Fraser. At one of these 
meetings, in Dublin in 1891, tempers were lost completely, 
with Fraser insisting that the Americans 'always charged' 
and Wolseley, who chaired the meeting, replying fr~m his 
own memory of the war that the very idea of their charging 
at all was 'ridiculous'. The real argument was that 
touched on by Fraser when he invited the M.I. leader to 
transfer his men to the Cavalry, and Hutton replied that 
they preferred to remain Infantry. 'I see', Wolseley 
1. See above, Introduction, p 2 
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angrily summed up, 'even from what has occurred here today, 
that there is a tendency on the part of cavalry officers 
to imagine that when men lecture them on the uses of 
mounted infantry that it is a sort of personal attack on 
the cavalry ser~ice.,1 Fraser was still arguing the point 
with M.I. lecturers as late as 1895, shortly before re-
2 tiring as Inspector-General of Cavalry. 
Evelyn Wood took over Aldershot District in 
1889, and two years later arranged for the first complete 
Cavalry Division to train on Salisbury Plain. 3 Wood was 
also dissatisfied with the Umpiring system. 'It was 
assumed', he wrote, 'that the effects of rifle-fire on 
service nearly equalled that obtained on the ranges', and 
also that 'we over-estimated the value of Artillery prac-
tice when _guns were laid up on moving targets g• 4 Or, as 
Haig bluntly put it, gUmpires always decide against 
Cavalry.,5 In the late 1880s, as the magazine-loading 
small - bore rifles such as the British Lee-Metford were 
introduced, the results of theoretical tests on firing 
ranges became even more impressive. It was claimed that: 
1. Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, Lecture Four 
discussion, pp 23-6 
2. See Moreland, 'The Mounted Infantry Regiment as an 
Integral Part of the Cavalry Division', USM Vol XII NS, 
p 530 
3. Wood; From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol II, pp 192, 
214 
4. Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, p v 
5. Haig, 'Notes on the Skill Required of Cavalry Leaders', 
p 40 of Haig's 'Cavalry Notes', Staff College note book, 
Acc 3155.14 Haig 
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In future wars guns will be able to destroy 
the enemy's cavalry if halted under their 
fire 3,000 or even 4,000 yards away, while 
experiments made at Aldershot with the 
magazine rifle in 1888 proved that infantry 
can hit a smaller mark than a cavalry 
division every other shot at 2,000 yards, 
and every fourth shot at 2,600 yards. 1 
In 1895 the newly introduced Maxim machine gun under test 
scored 90 per cent hits on a target 6 feet by 8 feet at 
2 1,000 yards. A rather more realistic test three years 
later, however, using only average marksmen, gave a firing 
party of 34 Infantry and a Maxim each one minute to fire at 
a target representing 100 Infantry and a gun crew, at 700 
yards. Counting hits on the figures, the Infantry scored 
nineteen hits and the Maxim only nine. 3 Nonetheless, in 
the face of such potential firepower the value of histori-
cal examples was doubtful in the extreme. One theorist, 
Colonel F.N. Maude, complained of the Cavalry's 'historical' 
approach that the typical Cavalry enthusiast 'picks up from 
some text-book instances in which Cavalry has been success-
ful, never stops to enquire the cause of their success, but 
jumps to the conclusion that if they only ride home they 
will always be equally fortunate, . 4 He tried to calculate 
instead the actual volume of fire likely to strike a 
1. Altham, 'The Cavalry Revival, A Plea for Infantry', USM 
Vol II NS, p 27 
2. Ans tru ther-Thoms on, 'Machine Guns wi th Cavalry', JRUSI 
Vol 38, p 629 
3. 'Ajax', 'Machine Guns: their Use and Abuse', USM Vol 
XVII NS, P 512 
40 Maude, 'The Rise, Decay and Revival of the Prussian 
Cavalry', JRUSI Vol 38, p 20 
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rapidly moving target like a charging horseman. Veteri-
nary work showed that horses, compared to men, suffered 
little physical shock from wounds, and only a brain hit, 
heart hit or major bone break would bring down a charging 
horse outside the rifle's 'stopping distance', within 
which the physical impact of a hit was sufficient. For 
the new smaller calibres like the .JOJ Lee-Metford this 
could be as little as fifty yards, and a serious wound was 
1 
unlikely above JOO yards. 
Evelyn Wood's own views on Cavalry were that, 
though :they should not dismount 'too often', and the 
perfect hybrid was impossible,2 shooting was still vital. 
At Aldershot in three years he reduced the percentage of 
third class shots infue Cavalry from a half to a quarter, 
the same percentage as in the Infantry.J In 1891, to 
improve the effect of the charge the lance was introduced 
into the front rank only of Dragoon and Dragoon Guard 
regiments. 4 Although made largely in imitation of German 
practice, this was not a major change; the lance had been 
used in training by Dragoons and Dragoon Guards since 1817. 
1. Smith, 'The Effec·t of the Lee-Metford Bullet on the 
Bones of Horses', JRUSI Vol J8, pp 41-50; see also 
"A"1294, 'Report on Experiments with Various Bullets 
against Animals', 1902 (War Office) 
2. Wood in Hutton, Five Lectures on Mounted Infantry, 
Lecture Two discussion, p 22; Wood, Achievements of 
Cavalry, p 241 
J. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, Vol II, p 208 
4. Evans, The story of the 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, 
p 90; Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the 
British Empire, pp 208-9 
-112-
John French, commanding the 19th Hussars at Aldershot, was 
allowed to operate the full squadron system in his regi-
ment for three years before it was officially re- introduced 
in 1892.1 Wood, however, like Wolseley, still believed in 
Mounted Infantry, and supported Hutton's work with them at 
Aldershot. 2 In July 1892 Fraser tried to disabuse him: 
The Federal Cavalry, so called 'Mounted 
Infantry', which ultimately numbered about 
80,000 men, was armed with sword, carbine 
and pistol. It never carried a rifle from 
the beginning to the end of the war. If our 
Mounted Infantry are prepared and intended to 
play the role of the American Cavalry ••• the 
sooner they are similarly armed the better, 
and then indeed they will be useful (as an 
increase of trained cavalry seems an impossi-
bility) in swelling the number of mounted men 
in our attenuated Cavalry Division, whereas 
at present with their horses (which are only 
to be used, as I understand, as a means of 
conveyance from one place to another) they 
would be, I fear, a heavy encumbrance to it.3 
"-
Fraser finally wrote to Heros von Borcke, the veteran of 
stuartrs staff, still alive in 1893. The reply was all he 
wanted: 
I confess to be rather surprised that military 
men of such science as you name in your letter 
should be of the opinion, that the cavalry as 
well of the Southern as of the Northern states 
during the last great American struggle, had 
been regarded on both sides exclusively as 
mounted infantry and had been mostly used as 
such ••• Stuart delighted in the charge with 
sabres drawn ••• I have conversed with many 
officers and men who took an active part in 
1. Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, vol II, p 208 
2. ibid, p 207 
3. Fraser to Wood, 21 July 1892. Copy in Haig's 'Cavalry 
Notes', Staff College note book, Acc 3155.14 Haig 
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the cavalry fights of the other prominent 
cavalry leaders of the South ••• and I know 
that these Generals led their men in many 
glorious charges against cavalry as well as 
infantry ••• I am not at all averse to the use 
of cavalry as dismounted sharpshooters. It 
will be very necessary in the next war ••• 
very decidedly I am opposed to the change of 
cavalry into mounted infantry ••• Well drilled 
cavalry armed with a good carbine will be 
able to exe-cute what mounted infantry can do, 
but the latter will never be able to suffice 
the claims which must be made on good cavalry. 1 
Copies of both letters are in Haig's Staff College note 
books. Since he was Fraser's aide-de-camp for the 1894 
Cavalry manoeuvres it seems possible that Fraser gave them 
to him. Fraser found the Cavalry's standards at these 
2 
manoeuvres, both in scouting and the charge, unacceptable. 
Apparently at his instigation Redvers Buller, as Adjutant-
General, brought John French back from half-pay,3 and he 
and Haig Re-wrote the Cavalry Drill Book. 4 (At the same 
time Haig was befriended by Evelyn Wood, who already knew 
him by reputation. 5 ) The 1896 Cavalry Drill Book set out 
1. Von Borcke to Fraser 3 June 1893. Copy in Haig's 
'Cavalry Notes', Staff College note book. Acc 3155.14 
Haig; see also Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the 
American Civil War, especially pp 56-8 
2. See cutting from The Times, 6 October 1894, preserved 
in Acc 3155.6."F, Haig 
3. French, The Life ofo •• John French, First Earl of Ypres, 
p 35;_ Duff Cooper, Haig, vol I, pp 39-46; · and cutting 
from M.A.P. 3 March 1900, preserved in Acc 3155;6.F 
Haig, which outlines Fraser's role. 
4. Strictly, French began the book, and Haig finished it, 
see Duff Cooper, Haig, Vol I, pp 39-46 and Haig Diary 
entr~31 August 1895, Acc 3155.1 Haig 
5. Haig to Henrietta, 4 July 1895, Acc 3155.6 o B Haig 
- 114-
the charge against Infantry as being in loose order, from 
clqse-in behind cover, from a flank. Failing this only, 
if the Infantry were shaken, the charge could be started 
1,000 yards away. But, with echoes of von Bredow at 
Mars-la-Tour, it was also laid down that, as a principle, 
the Cavalry could be 'called upon to sacrifice itself 
1 
entirely or partially for the general welfare of the Army'. 
Dismounted fighting occupied just eleven pages, reflecting 
the eight days a year shooting practice in the Cavalry, 
compared to eight months learning the evolutions and man-
2 
oeuvres for the various forms of charge. 
Roberts, as Commander-in-Chief in India, did 
not have Wolseley's problems of a shortage of Cavalry, and 
took the view that Indian Cavalry, and British regiments in 
India, sho~ld be fully prepared to fight on foot. Roberts' 
own view was that: 
The function of Infantry is to shoot ••• Cavalry, 
on the other hand, have functions more important 
than shooting, and in their case it is proper 
(especially as the firearm is really a secondary 
armament) to give weight to subsidiary factors, 
of which 'handiness' is the principal one.3 
He was, however, aware of his reputation for obsession with 
the rifle, and, determined to work tactfully, appointed in 
in 1887 an Afghan War veteran, Major-General George Luck, 
1. Cavalry Drill, 1896, Vol II, p 185. See also pp 43, 
190-200, 202, 206 (War Office) 
2. Cavalry Drill, 1896, Vol II, pp 47-51, 210-15; Goodenough 
and Dalton, The Army Book for the British Rmpire, p 200 
3. Roberts to Lockyer, 27 December 1895, 7101-23-107 
Roberts 
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as the first Inspector-General of Cavalry in India, to 
supervise reform. As Roberts put it, 'Just at first 
British officers were apprehensive that their sowars 
[troopers] would be turned into dragoons, but they soon 
found out that there was no intention of changing any of 
their traditional characteristics. 11 Smith-Dorien, who had 
on Wood1s recommendation taken an Indian staff job, remem-
bered that Luck 'had large ideas on the powers of Cavalry 1 , 
and that his manoeuvres covered vast distances. 2 This was 
a Mounted Infantryman's view, not shared by Haig, serving 
I 
wi'th his regiment on the manoeuvres. 'We go' mooning on in 
close formation 1 , he recorded, Ino reconnoitring, no re-
serve, no patrols to approaches or flanks 1 0 3 Two members 
of the emerging school of exceptional young Cavalrymen, 
also on t~ manoeuvres, agreed. George Barrow of the 4th 
Bengal Lancers thought Luck had little knowledge of 'the 
employment of cavalry masses in the higher sphere of 
strategy and tactics l • 4 While Hubert Gough of the 16th 
Lancers condemned Luck's obsession with set-piece work 
rather than Iproblems we were likely to meet in real war l : 
1. Roberts, Forty One Years in India, p .528 
2. Smith-Don2en, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
p 73 
3. Haig Diary entry, 29 January 1890, Acc 31.5.5.1 Haig 
4. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 34 
.5. Gough, Soldiering On, p 34. The Goughs were an old 
Indian Army family, and Gough was reasonably well-known 
to Lord Roberts, and a friend of Smith-Dorieno See 
Soldiering On, pp 4.5, .5.5 
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By 1895 dismounted action, squadron sized 
co~bats, and the co-operation between Cavalry and machine 
guns or Artillery were the most fashionable military ideas 
of the day, endorsed by Roberts, Wood, Buller, Fraser, 
1 Russell and French. Even Wolseley came round to this view 
shortly after 1895. He told a Yeomanry Regiment at an 
inspection: 
If any of you will take the trouble to examine 
the maps of the country lying between the coast 
and London you will find that there is no spot 
where Cavalry can charge for a quarter of a 
mile. It is not likely that the invaders would 
be so kind as to move to Salisbury Plain to 
oblige us in order that we with our large 
Cavalry force and they without any .Cavalry to 
speak of might show how good were our horses 
and how gallant the men who rode them o •• 
Now that means that for the 12,000 Cavalry 
and 9,000 Yeomanry to be of real service in 
defending England they must learn to shoot well 
and fight on foot. Cavalry relying on swords in 
a clo~e country like England can do no useful 
fighting. 2 
French and Haig restated this doctrine clearly, in the 1896 
I 
Drill Book. This stated that in enclosed country like 
Britain, 'the mounted action of Cavalry will be confined to 
conflicts between any small bodies (probably not even the 
strength of a squadron on either side) which may endeavour 
1. In addition to the evidence cited above, see French, 
'Cavalry Manoeuvres', JRUSI Vol 39, pp 559-88, given 
from notes prepared by Haig, see Haig Diary entr~ 17 
February 1895, Acc 3155.1 Haig, and also Russell to 
Wolseley, 19 October 1892, Autograph Russell 2, Wolseley 
2. Text of speech in Wolseley's handwriting. Undated, but 
at one point reads 'this is the first Yeomanry regiment 
I have inspected since I became Commander-in-Chief'. 
Particularly in view of the evidence cited below (p 117, 
fn 1) on the Drill Book for 1896, this strongly suggests 
a date of 1895 or early 1896, W/W 1/14 Wolseley 
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1 to make sudden dashes'. So popular was this view of 
Cavalry with junior officers of other arms that in 1891 
examiners for promotion expressed concern that in tactical 
exercises on paper, 'dismounted Cavalry are frequently used, 
when Infantry are available, in a way calculated to dis-
2 hearten mounted troops'. 
In 1889, except for five regiments, all Heavy 
Cavalry became Medium, reducing the weight carried,3 and in 
1893, to ease recrufring, the Cavalry were grouped into 
three corps, of Dragoons, Hussars and Lancers, each of which 
4 
recruited en masse. This attempt at rationalisation 
brought the familiar protests from the regiments, and in 
1897 was replaced, this time successfully for two years, by 
the system of linking regiments in threes first proposed 
in 18840 5 , Also in 1897 it was ordered that only three 
6 
squadrons should serve in war, the fourth forming a depot, 
1. Cavalry Drill, 1896, Vol II, p 205. It specifically 
suggests this tactic for 'close country (like most of 
England)'. (War Office) 
2. 'Reports on the results of examinations held by officers 
of regular forces, militia and volunteers', November 
1892, p 7. No Cavalry or Yeomanry officers took this 
particular examination (CoU.LoOoP.R.) 
3. Evans, The Story of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon 
Guards, p 81. The practical effect of this was that 
they were required for the first time to serve abroad. 
Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, p 192. The five regiments were the three of 
the Household Brigade, and 1st and 2nd Dragoons. 
4. Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the British 
Empire, p 100 
5. Army Order 38 1897 (War Office) 
6. Army Order 41 1897 (War Office) 
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while the higher establishment of the six regiments stan-
ding first for overseas service was raised to 682 officers 
and men with 410 horses. 1 Between 1896 and 1898 Cavalry 
and some Yeomanry regiments were issued with Lee-Enfield, 
then Lee-Metford, carbines with which they were taught to 
skirmish at 600 yards, and Maxim guns, still one to a 
regiment. Shooting standards in the Cavalry were only 
slightly lower than in the Infantry, and there were occa-
sional instances of Cavalry regiments winning shooting 
t otO 2 compe l lons. 
There was still a lot to reform, above all 
the crushing weight on the horse; while, as Haig acknow-
ledged, although brigades and even on occasion a division 
might train together, trying to learn brigade drill before 
the squadrops were properly trained was trying to run be-
fore walking. J Nevertheless, considerable progress had 
been made both towards the hybrid, and towards the efficient 
Cavalryman; and the idea of the massed ~ blanche charge 
was just giving way to the doctrine of squadron-sized 
actions in European war. Unfortunately, the Cavalry 
entirely failed to project this fact to the rest of the 
1. Goodenough and Dalton, The Army Book for the Brit±h 
Empire, p 197 
2. Reynolds, The Lee-Enfield Rifle, p 50; The British Army, 
p 50; Evans, The Stor of the th Ro al Inniskillin 
Dragoon Guards, p 9 ; Malet, The Historical Memoirs of 
the XVIII Hussars, p 228. Shooting at the same targets, 
minimum qualifications for Infantry in musketry was a 
score of 175 compared to 155 for Cavalry, The British 
Army, p 179 
J. Haig Diary entry, 15 August 1895, Acc J155.1 Haig 
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Army, or to the public. They had clashed with the country's 
le~ding reformer of the Army, Wolseley, and they clung to 
a tactic, the charge, that Infantry officers, even in 
official papers, referred to as no longer possible. The 
very mention of 'the charge' or 'the Cavalry fight' evoked 
images of the big, knee- to-knee brigade display, rather than 
the open formations and squadrons already being practised. 1 
The expenses of the Cavalry had also produced a majority 
of officers who were snobbish, obsessed with sport, social 
activities and smartness. Even in civilian clothes a 
2 Cavalry officer was instantly recognisable from his manner. 
It was this image of the Cavalry, rich, incompetent and 
faintijridiculous, to which the Duke of Cambridge referred 
when, according to one newspaper, in 1895 'he congratulated 
the cavalrz very highly on their efficiency, and told them 
that whatever people might say to the contrary he could not 
agree with them'. 3 
The effect of the general standard of the 
1. For Infantrymen's doubts about Cavalry see, for example, 
"A"145, 'Magazine and Small Bore Rifles', 1888 (War 
Office) p 10, stating as fact that Cavalry will in 
future be divided into two classes, ~ blanche Cavalry 
to charge other Cavalry only, and Mounted Rifles. Infan-
try themselves were taught to form square against Cavalry 
until 1899. See Fuller, Last of the Gentlemen's Wars, p 7 
2. Maitland, Hussar of the Line, p 107; see also Stotherd, 
Sabre and Saddle; Cairnes, Social Life in the British 
Army. It was still possible to tell a Cavalry officer on 
sight in the 1930s (Shelford Bidwell, 10 August 1981, 
personal communication) 
3. Press cutting preserved in Haig's Diary, 28 August 1895, 
Acc 3155.1 Haig 
1 
d 
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Cavalry on the best efforts of the reformers was seen in 
1898 at the battle of Omdurman, in the charge of the 21st 
Lancers. The charge itself was superbly executed, a text-
book demonstration of a knee-to-knee crash into about 
2,500 Sudanese, ~tanding close-packed in twelve ranks, who 
became suddenly visible from a depress i on in front of the 
Cavalry. They broke through this mass - a remarkable 
tribute to the cohesion of the charge - dismounted and 
opened fire from the flank as if on Salisbury Plain, having 
achieved nothing for the loss of 74 men and 119 horses. 
Winston Churchill, who charged with the Lancers, defended 
1 the action as the only course open; but, beyond other argu-
ments, it was generally agreed, even by Churchill himself 
2 later, that the 21st Lancers, the junior and least smart 
regiment in the Cavalry, stung at the supposed motto of 
'thou shalt not kill' wished on it by other regiments be-
cause it had no battle honours,J had come intent on estab-
lishing its status by an ~ blanche charge. Haig, 
serving with the Egyptian Cavalry 'feared this all along, 
for the regiment was here to do something, and meant to 
1. The account here is taken from Churchill's despatch in 
Woods, Young Winston's Wars, pp 109-15. Churchill him-
self wrote in 19JO that in the charge 'one could see 
the futility of the much vaunted ~ blanche'. Churchill 
My Early Life, p 192. There is nothing in his contempo-
rary accounts to support this claim. 
2. Churchill, My Early Life, p 187 
J. ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p 79 
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charge something before the show was over,.1 Lord 
Kit.chener, commanding the Egyptian Army, who, it was claimed, 
2 had wanted the Lancers fresh to pursue, could only tell 
them that the charge 'will go down in history in the annals 
of your regiment,.J Its Colonel was commended, decorated 
4 
and replaced. The regiment's behaviour was exactly the 
attitude the reformers had been trying to escape from. In 
1894 one newspaper, taking its lead from Fraser, wrote of 
the Cavalry manoeuvres: 
It is only in peace manoeuvres that Cavalry 
attack each other merely for the sake of a 
fight. In war, a Cavalry fight, if it comes 
off, does so because the commanders, being 
entrusted with the carrying out of some mission, 
regard the fight as indispensable for its per-
formance. If they can execute that mission 
without a fight, a fight is worse than useless.5 
Haig preserved the cutting. Among his own impressions of 
Omdurman was that 'the effect s of the infantry fire was 
poor and not in accordance with the teachings of the 
theorists who design modern breechloaders',6 the classic 
'historical' view still typical of the Cavalry. He was, 
however, impressed by the Egyptian Cavalry, the British 
commanders of which Kitchener allowed complete autonomy 
1. Haig to Wood, 7 September 1898, Acc J155.6G Haig 
2. Lyttelton, Eighty Years, p 191 
J. Press cutting from The Times 1 October 1898, preserved 
in Acc J155.6F Haig 
4. Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p 107 
5. Cutting from The Times 4 October 1898, preserved in 
Acc J155.6F Haig 
6. Haig Diary entrY,2 September 1898, Ace J155.1 Haig 
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for their squadrons, and the brigade commander, Broadwood. 
Ha~g, trying his own hand at patronage, wrote directly to 
Evelyn Wood commending Broadwood, 1 ru~d also suggesting that, 
should more officers be needed, John Vaughan of his own 
2 
regiment might be sent out. He had, however, formed a low 
opinion of Churchill. J The chain started by Wolseley had 
yet to reach its last link. 
The intrigues between Wolseley and Buller 
over the succession to Cambridge had wrecked the last 
vestiges of the old Wolseley Ring. French and Haig owed 
4 their allegiance to Buller and to Wood. Wood had in fact 
even brought Ian Hamilton to Britain in 1897 to command the 
Musketry School at Hythe. 5 But the ambitions of Roberts 
and his men remained unfulfilled. Hamilton was still smart-
ing from t he Wolseley Ring's bar on his attempt to join the 
Gordon Relief Expedition in 1884 . 6 Roberts, in 1895, was 
given command in Ireland as a prelude to retirement, but 
when in 1897 war with the Transvaal threatened two of his 
Ring members ~ Rawlinson and Wilson, successfully encouraged 
their 'Chief' to press his claim for command of the Field 
1 • Haig to Wood, 15 March 1898, Acc J155 . 6F Haig 
20 Haig to Wood, 12 April 1898, Acc J155.6F Haig 
J . Duff Cooper, Haig, Vol I, p 62 
4 . French, The Life of ••• John French First Earl of Y12res, 
p J5; Haig to Henrietta, 21 April 1898, Acc J155 e 6B 
Haig 
5 . Wood, From Midshi12man to Field Marshal, Vol II, p 22J 
6 . Hamilton, Listening for the Drums, p 172 
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Army (which in fact consisted of just one Army Corps and a 
Cayalry Division) in opposition to Wood or Buller. 'The 
Wolseley Ring', Rawlinson wrote, 'will do their utmost to 
1 
suppress y our name.' The attempt by Roberts failed, and 
when the Second Boer War began in 1899 Buller took the 
Army to South Africa. But to these men the conflicts of 
the Rings were still a live issue. This fact was to set 
in motion a chain of events which in five years would take 
the arme blanche controversy from an important but highly 
technical debate within the Army to become a national 
affair of the highest importance. 
1. Rawlinson to Roberts, 24 April 1897 and 26 April 1897, 
7101-23-60 Roberts 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ABNORMAL WAR 
'In future campaigns in South Africa, it will 
have to be borne in mind that, in order to 
maintain the health and efficiency of English 
horses, it is imperative that they be liberally 
fed on suitable food.' 
- Report of the Veterinary Department on 
the Zulu War of 1879 1 
'They came with horses. Puttiala sent horses. 
Jhind and Nabha sent horses. All the nations 
of the Khalsa sent horses. All the ends of 
the earth sent horses. God knows what the 
army did with them, unless they ate them raw. 
They used horses as a courtesan uses oil: with 
both hands.' 2 
Kipling, A Sahib's War 
The third of July 1900 had been a disaster. 
Six months before, Erskine Childers3 had been a clerk in 
the House of Commons; but, like thousands of others in the 
aftermath of 'Black Week', he had volunteered to serve in 
South Africa against the rebels of Cape Colony and the 
4 Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
1. "A"833, 'Report of the Veterinary Department on the Zulu 
War of 1879', 1881 (War Office) 
2. Kipling, A Sahib's War and Other Stories, p 16 
3. The narrative of this and the next paragraph is taken, 
as nearly verbatim as possible, from Childers, In the 
Ranks of the C.I.V., especially pp 31, 35, 48, 53, 61, 
84, 90, 97 and 120. 
4. Strictly, 'The South African Republic'. For general 
histories of the war, see Maurice, The Official History 
of the War in South Africa; Amery, ed., The Times History 
of the War in South Africa; Walte~ trans, The German 
Official Account of the War in South Africa; Smith, A 
Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902. 
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Childers had arrived in Cape Town in late February as a 
driver in the Mounted Battery of the City Imperial Volun-
teers, and two months later had begun the long journey up 
the inadequate narrow- gauge railway incline to Naaupoort 
Junction, and on into the heart of the South African veldt, 
remembered by most of the British as a sea of grass, brown 
and featureless with spots of green, growing in a sandy 
soil that burnished the horseshoes until they gleamed like 
silver.1 It was broken by a multitude of flat-topped hills 
(the Boer word for them was kopje, of for the larger ones 
kop meaning 'head') covered with boulders which made them 
natural strong points, on which or in the shadow of which 
the Boers dug in . One could see, and shoot, for miles in 
the clear air six or seven thousand feet above sea level, 
but often there was nothing to be seen, no landmarks so 
that men and horses became lost, or broke their legs in 
ant - bear holes. The temperature at mid- day could pass a 
hundred degrees Fahrenheit, and at night it fell below 
freezing, and a dampness formed on the blankets before dawn. 
The main problems were not Boers - Driver Childers never 
saw om in his two months' soldiering career - but water and 
food, and the Argentine ponies that bit like mad dogs and 
Of more recent works, Pakenham, The Boer War, is con-
cerned mainly with the political aspects of the war, 
and apart from accepting the obsolescence of the arme 
blanche has little new to say about operations. A good 
short account is Belfield, The Boer War. 
1 . Except for the area around Ladybrand and Bethlehem. See 
de Wet, Three Years War, p 112 and Smith, A Veterinary 
Histor of the War in South Africa 18 - 1 02 (hereafter 
Veterinary History pp 6-8 
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kicked like cows, that had been living on half rations of 
bad quality oats since they came to South Africa, and when 
made to exert themselves on trek lost weight so rapidly 
that the harness slipped and rubbed their backs raw. 
On 2 July the battery had joined General 
Paget's 20th Brigade as part of General Hunter's big 
'drive' 1 through what was now the Orange River Colony. The 
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts (who had succeeded General 
Buller at the beginning of the year) had captured the two 
enemy capitals, Bloemfontein and Pretoria, and at the start 
of June had announced that Boer resistance would soon 
2 
collapse. But the Boers would not surrender, and there 
seemed no prospect of the decisive battle to defeat them, 
or of the war ever ending. Somebody or something was clear-
ly at fault, and now Driver Childers knew what it was. On 
that July day the 38th Royal Field Artillery Battery, part 
of Paget's brigade, had taken heavy casualties in a Boer 
ambush when, due to a misunderstanding, the inexperienced 
Mounted Infantry covering it had retreated. That evening, 
Childers found a Serjeant of the battery crouched over his 
camp fire, deep in shock and not knowing where he was . 
Childers listened as the man began a long rambling soli-
loquy on how British horsemen went along, heels down, toes 
in, arms close to Sides, all according to regulation, 
keeping distance regardless of ground, while the Boers 
1. The Orange Free State had been annexed to the crown 
under that name in late May 1900. 
2. Roberts to Lansdowne, 7 June 1900, 7101-23-110-3 Roberts 
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cared nothing so long as they got there and did their job. 
Th~ Serjeant did not call them Mounted Infantry; to him 
Cavalry were Cavalry. Finally, he became incoherent, and 
Childers led him back to his own lines, convinced that the 
Army's failure was the fault of the Cavalry, with its 
hidebound approach to warfare, and the Cavalry-style 
training and influence upon the Mounted Infantry. 
Childers' melodramatic experience was not 
unique. Others, through other episodes,1 came to believe 
that Cavalry, and the 'Cavalry mentality' were responsible 
for the Army's troubles. Among these were Lord Roberts 
himself, and his Ring members. Beyond doubt this belief 
was sincere, but it was mistaken: the fault lay far more 
with Roberts' own mistrust of the Cavalry. To appreciate 
this, the problem facing the Army in South Africa on the 
outbreak of war must be understood. The Boer armies, with 
the exception of some professional Artillery, were theoreti-
cally composed of all able-bodied men between sixteen and 
sixty,2 and fought in loosely organised groupings, the 
'Commandoes'. Most Boers lived on widely-spaced farms, and 
1. For example, Peel, Trooper 8008 I.Y., pp 17-19 
2. The number of Boers who fought is a matter of some con-
jecture, upper estimates ranging from 87,000 to 65,000. 
See Belfiel~ The Boer War, pp 10 and 168 for a dis-
cussion of this. It is clear from de Wet, Three Years 
War, pp 13, 124, and from Reitz, Commando, that some men 
of military age avoided fighting, boys younger than 16 
fought, and generally the Boer leaders had only the 
haziest idea of how many men they commanded. Estimates 
of Boer strength at various battles are therefore little 
more than guesses. 
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their republics had only a rudimentary political organi-
sa~ion; the loyalties of the Boer were first towards his 
own family, and then a general respect for the lives of 
white men. Only a few were willing to fight for such ab-
stracts as Liberty or the state, or even to defend a 
national capital. They could no more understand the 
British soldier, who risked his life at his officer's command, 
than the British understood Boer 'cowardice' in refusing to 
stand for a pitched battle. 1 
The Boers' small ponies, two or three to a 
man, needed only 8 pounds of grain a day, and were" trained 
to graze placidly beside gunfire. They were also accli-
matised to heat, cold, and mostly immune to the South 
African horse sickness. 2 Although not usually outstanding 
marksmen, ~xcept at close ranges, the Boers shot well enough 
in the clear air and open plains of the veldt, which made 
firing at up to 2,000 yards un±terrupted by obstacles pos-
sible. They carried old-fashioned Martini-Henry breech-
loaders at first, increasingly supplemented with German 
Mauser magazine rifles, and later captured British Lee-
Metfords. J They had few revolvers and no swords, and no 
doctrine of a charge; their tactics remained, as in 1880, 
1 0 "A"596, 'Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South 
Africa', p 50 (War Office); Peel, Trooper 8008 I.Y., 
P 128; Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p J2J 
2 . Smith, Veterinary History, especially p 247; Sternberg, 
My Experiences of the Boer War, p 240; Childers, War and 
the Arme Blanche, p 277 
J. "A"596, 'Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South 
Africa' (War Office); WO/105/27 listing firearms captured 
at Paardeberg; de Wet, Three Years War, p 1J5 
F 
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to hold a defensive position, but ride away if it became 
un~enable. There may have been more than 70,000 fighting 
in the early stages of the war, and more than 20,000 
finally surrendered when peace was signed in June 1902. As 
Colonel Maude, the British theorist, put it, the British 
Army was faced by the equivalent of twenty Cossack divisions 
trying to prevent their advance from Cape Town to Pretoria, 
1 
a distance comparable to that from Vienna to st. Petersburg. 
To oppose the Boers a far greater number of 
horsemen, of some kind, were required than the regular 
British Army possessed. In addition to the two regiments 
of Cavalry already in South Africa a number of local units 
of mounted riflemen (referred to confusingly by the British 
as 'Colonials') were created under selected British Cava1ry 
officers. ~ The most distinguished were the South African 
Light Horse under Julian Byng of the 10th Hussars, Colonel 
Michael Rimington's 'Tigers' and the Rhodesian Frontier 
Force under Baden-Powell, with an Infantryman, Herbert 
Plumer, in command of one battalion. 2 In addition, Buller's 
Army Corps from Britain provided three Cavalry brigades and 
two regular Mounted Infantry battalions as intended. More 
reinforcements came from India. Still, by October 1899 
there were fewer than 14,500 mounted men available to fight 
the Boers. J 
1. Maude, Cavalry: its Past and Future, p 271 
2. Hillcourt, Baden-Powell, The Two Lives of a Hero, pp 156-9 
J. 'Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to 
Inquire into the Military Preparations and Other Matters 
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Inevitab1y, the British and the Boers both 
suffered from indifferent officers at the start of the war. 
But the flexible Boer organisation, whereby leaders were 
elected, allowed outstanding fighters like Christiaan de 
Wet, de la Rey, and eventually Jan Smuts, to emerge as 
dominant within a few months. Replacing a British officer, 
especially in the Cavalry, of which there was the greatest 
need, was far more difficult,1 and the British found them-
selves handicapped by generally indifferent Cavalry leaders. 
Roberts considered most brigade commanders as no more than 
'ordinary', while French was quoted as saying that most of 
his regimental commanders 'lost their heads in a crisis and 
were like old fussed hens,.2 At the battle of Talana Hill 
in October 1899, am ambitious flanking movement by a 
squadron ot the 18th Hussars under its Colonel was surround-
ed and forced to surrender. J At the end of the month a 
sizable force, including a complete Cavalry brigade, had 
been trapped in the siege of Ladysmith. The horses were 
Connected with the War in South Africa', (hereafter 
Elgin Commission) Report, pp J2-8 (War Office); Amery, 
The Times Histor of the War in South Africa (hereafter 
Times History Vol II, p 10. The Army List shows that 
15 Cavalry officers were sent to South Africa on 'special 
service' before November 1899 
1. WO/105/24 on difficulties of removing an incompetent 
officer; Rawlinson Diary entry, 29 September 1899, 5201-
JJ-7-10 Rawlinson/Boer; Kitchener to Roberts, 17 December 
1902, 7101-2J-JJ Roberts 
2. Roberts to Lansdowne, JO January 1900, 7101-2J-110-1 
Roberts; French's remark is attested in a sworn depo-
sition made on 1J November 1902, Mss 5907, Nos 206-9 
Haldane 
J. Malet, The Historical Memoirs of the XVIII Hussars, 
p 244 
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eventually nearly all eaten by the garrison. 1 Two of the 
di~asters of 'Black Week', (10-15 December 1899) the defeats 
of Lord Methuen at Magersfontein and General Gatacre at 
Stormberg, along with Methuen's earlier defeat at Modder 
River, were directly attributable to inadequate reconnais-
sance owing to a virtual absence of mounted troops. Douglas 
Haig, acting as French's Chief Staff Officer in an impro-
vised defence of the vital Colesberg railway junction in 
December, commented angrily that 'if only we had sufficient 
Cavalry with fit . horses, we could do anything we liked with 
the Boers. It is because self-advertising men like Gatacre 
push on without realising the value of a well-found Cavalry 
that we have been checked at so many points. ,2 An Austrian 
with the Boers opposing Methuen observed: 
One reads in the papers that the bad reconnoitring 
by the English baffled description, and their 
general training was condemned on these grounds. 
As an eyewitness I must protest against these 
attacks on the English army. The reconnoitring 
patrols which were sent out had to examine many 
square miles of barren country and spy the enemy. 
The country could not be reconnoitred by a few 
men; regiments were necessary.3 
At that time the only horsemen with Methuen's division were 
the 9th Lancers and a few Mounted Infantry. After Magers-
fontein, French offered to send Methuen all his own horse-
men, the equivalent of a strong brigade, but Methuen did 
1. Rawlinson diary entry, 10 November 1899, 5201-33-7-10 
Rawlinson/Boer 
2. Haig to Henrietta, 12 December 1899, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
3. Sternberg, My Experiences of the Boer War, p 204 
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not feel the country could provide sufficient water for all 
1 the horses. The Boers, with their dominance in horsemen, 
still controlled the main rivers. For political reasons 
the Indian Cavalry were not employed in South Africa,2 
although a number of their officers came out to command 
Mounted Infantry or mounted riflemen,3 and volunteer Mounted 
Rifle regiments came from Canada, New Zealand and Australia. 
French, in order to impose a 'moral ascendency' over the 
superior Boer force opposing him at Colesberg, taught his 
New Zealand Mounted Rifles to charge mounted with bayonets 
fixed to their rifles. 4 The cautious Boer general opposing 
him did not attack. 
The spreading of the few regular Cavalry 
regiments between areas of fighting produced mixed formations 
with, as i~ the 1880s, no common tactical doctrine. The 
Mounted Brigade with Buller, in the hill country of north-
ern Natal by the Tugela River, was composed of one and a 
half regular Cavalry regiments, two regular M.I. companies, 
and five different units of mounted riflemen. The Earl of 
Dundonald, placed in command, was determined not to risk 
1. Amery, Times History, Vol III, p 370 
2. Maurice, Official Histor of the War in South Africa 
(hereafter Official History South Africa Vol I, p 89 
3. Roberts to C-in-C India, 6 February 1900, 7101-23-110-1 
Roberts 
4. Amery, Times History, Vol II, p 117; New Zealand Mounted 
Rifle Association to Lady Haig, 4 March 1937, Acc 3155. 
325(b) Haig; Haig diary entrYJ 4 December 1899, in diary 
for November 1899-December 1899, enclosed in diary for 
1903, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
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the life of any member of this force if the same result 
co~ld be obtained by other means. 1 Although, with a scratch 
force in such country, Dundonald was not expected to 
achieve much, he was generally highly thought of, and was to 
emerge from the war as a public idol, much admired by 
Roberts. This high opinion of Dundonald was not, however, 
shared by a number of subordinates. Henry Wilson, with 
characteristic hyperbole, called him 'a suspect fool, and 
useless',2 while Hubert Gough, serving as Dundonald's 
Intelligence Officer, remembered: 
Dundonald was another of Buller's weak sub-
ordinates. Known to us as Dundoodle, he was 
hesitating, vacillating and vain. Mistakenly 
over-praised by a not well-informed Press, he 
was known as 'the stormy petrel'o The fact 
behind this soubriquet was that he had men 
under him of indpendent character and initia-
tive, whose every act was credited to 
Dundopald.J 
Gough's particular grievance was his claim that Dundonald 
robbed him of the credit for the final relief of Ladysmith, 
aided by the fiction of Winston Churchill, who had attached 
4 himself to Dundonald's staff as a war correspondent. 
Gough, like Dundonald, was however to emerge from the war 
with a high reputation for commanding horsemen. 
1. Dundonald, My Army Life, pp 99-111 
2. Wilson Diary entry, 11 April 1900, Wilson 
J. Gough, Soldiering On, p 70. This was written more than 
fifty years after the event 0 But see Pakenham, The Boer 
War, p 280 for evidence of Dundonald's nickname. 
4. Gough, Soldiering On, pp 75-81; Woods, Young Winston's 
Wars, p 246 
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Only once in themrly stages of the war 
could French show what his Cavalry could do, in October 
1899 at the battle of Elandslaagte, facing not Boer farmers 
but a mixed force of urban volunteers from Johannesburg and 
the various foreign contingents (French, Dutch, German, 
Irish and American settlers or miners) of the Transvaal 
1 Army. Attacked by Infantry led by Colonel Ian Hamilton, 
these men left the decision to retreat too late: when they 
finally mounted up and fled they were charged in flank and 
rear by squadrons of the 5th Lancers and 5th Dragoon Guards, 
which had worked dismounted round one flank. Charging in 
2 
open formation over the rough ground, the lances of the 
Cavalry shattered the retreating Boers. Haig, interviewing 
prisoners after the battle, was struck by their intense 
fear and disgust at the lance. 3 It seemed conclusive proof 
of the value, both physical and psychological, of the arme 
blanche and the Cavalry. However, twice before starvation, 
overloading and failure to acclimatise had destroyed the 
Cavalry force in South Africa, and now it was to happen 
again on a massive scale. 
The attempt to supply the increasing number 
of horses in South Africa strained the tiny Remount Depart-
ment, geared to peacetime requirements of 2,500 horses a 
year, until it collapsed altogether; and with officers 
1. Haig to Henrietta, 26 October 1899, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
2. Evans, The Story of the Fifth Royal Inniskilling Dragoon 
Guards, p 98. Other accounts suggest a closer formation 
3. Haig to Henrietta, 26 October 1899, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
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needed for the fighting arms it remained poorly and inade-
1 qu~tely staffed. In South Africa itself officers found 
incompetent were put in charge of remount depots as an 
alternative to dismissal, and the main depot at Stellen-
bosch entered the language as a verb, meaning to be sacked. 
There was no time in the war when demand for horses actually 
exceeded supply, but the horses from Argentina, North 
America, Hungary, and Australia (as well as India) varied 
greffiiy in quality, and were generally poor~ If, at the 
war's start, the British had made a conscious decision to 
adopt Boer methods of fighting, the ponies available in 
South Africa might have met their needs;3 but they were far 
too small to carry a fully equipped Cavalr~nan or Mounted 
Infantryman. To use these horses meant giving up not only 
the charge~ but the entire training system of the British 
mounted forces in order to learn another, in combat, against 
an enemy born to it. 
Those horses which survived the ~o months 
sea voyage to South Africa (and, for example, the 10th 
Hussars lost eighteen horses from one of their two troop-
ships on the voyage out4 ) were unfit on arrival. Haig 
1. Smith, Veterinary History, pp 120- 33; "A"788, 'Report on 
the Work of the Remount Department 1899-1902' (War Office) 
2. Smith, Veterinary History, especially pp 229 - 32; WO/105/ 
24: case of Captain Gage, 14th Hussars; cases of Colonels 
Page Henderson, 6th Dragoons, and Frewen, 16th Lancers; 
case of Colonel Moller, 18th Hussars 
3 . Smith, Veterinary History, pp 226- 7, 132- 4 
4 . Brander , The 10th Royal Hussars, p 75; Smith, Veterinary 
History, pp 252- 9 
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thought two weeks' acclimatisation essential; Lord Kitchener, 
like Wood before him, would have preferred three. A senior 
veterinary officer reckoned nine weeks minimum were re-
. d 1 qUlre • As it was, the horses were rushed in a week in 
narrow gauge coal trucks up to the veldt and to the Tugela, 
and pressed into service carrying twenty stones, ridden by 
men whose horsemastership was quite inadequate to South 
Africa's problems of heat and food shortage. The horses, 
unwilling to eat the thin, reedy, bitter grass of the veldt, 
placed an impossible strain on Buller's supply lines. On 
6 November he issued orders reducing horse rations to 12 
pounds of oats with no hay ration, the ration to be cut to 
8 pounffiif hay or grazing were available. In practice this 
meant that 8 pounds of oats a day alone, a fraction of their 
requiremen~ in Europe in peacetime, became the standard 
horsemtion. 2 The regulation bit and breast-strap made 
grazing impossible unless the horse was unsaddled, which in 
the enemy's presence was unwise.3 Colonel Rimington, who 
with his Tigers was thought the best horsemaster in the 
Army in South Africa, recalled one officer arguing that 
'If I graze my horses I shall be likely to lose some, for 
which the responsibility would fall on me; whereas if they 
starve they do so in accordance with regulations, and I 
1. Haig diary, 13 October 1899, Acc 3155.2 Haig; Kitchener 
quoted, and criticised, in Smith, Veterinary History, 
p 189 
2. Davies-Cook diary entry, 24 April 1900, 7104- 25 Davies-
Cook; Smith, Veterinary History, pp 14- 16 
3. Tylden, Horses and Saddlery, p 29 
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have no responsibility . ,1 Shortly after Buller's order, 
th~ senior veterinary officer in Cape Town protested that 
on this sc a le of rations the horses would indeed starve . 
It was an Army truism that the Cavalryman's 
first weapon was his horse, not his sword . The effort and 
anger that had gone into the ~ blanche controversy since 
the 1880s had produced Cavalry reform in minor tactics, but 
not in the wider issues of horse masters hip and the number 
of horsemen the Empire would need . The Cavalry's success 
in solving the ~ blanche problem, in understanding the 
relation between sword and carbine, had caused the Army to 
ignore the fact, attested to by commanders in war and in 
official documents, that an overburdened, starving, unfit 
horse, carrying a poor horsemaster, was useless in war no 
matter wh~t weapons his rider carried . 
Despite this, Buller, who owed his own re-
putation to success as a leader of irregular horsemen in 
South Africa, continued to press for more . His defeat at 
Colenso prompted him to request the raising of '80,000 ir-
regulars in England, organised not as regiments but in com-
panies of 100 each. They should be equipped. a:s ·Mounted In-
fantry, be able to shoot as well as possible, and ride 
2 decently . ' This call was taken up in The Times by the 
patriotic Dr Arthur Conan Doyle, who de c lared that 'England 
1 . Rimington, The Horse in Recent War, p 19 
2 . Buller to Lansdowne, SA91, 16 December 1899, 7101 - 23- 114 
Roberts 
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is full of men who can ride and shoot', and by the leading 
1 figures of each county. The result was the Imperial Yeo-
manry, created largely by the men who already officered 
Yeomanry regiments, but outside both the structure and the 
tactical doctrines of the Yeomanry itself. The first con-
tingent of ten thousand was poorly trained and just as over-
laden as the Cavalry. Junior Cavalry officers had to be 
promoted rapidly to lead them, 'a case', Haig observed, 'of 
the blind leading the blind',2 but a great attraction for 
those anxious for independent command. Haig himself ad-
vised a yo~mg friend to 'join the South African Light Horse 
or some such Skallywag corps, and go on the veldt and com-
mand men,.3 Less than a third of those who volunteered had 
4 
served in the Yeomanry at home. The remaining two contin-
gents, sent out in the course of the war, were even less 
competent, and it became proverbial that a new 'I.Yo' regi-
ment was so likely to be cut ~f and surrounded as to consti-
tute little more than a free gift of clothing and rifles to 
the Boers. 5 'I.Y.' according to one Serjeant, stood not for 
6 Imperial Yeomanry but for 'I'm Yours'. 
1. Conan Doyle to The Times, 18 December 1899; Pease, The 
History of the Northumberland (Hussars) Yeomanry, p~ 
2 . Haig to Henrietta, 30 March 1902, Acc J155.6c Haig 
3. Haig to Henrietta, 27 January 1901, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
4 . Elgin Commission, Report, pp 70 - 77, Evidence Vol I, 
pp 310- 12; Peel, Trooper 8008 I.Y., P 2 
5 . Gardner, Allenby, p 50; Kitchener to Roberts s.459, 
10 July 1901, 7101 - 2J- 33 Roberts; Hamilton to Roberts, 
6 February 1904 Hamilton 24/7/10/15 Hamilton 
6 . Hay to Gray, 18 January 1902, 7004/1 Gray 
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Following Buller's defeat at Colenso Roberts 
was sent out to take command, with Kitchener as Chief of 
Staffo Roberts now had the chance to wipe out the 'Majuba 
surrender' and show his superiority over the Wolseley Ring. 1 
On 10 January 1900 he arrived in South Africa, and five days 
later wrote from Cape Town to the Secretary of State for 
War, Lord Lansdowne, 'Large bodies of Mounted Infantry are 
what are chiefly required. Those that are coming from the 
Colonies and from England, as well as the Imperial Yeomanry, 
will be most useful, and I am doing all I can to raise more 
2 in this country.' Two new corps of Mounted Rifles were 
created in South Africa, Roberts' Horse and Kitchener's 
Horse, while the extra M.I. were provided by requiring 
every Infantry battalion in South Africa to produce one 
company. ~Apart from weakening the Infantry, and drasti-
cally multiplying the forage problem, this condemned the 
Army to a long war. These men would have required months 
of training before they could have coped in South Africa. 
The flaws in the conception of the original M.I., which had 
come from Britain as part of the Army Corps, had already been 
exposed. Ten weeks training a year was simply not enough 
to produce good horsemen; these specially selected Infantry, 
according to Haig, were 'the best of officers and men, but 
feel they are no use and can't get about on their horses,.3 
1. See above p 86 
2. Roberts to Lansdowne, 15 January 1900, 7101-23-110-1, 
Roberts 
30 Haig to Henrietta, 26 November 1899, Acc 3155.6C Haig 
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Yet, although most of the new M.I. force knew nothing of 
ri~ing and horses, most getting their mounts only in the 
1 first week of February, Roberts planned for them to fight 
a major campaign within a week. It was the Mounted Infantry 
theory, the belief that scouting horsemen could be impro-
vised, taken to its furthest extreme. The result was 
tragic: one M.I. Colonel admitted most of his men did not 
know how to saddle a horse properly, a sure way to produce 
sore backs; others went into combat still wearing their 
Infantry trousers, or even kilts. Rimington, straight-
faced, recalled that one Mounted Infantr~nan had told him 
2 he did not know whether to feed his horse on beef or mutton. 
Roberts, concentrating his forces at Modder 
River, where Methuen was still facing the Boers under 
General Cr~nje, used most of his M.I. and Colonials to form 
a protective force (known as 'divisional cavalry') for his 
mairt body of Infantry, in order to free the Cavalry for in-
dependent action. A Cavalry Division of three brigades, 
accompanied by two M.I. brigades, would be led by French on 
a wide outflanking dash to relieve the siege of Kimberley, 
which had held out against the Boers since the war's begin-
ning. The united force would, when the Infantry had caught 
up, press on to the Orange Free State capital of Bloem-
fontein. This was the crucial movement of the war. Up to 
1. Amery, Times History, Vol II, p 369 
2. Elgin Commission, Report, p 97, Evidence Vol II, p 319; 
Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, p 94 
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this point nothing but defeat had faced the British, and 
Lansdowne badly needed a victory. 1 Every major power, 
Japan included, sent obs erver s to the war , and though it 
lasted three years it was generally appreciated that only 
the conventional manoeuvring and set- piece battles of the 
Bloemfontein campaign, and the subsequent advance to the 
Transvaal capital of Pretoria, had anything to teach ob-
servers which was of value to European war. (The history 
offue war written by the Ger man General Staff dismissed the 
entire period of Kitchener's command in South Africa in 
succession to Roberts, eighteen months of guerrilla war, in 
one paragraph of a two- volume work.) It was also this 
campaign which provided the evidence for the next phase of 
the arme blanche controversy. 
Into the area which Methuen had felt could not 
support an extra brigade of horses, Roberts concentrated 
37,000 men, 14,000 horses, 12,000 mules and 10,000 oxen, 
during the summer drought, while at the same time re- organ-
2 ising the transport system. The 5,500 Cavalry and 5,800 
Mounted Infantry in French's command were competing directly 
with each other for water, forage and horses . 3 Roberts' 
advice to the Cavalry on South African warfare, issued on 
1. Roberts to Lansdowne, 27 January 1900, 7101 - 23- 110-1 
Roberts 
2. Amery, My Political Life, Vol I, p 126. Strengths for 
Roberts' forces are from Official History South Africa. 
3. Amery, Times History, Vol III, pp 370- 6; Smith, Veteri-
nary History, pp 29-41; Goldman, With General French and 
the Cavalry in South Africa, pp 73- 87 
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26 January, contained many sound suggestions, learned in 
the . heat of India, on dismounting whenever possible, 
resting the horses and proper feeding, but was ironic in 
the extreme in view of the sudden dash on half-rations he 
1 had planned for them. There was more than a hint of des-
peration in Rimington's advice that all surplus equipment 
should be thrown away to ease the weight carried by the 
horses, and ending 'they must have a bellyful; I graze 
2 
whenever safe (and sometimes when doubtful)'. To add to 
Roberts' burdens, his supply officer was (in Roberts' 
opinion) incompetent, and the Commander-in-Chief was 
having to do the job himself, without the help of two of 
his most trusted staff ofllcers, Ian Hamilton and Henry 
Rawlinson, both still trapped in Ladysmith. 3 It did not, 
however, occur to Roberts that if 10,000 horse.s could be 
maintained on half-rations for the relief of Kimberley, the 
5,000 horses of the Cavalry alone could have been properly 
fed if the M.I. had been dispensed with. 
French began his mavch on the morning of 11 
February with five days forage distributed through his 
column. Many regiments were not equipped with corn sacks, 
and as the spare horses which carried the surplus load were 
1. Elgin Commission, Evidence Vol I, Appendix, p 532, · C.O.S. 
circular memo no 5, 26 January 1900 
2. Elgin Commission, Evidence Vol I, Appendix, p 531, 
CoO.S. circular memo no 8, 5 February 1900 
3. Roberts, confidential letter to Lansdowne on senior 
officers, August 1900, 7101-23-124 Roberts; Wilson diary 
entry, 22 December 1899, Wilson 
r -
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needed to replace horses dropping out through exhaustion, 
the corn was dumped on the veldt. It was the Army's policy 
in South Africa at that time, if a horse collapsed, to 
shoot it rather than leave it to die. Many horses which 
might otherwise have recovered were, in this manner, des -
1 troyed. Roberts and Kitchener had impressed on French and 
his officers that Kimberley must be relieved if it cost 
half his force, that the pre stige of the Empire was at 
stake, and French dramatically replied that he would reach 
the town by the evening of 15 February, if he were still 
I , 2 a ~ve. But in addition to their other burdens Roberts 
chose this time to replace Cavalry officers whom he con-
sidered unfit, resulting in new commanders taking over 
just as the march began. Babington, one of French's bri-
gade commanders, was dismissed by Roberts, causing consid-
, 
erable ill- feeling (Haig attr ibuted the action to 'Pole-
Carew's evil tales,)3 and replaced by Broadwood. Another 
Brigadier- General, Brabazon, was removed at French's re-
quest on grounds of old age and incompetence; but Roberts 
promptly found his old friend from India another post, the 
1. Roberts to Wolseley, 1 July 1900, Autograph Rob erts 9, 
Wolseley; Goldmann , With General French and the Cavalry 
in South Africa, p 81; War Diary of the Cavalry Division 
in South Africa, Acc 3155.34 Haig (and also copy 'Boer 
War Cavalry Division Diary and Orders', 6807/159 Nation-
al Army Museum) entry 11 February 1900 
2. Cavalry Division War Diary, 10 February 1900, Acc 3155. 
34 Haig; Kitchener to Broadwood, 10 February 1900, 
7508- 34 Broadwood; Chisholm, Sir John French, p 67 
3 . Haig to Henrietta, 23 April 1900 and 26 December 1900, 
Acc 3155.6c Haig 
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1 
command of the whole Imperial Yeomanry. Further, Roberts 
decjded that Haig, a local Lieutenant-Colonel, was insuf-
ficiently senior to be the Cavalry Division's Chief Staff 
Officer. Roberts had promised a post, on Wolseley's re-
commendation, to the Earl of Errol, who himself had served 
as aide-de-camp to the new Inspector- General of Cavalry 
before the war. Errol replaced Haig, who had worked with 
French for five years and was known as one of the best 
2 
staff officers in the Army. An outraged French simply ig-
nored Errol's presence and Haig continued with the job. 
So rapid and haphazard was Roberts' plan of campaign that 
when the Cavalry and M.I. began their march none of the 
Brigadier-Generals had joined their brigades, and the last 
was not to do so until the evening three days later. 3 
The march to the Modder River, and across it 
at Klip Drift, was slowed by heat, dust storms, and the five 
hours necessary to feed and water the horses each evening . 
In the first three days 460 horses died or dropped out. On 
the third day two or three days' supplies were issued, but 
there would be no more until Kimberly was reached. Mean-
while, far to the rear, a Boer raiding party under de Wet, 
which had brushed against French's advance, avoided the M.I . 
1 . Roberts to Lansdowne, 5 March 1900, 7101 - 23- 110- 2 
Roberts; Bellew Diary, 10 February 1900, 5707/8 Bellew 
2. Roberts to Wolseley, 20 December 1899, Autograph Roberts 
8,Wolseley; Cavalry Division War Diary, 14 February 1900, 
Acc 3155.34 Haig; Elgin Commission, Report p 59 
3. Cavalry Division War Diary, 11 February 1900 to 15 
February 1900, Acc 3155.34 Haig 
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and Colonials scouting for the main body of Roberts' forces 
1 
and captured his main supply column. 
At about 10 a.m. on 15 February, two miles 
upstrerun from the Kl~p Drift crossing on the route to 
Kimberley, the Cavalry Division and accompanying M.I. en-
countered real opposition for the first time: fire from 
about 800 Boers with two Artillery pieces, forming an ex-
tended arc on the ridge of hills barring the advance. 
Mounted Rifles, or even cautious Cavalry, would have dis-
mounted or tried to outflank the position, but this could 
take hours. French was not certain of the number of Boers, 
and they could be reinforced at any moment. The fire 
seemed least at a low point, or nek, across the middle of 
the range of hills. French had promised Roberts; it was 
time for toe sacrifice he had written into the drillbook 
himself. Sending ahead scouts with wirecutters to clear 
any fences, French called for covering fire from his seven 
batteries, and ordered his troops, led by two Lancer squad-
rons, to open out to five yard intervals between files. He 
then led them in a charge through the Boer position and over 
the nek, without stopping. 2 The leading Brigadier-General 
later estimated that his men charged at about 14 miles an 
hour; the force spent roughly four minutes under fire, most 
1. Official History South Africa, Vol II, pJ2 
2. As with Mars-Ia-Tour, there are a number of descriptions 
of the Klip Drift charge, unfortunately none very de-
tailed and with considerable variation. See Official 
History South Africa, Vol II, pp J-6 
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of which Haig judged to come from around 1,000 yards, 
co~ered by their own Artillery and the dust thrown up from 
their horses' hooves. One hit for every five rounds fired 
at them would have killed or wounded every other man or 
horse in the charge. When the Cavalry and M.I. collected 
themselves miles behind the nek, they found their casualties 
to be four men wounded and two horses killed,1 and the way 
to Kimberley was open. 
The Klip Drift charge rivalled the Death Ride 
at Mars-Ia- Tour for drama and controversy. It did not re-
semble the close-order charge against Cavalry, nor was the 
destruction of the Boer force to its front its immediate 
objective, although a few were killed as the nek was cross-
ed. It was undoubtedly a perfect example of a charge for 
a reason ~d purpose over and above the charge itself. All 
the factors which the 'scientists' had failed to consider, 
dust, covering fire, poor shooting at extreme ranges, and 
the psychological pressure of a mass of horsemen bearing 
down on the Boer position, combined to produce what seemed 
to the Cavalry as a miracle. 2 They did not know how they 
had done it. Haig went so far as to suggest, in the Divi-
sional diary, that it was unfortunate a squadron had not 
1. Cavalry Division War Diary, 15 February 1900, Acc 3155. 
34 Haig. Other accounts place casualties as high as 
twenty killed and wounded, and up to sixty horses. 
2. Cooper, British Regular Cavalry 1644- 1914, p 200, suggests 
that the horses' hooves emerging through a dust cloud may 
have, with its biblical echoes, panicked the highly 
rel igious Boers. 
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1 been kept in close order to improve the shock of the charge. 
on time, 
French kept his promise by relieving Kimberley 
2 
although his supply problems remained unsolved. 
Nor could he contact Kitchener, following with four Infantry 
divisions, since the telegraph was cut and the heliograph 
unresponsive. J The effort of the march and the last gallop 
at Klip Drift had reduced the Cavalry, recorded one Colonel, 
to a 'desperate state' by the morning of 16 FebrUary.4 
French, anxious to catch the Boers who abandoned the siege 
on his approach, sent out two brigades which, with the 
extra effort, collapsed completely during the day. One 
brigade alone lost sixty- eight horses. 5 Only the remaining 
brigade, Broadwood's, was fit to move when French received 
fresh orders that night: the Cavalry were needed elsewhere. 
Cronje's force at Magersfontein was about 
6 4,000 men, with their families carried in trek waggons. He 
had believed, quite correctly, that Roberts could not supply 
his Army away from the main railways, and therefore con-
cluded a flank march was impossible; he also had a low 
1. Cavalry Division War Diary, 15 February 1900, Acc J155. 
J4 Haig. The same suggestion occurs in Goldmann, With 
Gene~al French and the Cavalry in South Africa, p 8J, 
indicating that he had access to the diary, or to Haig. 
2. Cavalry Division War Diary, 16 February 1900, Acc J155. 
J4 Haig; Smith, Veterinary History, p J4 
J. Official History South Africa, Vol II, p 94 
4. Bellew Diary, dawn, 16 February 1900, 5707/8 Bellew 
5. Official History South Africa, Vol II, p 94, Smith, 
Veterinary History, p J4 
6. This figure is a guess based on the number who finally 
surrendered. GoldmaTIA, With General French and the Caval-
ry in South Africa, p 102 puts the figure as high as 
6,000. 
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. 1 
opinion of Cavalry. Finding, with the relief of Kimberley, 
that he was cut off, he took the considerable risk of 
moving across the Cavalry's rear, with Kitchener in pursuit 
on the other bank of the Modder. On Roberts' orders French 
pushed Broadwood's brigade t~ty-five miles in one morning 
to place itself in a dismounted blocking position ahead of 
Cronje at Paardeberg Drift. When the Cavalry opened fire 
Cronje, with no idea of the size of the force opposing him, 
assumed Kitchener's Infantry had got ahead of him, and 
halted, entrenching his force in the banks of the Modder. 
Kitchener's arrival turned this into a formal siege, and 
after a relief attempt had failed, Cronje and his men sur-
rendered ten days later. 
So Roberts had two spectacular victories, the 
relief of Kimberley and the capture of Cronje, both achieved 
by the much criticised regular Cavalry~ Christiaan de Wet 
atUibuted every defeat of the next two months to his men's 
2 poor morale following news of the surrender. Together, the 
two exploits represented the triumph of the hybrid doctrine. 
Unfortunately, at the time the sixty-eight year old Roberts 
was incapacitated by a severe chill, and took no direct 
part in his Army's movements. He never fully appreciated 
either the extent of the Cavalry's success, nor the extent 
of their weakness o As no newspaperman followed the Cavalry 
through the whole of the campaign,J neither did the general 
1. Sternberg, My Experiences of the Boer War, pp11J, 159 
2. de Wet, Three Years War, p 68 
J. Goldmarmaccompanied the Cavalry for most of the campaign. 
-149-
public. With part of his main supply column lost, Roberts 
did, however, find the problem of feeding his force im-
possible. The Cavalry received no supplies for their horses 
for four days after relieving Kimberley. Their rations for 
the .following .day were five pounds and, for the day after 
that, one pound of corn. Not until 23 February were 
'normal' rations issued to the horses. By this time few 
could move above a walk, and the Division's strength had 
dropped to 4,500 men with 4,200 horses, despite receiving 
. 1 
a number of remounts. M~while a series of incidents 
soured the already uneasy relations between the Cavalry and 
Roberts' headquarters. On the night of 21 February, French, 
who had been pressing for Haig's promotion, appointed him 
to command a brigade, moving one Brigadier-General to an-
other comm~d and returning a second to his regiment. On 
the following afternoon, French was invited to Roberts' 
headquarters. By the evening, both Brigadier-Generals 
were re-instated with their original commands, but Haig 
was appointed Chief Staff Officer to the Cavalry Division, 
and the Earl of Errol was to escort Cronje into captivity 
on his surrender, leaving, so French and Haig recorded, be-
cause of ill-health. 2 In fact, Roberts put Errol, unfit 
1. Haig diary, 15-23 February 1900, Acc 3155.38 Haig; 
Cavalry Division War Diary, 15-23 February 1900, Acc 
3155.34 Haig; Goldman~,With General French and the 
Cavalry in South Africa, p 116 
2. Haig to Henrietta, 22 February 1900, Acc 3155.6c Haig; 
Cavalry Division War Diary, 22 February 1900, Acc 3155. 
34/Hai,; Haig diary, 22 February 1900, Acc 3155.38 Haig; 
WO 105 25 General French's reports upon Major-General 
Brabazon/Col Earl of Errol/Col Babington, letter dated 
27 February 1900 
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or not, in charge of a brigade- sized force of the new 
1 Mounted Infantry. 
On 24 February a Cavalry raid towards Bl oem-
fontein planned by Roberts was cancelled: French had an-
nounced that his Division was incapable of movement. 2 Haig, 
over at Roberts' headquarters that day on a routine visit, 
was told by Roberts something he recorded in sheer dis -
belief. 'He said he considered Cavalry Officers did not 
sufficiently look after their horses !' Haig wrote, 'General 
French also, to be hard on his horse~,3 Although French's 
0pinion that 'the horsemastership of the Cavalry is - very 
nearly all that we can desire,4 is equally questionable, 
amount of care could have helped the Division's starving 
no 
horses, and Roberts knew it. On 22 February he telegraphed 
Lansdowne: 
We are experiencing extreme difficulty about 
supplies . None are available locally, and 
owing to the drought water is rarely found 
except in rivers . In most places there is 
little or no grazing for animals and it is 
impossible to carry forage for them . 5 
Five days later he wrote that 'I should be unable to move 
on account of the crippled stae of my horses . For several 
days they were worked hard, with no grai~ and with very 
1. Official History South Africa, Vol III, p 34 
2 . ibid, Vol II, P 172 
3 . Haig diary, 24 February 1900, Acc 3155 . 38 Haig 
40 Elgin Commission, Report, p 47 
50 Roberts to Lansdowne, 22 February 1900, 7101 - 23- 110- 2 
Roberts 
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1 little else to eat.' Because of the transport problem, 
Roberts made a personal appeal to the Cavalry to put up 
with inadequate supplies. But on 28 February his supply 
officer reported that their horses had considerably ex-
ceeded their ration. Leopold Amery, the assistant foreign 
editor of The Times, who was in South Africa, remembered 
that 'this time the Little Chief let himself go and gave 
2 the Cavalry a real dressing down for not playing the game'. 
But there had been an elementary error in the calculations. 
As the Cavalrymen pointed out, with frigid politeness, they 
were drawing forage not only for their fit horses, but also 
for those which were sick. 
'never forgave. ,3 
'The Cavalry', wrote Amery, 
The strain on relations between French and 
Roberts fi~ally produced the most controversial episo& of 
the war. On 28 February the Cavalry's fit horses numbered 
3,500, including a large number of poor quality remounts. 4 
That day the Army, following Cronje's surrender, beganto 
move towards Bloemfontein, and on 6 March it faced 6,000 
Boers under de Wet in a blocking position across the Modder 
at Poplar Grove. 5 By this time the effort of marching had 
1. Quoted in Official History South Africa, Vol III, p 29 
2. Amery, My Political Life, Vol I, p 131 
3. Haig diary entry, 28 February 1900, Acc 3155.38 Haig; 
Cavalry Division War Diary, 28 February 1900, Acc 3155. 
34 Haig; Amery, My Political Life, Vol I, p 131 
4. Cavalry Division War Diary, 28 February 1900, Acc 3155. 
34 Haig 
5. Again a rough estimate. The German Official Account of 
the War in South Africa, Vol II, p 6 lists the possible 
figures given, ranging from 2,000 to 8,000. 
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brought the Cavalry down to 2,800 horses, but they were 
still required to share their forage with the M.I., who had 
1 
run outo Roberts planned another Paardeberg , intending to 
trap the Boers against the river bank by a deep turning 
movement, led by French's Cavalry, which was required by 
daybreak to be far enough behind the Boer flank to prevent 
escape when the Infantry assaulted . Unfortunately, Roberts 
gave his orders in a rousing speech which omitted to mention 
starting times, and French apparently walked out early, with 
the belief that he should move at 3 a . m. ; while his close 
friend, General Kelly- Kenny, commanding the supporting 
Infantry division, believed he should move at 2 a.m., but 
behind the Cavalry. French and KellY- Kenny both blamed 
Roberts for the ensuing confusion, and he blamed them . The' 
result was , that by dawn the Cavalry had just got behind the 
B °to 2 oer POSl lon e 
As the Boers were outflanked, de Wet wrote 
later, 'a panic seized my men, . 3 They abandoned their 
position and retreated, as a British observer put it, 'as 
4 fast as they could get their horses away' . Roberts tele-
graphed to Lansdowne that they had even left their cooked 
meals behind them? Poplar Grove, intended as the decisive 
1 . Elgin Commission, Evidence Vol II, p 304; Official His tory 
South Africa, Vol II, p 190 
2 . Pakenham, The Boer War, p 373; Official History South 
Africa, Vol II, p 192 
3 . de Wet, Three Years War, p 69 
4 . Bellew diary, 7 March 1900, 5707/8 Bellew 
5 . Roberts to Lansdowne no 259, 8 March 1900, 7101 - 23- 110- 2 
Roberts 
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battle, was turning out to be only the Cavalry, trying un-
successfully to raise a trot from their exhausted horses 
(according to Smith-Don2en, an eyewitness)1 in pursuit of 
twice their number of Boers. Small Boer dismounted parties, 
which the Cavalry could neither outflank nor gallop through 
in their crippled state, slowed the pursuit, and by 3 p.m. 
they were ridden to a standstill. 'The rout', Roberts told 
Lansdowne, 'was complete, the men declaring that they could 
not stand against British Artillery and such a formidable 
2 force of Cavalry.' It was only on the following day that 
he learned what had been missed: with the Boers had been the 
Presidents of the two republics, who had arrived to confer 
with de Wet just as the batile started. To have captured 
all three would surely have meant a total Boer collapse. 
Roberts tried to explain to Lansdowne: 
Owing to the absence of forag~ and hard work, 
a good many [horses] have been lost during the 
past month ••• five hundred and fifty eight were 
either killed, died, or went missing during the 
relief of Kimberley, and [at Poplar Grove] .54 
were killed, 47 wounded, 62 died from exhaustion 
and 116 others were reported unfit for work. It 
must be remembered that the sickly season is 
approaching ••• The success of the campaign depends 
entirely on the mounted troops being efficient.3 
In thirty days between leaving Modder River and finally 
arriving in Bloemfontein, with de Wet still undefeated and 
1. Smith-Do~en, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
p166 
2. Roberts to Lansdowne, no 266, 9 March 1900, 7101-23-110-2 
Roberts 
3. Roberts to Lansdowne, no 271, 9 March 1900, 7101-23-110-2 
Roberts 
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at large, the Cavalry had lost 42 per cent of its mounts, 
even allowing for remounts, and was competing directly with 
the M.I. for any horses it could get . The Cavalrymen would 
have preferred their own big troop horses, which Rimington 
thought the best in the country, if only they were given 
1 
sufficient food. On 16 March a furious Douglas Haig wrote 
home: 
I have never seen horses so beat as ours this 
day. They have been having only 8 lbs of oats 
a day, and practically starving since we left 
Modder River on February 11th. So many colonial 
Skallywag corps have been raised that the horses 
of the whole force could not have a full ration. 
The Colonial Corps raised in Cape Colony are 
quite useless, so are the recently raised Mounted 
Infantry. They can't ride, and know nothing of 
their duties as mounted men. Roberts Horse and 
Kitcheners Horse are good only for looting and 
the greater part of them disappear the moment a 
shot is fired or there is the prospect of a 
fight. You will see then that the success of the 
Cavalry Division has been in spite of these 
ruffians and notwithstanding short rations . 2 
William Howard Russell, the veteran critic of British 
Generalship, annoyed at the adulation of Roberts in the 
British Press following Paardeberg, wrote to Garnet Wolseley 
from the safety of Dover: 
Well 1 after all the 'common sense strategy', 
the 'spinning of the coils', the 'closing of 
of the net', the . 'anaconda folds', and the rest 
of the damnable stuff streaking the columns of 
the great 'organs' that are set to the same 
tQDe, 'Gloria in excelsis Bobbibus I' I cannot 
for the life of me see anything but an abortive 
attempt to direct some 40,000 men, three brigades 
of horse, 100 guns and six Generals to get hold 
1. Smith, Veterinary History, p 42; Tylden, Horses and 
Saddlery, p 36 
2 . Haig to Henrietta, 16 March 1900, Acc 3155 . 6c Haig 
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of some .5,000 Dutchmen not very far from 
Bloemfontein who could not [be] taken prisoner 
but who could march away under our noses. 1 
Wolseley himself, reading between the lines of Roberts
' 
re-
ports coming into the War Office, realised the supply 
failure and what it had done to the Cavalry. Knowing that 
Roberts was due to succeed him as Commander-in-Ch~ at the 
end of the year, however, he feared that any statement by 
him would be misinterpreted as spite. He expressed unfeigned 
and bitter admiration for Roberts
' 
ability to keep the Press 
h ' 'd 2 on 1.S S1. e. 
On the same day that Haig wrote home, 16 March, 
Roberts wrote again to Lansdowne, with a new note in his 
despatch: 
Tpe Cavalry horses were, no doubt, done up, but 
we should have had a good chance of making two 
Presidents prisoner if French had carried out my 
orders of going straight for the Modder River 
instead of wasting valuable time by going after 
small parties of the enemy.J 
On 24 April he developed this theme into his explanation for 
the failure, so far, of the campaign: 
I think we might have done better on more than 
one occasion if our Cavalry had been judiciously 
handled. French will never make a great Cavalry 
leader, he is wanting in initiation [sic] and has 
no idea of how to take care of his horses. He 
carried out the relief of Kimberley in a satis-
factory manner because he acted exactly in 
1. Russell to Wolseley, 28 April 1900, Autograph Russell 28, 
Wolseley 
2. Wolseley to George Wolseley, 20 April 1900 (uncatalogued) 
Wolseley 
J. Roberts to Lansdowne, 16 April 1900, 7101-2J-110-2 
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accordance with the instructions I gave him. 
But the following day, instead of giving his 
horses a much needed rest, he worked them from 
daylight to dark without injury to the enemy or 
advantage to ourselves ••• At Poplar Grove, French 
started late and allowed himself to be beguiled 
by the enemy into fighting a series of rearguard 
actions, instead of giving them a wide berth and 
placing himself on the Boer's line of retreat. 
They were thus able to carry off their guns, and 
[Presidents] Kruger and Steyn effected their 
escape. 1 
There was no mention of supply problems in this letter, 
which was the first occasion on which the theory was advanced 
that the Cavalry's 'failure' at Poplar Grove was due to 
French, and to Cavalry trained in the ~ blanche mentality 
of always charging, being unable to cope with the skirmish-
ing tactics of mounted riflemen. This claim by Roberts 
transformed the ~ blanche controversy. For the Cavalry 
to accept it would be to acknowledge that Poplar Grove, 
and the subsequent two years of war , were their fault. For 
Roberts to admit that the Cavalry were not incorrectly 
trained would be also to admit that their failure was due 
to the collapse of their horses, the fault of himself and 
of his staff. The members of the Roberts Ring, who would 
later provide his principal supporters in the postwar arme 
blanche debate, a1,1 arrived in Bloemfontein after its cap-
ture. Ian Hamilton, released from Ladysmith on 28 February, 
was given a divisional command by Roberts, although still 
only a Colonel, along with administrative command of the 
2 
entire Mounted Infantry. His command included French's 
1. Roberts to Lansdowne, 24 April 1900, 7101 - 2J- 110- 2 
Roberts 
2. Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p 294 
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best brigade, under Broadwood, despite the latter's high 
1 
opinion of French. The future exploits of Hamilton's 
force were guaranteed publicity by the presence of Churchill, 
who eulogised Roberts as 'Her Majesty's greatest subject', 
2 
and Hamilton as 'the man who won the fight at Elandslaagte'. 
Rawlinson, Wilson and Robertson all joined Roberts' staff 
at about the same time. 
Meanwhile, the Army was stuck in Bloemfontein, 
receiving a little over half the number of supply trucks a 
day it needed from the railway.3 There was no rest, however, 
for the Cavalry . Haig complained that 'Whenever there is an 
alarm Lord R[obertsJ at once orders out French and the Caval -
rYe I don't know what we'll do for horses . Only wretched 
beasts and Argentine ponies are arriving, . 4 Fresh horses 
were distri~uted, but they were worked too hard too quickly, 
and rapidly became diseased. 5 After a day spent patrolling 
on 31 March the three Cavalry brigades (the 4th Brigade 
arrived in April) had only 1,073 horses fit for action . The 
16th Lancers, a particularly bad case, had only eighty- two 
fit horses in the regiment . 6 The advance from Bloemfontein 
was delayed by French's confession that, once again, his 
horses could not move . On 3 May Roberts attempted to 
1. Broadwood to his mother, 21 February 1900, 7508- 34 
Broadwood 
2. Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p 272 
3 . Amery, Times History, Vol IV, p 13 
4 . Haig to Henrietta, 7 April 1900, Acc 3155 . 6c Haig 
5 . Haig to Henrietta, 5 May 1900, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
6 . Smith, Veterinary History, pp 52- 4 
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advance without the Cavalry, but soon found that his few 
ColQnials, untrained M.I. and newly arrived Imperial Yeo-
manry were inadequate as scouts for his Army. On 8 May he 
demanded the Cavalry's presence at Vet River, sixty miles 
from Bloemfontein, forcing two of the brigades to cover the . 
distance in one day, and then reprimanded French for 
1 
allowing his horses to straggle. 
The Cavalry were needed for another attempt to 
trap the Boers, at the battle of Zand River on 10 May. This 
produced another controversy: ten years later, Ian Hamilton 
wrde of it as the action which destroyed his last faith in 
the ~ blanche. 'The horses were fresh', he told Erskine 
Childers, 'after several days complete rest', but failed 
when ordered to break through and pursue the retreating 
Boers. 'I ~o not blame the Cavalry personnel', Hamilton con-
tinued, 'no finer fellows serve in the British, or any 
other, Army.' He blamed the '.false training which had taught 
them in peace tactics palpably impractical for war,.2 But 
in the same battle the Cavalry discovered that, although 
their horses were far too weak to gallop, they could cause 
a Boer retreat by the threat of a charge, however badly de-
livered. French led one charge personally: 
I galloped from the kopje to the outer brigade 
with the thought that either every idea which 
I had ever formed in my life as to the efficacy 
1. Haig to Henrietta, 14 May 1900, Acc 3155.6c Haig; Amery, 
Times History, Vol IV, p 122 
2. Hamilton to Childers, copy to Roberts and Churchill, 
30 October 1910, Hamilton 7/3/15 Hamilton 
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of shock action against mounted riflemen was 
utterly erroneous, or this was the moment to 
show that it was not ••• The Boers realised what 
was coming. Their fire became wild, and bullets 
began to flyover our heads. 1 
Another participant recalled with amusement the Boers 
mounting up and retreating before 'the terrifying spectacle 
of 200 men flogging their horses with the flat of their 
2 blunt swords'. 
The$ffie tactic was used successfully at the 
battle of Diamond Hill on 11 June, virtually the last set-
piece battle of the~r. Churchill, an eyewitness, described 
the charge of the 12th Lancers: 
Its effect was instantaneous. Though the 
regiment scarcely numbered one hundred and 
fifty men, the Boers fled before them ••• Had 
the horses been fresh and strong a very severe 
punishment would have been administered to the 
enemy, but with weary and jaded animals which 
were all worn out with hard work and scanty 
food, ' they were unable to overtake the mass of 
fugitives who continued to fly before them o •• 
Altogether ten Boers perished by the lance, 
and the moral effect on those who escaped must 
certainly have been considerable.3 
The Life Guards, who thanks to Dundonald's training proved 
to be among the best shots and scouts in South Africa, de-
spite being Heavy Cavalry, also had a chance to charge: 
Delighted at this unlooked- for, unhoped-for 
opportunity the Life Guardsmen scrambled back 
into their saddles, thrust their hated [sic] 
carbines into the buckets, and, drawing their 
long swords, galloped straight for the enemy. 
The Boers, who in this part of the field very 
1. French, preface to Bernhardi, Cavalry in War and Peace, 
p xi 
2 . Vaughan, 'Cavalry Notes', JRUSI Vol 45, P 452 
3 . Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p 322 
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considerably outnumbered the Cavalry, might 
very easily have inflicted severe losses on 
them. But so formidable was the sight of these 
tall horsemen cheering and flogging their gaunt 
horses with the flat of their swords, that they 
did not abide, and, running to their mounts, 
fled in a cowardly haste, so that, though eigh-
teen horses were shot, the Household Cavalry 
sustained no loss in men. 1 
No Cavalryman before the war would have advocated charging 
Infantry entrenched on a hill crest; yet repeatedly the 
Cavalry found such tactics worked against mounted riflemen~ 
The Boers, worried about turning movements on their flanks, 
stretched their line at Diamond Hill to twenty-five miles, 
or about one man to every six yards of front. They were 
unable to concentrate enough firepower to stop even a slow 
moving charge. 3 But also at Diamond Hill, with the armies 
stretched over such distances, control of the battle by 
Roberts and his officers proved impossible; chances were 
missed, and the result was inconclusive. The Boers re-
verted to skirmishing,and were quite prepared to ride away 
when threatened. Haig was happy enough with this. 'I hear 
from several . sources', he wrote, 'that the Infantry is 
guite jealous of the success of the Cavalry. The poor 
creatures merely carry their guns without a chance of 
loosing off ! In fact they simply wear their boots out to 
4 
no purpose l' To suggest to men in this mood that they had 
1. Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p 323; Roberts to Lansdowne, 
JO January 1900, 7101-23-110-1 Roberi;;s 
2. Elgin Commission, Evidence Vol I, p 293 
3. Lascelles, 'The Influence of Ground on Shock Action', CJ 
Vol 5, no 19, p 492; Maude, Cavalry; its Past and Future, 
p 253 
40 Haig to Henrietta, 14 May 1900, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
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failed was to court ridicule . After a farcical episode 
(reminiscent of that between Dundonald and Gough) in which 
Roberts forced French to retreat from a town so that, for 
publicity reasons , he might receive its surrender person-
ally, Haig observed 'I am afraid he is a silly old man and 
1 
scarcely fit to be C. in C. of this show'o 
In contrast, Roberts, having achieved his 
objective with the fall of Pretoria on 5 June, took a more 
charitable view of the Cavalry than previously. He wrote 
to Lansdowne on 2 August that 'French has been doing very 
well lately. He lost his head a little after all the praise 
showered upon him for the relief of Kimberley, but has now 
2 
recovered and is of great use . ' By the end of the month 
he placed French alongside Hamilton as 'one of the three or 
four I would entrust with a difficult business',J and a few 
. 4 
weeks later summed him up as 'an excellent Cavalry commander' ~ 
He does not se.em to have realised the antipathy towards him-
self that he had created in French and his Cavalry . By 
1 August he thought them 'pretty well off,5 for remounts and 
supplies; but the cost of the campaign had been enormous . 
Allowing for replacements received, the Cavalry between 19 
May and 9 June lost 40 per cent of the horses from its 1st 
1 . Haig to Henrietta, 14 May 1900, Acc J155 . 6c Haig 
2. Roberts to Lansdowne, 2 August 1900, 7101 - 2J- 110- J 
Roberts 
J . Roberts to Lansdowne, 29 August 1900, 7101 - 2J- 110- J 
Roberts 
4 . Roberts to Lansdowne, 17 September 1900, 7101 - 2J- 110- 4 
Roberts 
5 . Roberts to Kitchener, c.24JJ, 1 July 1900, 7101 - 2J- 111 
Roberts 
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Brigad~ while 4th Brigade, relatively new to the country, 
1 lost 60 per cent. Nor were these figures to improve for 
the period of guerrilla war that was just beginning. In an 
attempt to contain the Boers, great mounted 'drives' were 
organised through the veldt, demanding yet more horsemen. 
Nearly every regular Cavalry regiment was rotated through 
South Africa in the course of the war,2 and had to learn 
the special horsemastership skills of the country . More 
M.I. units were created, even the Artillery contributing, 
and more Imperial Yeomanry arrived, 'a helpless looking lot', 
according to one of their members. 3 Horses were overladen, 
not with superfluous equipment, but with food as an attempt 
to overcome the uncertainties of the supply system. 'I 
should like you to see us sometime', a happy I.Y. Serjeant 
wrote to hi s father, 'with half a sheep hanging behind our 
saddles, and half a tree in front to cook it with.,4 He 
was puzzled at his horse's poor condition. The ration for 
horses seldom rose above the 8 pounds of corn accepted as 
standard, and could easily drop as low as 2t pounds of corn 
and mealies if the supply system clogged, as it often did. 5 
More than 500,000 horses were finally used in the war, and 
1. Amery, Times History, Vol IV, p 162 
2. Stirling, Our Regiments in South Africa, pp 398- 463. The 
single exception was the 15th Hussars. 
3. Paterson diary, April 1900, (a summary) 7208-8 Paterson 
4. Britten to his father, 29 June 1900, 7812-34 Britten 
5. Rawlinson Column War Diary 1901, 5201 - 33-8 Rawlinson/ 
Boer; Davies-Cook, diary entries 19 February 1901 and 
b:March 1901, 7104-25 Davies- Cook 
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a little more than 66 per cent died, mostly of starvation and 
mistreatment. 1 The survivors were the small, light ponies 
of the type the Boers themselves rode. 
The British horsemen of the last year of the 
war, veteran Mounted Infantry and Cavalry (in fact elite 
Mounted Rifles in all but name) gradually regained their 
mobility on these horses, but only at the expense of the 
charge and the ~ blanche itself. In late 1900, as 
Roberts relinquished command to Kitchener, set piece battles 
had given way to skirmishes at 1,000 yards or more by small 
parties of Boers. As a weight saving, swords and lances 
were given up and the Cavalry issued with the Lee-Metford 
rifle to replace their carbines. Some Cavalrymen, grateful 
for a long-range weapon, even attempted to open fire at 
4,000 yards or more, well beyond the rifle's range. 2 These 
skirmishes at extreme range produced few casualties, and, 
compared to the rifles of thirty years before, only minor 
wounds. 3 The Scots Greys, in South Africa from the start 
of the war, lost only 76 dead in its entire course;4 the 
2nd Dragoon Guards lost 80 dead in seven months, 23 of them 
in a single ambush. 5 One Imperial Yeomanry company spent 
eighteen months in the field, under fire sixty-five times, 
for the loss of only three men; another spent fifteen 
1. Smith, Veterinary History, p 226 
2. The Question _of Mounted Infantry by a Rifleman, p 61 
3. Sternberg, My Experiences of the Boer War, p 62 
4. According to its memorial in the grounds of Edinburgh 
Castle. This does not state how many died in battle, 
or of wounds. 
5. Whyte, A History of the Queens Bays, pp 179-81 
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months in South Africa without a death in battle. 1 The 
first Imperial Yeomanry contingent saw far more fighting 
than the two following ones, but even this lost only 2 per 
t f "t " t" 2 cen 0 l S men ln ac lone 
Although Roberts made a general enquiry be-
fore issuing the rifle to his horsemen, he did not draft a 
positive order forbidding the arme blanche. 3 French ob-
jected to the suggestion, but the decision was finally left 
to individual commanders of the mounted 'columns' of 500 to 
1,500 men who made the drives. Horace Smith-Donien, whom 
French regarded as the best of his senior column commanders, 
actively sought permission to abandon the sword, and gave 
the 5th Lancers, part of his column, the choice of leaving 
their swords and lances or being left behind when the 
4 
column moved. Some regiments, however, kept their swords 
to the end of the war,5 and one newspaper was later to 
quote: 
One grim faced horse-soldier of our acquain-
tance who received a peremptory personal order 
to cast aside his swords. He did so, but, in 
his own words, vAs soon as that d----d fellow' 
(mentioning a certain general) 'had turned his 
back we picked 'em up again, and what's more' -
1. Fox, A History of · the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars 
Yeomanry 1891-1922, p 13; Edmeades, Some Historical 
Records of the West Kent (Q.Oo) Yeomanry 1794-190~ p 114 
2. Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol I, p 279 
3. WO/105/29 'Opinions as to the arming of Cavalry with the 
long rifle'; Roberts to Hamil ton, 4 April 1902, 7101-23-
122 Roberts; Hamilton to Roberts, 30 April 1902, 
Hamilton 24/7/10/23 Hamilton 
40 Smi th-Dollien , Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
p 260 
5. Hamilton to Roberts, 30 April 1902, Hamilton 24/7/10/23 
Hamilton 
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he added with exultation - 'we used them; 
and though the Boers took to charging some 
fellows' columns, by G-- 1 they never tried 
to charge mine !'1 
The remaining Boers, about 20,000 v eterans of a year's 
fighting, did indeed begin to charge British columns in 
2 
early 1901, and' Brabazon, the Imperial Yeomanry commander, 
also attributed this to his men's lack of the ~ blanche . 3 
A Boer 'rifle charge' was a compromise between their normal 
skirmishing tactics and the need to inflict casualties on 
the enemy. It consisted of a fast gallop by horsemen in 
loose formation, firing from the saddle and often supported 
by a dismounted party; at close range, however, rather than 
charging through their opponents, the Boers would dismount 
and engage in a prolonged rifle-duel. At Bakenlaagte on 
30 October 1901 a charge by about 900 Boers ended in a 
firefight t aking fifteen minute s to overwhel m a British 
rearguard of 180 men, while the column they were covering 
. 4 
escaped . At Roodewall in the western Transvaal on 10 April 
1902 a Boer force of nearly 1,000 failed to surprise a 
Mounted Infantry column, and charged in two closely bunched 
lines quite slowly into the fire of 1,500 rifles . Even so, 
they were not turned back until the closest were within 70 
1 . Saturday ReView, 28 May 1910, preserved in 7101 - 23- 222 
Roberts 
2 . Rawlinson Column War Diary, standing order no 4 of 27 
April 1901 warns against this, 5201 - 33- 8 Rawlinson/Boer . 
For the whole ques tion of the 'rifle charge' see evidence 
collected in 7101 - 23- 221· Roberts, and Childers, War and 
the Arme Blanche, especially pp 246- 8 
3 . Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol I, p 293 
4 . Amery, Times History, Vol V, pp 365- 76 
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yards of contact, and lost only 51 killed, 40 wounded and 
36 prisoners. 1 The British General Staff suggested ten 
years later that a small mounted party with swords, 
charging into their flank just as they faltered, would 
2 have destroyed them. 
Only once, apparently, at Blood River, on 
17 September 1901, did the Boers deliberately carry a 
charge home, when they ambushed a column led by Hubert 
Gough. The column was fixed in front by rifle fire, and 
in the classic tactics of Mounted Rifles had itself dis-
mounted in open order, when a party of 200 Boers rode into 
and over it from the flank. 3 Kitchener decided Gough was 
not to blame for the destruction of his command. The man 
who went to Gough's rescue, Edmund Allenby of the Innis-
killing Dragoons, apparently disagreed, and an enmity grew 
" 4 between them. There were, however, throughout the war a 
number of clashes between mounted Boers and British forces 
in which bayonets or clubbed rifles were used. The Cavalry 
complained they were handicapped without their swords, and 
Jan Smuts agreed, calling the giving up of the arme blanche 
the biggest mistake of the war. 5 Kitchener preferred to 
1. Amery, Times History, Vol V, pp 530-7 
2. Review of Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, by the 
General Staff, CJ, Vol 5, no 19, p 408 
3. Gough, Soldiering On, pp 84-9 
4. Kitchener to Roberts, 27 September 1901, 7101-23-33 
Roberts. Gardner, Allenby, p 49 offers this as an 
explanation of Gough's behaviour in 1914. 
5. Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol II, p 411, Smuts quoted by 
Haig. 
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believe, with some justification, that the successful Boer 
ch~rges were due instead to the poor shooting and panic of 
1 
novice M.I. and Imperial Yeomanry. Such disasters as the 
capture of Lord Methuen and the scattering of his column at 
Tweebosch on 7 March 1902 were undoubtedly due to inex-
perienced toops panicking under fire. But Kitchener asked 
too much of his columns: regiments that had been in South 
Africa less than two weeks were deemed operational, and 
2 thirty or forty miles a day demanded of them. 'If a 
column commander is not successful', Kitchener decided, 
'it is the first excuse that the horses were no good.,J 
He drove the columns so hard that his staff under Ian 
Hamilton resorted (generally unsuccessfully) to hiding the 
existence of columns from him in order to rest the horses. 4 
Haig, impa~ient with Kitchener's orders for his own force 
of six columns, occasionally carried out his own plans and 
informed the Commander-in-Chief later. 5 
For the duration of the guerrilla war, mili-
tary reputation and subsequent promotion prospects depended 
on the ability to command the mobile columns of horsemen onfue 
veldt. The successful commanders included Infantrymen who 
1. Kitchener to Roberts, 9 March 1902, 7101-2J-JJ Roberts 
2. Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier, p 205; Seely, 
Adventure, p 56 
J. Kitchener to Roberts, 7 February 1902, 7101-2J-22 Roberts 
4. Hamilton to Roberts, 24 December 1901, Hamilton 24/7/10/ 
14 Hamilton 
5. Haig to Henrietta, 2 September 1901, Acc J155.6c Haig 
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in the normal course of their careers would never have led 
Cavalry, and whose experience of mounted tactics was re-
stricted entirely to South Africa. One of the main prob-
lems in the ~ blanche controversy after the war was that 
there were too many experts. As Colonel Maude acidly re-
marked: 
The hardest task of all is to convince a man 
who has seen a good deal of active service, 
that the scope of his personal impressions and 
opportunities is not in itself sufficient to 
provide him with brains if he has none, or to 
over-ride the experience of thousands of others 
who have gone before him.1 
High on the lists of good column commanders drawn up by 
2 Kitchener, Hamilton and French for Roberts were Infantry-
men such as de Lisle, Smith-Don2en and Henry Rawlinson, as 
well as Cavalrymen like Haig, Allenby, Rimington, Gough, 
Byng and a , promising Major Charles Kavanagh. All would 
play significant roles in the arme blanche controversy and 
reach high rank in the Fi~ World War. In fact, French and 
a number of his Cavalrymen were excluded from the main 
theatre of guerrilla war by Roberts, who had decided in 
September 1900 that Kitchener should succeed him in South 
Africa, and General Neville Lyttelton, a veteran of Egypt 
like Broadwood, should succeed Kitchener. J French's 
1. Maude, Cavalry: its. Past and Future, p 158 
2. French to Roberts, 22 September 1901, 7101-2J-JO 
Roberts; Kitchener to Roberts, 6 September 1901, 7101-2J-
JJ Roberts; Hamilton to Roberts, 8 February 1902, 
Hamilton 24/7/10/14 Hamilton 
Jo Roberts to Lansdowne, 9 February 1900 and 17 September 
1900, 7101-2J-110-1/J Roberts 
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command of Cape Colony was by no means small, with Haig as 
a local commander under him, but once Boer attempts to in-
vade the colony, never very practical, were defeated, it 
was a side-show. This was despite the fact that de Wet, 
who evaded capture by all the drives for the entire war, 
regarded French as 'the one Boer general in the British 
Army', and (according to a fierce admirer of French) had 
once declared that if the Cavalrymanaone had been allowed 
to pursue him, he could not have evaded capture for two 
1 
weeks. The most important column work was given by 
Kitchener to Henry Rawlinson, who had some experience with 
Mounted Infantry in the Burma c~~paign of 1886 (where he 
had met Henry Wilson, also commanding Mounted Infantry).2 
Rawlinson made a shaky start in South Africa against the 
Boers, how~ver. Roberts wrote, revealingly, to Ian Hamilton 
'If you come across Rawly, tell him I hope to hear of him 
as being one of the most dashing leaders in the Army. It 
grieves me terribly to hear doubts about him.,3 Rawlinson 
eventually repaid Roberts' trust: between April and Dec-
ember 1901 his column of just under 1,500 men marched 3,397 
miles across the veldt, accounting for 538 Boers killed, 
wounded and prisoners. 4 
1. Meintjes, The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, p 37; Chisholm, 
Sir John French, p 128 
2. Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, 
pp 12-15 
3. Roberts to Hamilton, 27 March 1902, 7101-23-122 Roberts 
4. Rawlinson Column War Diary, Table 'Bag of Colonel 
Rawlinson's Column April-December 1901', 5201-33-9 
Rawlinson!Boer 
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The tactics adopted by Rawlinson and other 
column commanders were the same as those finally adopted by 
the Boers themselves . Carrying nothing on the horse but a 
greatcoat, a rifle and three bandoliers, Rawlinson's force 
covered 80 miles in 26 hours (at the cost of 96 horses 
dead and 136 sick with exhaustion) and galloped to surprise 
its Boer opponents in dawn 'rifle charges' on their camps. 
Rawlinson came to believe that his veteran M.I. were among 
1 the best troops in the Army o Once more a name made all 
the difference to the ~ blanche controversy. Detractors 
of the Mounted Infantry after the war drew support from 
descriptions of the untrained men of 1900; their supporters 
pointed to columns such as Rawlinson's, whose 'Mounted 
Infantry', formed by two years of war, bore no resemblance 
to the temP9rary and improvised force envisaged by Wolseley 
and Roberts in the 1880s. 
Superficially, the case against the arme 
blanche in the war looked foolproof. Cavalry armed with 
the sword and lance had failed to cope with Boer mounted 
riflemen, and had made no successful massed charges which 
had killed hundreds of Boers. The arme blanche had been 
given up as useless, while when Mounted Rifle tactics had 
been adopted, from sheer necessity, there had been successes 
on both sides. This was certainly the way it appeared from 
1. See Rawlinson to Roberts, especially 25 November 1901, 
15 December 1901, 27 March 1902, 7101-23-61 Roberts 
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Britain. One of Wolseley's last recommendations as Com-
mander-in-Chief, prior to retirement in December 1900, was 
that 'all Cavalry, i ncl uding Yeomanry, s houl d be turned in-
to "rifle cavalry", i . e. carry an Infantry rifle' . 1 It 
was also the way it appeared to Roberts and his Ring . 
Hamilton in particular seemed vindicated; much as he had 
predicted in 1885, war had been a matter of long- range 
rifle duels, with Cavalry and Artillery falling into dis-
use. 
The Cavalry failure in the first year of war, 
however, had simply reflected the failure of the supply 
system, inadequate from the start, and finally swamped 
beneath large numbers of unnecessary Mounted Infantry, 
Colonial Mounted Rifles and Imperial Yeomanry . Kitchener, 
nominally ~oberts' Chief Staff Officer, had functioned as 
a Second- in- Command rather than a genuine Staff officer . 
The · staffwork abilities of the Roberts Ring had proved 
inadequate to cope with either major problem$ like the 
supply and care of horses, or even minor ones s uch as, at 
Poplar Grove, making sure that orders were clearly under-
stood . In comparison the Cavalry had been highly success-
ful . The regular Cavalry itself, in proportion to the 
other arms, never exceeded one to six teen i n South Africa, 
compared to the ratios of one to nine still thought normal 
for European war . It had, again in itself, always been 
1 . W/Misc/11, P 2 Wolseley 
- 172-
outnumbered by the Boers, and had unsurprisingly failed to 
subdue them single handed. In contrast to Roodewall, no 
Cavalry charge had been shot down by the Boers, and none 
that had been attempted had been unsuccessful. The Cavalry 
also had Paardeberg to its credit, and Elandslaagte, and 
the mystery of Klip Drift. The war renewed their faith in 
the ~ blanche, by showing that it could be used to turn 
mounted riflemen, or 'scare' them out of position. The 
Cavalry interpreted the Boer readiness to retreat if defeat 
or death threatened, behaviour which was the product of 
their whole social and cultural system, as deriving entire-
ly from the weapons they carried. Even more than before, 
they saw the ~ blanche not only as a weapon, but as a 
stimulus providing the willingness to attack, and to risk 
death. 
Within a few years of the war's end, however, 
the Cavalry theorists, conscious as always of history, 
would begin to fear that the unusual circumstances under 
which the war had been fought might have distorted its 
events to such as extent as to make no parallel with 
European, or any other, war possible. 'All wars are 
abnormal', John French noted, 'because there is no such 
1 thing as a normal war . ' 
1 . French in preface to Bernhardi, Cavalry in War and 
Peace, p viii 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BOBS, JOBS, SNOBS & CO. 
'No-one can have a greater belief in cavalry 
than I have. It will, I am satisfied, be more 
required than 'ever in war-time.' 
- Lord Roberts of Khandahar, 1901 1 
'The simplest and most effective reform would 
be one which should abolish it altogether, 
retaining the household regiments for public 
functions.' 
- Dr Arthur Conan Doyle, 19002 
The monotony of life in the 9th Lancers at 
Rawalpindi in 1903 was eased slightly for Private Grainger 
on 10 July. He wrote in his diary: 
Orders had come out no more to do with the 
lance, ~s they talk of doing away with them. 
I suppose that is some smart official's work, 
making out he is saving the expense of buying 
lances, to put the money in his own pocket. 
But I fancy we shall bring them on guard 
peachy [shortly].3 
For once, the soldier's reflex of blaming all his ills on 
the Treasury was wrong. The abolition was a direct order 
from the Commander~in-Chief, Lord Roberts. Grainger was, 
however; otherwise quite right: four days later his regiment 
paraded, in apparent defiance of the order, carrying its 
4 lances. The ~ blanche controversy had entered its most 
1. Roberts to Wood, 29 September 1901, 7101-23-122 Roberts 
2. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, pp 518-9 
3. Grainger Diary entry, 10 July 1903, 7104-31 Grainger 
4. Grainger Diary entry, 14 July 1903, 7104-31 Grainger. If 
this were a parade ~r inspection, carrying the lance was 
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bitter phase. 
Roberts came to Britain from South Africa 
intent on the drastic reform of the Army, including the 
Cavalry. But since he blamed the failure of his campaign 
in South Africa directly on the Cavalry, he altogether 
failed to employ, even to recognise the existence of, the 
strong reforming movement already in being among the Cavalry 
in Britain. Understandably so, since its leading lights, 
like French and Haig, were the men he held primarily respon-
sible for the failure 0 He wrote of Haig, 'I consider it 
quite a misfortune that Haig should be of the old school in 
regard to the role of cavalry in the field. He is a clever, 
able fellow, and his views have a great effect on French, 
Scobell, and some other senior officers. ,1 Never having 
been closely~ involved with the arme blanche controversy in 
Britain, he did not recognise that there was not one 'old 
school' but two: traditionalists who believed in the arme 
blanche alone for the Cavalry, and reformers who believed in 
the hybrid, in opposition to his own belief - which had 
proved so mistaken - in Mounted Infantry . 
Haig had already outlined his own ideas on 
the role of Cavalry in June 1900 in South Africa . He pro-
duced an aide memoire which set down that 'Cavalry as now 
arrived is a new element in tactics' . Between Modder River 
quite correct. The subtleties of Roberts' order do not 
seem to have been passed on to the rank and file. 
1 . Roberts to Kitchener, 28 January 1904, 7101 - 23- 122 
Roberts 
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and Diamond Hill the hybrid had shown itself to be, as 
Haig at last recognised, distinct from either Infantry or 
Cavalry as they were traditionally understood. He recom-
mended an increase in this arm until it made up 20 or 25 
per cent of the Army, increasing the strength of the 
squadron, the basic tactical unit, from 120 to 160 men in 
peacetime, selecting Cavalry officers for ability and in-
telligence from the other arms, lighter riders, less weight 
on the horse, more tactical training in musketry, a better 
carbine or short rifle, practice in rapid dismounting, a 
scientific horse-breeding system, and the restriction of the 
lance to Lancer regiments. 'Question whether the dragoon 
lancer is not a mistake', Haig noted, 'his lance hampers 
h . ,1 :r.m. 
Roberts would have approved; he put most of 
these ideas into practice as Commander-in-Chief. But 
Robe~ts was also convinced that the rifle had proved the 
principal weapon for Cavalry. In August 1901 he wrote to 
French in South Africa: 
It is quite clear, I think, that Cavalrymen 
only require one weapon besides the rifle, 
should it be the lance or the sword, or should 
there be some of one kind and some of the 
other 7 ••• The Boers have no Cavalry, but they 
have shown us more than once that the way to 
keep Cavalry off is by dismounting and opening 
fire with the rifle ••• Shock action may be 
possible in the future but in my opinion the 
side which dismounts and opens fire with the 
magazine rifle will prevent the other from 
1. Written into the back of Haig's personal diary for 1899, 
dated Pretoria 3 July 1900, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
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coming near them. However, your experience 
is unrivalled, and I am most anxious to get 
your views on the subject. 1 
French's reply was a reproduction of Haig's programme 
(which he had almost certainly seen). But French insisted 
on the dominance of the arme blanche: 
Cavalry like other arms will of course gain 
strength from the possession of an improved 
fire-ar~ and (with greater attention paid to 
training in its use) will probably resort 
more frequently to dismounted action. Still 
I should ••• be averse to curtailing in any 
degree ••• its power of offensive action as 
Cavalry. 2 
If French were right, then the failure at Poplar Grove and 
two subsequent years of war were Roberts' fault. At 68 
years old, hailed by the Press and public as Britain's 
foremost soldier, he could not accept this view. He set 
out to reform the Cavalry. 
Roberts' first attempt at this reform was to 
do with the Yeomanry: he intended finally to enforce the 
ruling, decided on by Cambridge and Wolseley in 1892, that 
they should place more emphasis on their fire-arms. The 
Yeomany, as before, were apprehensive that they might be 
turned into 'Mounted Infantry', and in attempting to re-
assure them, the tactful approach which had worked well in 
India with the Cavalry, Roberts was frequently vague. The 
Royal Gloucestershire Hussars were told in May 1901: 
The Duke of Beaufort was speaking to him 
about having some weapon other than the 
rifle. Well, at present they had got the 
1. Roberts to French, 19 August 1901, 7101-2J-122 Roberts 
2. French to Roberts, 10 September 1901, 7101-2J-JO Roberts 
- 177-
sword o What might happen in the future he 
did not know. They, themselves, might take it 
that some kind of a sword, or a sword that 
went on a rifle, would be necessary. 1 
By speaking vaguely in this manner of 'Cavalry Reform', 
Roberts unconsciously tapped the support of the reforming 
movement in the Cavalry. When his programme for 'reform' 
finally became clear to them, the hostility was increased 
by a sense of having been duped . For example, in September 
1901 he wrote to Evelyn Wood, then at Salisbury Command: 
It is essential that a Cavalry soldier should 
be a good rider, and skilful in the use of 
sword and lance •• • [butJ opportunities for shock 
action will seldom occur ••• [andJ Cavalrymen will 
have mainly to depend on their rifles. For this 
reason, I would do all in my power to encourage 
musketry, and to make the Cavalrymen understand 
that they must not think it in any way infra dig 
to fight on foot.2 
Wood had been doing this since 1887. He wrote back that 
'I am glad -to think that we are absolutely of the same mind. 
My idea, put very roughly, is that the Cavalry sddier should 
never dismount when he can overthrow the enemy on horseback 
with minimum 10ss.,J Apparently misled by Roberts' vague-
ness, Wood did not realise that their views were in fact 
opposing. 
For the first eighteen months of Roberts' 
period as Commander- in-Chief, all internal divisions were 
subordinate to the fact that there was still a war to win. 
Haig, French and most senior Cavalrymen stayed in South 
1. wO/16J/9 Army Council Decisions 1904, pp 208- 9 
2. Roberts to Wood, 29 September 1901, 7101-2J- 122 Roberts 
J. Wood to Roberts, JO September 1901, 7101 - 2J-91 Roberts 
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Africa until the end of the war, and Hamilton returned 
there as Kitchener's Chief Staff Officer after a short 
spell in the War Office . But as soon as he could,Roberts 
moved his own men into key positions. Hamilton was made 
Quartermaster-General in 190J; Nicholson, despite rot 
wanting to leave India,1 was made Director General of 
Mobilisation and Military Intelligence in May 1901. Pole-
Carew was offered, but decline d on g round s o f health, the 
Egyptian Army in 190J. 2 Robertson, Rawlinson and Wilson 
were all given junior but influential posts in the War 
Office, and in May 1904, on Roberts' recommendation, 
Rawlinson became Commandant of the Staff College. 'They 
say the smell of curry all over the War Office is very 
overpowering', wrote Wolseley, spitefully.J These men, 
mostly vete~ans of Simla, with an almost open contempt for 
the British - as opposed to the Indian - military system, 
now controlled the distribution of honours for the war, the 
publication of training manuals, and the setting and 
marking of promotion examinations. 4 At the same time the 
Roberts Ring, having achieved success, developed some of 
the characteristics of the Wolseley Ring. Hamilton and 
Nicholson, estranged by an alleged slight years before, had 
little contact with each other,5 while Hamilton's own 
1. Nicholson to Roberts, 16 February 1901, 7101 - 2J- 52 Roberts 
2 . Roberts to Kitchener, 21 May 190J, 11/1J Kitchener 
J . Roberts to Knollys, 19 October 190J, 7101 - 2J- 122 Roberts; 
Wolseley to George Wolseley, 6 February 1902 (uncata-
logued) Wolseley 
4. Wilson Diary entrLes, 27 February 1901 and 14 June 1901, 
Wilson 
5. Hamilton, The Happy Warrior, p 229 
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reputation was now high enough to give him considerable 
independence from Roberts. Also, a number of officers who 
benefited from Roberts' patronage during and after the war 
never developed the close personal ties with him that had 
been the hallmark of the early Ring. Dundonald, Hubert 
Gough and Beauvoir de Lisle, all with high reputations for 
leading horsemen in the war, fell into this category. 
While amateur military critics flourished in 
the war's aftermath,1 condemning the Army's failure to win 
a quick and cheap victory, the personal prestige of the 
Commander-in-Chief had seldom been higher. Robertsmani-
pulated this prestige to his own advantage. Redvers Buller 
was hounded out of Aldershot Command by a Press campaign 
led by Leopold Amery in The Times,2 and, in seeking to 
promote this, Roberts rushed the publication of his South 
African despatches so that his story might appear before 
Buller's. These contained a serious mistake: they implied 
that French's Cavalry had not been responsible for stopping 
Cronje and his men at Paardeberg. J What had been intended 
as an attack on the last vestige of the Wolseley Ring 
appeared as an attack on the Cavalry. The extent of Roberts' 
standing with the Press and public may be judged from a com-
ment which appeared in an editorial by the Daily News fol -
lowing criticism of Roberts' despatch. 'There are men so 
10 Baden-Powell, War in Practice, p 1J 
2. Amery, My Political Life, Vol I, p 155 
J. Wilson Diary entri.€~8 January 1901 and 19 January 1901, 
Wilson; Stirling, Our Regiments in South Africa, p 400 
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utterly lost to all sense of decency', the paper pro-
claimed, 'that they will speak as disrespectfully of Lord 
Roberts as earlier scoundrels did of Queen Elizabeth or the 
Equator [sic].,1 Further, Roberts appealed to the populace 
by lavishing praise on the volunteer soldiers who had come 
out from Britain to fight in the war. Both the regular 
Cavalry and the highly competent Canadian and Australian 
Mounted Rifle units were angered and insulted by this, 
2 knowing the little value the Imperial Yeomanry had been. 
Meanwhile, with increasing self-confidence, 
the faults and activities of the Army were held up to scru-
tiny by civilians who rejected the very basis of military 
organisation: that the senior officers held their posts by 
virtue of their expertise. 'The question is not demon-
strated by names or authority', wrote one over the arme 
blanche controversy, 'and a correct solution can only be 
arrived at by an open mind duly considering the evidence of 
things.,3 Books on the history and tactical lessons of the 
war swamped the market. The United Service Magazine re-
viewed twenty-sevenn 1900 and a further seventy-one in the 
next three years, by which time authors were apologising 
4 , for their appearance. C.S. Goldmanns detailed account of 
the Cavalry'S supply problems became lost in the morass. 5 
1. W/PR/120/5ii Wolseley 
2. Smith-Do~en, Memories of Forty 
p 248; Broderick, Speech in the 
pp 56-7, W/PR/116 Wolseley 
3. Dalyell - Walton to The Times, 4 
Eight Years Service, 
Commons, 17 May 1901, 
May 1903 
4. 
5. 
Stirling, Our Regiments in South Africa, p ix 
Goldmann, With General French and the Cavalry in South 
Africa, especially pp 438- 41 
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But it was the Press, rather than any book, which caused 
most ill-feeling among Army officers. They blamed editors 
for sensationalism, so that, according to one, confronted 
with the headline ANOTHER BRITISH DISASTER, 'on reading 
further, one might discover that a patrol of three men and 
. t .., 1 a serJean were mlsslng • Kitchener complained to Roberts 
that such invented defeats were prolonging the war by en-
2 
couraging, the Boers. Colonel Henderson blamed the gutter 
Press for the mistaken beliefs of foreign writers that the 
British attacked, wearing red coats, in solid close order 
Infantry lines with volley fire, and that the Boers never 
dug in. J The fiction of an Engineer officer summed up the 
feelings of his contemporaries in the columns in 1902: 
He thought of what would happen if the y got 
too close to the enemy's trap to open out in 
time and were caught in column by cross-fire. 
Stellenbosch for him 1 Scare headlines in the 
papers at home ~ 'Another regratable incident l' 
'When will our officers learn sense 7' 'When 
will they take their profession seriously 7' He 
had quite recently smelt the railway, and had 
browsed on old papers and knew the gush by 
heart. Letters of advice from half the quid-
nuncs in England. 'Paterfamilias', 'Taxpayer', 
'Constant Reader', and 'Briton'. How he would 
like to have 'Constant Reader' ahead to guide 
him now, and 'Taxpayer' alongside himself to 
advise. Lt 
The troops themselves were surprised at Roberts' own high 
popular image. A Mounted Infantryman wrote home late in 
1. Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier, p J15 
2 . Kitchener to Roberts, 9 August 1901, 7101-2J-JJ Roberts 
J. Henderson in preface to Sternberg, My Experiences of the 
Boer War, p v 
4. 'Ole Luk-Oie' (pseud. of Ernest Swinton), The Green Curve, 
pp 117-8 
1900: 
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I . wonder that people have not begun to carp at 
Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener for their 
apparent inability to find an end to it, but 
the public and the papers seem to have un-
limited faith in those two and nobody has yet 
raised a note of disapproval. 1 
More guardedly, Edmund Allenby answered an effusive letter 
from home, 'Lord Roberts has been very genial to me. I 
2 don't know if he is a great man or not.' It was against 
this background that subsequent developments in the ~ 
blanche controversy were set. 
The Cavalry, under attack in the Press and 
blamed by Lord Roberts, became extraordinarily sensitive to 
criticism. When one critic pronounced 'The Epitaph of the 
British Empire - ruined by a Cavalry subaltern with £1,000 
a year', Winston Churchill, himself an ex-Cavalry subaltern, 
pronounced thi s to be 'garbage' . But Churchill, despite his 
own accounts of the charges at Diamond Hill, was by the end 
of 1900 telling the RUSI that after a month shock tactics 
had vanished in the war 'never to return', and that the 
Cavalry 'were well- mounted, they had bigger and better 
horses than the Boers'o3 Churchill spread these views in 
a lecture tour of the country, finally coming together with 
4 Henry Wilson on the need for Army Reform. Leopold Amery's 
1 • Ballard to his mother, 10 October 1900, Ballard II/1 
Ballard 
2 . Allenby to his wife, 14 September 1901, Allenby 1/2 
Allenbz 
3. Churchill, 'Impressions of the War in South A!~rica' , JRUSI 
Vol 45, pp 835-48 
J+ • Wilson Diary entry, 9 May 1901, Wilson 
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Times History of the War also ensured that Roberts' version 
of the Cavalry in the war would receive most popular 
attention. He saw his job as 'essentially propagandist', 
feeling that' unflinching f 'rankness of criticism was 
needed in the public interest t , and indeed was 'desired by 
the great body of officers who supplied me with information,.1 
Three of the four he mentioned as particularly useful to 
him were Lord Roberts, Ian Hamilton, and Henry Wilson. 2 The 
early drafts of Amery's history were sent to Roberts and 
Wilson for correction. J Amery identified himself whole-
heartedly with Roberts' views on the arme blanche. He wrote 
to Roberts in 1904: 
I went down to Aldershot last night to stay 
with General French, and he, Scobell [commanding 
the Aldershot Cavalry Brigade] and myself talked 
cavalry tactics hammer and tongs from nine till 
midnight, and we had some more at breakfast this 
morning ~ It was all very interesting, and I was 
glad to get their point of view, but I confess 
I heard nothing that would induce me to go over 
to their camp. Their chief point is that the 
man who doesn't dismount is much more mobile 
than the one who does and can therefore always 
choose the point where he will break through. 
But they omit from their consideration the 
mobility of the bullet, which is the greatest 
factor of all. 4 
Unsurprisingly, the Times History's first three volumes, all 
out by 1905 Ca year before the fi~ volume of the official 
account) concluded that the Cavalry charge, in any form, was 
1. Amery, My Political Life, Vol I, p 192 
2. ibid, P 152 
J. Amery to Roberts, 25 November 1902, 7101-2J-1 Roberts; 
Wilson Diary entry, 19 June 1904, Wilson 
4. Amery to Roberts, 25 November 1902, 7101-2J-1 Roberts 
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obsolete; that at Poplar Grove the Boers had not panicked 
but fought a skilful retreat; and that the Cavalry had been 
stopped by the tactics of mounted r i flemen . De Wet's 
evidence to the contrary was handled by the staggeringly 
simple method of declaring him mistaken. The poor con-
dition of the Cavalry horses was blamed on 'bad horsemaster-
ship, and the overwork of the Cavalry by French on 16 Feb-
ruary after the relief of Kimberley - the one day the 
division was not under Roberts' direct command . 1 The German 
Official Account of the war (which Amery claimed was based 
on his own2 ) appeared in 1904, blaming the Cavalry failure 
on lack of acclimatisation, overloading and poor horse-
mastership.starvation was dismissed as 'an ever- recurring 
excuse'. The supply position had been so disguised that 
the Germans ~elieved that the loss of the supply train at 
Modder River, during the Cavalry march to Kimberley, had 
cut their fodder allowance only by half, not to practically 
nothing . They did ndappreciate that the Cavalry and other 
horses in South Africa lived permanently on less than half 
rations. 3 
There was so little room at the top of the 
Army that the inclusion of Rober ts' men left few posts for 
others . No member of the Cavalry Division staff (or indeed 
the staff of any Infantry division) joined Roberts' head-
1 . Amery, Times History, Vol III, pp 568, 413 
2 . Amery , My Political Life, Vol I, p 219 
3. Walters, The German Official Account of the War in 
South Africa, Vol II, p 143 
--
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quarters after the war. Allenby, Gough, Byng, Kavanagh and 
Haig all went to regimental jobs. 1 Roberts and his men were 
not, however, an anti-Cavalry conspiracy. They wanted 
Cavalry reform, as they understood it, and regarded belief 
in the arme blanche as a comparatively minor aberration on 
the part of capable soldiers, rather than as a daply held 
tactical doctrine. Consequently, in the war's aftermath, 
French got Aldershot Command in succession to Buller, and 
Roberts was keen to promote Haig and other good Cavalry 
Majors to Colonel. 2 He persistently refused, however, 
despite French's requests, to make Haig a Brigadier-General~ 
Against this must be set Hamilton's promotion from Colonel 
before the war to Lieutenant-General in its aftermath, or 
de Lisle's from Captain in 1899 to a Lieutenant-Colonel 
commanding an Infantry battalion after the war. In April 
1902 French told Haig that he wanted him for the Aldershot 
Cavalry Brigade. 4 Four months later Kitchener, having 
taken up the post of Commander-in-Chief in India, wanted 
Haig as his Inspector-General of Cavalry. Haig preferred 
the first post,5 but was given the second, while Aldershot 
went to Scobell, a lesser protege of French. Haig was 
convinced Roberts, with his reputation for jobbery, had 
1. Herbert Lawrence was offered the Colonelcy of the 17th 
Lancers in succession to Haig, but left on inheriting 
his fortune. Roberts to Cambridge, J1 March 190J, 7101-
2J- 122 Roberts 
2. Roberts to Hamilton, J1 August 1901, 7101-2J-122 Roberts; 
Roberts to Kitchener, 7 February 1902, 0/71 Kitchener 
J. Haig to Henrietta, 7 August 1900, Acc J155.6c Haig 
4. Haig to Henrietta, 25 April 1902, Acc J155.6c Haig 
5. Haig to Henrietta, 17 September 1902, Acc J155.6c Haig 
-
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blocked the appointment. In late August he wrote to his 
sister., 'I fancy the excellent house at Aldershot in which 
the G.OoC. Cavalry Brigade lives will oblige Lord Roberts 
to select the husband of "dear Mrs" So & So because the 
nursery and rooms will so exactly suit the family'. 1 By the 
next month he was cle.arly worried about his prospects. He 
wrote again that II have heard nothing officially about 
either going to Aldershot as GoO.C o Cavalry Brigade or to 
India as Inspector-General, so no doubt one of Roberts' 
pals (or? Lady Roberts' pals) has been chosen for the 
2 former'. There is in fact no evidence Roberts had anyone 
in mind for the post. He had intended Broadwood for the 
Cavalry Brigade in Ireland, but his health broke and 
Rimington got the job. 3 Nevertheless, as Roberts' repu-
tation spread, the phrase 'Bobs, Jobs, Snobs & Co.' began, 
to Wolseley's delight, to be used to describe the War 
Office ~ 4 
After a war which had seen horsemen used to 
such an extent, it was no longer argued that the horse in 
war was useless; but its tactical role was subject to fierce 
debate as some officers, and most members of the public, 
discovered the arme blanche controversy for the first time. 
Conan Doyle, in his own account of the war, insisted that 
'lances, swords and revolvers have only one place - the 
1. Haig to Henrietta, 25 August 1902, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
2 0 Haig to Henrietta, 17 September 1902, Acc 3155.6c Haig 
3 . Roberts to Hamilton, 11 January 1902, 7101 - 23- 122 Roberts 
40 Wolseley to George Wolseley, 6 December 1901 (uncatalogued) 
Wolseley; Lehmann, All Sir Garnet, p 388 
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1 
museum', and that 'the best shots and skirmishers' would 
2 
always win a Cavalry engagement. A Major from India who 
had commanded one of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle batta-
lions in South Africa declared: 
Cavalry, as such, when opposed by modern 
rifles, can make no headway on the flat ••• 
a force of cavalry and mounted rifles, with 
a preponderance of the latter, is the best 
combination for war. One regiment of cavalry 
to three of mounted rifles is ample.3 
He also called for the dropping of the lance from three 
Lancer regiments out of four: a significant judgement for 
a Lancer officer. Colonel Callwell, the author of the 
Official Handbook on colonial wars, also wrote that 'mounted 
troops should now depend on their rifles and carbines rather 
than upon shock action', although 'it would be as unwise to 
deprive the trooper of the arme blanche as it would to rob 
4 the infantryman of his bayonet'. Colonel Maude came 
closest to realising the reason for the successful charges 
at Diamond Hill: 
For practical purposes the Boer Mauser does 
not fire twice as many bullets in a minute as 
the Chassepot, hence ••• if the fire of 5000 
Chassepots to the mile of front failed to 
stop the Prussian Cavalry ••• there is no reason 
to suppose that 500 Mausers to the mile would 
have any' better effect. 5 
Maude also noted the trend of the Boers, the Mounted 
1. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, p 591 
2. ibid 
3. Andrew, Cavalry Tactics of Today, p 109 
4. Callwell, Tactics of Today, p 93 
5. Maude, Cavalry: its Past and Future, pp 253 
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Infantry and the Cavalry, after a year's fighting, all to 
become the same hybrid troop type. The distinction, he 
maintained, was artificial, and therefore neither Mounted 
Rifles nor Mounted Infantry in peacetime offered any 
1 benefit over Cavalry. Rimington, now a Brigadier-General, 
added his authoritative voice to the argument. Although his 
own reputation had been made with Mounted Rifles he still 
believed in the wider value of the charge. f It:is generally 
conceded', he wrote, 'that once cavalry superiority is 
gained we may consider the difficulties of the forage supply 
as almost settled. One successful charge may mean this. No 
fire effect is likely to do so. ' 
2 In 1905 Colonel Hender-
son's collected essays, The Science of War, appeared post-
humously. Consisting of extracts, undated, from more than 
twenty years of lectures, they could be read for almost any 
shade of opinion on the arme blanche. Still, although 
Henderson felt that increased firepower had made the massed 
knee-to-knee charge an impossibility, that 'small-bore and 
smokeless powder have destroyed the last vestiges of the 
traditional role of cavalry', he nevertheless opted for a 
combination of Cavalry and Mounted Rifles. Moreover, like 
others before him, he tried to set the whole controversy in 
perspective: 
That men on horseback are no match for men on 
foot, with confidence in their weaponry, in 
good heart, and expecting the attack, has been 
1 . Maude, Cavalry: its Past and Future, pp 269, 274 
2 . Rimington, The Horse in Recent War, p 15 
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apparent since men were first drilled and 
disciplined. No cavalry soldier ever dreams -
ever did dream - of supporting so wild a 
propo~ion.1 
The views of the most prestigious military historian in the 
Army were not easy to dismiss as blind Cavalry sentiment. 
The ' lack of precise terminology was now felt 
more than ever, as more writers entered into the contro-
versy. When Roberts wrote that he wanted more Cavalry and 
Conan Doyle that he wanted them abolished, they both, in 
fact, wanted Mounted Rifles. As de Lisle, advising Roberts 
on the matte~ wrote: 
[When]Cavalry object to becoming Mounted 
Infantry the term itself forms part of the 
objection. Cavalry are taught, and rightly 
taught, to despise Infantry, with a view 
to encouraging them, when the occasion 
arises, to charge broken and demoralised 
Infantry with confidence and boldness. 2 
De Lisle hims elf transferred from Infantry to Cavalry be-
fore the First World War. Roberts was keen to refute the 
idea that he was 'the one who turned, or wishes to turn, the 
Cavalry into Mounted InfantrY',J but he failed to convince 
the Cavalry itself . The bulk of officers feared for their 
regiments, those who believed in reform would not accept 
Roberts as a leader, and indeed he made no effort to win 
their support. Roberts himself, not the ~ blanche, had 
become the single greatest factor in the controversy. 
1. Henderson, 
2. de Lisle, 
Roberts 
All this was demonstrated in Roberts' first 
The Science of War, pp 58, 110, J79 
'Cavalry Training', 71902, 7101 - 2J-221 - J 
J. Roberts to Hamilton, 4 April 1902, 7101-2J-122 Roberts 
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attempts at Cavalry reform. A committee of Yeomanry 
officers enquiring into the or.ganisation and equipment of 
the force reported to him in January 1901. 1 A majority 
were prepared to accept conversion to Mounted Rifles, and 
arming with rifle, bayonet andmvolver. Of the five who 
signed this report only three signed a minority opinion 
calling for the sword to be retained. But there was also 
another minority report, calling for the title 'Imperial 
Yeomanry' for the force, rather than 'Yeomanry Cavalry', so 
identifying it completely with the men whom Buller had con-
ceived of as 'Mounted Infantry', and armed with the rifle 
alone. This recommendation was made by just one Yeomanry 
officer, and the regular Cavalry representative on the com-
mittee - Lord Dundonald. This was good enough for Roberts, 
who prevailed upon the Secretary of State for War to accept 
Dundonald's report. Dundonald also submitted a memorandum, 
calling (as Haig had done) for a special eliteoorps of 
Cavalry officers, but arguing that since they would have to 
train the new Imperial Yeomanry, they must themselves be 
Mounted Rifles. The Lancer regiments would be kept for 
2 
nothing brt the arme blanche charge. 
An attempt in late 1901 to return the sword 
to the Imperial Yeomanry at home was turned down because, 
according to the Army Counci~ reviewing the position in 
1904, 'It was feared that if a sword was issued to the 
10 'Recommendations of Committees on Army Matters 1900-20', 
(War Office) p 459 
2. Dundonald, My Army Life, pp 180-1; 'Opinion of the Earl of 
Dundonald on Yeomanry Armament', 7101-23-221-15 Roberts 
i 
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Yeomanry generally, the Mounted Infantry character which 
had been given them on reorganisation would tend to be ob-
. 1 
scured.' They were in 2 1903 issued with an Infantry bayonet, 
while in the new training manual for Imperial Yeomanry of 
1902 Roberts exhorted them 'Not to aim at what they have 
not the time at their disposal to become, i.e. an efficient 
Cavalry, but to strive to perfect themselves in those duties 
for which the Imperial Yeomanry are eminently qualified,.3 
The Yeomanry, much as Cambridge had predicted, complained 
bitterly. They also suspected Roberts' motives. They were 
right. In June 1902 Hamilton wrote to him: 
I have just .read your preface to the Yeomanry 
Training Regulations, and I think you have 
skated over this thin ice with all your wonted 
skil~ and that you have made your point with 
a minimum of disturbance to the preconceived 
ideas of those immediately concerned.4 
Roberts, and~bove all Hamilton, thought that from defer-
ence to sentiment in the Cavalry and Yeomanry they had dis-
guised their real opinions. The disguise was in practice 
completely transparent. As one Yeomanry officer declared, 
'the real object of this halting policy was to discourage 
the Cavalry tradition', but the attempt 'paid very little 
attention to the powers of sentiment. ~ The Royal Gloucester-
shire Hussars, led by their Colonel, the Duke of Beaufort, 
1. wO/163/9 Army Council Decisions 1904, pp 246-7 
2. 'Memorandum on the Arming and Training of Yeomanry', 
? 1909, 7101-23-222-11 Roberts 
3. Yeomanry Training 1902, preface (War Office) 
4. Hamilton to Roberts, 7 June 1902, Hamilton 24/7/10/28 
Hamilton 
5. Le Roy-Lewis, 'Imperial Yeomanry in 1905', JRUSI Vol 48, 
p 1024 
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petitioned the King directly for permission to carry swords 
1 
on ceremonial parades. The sword, which a year previously 
they had been prepared to give up, became a symbol of their 
opposition to Roberts and the manner in which he had ig-
nored and cleceived them. The Middlesex Yeomanry obtained 
the same permission, as did the Montgomeryshire Yeomanry, 
and petitions became so common that at the end of the year 
Roberts had to fight off a request from Edward VII to make 
2 this general. The South Nottinghamshire Hussars refused 
to carry the rifle, and in 1904 equipped the whole regiment 
with lances. 3 Roberts had made his own prophesies ofa 
'sentimental' reaction self- fulfilling . In a force of 
Volunteers there was, moreover, little he could do about it 
without grass roots support . In 1905 the Inspector- General 
of Cavalry was still, repeatedly, trying to convince the 
Yeomanry of the value of the rifle, against the oppos i tion 
of his own District Inspectors and Adjutants, all regular 
4 Cavalrymen. The Yeomanry were branded as hopelessly re-
actionary . 
Roberts created another committee, to enquire 
1 . Fox , The History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars 
Yeomanry, pp 16- 17 
2. Stonham and Freeman, Historical Records of the Middlesex 
Yeomanry, p 109; Williams Wynn, The Historical Records of 
the Montgomeryshire Yeomanry, p 82; 'Memorandum on the 
Training and Arming of Yeomanry', 71909, 7101 - 23- 222 - 11 
Roberts 
3 . Fellows and Freeman, Historical Records of the South 
Notts Hussars Yeomanry, Vol I, pp 193- 6 
4 . 'Reports of the Inspector- General of the Forces 1904- 13', 
Baden- Powell to Connaught, 10 June 1905, 34/322 (War 
Office) 
-
, 
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into the weight carried by horses in the mounted branches 
of th~ Army. It consisted of just three members, Major-
General Grant, the current Inspector-General of Cavalry, 
Ian Hamilton for the Mounted Infantry and Dundonald for the 
Yeomanry. But Roberts did not get the majority report he 
wanted. By juggling weights and discarding equipment the 
committee increased the ammunition carried by Cavalry 
horses from thirty to fifty rounds, while cutting the total 
1 
weight by over two stones. But they could only submit 
divided reports on the question of armament. Dundonald 
revived the idea of discarding the sword for lancers ·as a 
weight saving, cl early still thinking of them entirely for 
the shock charge. Grant, partly agreeing, still wanted the 
lance kept in the front rank of Dragoon and Dragoon Guard 
. t 2 reg:unen s. 3amilton submitted a lengthy dissent from them 
both on the whole value of the ~ blanche, which he then 
watered down: 
I do not mean · the foregoing remarks to be read 
as an advocacy for the immediate relegation of 
all lances and swords to museums. I would leave 
the existing Lancer regiments alone, and would 
retain the sword for Hussars and Dragoons: 
(1) Because it is always well to proceed with 
caution, and the feelings of the whole of 
the Cavalry have to be considered. 
(2) Because I admit that the consciousness of 
an ability to meet a mounted charge without 
dismounting undoubtedly tends to boldness of 
movement in the field.J 
It is one thing to show consideration for another's 
1. "A"694, 'Report of the Committee on the Weight on the 
Horse in the Mounted Branches', (War Office) 
2. ibid, P 5 
3. ibid, P 3 
i 
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mistaken but cherished beliefs; it is quite another to tell 
him you are doing so. By assuming that nothing but tradit -
ionalist sentiment opposed his ideas, Hamilton created yet 
more opposition . 
In 1902 Dundonald went to command the armed 
forces of Canada, and in September issued orders for the 
Canadian Mounted Rifle regiments to discard the sword, for 
which he received Roberts' congratulations . 1 When this was 
formalised as a Cavalry Training manual in 1904, however, 
it received a highly critical, but anonymous, review in the 
United Service Magazine: 
It is all very well to write of 'coolly dis-
mounting, forming up, and when the enemy gets 
within range' - (pray what is that - fifteen 
or fifteen hundred yards ?) - 'pouring in such 
a withering fire as will kill as many of the 
enemy as the same enemy with sword and lance 
would kill in five years of active service' . 
But what ' happens in war? We have not yet 
forgotten Botha's charge at Bakenlaagte and 
Kemp's charge in the Western Transvaal, both 
unsupported by artillery fire . What became of 
the coolness and accurate fire ?2 
The review ended with the sarcastic suggestion that Dun-
donald should read Pr ince Kraft . Dundonald was told that 
the author of this piece was Douglas Haig . If so (there is 
no evidence for it) both the tone and arguments illustrate 
the extent to which, over three years, the views of the 
Cavalry had hardened in opposition to Roberts . 
In January 1903 Grant retired as Inspector-
1 . Dundonald, M4 Army Life, p 194; Roberts to Dundonald, 
22 April 190 , 7101 - 23- 122 E£Perts 
2 . 'Reiver', 'Cavalry Training Canada 1904', USM Vol XXIX 
NS, pp 414- 8, and see Dundonald, My Army Life, p 194 
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General of Cavalry. It was by use of this post that Roberts 
had achieved partial reform of the Cavalry in India. Indeed 
the last two Inspectors-General had transferred from the 
same post in India to Britain. The designated Inspector-
General of Cavalry in India was Haig, who might have ex-
pected the same post. But Roberts evidently believed that 
neither Haig, nor any of his Cavalry brigade commanders, 
would wholeheartedly support his views. Instead he chose 
the Commandant of the para-military South African Constab-
ulary, Maj9r-General Robert Baden-Powell. It was an odd 
choice. Baden-Powell's service with his own regiment had 
been largely in India, and he felt himself out of touch with 
British Cavalry opinions. He was not a Staff College grad-
uate, and his military history was poor. Moreover, he was 
a Wolseleyite who had created his awn military force in 
South Africa, and believed his career was settled o But he 
was also an accepted authority on scouting and outpost work, 
particularly in colonial warQ In South Africa Roberts and 
Hamilton thought him a poor organiser of troops; Haig 
thought him a self-advertiser; French and Kitchener thought 
him slow. But he was a competent leader, and the Hero of 
Mafeking, the most popular officer with the Press and public 
in the Army, excepting Roberts himself. 1 He was also willing 
to obey Roberts' orders. He wrote gratefully from South 
1. Hillcourt, Baden-Powell, The Two Lives of a Hero, pp 163, 
233; Roberts to Hamilton, 27 November 1901, 7101-23-122 
Roberts; Haig to Henrietta, 9 July 1900, Acc 3155.6C Haig; 
French to Haig, 20 May 1901, Acc 3155.334 Haig; Kitchener 
to Roberts, 24 May 1901, 7101-23-33 Roberts 
-
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Africa: 
Your selection of me for the post of Inspector-
General of Cavalry has come to me as a great 
sur prise, and as a great gratification, for it 
means that you have confidence in me ••• I will 
do everything in my power to carry out any 
designs you may have with regard to the develop-
ment of Cavalry. 1 
Baden- Powell, having served outside the country and outside 
his regiment for so long, was also ignorant of the details 
of the controversy . When asked by the Elgin Commission in 
1903 what arm Cavalry should have besides the rifle, the 
very heart of the matter, he answered that 'I do not care 
much about that. I do not think it matters what they have', 
but that 'a good sword- bayonet, which you can use as well 
as a bayonet, is as good a thing as 2 any. ' Before the end 
of the year he had endorsed in a preface to his brother's 
book the view, that 'Whereas formerly it was the golden rule 
for Cavalry never to receive a charge at the halt, but to 
gallop forwards to meet it, now it would almost invariably 
be preferable to dismount and receive the charge with a 
volley of musketry,.3 Baden- Powell was a good officer and 
reformer of long standing who in the war's aftermath in-
clined even more to musketry than previously . Nor was he 
a bad Inspector- General . But he was not the best man for 
the job . The ~ blanche controversy had begun to affect 
the highest ranks of the Army and its most basic needs of 
1 . Baden- Powell to Roberts, 18 January 1903, 7101 - 23- 191 
Roberts 
2 . Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol II, p 430 
3. Baden- Powell, War in Practice, p 248 
---
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training and efficiency. 
In late 1902 and early 1903 the Elgin Com-
mission on the conduct of the war met to hear evidence. 
The arme blanche was a major issue: every Cavalry, Yeomanry 
or Mounted Infantry officer giving evidence was asked about 
his views on it. In contrast, no member of the Veterinary 
Service or Remount Department was called, evidence on horse-
supply coming from the Quartermaster-General, who had not 
served in South Africa. Kitchener, who as Roberts' Chief 
Staff Officer had at least nominal responsibility for the 
supply system's failure, minimised its importance: 
No doubt the war horse suffered to some extent 
for the shortness of the ration that he received 
in the field, especially the large animals that 
were so generally in use at the beginning of the 
campaign, but I consider that the falling off of 
condition was due more to the want of rest and 
the general hardships experienced from the heavy 
work an&new climate, a condition on which an 
extra 6 Ibs or 8 Ibs of oats would have little 
or no effect. 1 
Despite the evidence of French and Rimington in particular 
on their horses' condition, the Commission never appreciated 
the extent of the Cavalry collapse. It reported that: 
The evidence before us confirms the view that 
the chief cause for the loss of horses in the 
war was that they were for the most part brought 
from distant countries, submitted to a long and 
deteriorating sea voyage, when landed , sent into 
the field without time for recuperation, and 
there put to hard and continuous work on short 
rations. 2 
This entirely failed to mention either the overloading of 
1. Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol I, p 9 
2. Elgin Commission, Report, p 98 
'---. 
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horses or the standard of horsemastership, the two things 
which might be altered to prevent repetition in future war 
of the same losses. Nor did the commissioners make the 
obvious link between these facts and the ~ blanche con-
troversy, that all arguments about tactics depended on the 
fitness of the horses. Fortunately, the committee under 
Grant had already taken the first steps to lessen the weight 
on the horse, while every column commander in South Africa 
had learned from sheer necessity to be an expert horse-
master, and this knowledge was now being passed on in 
Cavalry training. 
When asked about the arme blanche itself, 
French gave evidence that the Cavalry depended on the sword 
for its morale, that the Yeomanry should, while being 
Mounted Rifles, carry the sword, and that Mounted Infantry 
could only be regarded as a form of Infantry transport, 
with no value as scouts. Haig agreed, stressing that 'the 
ideal Cavalry is that which can attack on foot and fight on 
horseback'. Rimington wanted an all-Cavalry force, and the 
Mounted Infantry disbanded. 1 Of the Yeomanry commanders who 
gave evidence, Brabazon caused amusement by suggesting that 
it was not Anglo-Saxon nature to point with a sword, and 
Yeomanry should carry a tomahawk (incredibly, one turned 
up at the 1908 manoeuvres, where Haig pronounced it 
'absolutely useless,.)2 This was not the sort of minor 
1. Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol II, pp 300-17, 402-12, 
27-31 
2. Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol I, p 294; Haig Diary 
entry, 23 August 1908, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
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detail with which the commander of the entire Imperial 
Yeomanry should have been chiefly concerned, as one of the 
. . . d 1 commlSSloners recognlse • Other Yeomanry officers wanted 
a sword- bayonet or light sword for their men . The M. I . 
commanders denounced the sword as an 'absurdity' and ex-
pressed themselves entirely satisfied with the improvised 
nature of their force. Indeed the head of the Aldershot 
M.I. School wanted his men to both support the Cavalry 'and, 
2 in the absence of Cavalry, to ,take its place'. 
Roberts gave evidence that the rifle should 
be the main weapon of Cavalry, although he was uncertain as 
to whether the lance were needed, and ideally Cavalry 
should be perfect with rifle and sword. He also told the 
Commission that the Yeomanry liked their new training as 
Mounted Rifles - a flat lie . 3 While Roberts gave evidence 
Ian Hamilton sat beside him to prompt his Chief; the close 
associati on was evident,and where Roberts was sometimes 
vague as to his views on the arme blanche, Hamilton was not: 
1 • 
2 . 
3. 
I have heard it said that if the Boers had 
possessed Cavalry, in the European sense of 
the word, our men wou~have had a chance of 
showing the advantages of a boot- to- boot 
charge over a looser formation admitting of 
more individual initiative . It is difficult 
to answer this sort of argumont. If both 
sides were to agree to carry out their fight 
with punctilio and a chivalrous disregard of 
Esher, quoted in Gooch, The Plans of War, p 34 
EI~in Commission, Evidence, Vol I, pp 300, 311 - 12, 
Vol II, pp 320, 434 
Elgin Commission, Evidence, Vol I, pp 438- 9, Vol 
p 66 
II, 
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the requirements of scientific arms, then no 
doubt there would still be suitable scope in 
w~rfare for old-world methods ••• Compared to 
the modern rifle, the sword or lance can only 
be regarded as a medieval toy.1 
and again, patronising: 
I think that the regular Cavalry still ought 
to have a weapon of offense, because for 
hundreds of years it has been so intimately 
connected with every Cavalry story, and their 
whole history, that, morally, it gives them 
the idea that they can do things which they 
cannot, but still they think they can, and 
therefore it enables them to act with greater 
boldness than they otherwise would. 2 
Within two weeks of this speech, made in February 1903, 
Roberts with Hamilton's support took the step which was to 
transform the controversy into a crisis: the abolition of 
the Jance. 
The Elgin Commission, trying to balance 
contradictory views on the arme blanche without understanding 
, ----
the motives behind them. reported: 
Most of the witnesses agree that in view of 
the great extension of the field of operations 
in modern warfare, an Army should contain a 
much larger proportion of mounted men than 
formerly. There was, however, much diversity 
of opinion as to what should be the nature and 
armament of these mounted forces.3 
It concluded that a regular Cavalry, armed with the sword 
'if not the lance' (a nice ambiguity) should be supported 
by considerable forces of Mounted Rifles, including Yeo-
manry.4 This compromise, with much goodwill on all sides, 
1 • EI~in Commission, Evidence, Vol II, p 105 
2. ibid 
3. EI~in Commission, Report, p 49 
4. ibid, p 51 
a 
-201 -
might have worked. But Roberts had already set the seal on 
hostility between the Cavalry and the War Office. Before 
either French or Haig gave evidence to the Commission, he 
issued at the end of February an Army Order limiting the 
use of the lance, in Lancer, Dragoon and Dragoon Guard 
regiments, to escort duties, reviews and parades. It was 
not to be carried on manoeuvres, nor taken to war. With 
the order came a memorandum signed by Roberts (although 
French believed its real author was Hamilton) 1 setting out 
historical arguments for the action. It listed the dis -
astrous French charges of 1870, explaining that Bazaint 's 
orders, not von Bredow's charge, halted the French advance 
at Mars - Ia-Tour, and contrasting these with the successful 
use of firepower by horsemen in the American Civil War. 
The conclusiop to be drawn was that the rifle was the pr in-
cipal Cavalry weapon; the lance was conspicuous when 
scouting and made dismounting difficult, therefore it 
2 
should go. 
At once, in a battery of letters to The Time~ 
ex- officers and honorary Colonels of several regiments 
which carried the lance attempted to prove that the lance 
was superior to the sword . ) This was quite irrelevant to 
1. Arnold- Forster Diary entry, 29 February 1904, a ~ d mss 
50))6, Vol LXII Arnold- Forster 
2 . 'Memorandum by Lord Rooerts on Cavalry Armament', JRUSI 
Vol 4), pp 575- 82 
) . Compton to The Times, 4 May 190); Dunham- Masser to The 
Times, 26 April 190); Wilkenson to The Times, 2) April 
190); Howard to The Times, 24 December 190); also 'Lance 
v Sword by a very old cavalry officer', Army & Navy 
Gazette, 18 April 190). All in 7101 - 2)- 221 - 9 Roberts 
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Roberts' argument. However these reactionary Cavalrymen 
carried considerable Dfluence, and at the end of March a 
group of them, all M.Ps., raised the matter in the House of 
Commons , Echoing the old bogey-cry, one, the future Lord 
Jessel, believed that 'on the initiative of Sir Ian 
Hamilton a movement was afoot to abolish Cavalry and sub-
1 
sti tute Mounted Infantry'. Trying to .. force the issue, 
these men argued that it was unfair to ask a soldier to 
care for a weapon he would never use: it must be re-in-
stated or discarded altogether. The high point in this 
drama came at the beginning of May, when the RUSI heard a 
paper on 'The Lance as a Cavalry Weapon' by an Engineer 
officer. This had been d~berately advertised in The Times 
beforehand as offering the definitive statement on the 
subject,2 an~ in the chair was Lieutenant-General Wilkinso~ 
Colonel of the 4th Dragoon Guards. The paper itself, al-
though attacking Roberts' memorandum as 'a bit of special 
pleading' which struck at 'the proud traditions of our 
Cavalry', concluded, after a long historical review, that 
there was in fact little to choose between lance and sword, 
3 
and the loss was no great handicap. But then, in a re -
markable scene, Colonels of regiments which carried the 
lance, led by the Chairman, stood up to declare its 
1. Hansard, 4th Series, Vol 120, pp 639-63; Jessel to Lady 
Haig, 16 February 1930, Acc 3155.254, p 3 Haig 
2. Hale to The Times, 4 May 1903 
Mayne, 'The Lance as a Cavalry Weapon', JRUSI Vol 49, 
pp 118-40 
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superiority in extravagant terms: 
••• being taught to frequently and habitually 
abandon their first and second weapons for the 
sake of performing some of the duties of 
Infantry on the ground with their rifles ••• 
In mortal combat in the field a good lancer 
will defeat a good swordsman in nine cases out 
of ten • •• in the melee and pursuit they are 
immeasurably superior to swordsmen •• • a well -
timed cavalry charge need never be stopped by 
modern rifle- fire •• • I claim that lancers can 
and do dismount faster than swordsmen •• • even 
supposing the lance nver succeeded in doing 
any damage in the field ••• the morale effect 1 
must be remembered as the most important item . 
For good measure, the Chairman had with him a dismounted 
lancer, who proceeded to go through full lance drill as a 
demonstration. These bizarre episodes only reinforced the 
opinion of Roberts and his men that they were opposed by 
foolish reaction only. When Evelyn Wood, along with two 
other officers, wrote calling for the lance's re- intro-
duction , Rober ts observed to Hamilton that it was 'rather 
amusing' that Wood, who had seen no service for a quarter 
::z.. 
of a century, should pose as an expert. 
The new generation of Cavalry reformers 
opposed the move for entirely different reasons . They could 
not accept Roberts' premise that the rifle was the principal 
Cavalry weapon. The Lance itself mattered little to them . 
French wrote to Roberts: 
I do not attach so much importance to the 
que s tion of sword versus lance as some people 
do, but I think that the lance should be 
1 . Mayne, 'The Lance as a Cavalry Weapon', JRUSI Vol 49, 
pp 133- 40 
2 . Roberts to Hamilton, 4 May 1904, 7101 - 23- 122 Roberts 
1 --
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retained in the existing lancer regiments, 
on the same principle that they are probably 
retained in the Russian Army by the Cos.sacks 
of - the Don. 1 
This principle was entirely one of morale, the Cossacks 
being mounted riflemen. Haig had considered abandoning the 
lance three years earlier; in April 190J, although Colonel 
of the 17th Lancers, he suggested its replacement by 'a 
good hog spear' rather than outright abolition. 2 But Haig 
had his own influence to contribute. In June Roberts wrote 
to Kitchener: 
I am glad to get your opinion about the lance 
as it helps me with the King, who is somewhat 
regretting that weapon having been done away 
with after he had some conversation with Haig 
in Edinburgh. Haig, I am sorry to say, still 
inclines to the lance, though he can have no 
experience of its use in war. I agree with you 
that a cavalry soldier must have a sword and be 
able to use it.J 
The assumption -of opposition based on grounds of sentiment 
only was Roberts' greatest error throughout the whole con-
troversy. In Haig's case, he had forgotten about Elands-
laagte and Omdurman. 
Roberts, or Hamilton, was also no match at 
history for Haig, who prepared another aide memoire which 
destroyed the arguments of Roberts' memorandum. Roberts 
had cited the French disasters of 1870 and not the Prussian 
successes. 'What', Haig asked, 'does that prove? that 
German Cavalry were better trained and better led than the 
1. French to Roberts, 18 March 190J, 7101-2J-JO Roberts 
2. Haig to Jessel, 2J April 190J, Acc J1550254, p J Haig 
J. Roberts to Kitchener, JO June 190J, 11/16 Kitchener 
- 20.5-
French, and again the French, in having a better carbine, 
were better armed.' As for the interpretation of the Death 
Ride, 'who can say? it is merely an ex parte statement . ' 
On American Cavalry Haig added: 
We do not wish to deny that the firearm is 
a useful weapon ., What Lord Roberts says about 
the American Army in a matter of combination of 
fire and shock admits our entire contention. We 
maintain that shock action can produce important 
effects and particularly in combination with 
fire action that the sphere of usefulness of 
Cavalry is increased . 1 
Haig's history was in fact too good . He recognised that the 
use of trenches by Infantry would render shock action less 
effective, but pointed out that no modern army fought from 
them o To the British Army in 190J, 'the trenches' meant the 
Crimea, or possibly Richmond in 186.5 . 
Shortly afterwards, Haig went out to India 
as Inspector- General of Cavalry. But after three years of 
failure, Roberts' attitude was hardening. He wrote to 
Kitchener: 
I am all in favour of cavalpy soldiers being 
bold riders, and of their endeavouring to 
overthrow their enemies' mounted men, but I 
am convinced that in 99 cases out of a hundred 
this will be done more effectively~ artillery 
and dismounted fire in the first instance . I 
hope you will keep Haig on the right line, as 
I intend to keep Baden- Powell 02 
In September, shortly after Haig's departure, Roberts 
called a meeting of senior Cavalry officers and tried to 
1 . Undated, unsigned, typewritten paper with corrections in 
Haig's handwriting. The original has 'shot' not 'shock', 
indicating that it may have been dictated or typed from 
notes . Acc J1.5.5oJ2a Haig 
2 0 Roberts to Kitchener, 24 September 190J, 7101 - 2J- 122 
Roberts 
r 
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convince them of his case. He found them unresponsive. 1 
At about the same time he ordered Cavalry bugle calls to 
be abolished, and calls taken from the Infantry to be 
employed instead. This apparently trivial and quite un-
necessary decision produced from Private Grainger in 
Rawalpindi the glum observation1on hearing the news, that 
'[I] expect we shall soon be M.I. in peace as well 2 as war'. 
Haig worked through the year on the various 
manuals which would enshrine the reformed Army's doctrines: 
Field Service Regulations, Combined Training, and Cavalry 
Training . J The Cavalry book was a considerable improve-
ment on the previous manual, with sections on horsemaster-
ship, the importance of resting horses by dismounting on 
the march, skirmishing, and the value of firepower . But 
Haig incorporated the ideas of Austrian and German writers 
~ 
into his drafts for all three manuals~and Roberts, seeing 
them in November, was surprised to find that Haig 'clings 
to the ~ blanche system, and in the chapter for the re-
vised edition of the Drill Book, which was entrusted to him, 
on Collective Training, there is not one word about Artil-
lery or Dismounted fire .'.5 Cavalry Training was found un-
1 . Roberts to Kitchener, 8 October 190J, 7101 - 2J- 122 Roberts 
2 . wO/16J/114 Army Council Decisbns 1909 , no 608, pp 424- .5; 
Graing er Diary entry, 29 September 190J, 7104- J1 Grainger 
J . Field Service Re ulations 1907; Combined Training 190.5; 
Cavalry Training 190 all War Office) 
4 . Ha.ig Diary entry, 8 November 190J, Acc J1.5.5 . 2 Haig; 
'Obsolete Theories in Tactics,' The Standard, 1J April 
1910, in 7101 - 2J- 22J- .5 Roberts 
.5 . Roberts to Kitchener, 2 4 November 190J, 7101 - 2J- 122 
Rober ts 
-
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satisfactory for the same reason, its emphasis on the 
~ blanche. A partial revision was entrusted by Roberts 
to Rimington, and to 
Hubert Gough, who in early 1904 was given a Staff College 
instructorship under Rawlinson. The biographers of Henry 
Wilson have claimed he also had a share in it. 1 In its 
final version Cavalry Training 1904 remained a Cavalryman's 
work, however. It taught the necessity for the charge in 
close or open order: 
When the chance of a charge arises, it should 
be seized without a moment's delay, and the 
attack delivered with the full determination of 
riding the enemy down by sheer force and 
impetus. It should, as a rule, be assisted by 
the fire of horse artillery and dismounted men. 2 
The only point with which the Cavalry reformers seriously 
disagreed was the statement that the rifle was the principal 
Cavalry weapon . Even the requirement for Cavalry to s a c r i-
fice itself if necessary had been retained. 3 Haig himself, 
when the book appeared, queried only a few minor points of 
1. Roberts to Kitchener, 28 January 1904, 7101-23-122 
Roberts; Callwell, Life of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 
p 56; Ash, The Lost Dictator, p 49; undated, unsigned 
paper headed 'The following is suggested as a substitute 
for Col Haig's introduction to Part IV'. The writer refers 
to its authors as 'de Lisle, Rimington and myself' . This 
last is almost certainly Gough, since also Gough to 
Roberts, 1 December 1903, 'I have been re-reading the 
suggested introduction to Part IV that I sent you last 
week, and find it capable of a good deal of improvement'. 
7101-23-221 - 5/8 Roberts 
2. Cavalry Training 1904 (War Office) 
3. ibid, pp 199-201 
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h . 1 p raslng. But just before publication, Baden-Powell 
suggest.ed to Roberts that he might write a preface for the 
book . Three days later the preface appeared. Roberts had 
chosen to provide a precis of his memorandum on the lance, 
which would now be incorporated into the official manual 
fC I T .. 2 o ava ry ralnlng. 
The re - appearance after the war of sugges -
tions that charging Cavalry might be supported by Mounted 
Rifles gave, as previously, little attention to the reali-
ties of British military spending . After the war the M.I . 
commanders, Rawlinson included, begged Roberts to keep their 
units in being . J But the plan of reform advanced by the 
new Secretary of State for War in 1900 called for only five 
mounted brigades, and only two of those to serve abroad . 4 
In 1901 Robert~ was told that the Treasury would not 
sanction large- scale reforms. 5 As previously, the hybrid 
was the only feasible form of Cavalry, given the size of 
the force . In 1902, to Roberts' alarm, there was an 
attempt by the Government to reduce the Army Estimates and 
6 
cancel the 190J manoeuvres as an economy measure . Money 
1 . Kitchener to Roberts, 5 May 1904, Q/JO Kitchener 
2. Baden- Powell to Roberts, 9 January 1904, 7101 - 2J- 6 
Roberts; Baden- Powell to Roberts, 12 January 1904, 7101 -
2J- 6 Roberts 
J. Rawlinson to Roberts, 27 March 1902, 7101 - 2J- 61 Roberts; 
Dunne, 'A plea for the forma tion of a special corps out 
of the present Mounted Infantry in South Africa', 7101 -
2J- 221 - 5 Roberts 
4 . Wilson Diary entry, 21 December 1900, Wilson 
5. Wilson Diary entries, 10 February 1901, J May 1901, 
Wilson 
6 . Roberts to Broderick, 10 October 1902, 7101 - 2J- 122 Roberts 
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for reform was scarce, and with Roberts as Commander- in-
Chief the bulk went to the Infantry and Field Artillery -
1 itself badly inmed of reform. The Cavalry's share of the 
Estimates dropped from 6 per cent in 1900 to 4·J4 per cent 
in 190J. 2 In October 1902, despite an already existing 
shortage of men, Cavalry recruiting was stopped tempor-
arily; between 1899 and 1905 the number of Cavalrymen 
declined by over 1,JOO, or from 8 per cent to 6 · 5 per cent 
of the regular Army.J The Yeomanry too suffered; in 1902 
the Government rejected a scheme for the Army to pay for 
their horses . 4 
stringent efforts were meanwhile made to 
bring down the expenses of life as a Cavalry subaltern, 
5 still costing about £500 a year . In November 1901 ex-
pensive regi~ental polo tournaments were banned. 6 Even so, 
one I . Y. officer in South Africa with the chance of a 
r egular commission wrote sadly, 'I could not afford to stop 
in a Cavalry regiment at home, . 7 Roberts noted that 
regular officers of high ability took commands in India for 
the same motive; even Broadwood was lost to the home Army in 
1 . Spiers, 'Rearming the Edwardian Artillery', pp 167- 76 
2 . See Tables, Part On~ , Tables 4 and 7 
J . See Tables, Part One, Tables 1 and 2 
4 . 'Recommendation of Committees on Army Matters 1900- 20', 
p 179 (War Office) 
5 . 'Report of a Committee to Enquire into the Education and 
Training of Officers in the Army', Appendix 42, p 71 
(War Office) 
6 . Wood to Roberts, 25 NovembEr 1901, 7101 - 2J- 91 Roberts 
7 . Britten to his father, 18 May J900, 7812 - J4 Britten 
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1 this way. With Haig's help, Roberts set up in 1903 a 
f C I ff . t I d t .. 2 committee 0 ava ry 0 lcers 0 p an re uc lons ln expenses. 
As de Lisle told him, 'It ought to be made impossible for 
any officer to say, as is so often said at the present day, 
that he would like to be in a Cavalry regiment but could not 
afford it' , 3 These reforms cut into the pleasures of the 
rich volunteers who still largely officered the Cavalry. 
They did not like it, and a number exercised their pre-
rogative by leaving; voluntary resignations among Cavalry 
officers were in 1903 triple what they had been in 1898 04 
The War Office made no attempt to attract them back: a 
suggestion by a committee on officers' expenses that the 
Army should pay for the two riding horses that every 
officer must have, made in 1902, was indignantly rejected 
on the grounds that the Army had no intention of paying for 
officers to hunt in their leisure time . 5 In the same year, 
a special section of a report on education in the Army ex-
pressed deep concern over the cost of joining a Cavalry 
regiment . 'Our Cavalry must be officered', it noted . 'We 
may require from the candidates either money or brains . 
The supply is most unlikely to meet the demand if we en-
6 deavour to exact both.' The report's recommendations, 
1 . Roberts to Kitchener, 31 January 1902, 0/59 Kitchener; 
Roberts to Kitchener, 3 April 1903, 11/7 Kitchener 
2 . Roberts to Kitchener, 19 March 1903, 11/5 Kitchener 
3 . de Lisle, 'Cavalry Training', 71902, 7101 - 2)-221 - 3 
Roberts 
4. 'Mrs Clarke', 'Jobbery under Arms', USM Vol XXX NS, P 538 
5. WO/163/5, pp 256- 8. For hunting as an aid to judging 
ground, see Alderson, Pink and Scarlet, p 9 
6 . 'Report of a Committee to Enquire into the Education and 
Training of Officers in the Army', p 35 (War Office) 
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intended to reduce the private income necessary to £200 a 
year by drastically curtailing social expenses, were im-
1 plemented by a string of Army Orders over the next year. 
By 1904 a private income 
so until 1914.3 
2 
of £300 was adequate, and stayed 
Nonetheless, the standard of officers in the 
Cavalry, with more demanded of them, energetic reformers 
returning from the Boer War, and constant exposure to 
public criticism, continued to decline with their number. 
'How can any ill come to our beloved country so long as the 
shires produce such men 7' enthused Private Maitland of the 
19th Hussars, 'Has any writer, philosopher, psychologist 
ever properly placed these young men who officer the proud 
British Army ?,4 Less enthusiastically, Private Grainger 
summed up the officers of the 9th Lancers as 'our Blue 
Blooded bacon dryers, cheese mongers and pork butchers that 
are in command and have money, . 5 Doubtles~ both were right . 
The Cavalry officers intended by Haig and Dundonald as an 
elite corps remained an exclusive gathering of sportsmen, 
through which an occasional outstanding soldier would 
emerge . They caused Roberts much anxiety with their 
1. Army Order 1, 1903; Army Order 169, 1903; Special Army 
Order 9, April 1903; Army Order 121, 1905 (War Office) 
2. WO/163/10 Army Council Decisions 1904, no 248, pp 470- 1 
30 Allenby to his wife, 11 December 1914, Allenby 1/5/74 
Allenby 
4. Maitland, Hussar of the Line, p 37 
5. Grainger Diary entry, 9 April 1903, 7104- 32 Grainger 
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generally poor e x amination results and diminishing numbers .1 
But this was largely his own fault: an enquiry into the 
shortage of Cavalry officers in 1905 gave the three main 
causes as low pay in the Army, the cutting of social acti-
vities and long leave, and the ridicule of the Cavalry in 
2 the Press. All these factors, stemming from Roberts' 
attempts at reform, and from blame placed on the Cavalry in 
south Africa, meant that they went out of fashion . 'Young 
men with private incomes of £400- £1,000 a year are ceasing 
to join the British Cavalry', Baden - Powell was informed, 
'while young men with smaller incomes cannot afford to jOin'~ 
When, at the end of 1905, the Adjutant - General issued a 
strongly- worded memorandum on expenses in the Cavalry, 
Baden- Powell took his officers' side: 
They were seldom, if ever, consulted or 
taken into the confidence of their leg islators , 
with whom they were altogether out of touch 
(even up to date: a typical e x ample being the 
recent unfortunate memorandum on the expenses 
of Cavalry officers) 
This feeling of discouragement has not 
merely been confined to the senior officers, 
but has in a measure e x tended down to all . 4 
Physically and spiritually, the ~ blanche controversy 
1. Roberts to Haig, 10 January 1903, 7101 - 23- 122 Roberts. 
The popular view of the Cavalry officer was still as 
brave but brainless, holding that 'sweating at tactics 
is all bally rot'. Blaire, Epaulettes, p 31 
2. 'Recommendations of Committee5 on Army Matters 1900- 20', 
p 179 (War Office) 
3 . Carbon of letter, unsigned, undated, 1903- 05, to Baden-
Powell from ?Haig, Acc 315502 Haig 
4 . 'Reports of the Inspector- General of the Forces 1904- 13', 
summary of Cavalry winter training by Baden- Powell, 
18 April 1905 34/317 (War Office); WO/163/10 Army Council 
Decisbns 1905, no 191, p 241 
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had all but destroyed the Cavalry as a fighting force. 
Almost unnoticed in the noise of the contro-
versy, Cavalry reform continued. In 1901 pom-pom guns 
were introduced for the Cavalry, who later reverted to 
1 
machine guns in light carts. In early 1904 the strength 
of a home regiment in peace time was fixed at 565 officers 
and men, recruits being less than 11 stones in weight. 2 
Between 190J and 1905 the Cavalry were given the same new 
rifle as the Infantry, the Short Magazine Lee Enfield, far 
superior to any carbine o Roberts and Baden-Powell wanted 
this carried (as in Afghanistan) slung across the back, but 
were opposed by a bloc of senior Cavalry reformers (French, 
Scobell, Rimington, Byng, Broadwood and Haig) who in October 
1904 convinced the new Army Council that the rifle should 
be carried in~ a long bucket from the saddle to balance the 
sword. J Two years later a committee under Haig unanimously 
Od th' d .. 4 approve lS eClSlon. Roberts' hopes for this rifle 
help explain his approach to the question of the arme 
blanche. 'Our Cavalry', he wrote in late 190J, referring 
to the S.M.L.E., 'will shortly be armed with a magazine 
rifle which can be depended upon to kill at a distance of 
1. 'Recommendations of Committees on Army Matters 1900-20', 
p 47 (War Office) 
2. ibid, P 129 
J. Reynolds, The Lee- Enfield Rifle, p 97; wO/16J/9 Army 
Council Decisions 1904, no 126, pp J42-4; Roberts to 
French, 24 January 1904, 7101-2J-122 Roberts 
4. Haig Diary entry, 1J March 1906, Acc /155.2 Haig 
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1 
at least 2,800 yards.' One and a half nn iles was the ex-
treme range of the rifle, but any kill made at that distance 
would have been a complete fluke. The unusual conditions 
of South Africa alone had made such shooting possible. 
The Roberts Ring, having achieved its ob-
jectives by promoting its own members to high rank, began 
(as the Wolseley Ring had done) in early 1904 to break up. 
This was largely precipitated by the actiorn of the Esher 
Committee, which recommended Roberts' retirement, while he 
was hustled out of a possible post as Inspector-General of 
the Forces to make way for the Duke of Connaught. Even 
Hamilton finally broke with Roberts professionally, although 
t II th ' f . t· 2 no persona y, on e lssue 0 conscrlp lone Robertson, 
Rawlinson and Wilson had established their own careers, 
while in December 1904 Wilson was warned unoflicially to see 
less of Roberts, a warning he ignored. J The upheavals in 
the War Office generated by Esher co-incided with the 
completion of Cavalry Training 1904, which was due for issue 
on 1 March 1904. Before its issue, Roberts attempted to 
secure public opinion by a series of articles from the 
military correspondent of the Morning Post, clearly briefed 
1. Memorandum by the C-in-C in addition to memorandum by 
the I - G.C. on 'B' Cavalry Division, Germany, September 
190J, 7101 - 2J-221 Roberts; wO/16J/9 Army Council Deci-
sions 1904, no 1JJ, pp 281-J. At a test firing in 1902 
at a target representing a quarter of a battalion in 
column at 2,800 yards, there were five hits from . 1,100 rounds. 
Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, Vol II, p 276 
2 . Hamilton, The Happy Warrlor; pp 240- 3 
J . Wilson Diary entry, J1 December 1904, Wilson 
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1 
as to the book's contents. But not until 18 Feburary, the 
day after Roberts' retirement and the creation of the Army 
Council was formally announced, did the n ew Secretary of 
State for War, Arnold-Forster, ask to see John French about 
the manual: 
I said I had heard how much he had been con-
cerned to hear of recent decisions with regard 
to the use of Cavalry. It appears to me that 
as a sort of 'by product' it has been decided 
that we should cease ID have any Cavalry, in 
the ' ordinary Continental sense. As a civilian 
I did not know whether this were right or wrong, 
but it seemed to me far too important a question 
to be decided off hand. He entirely agreed. I 
suggested that he, as the only Cavalry Officer 
commanding an Army Corps, should write a full 
statement of the case for submission to the 
A[rmyJ C[ouncilJ.2 
The need that Arnold-Forster felt for a specialised vocab-
ulaFy to describe the arme blanche controversy, and the 
complete absen~ e of such a vocabulary, is very clear from 
this passage. Arnold-Forster discovered that his military 
advisers on the Army Council were also opposed to Cavalry 
Training 1904 as it stood. 'There will of course be a 
hideous row', he wrote, 'but after all it is our Council 
and not Lord R[obertsJ which is now responsible. ,3 Un-
fortunately, it was not that easy. A week later, Lord 
Lansdowne, now Foreign Secretary, called on Arnold-Forster. 
1. Prevost Battersby, 'The Future of Cavalry', 7101-23-221 -
9 Roberts 
2. Arnold-Forster Diary eptry, 18 February 1904, ~dd mB 
50336, Vol LXII Arnold- Forster 
3. Arnold-Forster Diary entry, 23 February 1904, ~dm" 
50336, Vol LXII Arnold-Forster 
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Lansdowne had just lunched with Roberts, who on hearing of 
the delay in issuing the manual 'threatened to give up the 
Committee of [Imperial] Defence, indeed to throw up every-
thing, and make a violent attack upon the Government in 
general and the Prime Minister in particular, for their 
, 1 
supposed bad treatment of him' . Arnold- Forster was 
astonished: he had asked his technical advisers for details 
of a military probl em, and had not anticipated the vehe-
mence of Roberts' reaction . He suggested, as a compromise, 
that the manua.l should be issued provisionally, got the new 
Adjutant - General to agree to this in the afternoon,and 
sent a message offeringfuis solution to Lans downe to put to 
Roberts over dinner, without consulting French or anyone 
else . The Government's safety was more important than the 
Cavalry's training . Roberts accepted the proposal 'with 
gratitude', and a relieved Arnold- Forster explained the 
position to French two days later . 2 Meanwhile , the ultimate 
form of persuasion was tried. On 3 March the King himself 
told Roberts of the Cavalry's fear that they were to be 
turned into Mounted Rifles o At once Roberts wrote to French: 
Nothing could be further from my views ••• 
There is nothing in the training I advocate 
which could possibly interfere with the dash 
and confidence in himself which it is so 
essential for a Cavalry soldier' to possess ••• 
It distresses me to think that your views 
1 . Arnold- Forster Diary entry, 26 February 1904, add mss 
50336 , Vol LXII Arnold- Forster; Roberts to Hamilton, 28 
February 1904, 7101 - 23- 122 Roberts 
2 0 Arnold- Forster Diary entries ~ 26 February 1904, 27 Feb-
ruary 1904 and 28 February 1904, add mss 50336, Vol LXII 
Arnold- Forster 
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and mine are so much at variance on a 
matter which is of such vital importance 
to our Cavalry.1 
French duly replied to this: 
As I tried to explain to you the other 
evening I have only made the same represen-
tations on the subject to the Army Council 
as I have repeatedly made to you as Com-
mander- in- Chief. Nothing can make me alter 
the views I hold on the subject of Cavalry, 
and I am sure they are nothing like so much 
at variance with yours as you seem to think.2 
The following day his memorandum was given to the Army 
Council, supported by Rimington and Evelyn Wood, calling 
for the omission of Roberts' preface. The Council agreed 
to the provisional issue of the manual with the preface 
(this, since the deal between Roberts and Arnold- Forster, 
was a foregone conclusion) and balanced this by rejecting 
the call from French, Scobell and Rimington for the re-
introduction of the lance for war . Instead , they propo s ed 
to abolish it altogether, the new Quartermaster- General, 
Herbert Plumer, asking the delicate question whether regi-
ments without lances could still be called Lancers. J 
Tradition and influence, however, were too s trong for the 
Council: on 5 May they were told that Edward VII, who had 
taken a close interest in the arming of t he Cavalry, would 
not sanction the abolition. 4 Short of provoking a consti-
tutional crisis, there was nothing to be done . Desp±te 
1 • Roberts to French, 4 March 1904, 7101 - 2J- 122 Roberts 
2. French to Roberts, 6 March 1904, 7101 - 2J- JO Roberts 
J . WO/16J/10 Army Council Decisions 1904, no 170, pp 118- J8 
4 . wO/16J/10 Army Council Decisions 1904, no 218, pp J74- 5 
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Roberts' usual tactic of a series of articles, this time by 
1 Amery in The Times during summer (at Roberts' request), 
Cavalry Training was issued provisionally for six months 
with the preface, and in the re-issue of January 1905 the 
preface was dropped. 
Haig, who was in India, played no direct part 
in all this. But the affair forced Kitchener to choose be-
tween Roberts and his own Inspector-General of Cavalry. In 
late March and April 190) Roberts had written to Kitchener 
stressing, from his own memories of Afghanistan, the value-
2 lessness of the lance. Kitchener had, even before re-
ceiving these letters, taken his own steps in the same 
direction: on 20 April he ordered Roberts' memorandum on 
the lance circulated toall Indian Cavalry regiments, for 
information, and in the next two months removed the lance 
from three of the twenty-four Indian regiments which carried 
it.) But Kitchener was considerably more sensitive than 
Roberts to his own Army. 'I think it is well to work grad-
ually', Kitchener wrote to him, 'as the natives of the 
Lancer regiments think a good deal of their lances, more as 
show than anything elseo,4 He sought Haig's advice, meeting 
with him briefly in early September to talk over the 
1 • Amery to Roberts, 11 May 1904, 7101-2)-1 Roberts 
2. Roberts to Kitchener, 27 March 190), 11/6 Ki tchener; 
Roberts to Kitchener, 17 April 190), 11/10 Ki tchener 
). Kitchener to Roberts, 20 April 190), Q/7 Kitchener; 
Kitchener to Roberts, 10 May 190), 11/11 Kitchener 
4. Kitchener to Roberts, 10 June 190), 7101-2)-)) Roberts 
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Cavalry question, on which, Haig recorded, they were quite 
1 
agreed. In the meantime Roberts wrote warning Kitchener 
2 
of Haig's d e votion to the arme blanche . Whe n Haig and 
Kitchener met again in November Haig recorded that Xitchener 
was 'quite at one with me regarding method of Cavalry action, 
namely offensive tactics,.3 Kitchener did not see it that 
way at all; he wrote to Roberts: 
Haig has arrived and I have had one talk with 
him and mean to have another, he seems to have 
a wrong idea that the morale of the Cavalry 
will be injured by dismounted training. I have 
told him that I disagree with this; that while 
I do not wish in any way to injure the dash or 
power of shock tactics of Cavalry, they must 
understand that whereas in the old days the 
carbine was the adjunct to the sword or lance 
in all training, now the sword must be4 the adjunct to the rifle and its practice. 
Their secomtalk took place six days later, and again Haig 
came awaY }1appily, recording that 'he quite agrees with me 
as to the need for impressing on cavalry the importance of 
offensive action mounted, while insisting on the necessity 
of being able to act dismounted with effect.,5 The complete 
failure to communicate with Kitchener may heve been due to 
Haig's notorious verbal inarticulateness, not eased by the 
ambiguous language of the ~ blanche controversy. They 
were clearly more in agreement than Kitchener realised. 
The Indian Cavalry had been subject to Roberts' 
1. Haig Diary entry, 5 September 1903, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
2. Roberts to Kitchener, 24 September 1903, 7101 - 23- 122 
Roberts 
3 . Haig Diary entry, 3 November 1903, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
4 . Kitchener to Roberts, 5 November 1903, Q/11 Kitchener 
5 . Haig Diary entry, 9 November 1903, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
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views on firepower for nearly twenty years, and many of 
their officers had commanded M.I . in South Africa. Haig 
was not impressed. In December, after manoeuvres, he 
noted: 
From what I see there is a risk of making 
our CavalrY , act on the defensive too much: 
at the Punjab manoeuvres it struck me on 
several occasions that Commanders dismounted 
their men to hold positions passively, when 
the military situation demanded an energetic 
offensive at once. On one occasion I saw a 
Cavalry Brigade attacked by Infantry when 
holding a village, and eventually [they] were 
outflanked and surrounded 111 
Twenty- five years later, one of Haig's staff recalled: 
The Indian Cavalry under the influence of 
many of its officers who had served in South 
Africa with mounted infantry units was permeated 
with the new doctrine and looked for approval 
from the new Inspector- General . There was a 
rude awakening. Haig would have none of it . 
Both at his inspections of regiments, and still 
more by means of his training memoranda and 
staff, rides, he taught unceasingly to his 
Cavalry in India that war far e still offer ed 
scope for horse and man and bare steel. 2 
This exaggerates . Haig's own notebooks reveal his pre-
occupation with 'thorough instruction of every horseman in 
skirmishing - they already shoot well', and 'higher training 
of officers in tactical use of the rifle,.3 Horace Smith-
DOn2en, at that time commanding the 4th (Quetta) Div ision , 
recalled that in 1904 Haig inspected the Cavalry under his 
command, 'and shortly afterwards I submitted to him my 
scheme for cavalry training and manoeuvres, which he 
1 . Haig to Edmunds, 29 Decemb er 1903, Edmunds 
Edmunds 
2 . Charteris, Douglas Haig, p 28 
1I/4/I 
3. Notebooks on Manoeuvres 1903- 6, Acc 3155.40 Haig 
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returned to me, remarking that he could not improve on it'. 1 
But to Haig, India seemed to confirm the Cavalryman's fear 
that too much reliance on the rifle meant passivity and 
poor morale. 
In April 1904 Roberts wrote to Kitchener 
asking for a letter in support of his---Cavalry Training 
manual, to show the Army Council. Before this l e,t ter could 
reach India Haig reported to Kitchener on the new Cavalry 
Training2 and Kitchener issued an Army Order in support of 
the manual. Roberts found this admirable, writing back that 
'what you have said in that order is exactly what Iwant,.3 
But Haig also found it quite acceptable. In May he and 
Kitchener met twice to discuss Roberts' request, and, Haig 
recorded: 
Had a long talk with Lord K[itchener] E£ new 
CavalrTDrill Book. He read me his remarks in 
letter [sic] which he had sent to Lord Roberts 
on the subject. He takes a middle course, 
thinking exact drill re training for charge 
necessary, but putting-efficiency in rifle first. 4 
Kitchener's 'letter' was in fact his Army Order. As he 
wrote to Roberts during his meetings with Haig: 
I think someone must have given you the wrong 
impression about Haig. I have only just arrived 
here so I have not been able to go into his work 
in detail but I had a long talk and he certainly 
1. Smith-Do~en, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
p 326 
2. Roberts to Kitchener, 28 April 1904, 7101-23-122 Roberts; 
Haig Diary entry, 11 April 1904, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
3. Roberts to Kitchener, 4 May 1904, 11/22 Kitchener 
4. Haig Diary entry, 14 May 1904, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
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never referred to old-fashioned charges, he 
quite agrees with what I wrote about cavalry 
in the enclosed A[rmyJ O[rderJ and told me so 
more than once. 1 
Haig's views had been moving away from the 'old- fashioned' 
mass, knee- to-knee charge towards squadron fire - and- movement 
tactics since th~ 1890s , virtually the start of his Army 
career . The issue that was dividing the Cavalry and the 
War Office, and tearing the Cavalry itself in pieces, was 
not reform, not the arme bla~, but the personality and 
methods of Lord Roberts. At bottom,the Cavalry did not 
trust him. Kitchener caught a hint of this in his con-
versations with Haig: 
It was not quite satisfactory, because 
although he agrees with my views he always 
seems to hark back as if something more were 
intended or that he was afraid more was 
intended than was saido • • The Cavalry are, I 
think, evidently very nervous that more is 
intend~d than is written down and that training 
for the role they can now perform with their 
rifle, they may lose the power or spirit to 
attack the enemy Cavalry when it is necessary . 2 
It was a point that Roberts did not himself appreciate . In 
June 1904 he again saw French about the Cavalry, and wrote 
to Kitchener afterwards, 'I am afraid our conversations will 
not result in much good, although French promised me he 
would endeavour to disabuse Scobell, Haig, and the few other 
officers who agree with them, that there is not the slight-
est wish to turn them into mounted rifles, . 3 This letter 
1 • Kitchener to Roberts, 12 May 1904, 7101-23- 33 Roberts; 
Haig Diary entry, 11 May 1904, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
2 . Kitchener to Roberts, 12 May 1904, 7101 - 23- 22 Roberts 
3 . Roberts to Kitchener, 3 June 1904, 7101 - 23- 122 Roberts 
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only showed how completely Roberts failed to understand the 
opposition to him. Beyond doubt, he now believed his own 
version of the Boer War. 
The Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 
1904, and its most startling news was that, in poor Cavalry 
country, a Japanese Cavalry with a limited but firm doctrine 
of the arme blanche was holding its own again~ ten times its 
own number of Cossacks, reputedly the best mounted riflemen 
in the world . British officers expressed amazement: 'What 
1 has happened to the Cossacks?' one wanted to know. Most 
critics waited for more details. Roberts, locked in the 
struggle with the Army Council, did not. His only source 
of information was Ian Hamilton, acting as an observer with 
the Japanese Army . Roberts let Hami lton know what he wanted 
to hear and why: 
I gather [the Japanese Cavalry] are really 
mounted riflemen riding ponies chieflYo.oI 
am most anxious to hear about them for a 
great opposition has set in against the 
opinion expressed in my Preface to 'Cavalry 
Training' • • • [the Chief of General Staff] said 
that nothing would be done until he knows 
what success the cavalry on the two sides 
meet wi.>th during the present war. This is 
why I want you to give me all the information 
you can on the subject . 2 
Hamilton, unique among British observers of the war, con-
cluded that the ~ blanche came badly out of it . To 
Roberts his letters were a vindication: 
Your letters are most interesting and in-
structive. I wish French could see them, if 
1 . Cadell, 'Some Lessons from the Russo- Japanese War,', USM 
Vol XXX NS, p 115 
2 . Roberts to Hamilton, 4 May 1904, 7101 - 23- 122 Roberts 
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he would take them to heart, but he is going 
on, as is Haig in India, with incessant knee-
to-knee charges, having one or two dismounted 
days a season, and paying very little atten-
tion to musketry. 1 
Roberts did ndunderstand that his actions had interrupted, 
and distorted, a programme of reform within the Cavalry 
nearly twenty years old. He imagined thatJ as all his 
wishes were not being carried out/the Cavalry must be re-
gressing to the standards and outlook of the 1870s. He took 
refuge in revenge: in December 1904 he urged Kitchener to 
recommend Hamilton as his successor in Tndia, in opposition 
to French (in fact neither got the post)~ In January 1905, 
when Cavalry Training was re-issued without its preface, he 
wrote directly to the Prime Minister's personal secretary: 
I should have been inclined to prevent [the 
making of the issue with the preface provi-
sional] had I not been confident that the 
manual would be generally approved of. The 
officers' reports have now been received, and 
I understand that they are unanimous as to the 
usefulness and practicabUity of the new regu-
lations ••• I know that in some commands, parti-
cularly Aldershot, the training is being 
carried out very much as it was before the war. 
Very little attention is paid to dismounted 
work ••• I do not think Mr. Balfour has any idea 
of how inefficient the cavalry were during the 
war. I had to get rid of six officers commanding 
brigades and five officers commanding regiments. 
The men did not know how to take care of their 
horses. When despatches had to be sent not only 
local irregulars but even Australians and 
Canadians were employed in preference to our own 
men; and General French would never go anywhere 
without some Mounted Infantry to assist him, 
because his Cavalry could not cope with the 
1. Roberts to Hamilton, 7 December 1904, 7101-23- 122 Roberts 
2. Roberts to Kitchener, 23 December 1904, 7101-23-122 
Roberts 
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Boers when fighting with the rifle ••• We must 
not allow the sensitivity of the more senior 
Cavalry officers - some of whom cling to their 
traditions of bygone days - to prevent the ••• 
necessity for changes in the future being 
pointed out. 1 
Roberts
' 
view of the Boer War did not, for the moment, 
matter. But again it would have serious consequences in 
the future. 
Roberts
' 
tenure as Commander-in-Chief, by 
encouraging contempt for the Cavalry, set back its under-
standing by officers of other arms by several years. In 
1901 the examiners for promotion of junior officers were 
impressed by their understanding of the handling of mounted 
troops (usually learned in the war). By 1904 'the mobility 
of mounted troops was not always sufficiently considered
'
, 
and a year later, ICav~lry was frequently badly handled l • 
It relnained a weak point aJnong junior officers until the 
Z First World War. But Robertsl retirement removed the main 
source of trouble in the controversy, which even he recog-
nised was daJnaging the Cavalry far more than it could be 
worth. In February 1905, therefore, he used a speech at 
the Kimberley Reunion Dinner 'to dispel any notion that I 
aJn not favourably disposed towards the Cavalry branchl,J 
and made his peace with French: 
I know your wishes are identical with mine ••• 
You want, as I do, to see Cavalry able to 
1 . Roberts to Sanders, 12 January 1905, 7101-2J-122 Roberts 
2. 'Reports on the examinations of offic crs of the regular 
forces, militia and volunteers I , May 1901 Captains, Nov-
ember 1904 Captains, May 1905 Lieutenants, December 191J 
Captains. (C.U.L.O.P.R.) 
J. Roberts to French, 16 February 1905, 7101-2J- 122 Roberts 
d 
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carry out a p'1..1.rsui t as effectively as 
Sheridan's Cavalry did to Lee's Army in 
1865 ••• I lay more stress on the rifle, you 
"on the sword. The Cavalry soldier must be 
able to use both weapons skilfully.1 
The Cavalry reform programme continued. In 1905, at Baden-
Powell's suggestion, a Cavalry Committee of officers was 
formed to debate technical problems of the force; a Cavalry 
School was opened with Byng as Commandant, and The Cavalry 
2 Journal founded, with Goldmann's help. In the first issue, 
Broadwood answered the hypothetical question, 'Is the rifle 
or sword the principal weapon of Cavalry?' with a cheerful 
'whichever you like to call so, provided that you are equal-
ly prepared to use either,.J So the ~ blanche debate 
subsided again into an affair for Captains and Majors to 
write articles about. It would never again be as bitter, 
or as important. But its consequences would be felt for 
years to come. 
1. Roberts to French, 16 February 1905, 7101-2J-122 Roberts 
2". wO/16J/19 Army Council Decisions 1905, no 177, pp 167- 9 
and no 216, p J7J 
J. Broadwood, 'The Place of Fire Tactics in the Training of 
British Cavalr~, CJ Vol 1, no 1, p 90 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CAVALRY SPIRIT 
iEach side will be under the supreme command 
of a General" who will be represented by a 
Cavalry soldier.' 
- H.G. Wells, Little Wars (1913)1 
'It is sad to think I am no longer in the 
Regiment. I was a rifleman for 22i years and 
very proud and happy to be one and I owe much 
of my good fortune to having been one.' 
Henry Wilson's Diary, 1 January 19072 
In 1878 a War Office report on the Russo-
Turkish war noted the novelty of the Russian Cossacks, armed 
with lance, sword and rifle, but trained to fight mainly on 
foot. 3 Six years later, Captain Chenevix-Trench emphasised 
that the Russian Cavalry, including Cossacks 'now differs 
in type, training and equipment from all other European 
Cavalry, and is avowedly intended to act as mounted infantry 
rather than regular Cavalry of the established type,.4 In 
1901 the British attache in Pekin reported that both Russian 
Cossacks and Japanese Cavalry there 'appear to be very good 
Mounted Infantry,.5 Soldiers cramming for examinations in 
Britain in 1903 learned that 'the Russians alone have mainly 
1. Wells, Little Wars, p 104 
2. Wilson Diary entry, 1 January 1907, Wilson 
3. "A"654, 'Report on the Russo-Turkish War' (War Office) 
4. Chenevix-Trench, Cavalry in Modern War, p 14 
5. "A"669(3) 'Notes regarding the French, German and Ameri-
can Cavalry in China'[sic] (War Office) 
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armed their Cavalry with the rifle as their sole [sic] 
1 
weapon'. The point was not in dispute. The majority of 
British officers reporting on the Russo-Japanese war con-
firmed that the Cossacks . (who made up the bulk of the 
Russian Cavalry) and the remaining horsemen in the Russian 
Army, were trained primarily to fight on foot. 2 A high 
proportion of Cossack officers were transfers from the 
Infantry3 and one Russian officer condemned their 'exag-
gerated and useless practice of dismounted action,.4 
In 1910, however, Ian Hamilton wrote to 
Erskine Childers, author of a volume of Amery's Times 
History of the War in South Africa, and now of his own book, 
War And The Arme Blanche: 
Next came the Manchurian War. Extremely awk-
ward for the framers of the 1907 Cavalry 
Training, even you must admit ••• The upholders 
of the ~ blanche have been driven, in dis-
cussing it, to invent the astonishing theory 
that Russian Cavalry and Cossacks are not 
Cavalry at all, but are merely Mounted Infantry 
••• In their complete adherence to shock tactics 
and the arme blanche the Russian regular Cavalry 
are second only to the British. As for Cossacks, 
a Cossack off his horse is like a duck out of 
water.5 
Childers, who had been surprised at the poor performance of 
the Cossacks,6 now had the explanation. His next book 
1. Moores, Summary of Tactics for Military Examinations, 
p 173 
2. "A"958 'Report on the Russo-Japanese War', . (War Office); 
see also other reports on the war, "A"983; "A"984; 
"A"1180 
3. 'How not to do It', CJ Vol 8, no 32, p 404 
4. Zalesskij, 'The Russian Cavalry in the War with the 
Japanes~, CJ Vol 1, no 3, p 316 
5. Hamilton to Childers, copies to Roberts and Churchill, 
30 October 1910, Hamilton, 7/3/15 Hamilton 
6 0 Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, p 335 
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announced that Cossacks were swordsmen totally ignorant of 
the rifle. 1 Hamilton sent copies of his letter to Lord 
Roberts, and to Winston Churchill. 
'Lessons' were ruthlessly extracted from the 
few mounted and dismounted actions in Manchuria, seldom of 
th d . 2 more an squa ron Slze. But the ensuing debate consisted 
of little more than contradictory assertions on the nature 
of the Cossacks and their Japanese opponents. J The anxiety 
of rifle theorists to save the reputation of the Cossacks, 
who for years had been held up as the ideal mounted rifle-
men, produced the strange result of von Wrangel in Austvia 
condemning their obsession with dismounted work,4 while de 
Negrier in France insisted that they owed such success as 
they had achieved to their skill dismounted5 and Hamilton 
in Britain blamed their failure on a total lack of such 
skill. As before, these arguments over the value of the 
~. blanche, viewed in the abstract, obscured other reasons 
for the lack of fighting between horsemen. The terrain in 
Manchuria was thought too broken for large masses of Cavalry 
1. Childers, German Influence on British Cavalry, p 145 
2. 'H0W Cavalry Might Have Been Used in the Russo-Japanese 
War', CJ Vol 2, no 8, p 477; Birkbeck, 'The Russo-
Japanese War', CJ Vol J, no 12, p 501; 'Minor Tactics in 
Manchuria', CJ Vol 2, no 5, p 64 
J. Towle, 'The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War on 
British Military and Naval Thought', pp 165-90 accepts 
Hamilton's view, but admits, p J85, that different 
officers produced widely differing analyses of what they 
saw. 
4. von Wrangel, The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War, p 55 
5. de Negrier, Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, pp 8, 72 
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(Hamilton called it 'five squadron countrY'),1 the weather 
in winter was freezing cold and the horses of both sides, 
on the end of tenuous supply lines, kept in poor conditions 
2 
and short of food. But this did not explain the Cossack 
failure to dominate their Japanese opponents, MOIDlted Rifles 
who were taught to charge mounted in emergencies, and who 
avoided contact with their numerically very much superior 
foe. Most British observers blamed the quality of the 
Cossacks themselves. One wrote that 'Even with very in-
ferior numbers, the cavalry of any other great Power would 
li terally have walked round the numerous Cossack squadrons, 
either in shock tactics or in shooting.,J Another recorded 
that the Cossacks were 'very nearly useless', they were 
'badly led, badly drilled, and very often wanting in courage~ 
The Cossacks themselves disliked the Army, while their re-
cruiting districts had become cultivated and even indust-
rialised. 5 They were no longer natural mounted riflemen. 
Rawlinson, watching them drill shortly after the war, wrote 
that his South African M.I would have completely routed 
6 them. 
1. Hamilton, A Staff Officer's Scrap Book, Vol 1, P 191 
2. "A"958, 'Report on the Russo-Japanese War', p 152 (War 
Office) 
J. "A"984, 
Colonel 
4. "A"958, 
Office) 
'Report on 
Waters', p 
'Report on 
the Campaign in Manchuria 1904 by 
42 (War Office) 
the Russo-Japanese War', p 6 (War 
5. 'German Cavalry and the Lessons of the Russo-Japanese 
War', CJ Vol 2, no 6, p 220 
6. Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Tr~nt, 
p 9J; 
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British Cavalrymen, still concerned mainly 
with the value of the ~ blanche, preferred to believe 
that the doctrine, rather than the troops, had been at 
faul t. One wrote: 
The operations of the Cossacks merely seem to 
confirm the deduction, made between the 16th 
and 18th centuries, that excessive dismounted 
work and dependence on fire effect destroy that 
true cavalry spirit without which any army in 
the field is deprived of its eyes and ears.1 
George Barrow of the Indian Cavalry, making the first of a 
series of contributions to The Cavalry Journal, believed: 
If we go below the surface and seek the reason 
why the Russian Cavalry played so subordinate 
a part in this titanic struggle, we will find 
that it lies in the fact that for many years 
the Russians have been teaching their men to 2 
look upon their rifles a s the principal thing. 
This was an echo of the first British views of the American 
Civil War: two cautious groups of horsemen, depending on 
firearms, meant little fighting and no advantage taken of a 
massive superiority • . The behaviour of both sides after the 
war gave support to this view. The Russians took away their 
Cossacks' rifles for a while in an effort to improve their 
courage by concentrating on the charge. J Rather more soberly, 
the Japanese doubled their number of Cavalry regiments and 
issued new regulations that 'the weapons of Cavalry are the 
sword when mounted and the rifle on foot . As a general rule 
1. Holbrook, 'The Russo- Japanese War: IV Mistchenko's 
Cavalry Raid', USM Vol XXX NS, P J82 
2. Barrow, The Spirit of Cavalry', CJ Vol 1, no 1, p 22 
J . Stone, The Eastern Front 1914- 17, p 17; "A"114J, 'The 
Military Resources of the Russian Empire 1907' (War 
Office) 
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Cavalry will fight mounted. ,1 British defenders of the 
hybrid welcomed this support of their views; the opponents 
of the arme blanche regarded it only as proof that idiotic, 
sentimental Cavalrymen were not confined to the Western 
hemisphere. 2 Russian Cossack failures when raiding against 
Japanese Infantry strongpoints put the idea of the long 
strategic Cavalry raid out of favour in Britain. But 
critics were impressed by the need for Infantry to close 
hand-to- hand in firefights (in contrast to South Africa) and 
by the battle fatigue noticeable in front - line troops after 
two or three days fighting} Belief in the physical attack, 
as opposed to the long-range rifle duel, reappeared. At 
the same time the break-up of the Roberts Ring allowed into 
high rank other men who had made their reputations in the 
Boer War. 
In 1905 John French joined the Committee for 
Imperial Defence, and in 1907 was promoted to Inspector-
General of the Forces in succession to Connaught. In the 
same year Haig returned to Britain as Director of Military 
Training, and later Director of Staff Duties . Neither ap-
pointment had anything to do with their views on Cavalry . 
French was wanted for his organising talents, Haig for his 
high reputation as a staff officer,4 but both brought their 
1 . 'The New Japanese Cavalry Regulations', CJ Vol J, no 11, 
p 218 
2. Repington to The Times, 26 March 1910, and Childers to 
The Times, 17 May 1910, both in 7101 -2J - 2 2 J - 5 Roberts 
J . 'The Value of the Arme Blanche from Actual Instances in 
the Rus s o- Japanese War, CJ Vol 6, no 2J, p J22 
4 . Gooch , The Plans of War, pp 48- 50; Duff Cooper, Haig, 
Vol 1 , p 105 
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beliefs on Cavalry to the War Office. Henry Wilson had 
taken the precaution, a year earlier, of expressing a belief 
in the notion of an elite corps of Cavalrymen to French, 
telling him they should get the pick of Sandhurst and Wool -
wich, and that French himself should succeed Kitchener in 
India . To Wilson's delight, French replied that 'I must 
never fear living on half- pay, and he would see me given 
command of a brigade' . 1 To Roberts, still his 'Chief', 
Wilson continued to show contempt for French both as a 
soldier and a Cavalry theorist. 2 In 1907 he was rewarded 
when, on Roberts' strong recommendation, he succeeded 
Rawlinson as Commandant of the Staff College . J Roberts, 
although retired, still had immense public prestige, and 
continued to involve himself in military affairs to the end 
of his life e As late as 191J he caused serious embarrass-
ment for the Government with the public statement that since 
the S oM. L . E . rifle was slightly inferior to the German 
Mauser at extreme ranges, British troops would fight Germans 
at a severe disadvantage . 4 
The rest of the Roberts Ring continued to 
make their way in the Army . Ian Hamilton became G.OoC . 
Southern Command on his return from Japan, a side- step which 
1 . Wilson Diary entry, 1 August 1906, Wilson 
2 . See Wilson to Roberts, 27 March 1910, 7101 - 2J- 22J- 10 
Roberts 
J . Ash, The Lost Dictator, p 50; Wilson Diary entry, 9 Oct-
ober 1906, Wilson 
4 . Seely, Adventure, p 158 
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resulted in his not becoming Adjutant- General until 1909. 
Rawlinson also went to a field command, an Infantry brigade 
at Aldershot, in 1906. A year later Robertson's job at the 
War Office ended and he requested a Cavalry brigade. In-
stead he went to Aldershot as Assistant Quartermaster-
1 General . Cavalry brigades had already gone to Allenby and 
Byng, while in 1907 French secured the Inspector- Generalship 
2 
of the Cavalry for Scobel1 9 At the same time, de Lisle 
found his candidacy for Commandant of the Cavalry School 
. blocked - he believed by Haig. 3 Two years later, John 
Vaughan, Haig's old fellow officer of the 7th Hussars, was 
given the job. 4 Rimington meanwhile replaced Haig as 
Inspector- General of Cavalry in India following the latter's 
arrival at the War Office o Other successful officers began 
to emerge into high rank: from being suddenly replaced as 
Quartermaster- General in 1905, Plwner took a divisional com-
mand , two years later, and Northern Command in 1911. James 
Grierson, a staff officer of outstanding ability with no 
Ring connections became Director of Military Operations in 
the Esher reforms, and went on to command a di"ilision at 
Aldershot two years later . In 1907 Horace Smith- Domen was 
given Aldershot Command, recommended - so he believed - by 
1 . Wilson Diary , entnes 11 October 1906 and 31 December 
1906, Wilson . Wilson did not attribute this failure to 
any Cavalryman c 
2 . For Scobell's career, see French to Knollys, copy to 
Haldane, 16 September 1908, no - 55 mss 5908 Haldane 
3. De Lisle to Roberts, 25 November 1907, 7101 - 23- 222 
Roberts 
4. Brande r , The 10th Royal Hussars, p 89 
-235-
. 1 
both French and Kitchener. 
By 1913 two Cavalrymen held the highest Army 
commands, French as the designated commander of the BoE.F., 
and Haig as GoO.C. Aldershot. But the supposed Cavalry 
dominance of the Army effectively meant just these two men. 
Hamilton was Inspector-General of Overseas Forces, Wilson, 
as Director of Military Operations, believed he was domina-
ting French,2 Rawlinson was in command of a division, 
Grierson held Eastern Cowmand, and Smith-Do~en Southern 
Command. Of the outstanding Cav~ymen of the Boer War only 
Allenby still held a significant post as Inspector- General 
of Cavalry and designated commander of the Cavalry Division. 
Byng was given a Territorial division on leaving his brigade 
in 1910, Kavanagh was put on half- pay on leaving his three 
years later . By 1914 only de Lisle and Gough still had 
their Cava.lry brigades. The remaining three brigades were 
led by men, such as Chetwode, who had made their reputations 
since 1902 . By the start of the First World War, excluding 
honorary appointments, of eight Field Marshals only two were 
Cavalrymen, John French and Evelyn Wood. Of eighteen 
Generals just one, Haig, was a Cavalryman. Of twenty-seven 
Lieutenant-Generals three were Cavalrymen. Of a hundred 
and fourteen Major Generals eight were Cavalrymen ( 7 per 
cent, a little lower than the 8 · 25 per cent of Cavalry in 
1 . Smith- Donien, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
p 339 
2 . Wilson Diary entries 19 March 1912 and 22 September 
1914, Wilson 
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the Army,1 and the 7.8 per cent of the B.E.F. justified). 
This. should be compared with the two Generals, three Lieu-
tenant - Generals and nineteen Major- Generals at the same 
2 date who had served with the Mounted Infantry. The Boer 
War did not advance the careers of Cavalrymen; if anything 
the upsets over the arme blanche in its aftermath retarded 
their promotion as a group. 
After Roberts' departure, a conscious effort 
was made to repair the damage done in the Army by the con-
t~oversy . The Cavalry were demoralised and confused; as 
Ian Hamilton observed in 1907: 
The fact is that they are afraid of Umpires . 
If they charge, some Umpires will declare them 
all dead men. If they dismount and use their 
rifles, other Umpires will accuse them of 
having lost the Cavalry Spirit, which in peace- J 
time seems to them even worse than annihilation. 
~ 
Hamilton told Southern Command at manoeuvres a ye a r later : 
Without for a moment touching on the contro-
versial question of Cavalry being capable or 
incapable of 'getting home' against modern fire -
arms, it will be admitted on all sides that they 
will do well, whenever they have the option, to 
choose the lesser of two evils and not the 
greater . Now although the modern rifle may be 
taken for general purposes to be several times 
as effective as it was in 1870, still, when the 
increased resisting power of Infantry against 
Cavalry shock tactics is brought under discussion, 
there are several saving clavses which must be 
placed on the other side of the balance . Thus, 
taking the rifle itself, there is good reason to 
believe that the present · JOJ bullet, with its 
1 . See Tables, Part One, Table 2 
2 . 'The Passing of the Old M. I . ', CJ Vol 9, no J4, pp 209 -
11 
J . 'Copy of Notes on Manoeuvres 1907 by Sir Ian Hamilton' , 
1 September 1907, 7101 - 2J- 220 Roberts 
r 
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complete cupro- nickel envelope, is less 
capable of stopping a horse than the . 577 or 
. 45 l eaden bullet which preceded it. Again, 
it is unquestionable that, since the days of 
the Franco- Prussian war, Infantry have been 
forced by other considerations to weaken 
their powers of resistance to shock and run 
some serious risks in respect to the dangers 
of a charge . Firing lines, for instance, are 
mudLless in ,hand than formerly; extensions 
are infinitely wider and, the depth of form-
ations being also greater, formed suppor ts 
are considerably further from the front than 
they used to be ••• The greatest and best ally 
of Cavalry is panic . 1 
He noted with pleasure that Cavalry had lost its tendency 
to hang back uncertainly at manoeuvres, and saw reason to 
hope that 'the heated controversies of the past few years 
as to the respective merits of fire and shock tactics are 
at last cooling down to the sensible conclusion that there 
may be room on the battlefield for either or both, . 2 John 
French entirely agreed . 'One amateur centaur would dash 
the sword and lance entirely out of the Cavalryman's hand', 
he told the RUSI in 1906, while another 'would throw the 
horseman's splendid firearm to the wind, . 3 Three years 
later he informed the Army Council: 
I do not think [the Cavalry] realise fully 
that the enormous advances in modern firearms 
have, to a large extent, modified, if not re-
volutionised, the methods to be adopted by 
Cavalry when supporting other arms •• • [I hope] 
a somewhat wider and more far- reaching view 
may be taken of the possible action and tactics 
of dismounted men. 4 
1 . 'Tactical Teachings', USM XXXVIII NS, pp 302- J 
2 . Notes in CJ Vol 3, no 9, p 117 
3 . French in discussion pf Bethune, 
Mounted Infantry in Modern War', 
4 . 'Reports of the Inspector- General 
13', report for 1909 (War Office) 
'Uses of Cavalry and 
JRUSI Vol 50, p 633 
of the Forces 1904-
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In 1907 Douglas Haig, in an often-quoted passage, expressed 
the belief that 'the role of Cavalry will always go on in-
1 
creasing • The reaons he gave for this belief were as 
follows: 
1. The extended nature of the modern battlefield 
means that there will be a greater choice of 
cover to favour the concealed approach of 
cavalry. 
2. The increased range and killi~power of modern 
guns, and the greater length of time during 
which battles will last, will augment the 
moral exhaustion, which will affect the men's 
nerves more, and produce more demoralisation 
amongst the troops. These factors contribute 
to provoke panic, and to render troops (short 
service soldiers nowadays) ripe for attack by 
cavalry. 
J. The longer the range and killing power of 
modern arms, the more important will rapidity 
of movement become, because it lessens the 
relative time of exposure to danger in favour 
of the cavalry. 
4. The introduction of the small-bore rifle, the 
bullet from which has little stopping power 
against a horse. 2 
This was not an arme blanche fanatic's fantasy. It was a 
summary of the case for the tactics the Cavalry were still 
developing; the use of cover for small parties, the use of 
surprise, the use of speed, and the fact that, in practice, 
a charging horse was a hard thing to kill. It said nothing 
about high troop density, barbed wire, or heavy enemy Artil -
lery dominance. When, between 1914 and 1918, those factors 
were absent, it proved a remarkably accurate prediction of 
events . This was, however, only Haig's personal opinion, 
1 . Haig, Cavalry Studies, p 8; see also Fuller in introduc-
tion to Wo lff, In Flanders Fields, p Xl.. 1.. 1.. , and Marshall -
Cornwall, Haig as Military Commander, p 65 
2. Haig, Cavalry Studies, p 8 
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not Army doctrine . He laid down in the official Field Ser-
vice Regulations of 1909 that, as a principle, 'The fact 
that [Cavalry] is armed with a long- range r ifle has endowed 
it with great independence, and e x tended its sphere of 
action; for cavalry need no longer be ~opped by difficulties 
which can only be overcome by the employment of' rifle fire, .1 
There was a general consensus that thelybrid Cavalryman 
would be independent in war. Even Roberts subscribed to 
th " " 2 lS Vlew . 
This consensus did not mean the end offue 
controversy. As a fresh generation of junior officers dis-
covered the problem the military journals (above all The 
Cavalry Journal) were dominated by it. But little had 
changed, indeed could change, about the arguments since the 
1860s . There was the same emphasis from Cavalrymen on the 
value of e x amples from actual warfare, the preservation of 
morale through the ~ blanche, and rapidly the same com-
plaints about an over- worked subject. Following the Cavalry 
achievements in South Africa the tendency to despise the ore-
tical reasoning was even stronger than after the Franco-
Prussian war. George Barrow wrote in 1906 that 'according 
to theories of trajectory, energy, penetrative intensity, 
rapidity of fire and ballistics, there should long ago have 
ceased to be any place for Cavalry on the battlefield' . ' 
1 . Field Service Regulations Part One, 1909, p25; see also 
Haig Diary entry, 2 3 December 1908, Acc 3155 . 2 Haig 
2 . Roberts, 'The Army as it Was and Is', 19th Century, Vol 
LVIII, P 21 
3 . Barrow, 'The Spirit of Cavalry', CJ Vol 1, no 1, p 15 
c 
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This view could easily slide into dogma. Four years after 
Barrow, another Cavalryman poured scorn on the whole notion 
of analysing combat. 'The theories of today', he wrote, 
'are oft the falsehoods of yesterday t War oft makes of 
them lasting heresies t Damn theories, let us remain prac-
tical ! Attack - attack quickly - attack persistently and 
tenaciously. Keep on the attack and chance the casualties.,1 
As the Drill Book had laid down in 189o, the losses from 
firepower simply had to be accepted if the result justified 
it. In Barrow's words, 'Cavalry must be prepared to face 
heavy losses, to suffer annihilation, if victory is' gained 
2 thereby'. This was not just rhetoric. On mobilisation in 
1914 the commander of 1st Cavalry Brigade told his Colonels 
that they must expect 50 per cent casualties in the first 
week of war.J There was constant emphasis from junior 
officers on the improvement dismounted action made to the 
Cavalry's attacking ability. One wrote that 'Cavalry will 
only succeed on condition that it knows how to make best 
use of all its means, and does not confound Cavalry Spirit 
with the unreasoning obstinacy of wishing only to fight 
4 
mounted'. Another suggested that it was possible to use 
the rifle on appropriate occasions, 'without losing the 
Cavalry spirit,.5 All this talk of 'Cavalry Spirit' 
1. Haag, 'Contact Squadron', CJ Vol 5, no 19, p J1J 
2. Barrow, 'The Spirit of Cavalry', CJ Vol 1, no 1, p 19 
J. Lumley, History of the Eleventh Hussars, 1908-J4, p 22 
4. Review of 'Cavalry in Action in Wars of the Future', 
CJ Vol 1, no 2, p 194 
5. 'A Rough British Military Summary by an Indian Army 
Officer', USM XXXVIII NS, P 80 
.--.... .............. ----------------
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amounted to an effort to re-create one, destroyed by the 
~ blanche controversy under Roberts. The emphasis which 
begaq shortly after 1904, to be placed on the ~ blanche 
was largely, if not entirely, an attempt to boost the 
Cavalry's low morale and opinion of itse£. 
Discussion was still, incredibly, complicated 
by the lack of an agreed terminology, although such a termi-
nology was gradually emerging. Captain Cecil Battine, a 
military theorist, told the RUSI in 1908 that, 'We hear a 
lot of talk about mounted infantry, but I don't think any-
one could really tell you what was the difference between a 
1 
mounted infantry corps and a cavalry corps'. Two years 
later, an Infantryman, trying to write a book summarising 
the arguments on Mounted Infantry, complained that there 
were no clear definitions of such fundamental terms as 
'Cavalry', 2 'Mounted Troops', and 'Mounted Rifles'. It was 
still possible for soldiers, and even more for civilians, to 
talk at complete cross-purposes on these matters. However, 
in another respect, argument about the Cavalry had been con-
siderably simplified. Before 1906 the Cavalry, like the 
rest of the Army, had been liable to .both fight colonial 
wars, for which the lance (for examps) was of undoubted 
value, and at the same time be ready for European war, which 
would require considerably different tactics. With the 
creation of the BoE . F. between 1906 and 1909, although 
1. Battine, 'The Uses of the Horse Soldier in the Twentieth 
Century', JRUSI Vol 152, p 315 
2 . The Question of Mounted Infantry, by a Rifleman, p 9 
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colonial war remained a possibility, the Army's outlook was 
increasingly geared to the notion that its next war would 
be in Europe. The massed 'Cavalry Fight' meanwhile was, in 
the opinion of most theorists in Britain, declining in 
favour as a likely opening to such a war. Instead, it was 
expected thoc the side with inferior Cavalry would use dis-
mounted action to slow their enemy's advance. But the arme 
blanche was also expected to prove its value, as in South 
Africa, in turning dismounted horsemen out of position by 
manoeuvre and the threat of a surprise charge. The con-
viction was also growing that, as in Britain, there was 
nowhere in western Europe where the ground was clear enough 
1 for a major charge~ 
As 1914 approached, both the percentage of 
the Army Estimates spent on Cavalry, and the percentage of 
. 2 
Cavalry in the Army, were lower than they had been in 1870. 
Following the recommendation of a committee chaired by Haig, 
the depot system was altered in 1909 so that entire 'reserve 
regiments' would in wartime supply replacements to the 
Cavalry; but an Army Council decision that it could not 
afford to keep Home regiments at their optimum strength 
meant that two years later there was still a considerable 
1. See Lascelles, 'The Influence of the Ground on Shock 
Action', CJ Vol 5, no 20, p 492; 'British Cavalry by 
one of them', USM XXXIII NS, p 316; Clifton-Brown, 'The 
Increased Importance of Training our Cavalry in Mobili-
ty', CJ Vol 2, no 8, p 447 
2. See Tables, Part One, Tables 2 and 4 
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shortage of trained men and horses. 1 The officer shortage 
was also still acute. In 1904 up to 70 per cent of the 
posts usually held in Cavalry regiments by Lieutenants, 
such as troop officer, were being filled by non-commissioned 
officers. 2 In the following year the Cavalry were allowed 
the desperate expedient of 'probationer' officers, nominees 
of officers already in the regiment, who did not pass 
through Sandhurst and served for two years before taking 
any examination. J As late as 1912 a Cavalry subaltern at 
4 Sandhurst was thought as rare as a black pearl. Paradoxi-
cally, the one section of the Cavalry left untouched by 
Roberts' attacks was the most exclusive of all, the House-
hold Brigade, which had a long waiting list for officers, 
and regiments at full strength0 5 
Nevertheless, on paper at least the regiments 
were strong, and. with a little over 15,000 men the Home 
Cavalry force was in numbers stronger tb-an it had been for 
fifty years.6 The Cavalry Division, with four brigades of 
1. 'Recommendations of Committees on Army Matters 1900-20', 
1909, P 8 (War Office); wO/16J/114 Army Council Decision~ 
1909, no 418, p 4J; Speech by the Secretary of State for 
War quoted in Army Estimates 1910-11, p 2 (War Office) 
2. 'Reports of the Inspector-General of the Forces 1904-1J', 
Report for 1904 (War Of~ice) 
J. 'ToM.P.', 'A Proposal for Officering Cavalry Regiments', 
USM XXXIII NS, pp 50J-8; wO/16J/10 Army Council Decisions 
1905, no 191, pp 2J6-42; 'Recommendations of Committees 
on Army Matters 1900-20', P 179 (War Office) 
4. 'F.O.', 'Military Officers' Education', USM Vol XLV NS, 
pp 188-92 
50 Fenwick to Wolseley, 1 October 1905, Autograph Fenwick 
1, Wolseley 
6. See Tables, Part One, Table 1 
T 
...................................... -
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three regiments each, was double the size of those in the 
French and German Armies, and was increased by a fifth 
brigade in 190B. (Intended originally for Egypt, and 
theoretically independent of the Cavalry Division, it was 
in practice under divisional command in 1914.)1 This was 
a lot for one man to control. J.E. Edmonds, the future 
official historian of the First World War, recalled asking 
Haig why four brigades were needed. According to Edmonds, 
Haig replied that in case of a massed charge, two brigades 
were required in the front line, one in the second, and one 
2 in reserve. In fact the Cavalry Division - like the rest 
of the BoEoF. - owed its structure to administrative con-
venience rather than tactical theory.3 In 1913 it was pro-
posed to create a second division by using two regiments 
then in South Africa; but the new staff, Signallers, engi-
neers and support troops could not be found without in-
creasing the Cavalry's 5·6 per cent share of the Army 
Estimates. 4 
But if the Cavalry Division was too large to 
control easily, it was very small for its role as the single 
arm of reconnaissance and exploitation the Army possessed 
for European war. 'Are our two or three brigades of cavalry', 
1. WO/32/70B4 'Organisation of a Force for Operations in 
Egypt', memo by DoMoO., 31 July 190B 
2. Gardner, Allenby, p 75 
3. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, 
p 194 
4. WO/163/1B Army Council Decisions 1913, no 734, pp 446-B; 
and see Tables, Part One, Table 4 
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one officer demanded, 'to go on charging and annihilating 
division after division of German Cavalry and still remain 
a serviceable arm ?,1 Since British Cavalry would always 
be weaker than its opponents, another argued, it should 
concentrate on the dismounted defensive and preserve itself 
f t ' 2 or scou lng. This tension between the two roles of the 
Cavalry, first evident in the theories of the 1860s, of 
scouting and the charge, remained unresolved. The Cavalry 
Division, in theory the main procurer of information for 
the BoE.F G , had no Intelligence Officer until Allenby un-
officially appointed Ba rrow on mobilisation in 1914.3 
The battlefield charge still occupied around 
four - fifths of the Cavalry's total training time,4 to the 
detriment of dismounted work, and reconnaissance. As 
Rimington ac~owledged, while 'a good swordsman on. a per-
fectly trained horse should account for any three of ordi-
nary ability on average horses',5 this training was largely 
for morale purposes. Cavalry were taught they could, in 
the right circumstances, ride Infantry down; Infantry that 
they could shoot down any charge. Shock action for the 
Cavalry was an 'ideal'~ a metaphor for aggression . One 
1 . 'The British Cavalry by one of them', USM XXXIII NS, p 315 
2. Buckley-Johnson, 'Cavalry Organisation - a suggestion, CJ 
2, no 'I,~ 3J9 4 3. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 1 1. As an Indian Cavalry 
officer Barrow was technically ineligible for the post . 
4 . de Lisle to Roberts, 7 June 1910, 7101 - 23- 223- 8 Roberts; 
Edwards, Notes on the Trainingt Equipment and Organi-sation of Cavalry for War, p 6 
5 0 Rimington, Our Cavalry, p 193 
6. ibid, pp 51 - 3, 58 
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junior officer summed up the prevailing attitude as a belief 
that 'Cavalry which is taught in peace to have a belief in 
mounted action, the arme blanche and shock tactics, will be 
likely, now and then, to take a reasonable risk to achieve 
1 
a great end'. Senior officers, faced with a serious morale 
problem in the Cavalry, saw a tendency among their men to 
resort to firearms as symptomatic of their lack of confi-
dence in themselves. In the 1908 manoeuvres, in which he 
was highly critical of Scobell's work, French complained 
2 that the division 'were worked too much like Infantry'. 
Haig also noted: 
The Cavalry Division dismounted three brigades 
and formed for attack like Infantry with 'the 
object of deceiving the enemy'. Question 
whether the risk was worth the results likely 
to be obtained: no commander would be likely 
to risk his reserve at the sight of a thousand 
men !3 
French removed Scobell, and until Allenby was appointed as 
Inspector-General of Cavalry in 1910 Haig, while still 
DoSoD., took over the training of the Cavalry.4 This 
apparent lack of belief in the aggressive use of Cavalry was 
not confined to .Cavalry officers. The examiners for pro-
motion of officers of all arms to the rank of Captain in 
1. 'Notrofe', Cavalry Taught by Experience, p 62 
2. 'Reports of the Inspector-General of the Forces 1904-13', 
Inspection of the Cavalry Division 21-28 August 1908 
(War Office) 
3. Haig Diary entr~ 28 August 1908, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
4. Gough, Soldiering On, p 95; Haig Diary entry, 11 July 
1909. Acc 3155.2 Haig 
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1910 reported: 
Scarcely any of the candidates appeared to 
-realise that Cavalry are meant to fight just 
as much as the Artillery or the Infantry. 
When the advance guard commenced its attack, 
orders were sent to the Cavalry to ••• do 
everything except to attack the enemy in 
conjunction with the other arms. 1 
As for junior Cavalry officers themselves, one of their 
seniors complained, 'to such pernicious and absurd lengths 
has this so-called lesson (sic 1) of South Africa been 
carried, that our Cavalry officers will now throw themselves 
off their horses at once on seeing, or even hearin& of, an 
2 
enemy'. They set out to reverse this trend by emphasising 
the arme blanche. In 1907 a new Cavalry Training manual 
was issued, which, while retaining most of the previous 
book,laid down that: 
Thorough efficiency in the use of the rifle 
and in dismounted action is an absolute 
necessity. At the same time the essence of 
the Cavalry spirit lies in holding the balance 
correctly between fire power and shock action, 
and while training troops for the former they 
must not be allowed to lose confidence in the 
latter. 
Experience in war and peace teaches us 
that the average leader is only too ready to 
resort to dismounted action which often results 
in acting defensively. It is of importance to 
lay stress during peace training on the 
necessity for offensive tactics for cavalry 
even when fighting on foot.J 
This was followed by a passage which, taken from this 
1. 'Reports on the Results of Examinations Held of Officers 
of Regular Forces', 1910,Captains, p 26 (C.U.L.O.P.R.) 
2. 'Further Letters on Cavalry, not by Prince Kraft', CJ 
Vol 5, no 18, p 152 
J. Cavalry Training 1907, p 187 (War Office) 
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context, became notorious: 
It must be accepted as a principle that the 
"rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace 
the effect produced by the speed of the horse, 
the magnetism of the charge, and the terror 
of cold steel. For when opportunities for 
mounted action occur, these characteristics 
combine to produce such dash, enthuSiasm, and 
moral ascendancy that cavalry is rendered 
irresistible. It is this that explains the 
success of many of the apparent 'impossibilities' 
of cavalry action in the past. 1 
This was a morale-booster and nothing else. By 1911 it had 
done its work and the manual was again revised, removing 
this passage. It formed no part of wartime Cavalry doctrine e 
A second morale-booster was the return of the 
lance to Lancer regiments. In comparison to its abolition 
this was a slow process: in 1906 ten dummy practice lances 
were permitted each squadron, 'for recreative purposes'. 
In the following year, the Lancer regiments of the Aldershot 
Cavalry Brigade all defied orders by carrying their lances 
at manoeuvres. The Duke of Connaught, now Inspector-General 
of the Forces, sympathised 0 The position was, after all, 
absurd; the lance was being carried on parade but not used 
in war. Eighteen months later the Army Council was invited 
to re-consider the position on the lance, and a new way of 
carrying it was adopted which did not hinder dismounted 
action (it was left in the rifle bucket on dismounting). 
It was re - introduced for drill in 1909, but not until 1912 
were the Lancer regiments allowed to take tlEir lances to 
1. Cavalry Training 1907, p 187 (War Office) 
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1 
war. As proof of the nature of this decision, entirely a 
matter of morale, the lance was taken altogether from the 
Dragoon and Dragoon Guard regiments. Indeed, the 5th Dragoon 
Guards expressed a certain relief to be rid of it. 2 
In 190J a committee under French had pro-
posed a new Cavalry sword, to replace the sword which had, 
in South Africa, been found inadequate,J but Roberts had 
turned the idea down on grounds of cost. In 1906 a new com-
mittee under Scobell produced a better pattern. Intro-
duced in 1908, it was intended primarily for thrusting, like 
a shortened lance; and like the lance, became a symbol for 
the Cavalry of the value of shock action. 4 Even the Cavalry 
trumpet calls were re- introduced. 5 Haig meanwhile ap-
proached Henry Wilson with the idea of a Cavalry Instructor 
6 
at the Staff College. Haig selected George Barrow, whom 
1. Army Order 258, 1906; Army Order 158, 1909; Army Order 
208, 1912; 'Reports of the Inspector- General of the 
Forces, 1904-1J', Report for 1907 (War Office); WO/16J/ 
114 Army Council Decisions 1909, no 419, pp 71-2 
2. Pomeroy, The story of a Regiment of Horse, Vol I, p 270. 
A number of later regimental histories suggest that the 
Dragoons and Dragoon Guards did take their lances to war 
in 1914. If so, it was against orders. However, photo-
graphs of regiments in the war show clearly that, at least, 
the 1st Dragoons, 2nd Dragoons, 6th Dragoons, 2nd Dragoon 
Guards and 5th Dragoon Guards did not carry lances in 
1914-18. See Hills, The Royal Dragoons, p 66 photograph; 
Blacklock, The Royal Scots Gre~s, p 78 photograph, and 
photographs nos QJ269-70; Q214 -51; Q42J6-8; Q5148J-5 in 
possession of the Department of Photographs, Imperial War 
Museum. 
J. Elgin Commission, Report, p 94; wO/16J/10 Army Council 
Decisions 1905, no 156, p 72 
4. 'Recommendations of Committees on Army Matters 1900-20', 
1908, P 11 (War Office) • 
5. wO/16J/114 Arlny Council Decisions 1909, no 608, pp 424-5 
6. Wilson Diary entry J1 March 1908, Wilson 
I 
I n 
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he had met in India, and Wilson approved. 1 But Barrow (or 
so he remembered) was dismayed to be mId on arrival at the 
College that only three lectures a year would be given on 
Cavalry - and those by the Artillery specialist . Barrow 
tried to resign, only to be told by Haig he had been ap-
pointed precisely to counter the influence of Wilson. 2 
Wilson was himself considered enough of a rifle specialist 
to chair, between 1909 and 1914, investigative committees 
on new rifles for the Army.3 He remained a committed 
opponent of the Cavalry. 
In emphasising the arme blanche for morale 
reasons, the senior Cavalrymen had the full support of 
their own reactionary wing, and also of French and German 
theorists . In fact the Cavalry were a little suspicious of 
the French doctrine that it mattered little what weapons 
Infantry were armed with 'if they can no longer use them 
4 
and fear conquers the soul'. Haig's own book on Cavalry 
contains many quotations and paraphrases from French and 
German writers;5 but the French influence on official 
British doctrine at this time was nevertheless minimal. 
1. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 104 
2. ibid, p 131. Note, however, that Barrow's memory is not 
perfect. He believed War And The Arme Blanche had been 
published by this date (1908) instead of 1910. 
3. 'Interim Report of 
Rifles 1911', (War 
4. "A"1634 and 1634/1 
of Ecole de Guerre 
Office) 
the Wilson Committee on Automatic 
Office) 
'Cavalry Tactics', English translation 
Lectures, 1913, Vol I, p 13 (War 
5 . Compare Haig, Cavalry Studies, pp 66- 9 with "A"281 
'Lectures by Colonel Cherfils on Cavalry Tactic s', Ecole 
de Guerre, 1892- 3, of which it is a repetition (War 
Office) 
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When Lieutenant Edward Spiers, a believer in the rifle, 
translated one French theorist with the sole object of 
gaining a reputation, he was mildly rebuked in the United 
Service Magazine for subscribing to the French arme blanche 
1 
cult. When in 1909 the French announced that it was only 
by means of their thirteen armoured Cuirassier regiments 
'that we shall be able to give ourselv$ elbow room',2 The 
Cavalry Journal noted carefully that 'this remains to be 
seen', and looked askance at their Tobust and perhaps fana-
tical faith in the importance of shock tactics,.3 At least 
in print, no British officers ever agreed with two French 
Light Cavalrymen that dismounted action was fit only for 
Cavalrymen 'too scared, old or worn out to ride properly'; 
nor did any British General echo General Sordet's obser-
vation to his men in 1912, that the charge was the only 
Cavalry action of which the Infantry need be afraid. 5 
4 
The German Cavalry still practised its massed 
charges against Infantry, and relied on its Jagers and 
Artillery for fire . 6 Eaply in the century, however, the 
1. Spears, The Picnic Basket, p 73 (Spiers anglicised his 
name to Spears during the war); review of 'Tactical 
Schemes', USM XLVIII NS, P 691 
2. Lowther, 'The French Cavalry', CJ Vol 4, no 14, p 196 
3 . 'Cavalry in France and Germany 1909', CJ Vol 5, no 18, 
p 222 
4. Quoted in CJ Vol 8, no 29, p 94, from a French journal 
(the original is in French) 
5 . 'French Manoeuvres of 1912', CJ Vol 9, no 33, p 107 
6 . Woodward, Armies of the World 1854- 1914, pp 32- 3; Hensman, 
'Some Impressions of the German manoeuvres', USM XXXIV NS, 
p 33; 'German Cavalry Training 1909', CJ Vol 4, no 15, 
pp 371 - 8 
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notion of a balance between fire and shock in Cavalry 
tactics made considerable progress in the German Army through 
the writings of General Frederick von Bernhardi. Bernhardi's 
subsequent influence on British Cavalry was massive. 1 The 
most ignorant Cavalryman was expected to have heard of him 
2 by 1914. John French wrote the preface to the English 
edition of his book,3 Cavalry in Future Wars (published 1906f 
and parts of Cavalry Training 1907 were said to derive from 
"t 5 1 • 
The Germans regarded Mounted Infantry as 
valuable only in colonial war, a particularly British pheno-
6 
menon. While the Cavalry in Britain were given new swords 
and lances, the M.I., without a patron to support them, were 
phased out of existence. South Africa had shown clearly the 
inadequacy of an improvised force of horsemen; yet, when 
offered the chance of a permanent force in 1905, the M.I. 
1. 'Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the 
Staff College, 17-20 January 1910', pp 7-15 (War Office) 
gives a clear indication of the importance of Bernhardi 
at the highest levels of the British Army. 
2. de Lisle, 'Letters of an Old Cavalry Officer to his Son 
- 4', 7101-23-221-14 Roberts; Edwards, Notes on the 
Training, Eguipment and Organisation of Cavalry for War. 
A ponderous joke in 'Summary of Information 2nd Cavalry 
Division Christmas Number 1914', Charrington I/2 Char- " 
rington, depended on a totally ignorant Staff Officer 
having heard of Clausewitz and Bernhardi. 
3. Bernhardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, English edition 
4. See also Bernhardi, Cavalry in War and Peace, English 
edition, also with preface by French 
5. See 'Obsolete Theories in Tactics', The Standard, 13 
April 1910, preserved in 7101-23-223-5 Roberts 
6. 'German Views on Mounted Infantry', CJ Vol 2, no 7, 
pp 348-51 
~I 
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commanders clung to their theory of improvisation. The 
1 idea was finally rejected on grounds - as always - of cost. 
Within a year of this, the Duke of Connaught discovered tha~ 
thanks to the rotation of battalions, one- fifth of the M. I . 
in South Africa was permanently untrained. 'The principle " 
he declared, 2 'is all wrong.' As even Roberts admitted, 
the equipping of Cavalry with the S.M.L.E. rifle destroyed 
the argument that M. I. were needed with the Cavalry for 
long- range fire. 3 They were instead made the divisional 
4 
cavalry of the B.E oF. In 1908 and 1909 the M. I. schools 
in Egypt and India were closed down as unnecessary.5 and whe~ 
three years later, two Cavalry regiments returned from South 
Africa, they took the M.I.'s last remaining role. French 
told the Army Council: 
It would not be possible to provide on mobi-
lisat~on even the twelve companies of Mounted 
Infantry [two for each Infantry division of 
the B.E oF.] without incorporating a large 
percentage of reservists . The presence of 
such men in the ranks of the Mounted Infantry 
would undoubtedly be a source of ganger in 
the event of a European campaign. 
1 . WO/163/10 Army Council Decisions 190.5, no 160, pp 78- 80 
2 . 'Report of the Inspector- General of the Forces 1904- 13', 
"Report on troops and defences in South Africa, January 
and February 1906", pp 36- 7 (War Office) 
3. Roberts, 'The Army as it Was and Is', 19th Century, Vol 
LVII , P 21 
4 . ibid, 
.5 . of Mounted Infantr a Rifleman, p .5; 
'Organisation of a Force for Operations in 
Egypt', memo by A.-G. , 3 November 1908 
6 . WO/163/18 Army Council Decisions 1913, no 734, pp 446- 8 
r 
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It is not obvious why this argument did not equally apply 
to the Cavalry, who went to war with 30 per cent reservists. 
Nevertheless, the 1914 Estimates announced the closing of 
1 the M. I . schools permanently . How they would have fought 
a gainst regular Cavalry will never be known. But they had 
been only an attempt to rectify a weakness in numbers of 
the Cavalry which no longer existed; their lack of training 
prevented their ever being a serious alternative to the 
Cavalry. 
Unlike their Cavalry opposite numbers, 
officers in the Yeomanry saw no flagging of interest in the 
~ blanche . In 1904 the Army Council was petitioned by 
all but one of the thirty- five Yeomanry regimental commanders 
2 to re- instate the sword . With the creation of the Terri-
torial Army the title 'Imperial' was quietly dropped from 
their names, and they were offidally designated as 'Cavalry' 
to provide one regiment each for the fourteen Territorial 
Infantry divisions, and fourteen additional mOlL~ted brigades~ 
From 1908 they were no longer required to carry the Infantry 
bayonet, and a year later a deputation of Mounted Brigade 
commanders, all Cavalry officers, received support from the 
Director- General of Territorial Forces for their request 
that they should carry instead a sword- bayonet. 4 In fact 
1 . Army Estimates, 1914 (War Office) 
2 . WO/163/9 Army Council Decisbns 1904, no 93, pp 246-7 
3 . Cardigan, 'The Cavalry of the Territor.ial Army', 19th 
Century, Vol LXIV, p 866 
4 . Memo undated c1909, 'The Arming and Training of Yeomanry', 
7101 - 23-2 18 Roberts 
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they had never given up the ~ blanche· or its traditions. 
In 1911 it was reported that at manoeuvres a Yeomanry bri-
gade had charged uphill against a dismounted Cavalry bri-
1 gade waiting to receive them. In training in July 1914 
squadrons of the Middlesex and the Warwickshire Yeomanry 
actually charged into each other; twelve horses were knocked 
over in the colliSbn, but, as the Middlesex historian put 
it, 2 'fortunately, swords were not drawn'. The Yeomanry, 
like the rest of the Territorial Army, had the opt~on of 
accepting foreign service in war (over 6 per cent had done 
so by 1910)3 and believed that in Europe they would need 
the charge. 'Armed with a rifle only and precluded from 
taking part in mounted combats', grumbled one officer in 
1908, 'Yeomanry must be content to abandon all idea of a 
strategic role.,4 In 1912 French convinced the Army Council 
that although 'the Yeomanry could never be more than Mounted 
Rifles',5 they should be given swords on mobilisation, and 
practise swordsmanship in peacetime. TheWarwickshireYeo-
manry (an unusually wealthy regiment) bought the 1908 
pattern sword privately for its own troopers when it first 
6 
appeared. 
1. Knox. 'Yeoman Hopkins, one Asset in our Armour', 19th 
Century, Vol LXIX, p 565 
2. Stonham and Freeman, Historical Records of the Middlesex 
Yeomanry 1797-1927, p 126 
3. Speech by Haldane, quoted in Army Estimates, 1911 (War 
Office) 
4. 'The Training of a Yeomanry Brigade', CJ Vol 3, no 12, 
p 547 
5. wO/163/17 Army Council Decisions 1912, no 595, pp 37-40; 
Yeomanry Training 1912, p 1 (War Office) 
6. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, p 53 
I 
--------------------------~~ 
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With some variation, the minimum strength of 
a Yeomanry regiment was fixed in 1908 as about 450 all 
ranks, and all regiments given, like the Cavalry, two 
h ' 1 mac lne guns. But although annual training was increased 
to fifteen days, only eight days were needed for a pass 
certificate. 2 Training was carefully timed to come between 
the Mayfly season and the hunting;3 the same horses were 
shipped round the country for different regiments to ride;4 
and a Yeoman might turn up on Salisbury Plain riding a horse 
he had met only a few days before, carrying a rifle he had 
never fired. 5 Their training, like that of the M.I,was 
insufficient for competence in any aspect of war. Their 
desire for the ~ blanche was therefore viewed with alarm 
by Ian Hamilton, who in 1910 as Adjutant-General wrote to 
Roberts that 'never, so long as I am here, will the Terri-
6 torial Mounted men be given back the sword'. There was a 
considerable gap between the Cavalry's perception of itself 
and the Yeomanry (laid down by senior Cavalrymen and re-
peated by regimental officers in The Cavalry Journal) as 
well trained in dismounted work but anxious to restore their 
1. Verdin, The Cheshire (Earl of Chester's) Yeomanry 1898-
1967, pp 25, 33 
2. ibid, p 25 
3. Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, p 43 
4. Memorandum from D.A.AoG o to A.G. on Yeomanry, 1 January 
1904, 7101 - 23- 221-10 Roberts 
5. Knox, 'Yeoman Hopkins, one Asset in our Armour', 19th 
Century, Vol LXIX, p 560 
6. Hamilton to Roberts, 10 March 1910, 7101 - 23-233- 7 
Roberts 
.................. --------------
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aggression by emphasis on the ~ blanche, and the percep-
tion of observers outside the Cavalry. A Colonial veteran 
of South Africa, on his arrival in London in 1904: 
met several Cavalry officers whom I had met 
during the war, and was surprised to learn 
from them that 'if a squadron leader wishes to 
get on now, spit and polish, knee to knee drill, 
and a studious avoidance of useful dismounted 
work was the way to do it. On the other hand, 
if he studied individuality, Boer tactics, 
mounted or dismounted, concealed outposts, 
common-sense ideas in combination with suf-
ficient close Cavalry drill, he was at once 
classed as a ---- Mounted Infantryman, and thus 
a marked man. 1 
An Infantry officer on the Umpires staff at the 1907 Cavalry 
manoeuvres reported: 
What impressed me as an Infantryman was the 
number of times squadrons advanced against 
entrenched positions mounted. These tactics 
seemed impossible, dismounted action being 
the only chance of success against entrench-
ments held by modern rifle fire, and where 
dismounted action was used it was generally 
successful; but the Cavalry soldier seemed 
very loath to leave his horse. 2 
The same complaints came also from junior Cavalry officers; 
but Boer war veterans, remembering the successful charges 
against Boer trenches, saw this only as confirmation of 
their timidity.J Lieutenant Spiers recalled an incident at 
Aldershot just before 1914, in which, as Machine Gun Officer, 
he fired blank from all six machine guns of 1st Cavalry 
1. 'The British Cavalry and the Lessons of 1899 to 1902 by 
a Colonial', USM Vol XXIX NS, P 420 
2. Letham, 'Impressions of an Infantry Officer at the Cavalry 
Manoeuvres 1907', CJ Vol J, no 9, p 55 
J. 'Further Letters on Cavalry - not by Prince Kraft', CJ 
Vol 5, no 18, pp 1J8-58 
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Brigade for ten minutes at 1,000 yards at the rest of the 
brigade, stationary in close order, which ignored the fire 
completely. When Spiers informed Brigadier-General Kavanagh 
that his command had been wiped out twice over, he was de-
nounced for lack of Cavalry Spirit and forced to walk back 
l ' 
as a pw~ishment. However, even senior officers who had 
supported Roberts in the ~ blanche struggle came, before 
1914, to have the same perception of the Cavalry as their 
former opponents. De Lisle, now a Cavalry officer, wrote 
in 1908: 
Some of our best officers ••• fearing that 
modern reformers were attacking the principal 
weapon of the Cavalry, felt obliged to defend 
the future importance of the sword, sometimes 
perhaps beyond their own convictions. The 
dispute is now happily at an end, and a 
sensible mean has been reached to which both 
parties in the encounter were aiming, namely, 
a proper appreciation of both weapons, fire 
and steel, and an equal ability to use the 
right one at the right time. 2 
Six years later, Hubert Gough insisted: 
The rifle is a weapon which Cavalry should 
know how to use, and I may say that the 
British Cavalry certainly do know how to 
use it, but it is not the weapon with which 
thEo/ must normally seek their decisions. 
The decision can only be arrived at by 
closing with the enemy, and when cold steel 
comes into play. 
The exception was William Robertson, a 'Cavalryman' who 
1. Spears, The Picnic Basket, p 79. Based on average rates 
of fire for the Maxim, Spiers' claim - if taken seriously 
- implies one hit for every three bullets, not unreas -
onable against a closed up stationary target at a known 
range. 
2. de Lisle, 'The Letters of an Old Cavalry Officer to His 
Son - 2', 7101 - 23- 221 - 14 Roberts 
3. Gough in introduction to Monsenergue, trans. Spiers, 
Cavalry Tactical Schemes, p xvi 
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had not served with the Cavalry since 1890, who considered 
that: 
Cavalry are, indeed , very loath and slow to 
adjust their tactics to modern requirements, 
and I doubt if much improvement will be made 
as long as the Brigades are automatically 
pooled in a division and trained on Salisbury 
Plain ••• at present the Cavalry regiments are 
encouraged •.• to continue on the same lines as 
forty years ago. 1 
As previously, in India in the 1890s, the man whose view 
of the Cavalry differed the most from their own was Smith-
Do~en. In the 1908 manoeuvres, of which French and Haig 
were so critical, he considered the Cavalry 'got in some 
most excellent reconnaissance as well as a lot of dismounted 
work and that they proved themselves most capable of doing 
0t' 2 1 • However, this doe~ not agree with his memories of 
taking over Aldershot from French a year later: 
I was no~ at all pleased to find that the 
Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot were low down on 
the annual musketry courses, and, further, on 
field days and manoeuvres they were hardly 
ever dismounted, but delivered perfectly 
carried out, though impossible, knee to knee 
charges against Infantry in action. So, on 
21st August 1909, ordering all cavalry officers 
to meet me at the 16th Lancers Mess, I gave 
them my views pretty clearly, with the result 
that dismounted work was taken up seriously, 
and the improvement in musketry was so marked 
that the cavalry went nearly to the head of 
the lists in the Annual Musketry.J 
1. Robertson to Roberts, 10 March 1910, 7101-2J- 22J- 11 
Roberts 
2. Smith-Do~en to Roberts, 26 September 1908, 7101-2J-
22J- 9 Roberts. This view of the Cavalry's improvement 
1908-9 is supported by de Lisle to Roberts, 16 January 
1909, 7101-2J- 221-24 Roberts 
J . Smith- Donien, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, 
pp J58- 9 
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When compared with Smith-Dorien's contemporary account of 
1908 this is clearly an exaggeration. To what extent the 
improvement in musketry depended on Smith-Do~en's personal 
intervention, or on the Cavalry's existing enthusiasm and 
ability reviving after a bad year under Scobell and the 
upsets of the arme blanche controversy under Roberts, is 
impossible to judge. 
Letters from Smith- Dorien, and from Hamilton, 
who was trying 'to drive a coach and pair through the 
Cavalry drill book'; along with his own beliefs on the 
state of the Cavalry and the Yeomanry's agitation for the 
~ blanche, led Lord Roberts to re-open the old wounds 
of the controversy. In late 1908 he wrote to Leopold Amery, 
asking that he or Erskine Childers should provide incidents 
from the Boer war proving the sword was unnecessary for the 
Yeomanry . Childers replied: 
I am only too glad to fall in with the 
suggestion ••• for my studies have led me 
inevitably to your conclusion ••• I go further 
and would like to see the arme blanche 
totally abolished in the regular service 
and all our mounted troops trained to act as 
mounted riflemen ••• I believe it is mainly 
the weight of the old Cavalry tradition which 
perpetuates the present system. 2 
Childers prepared an entire book in consultation with 
Roberts, War And The Arme Blanche, published in March 1910~ 
1. Childers to Roberts, 10 August 1909, 7101 - 2J- 222 Roberts 
2. Childers to Roberts, 4 November 1908, 7101 - 2J- 222 
Roberts 
J. Childers, War And The Arme Blanche; see also the whole 
of Childers' correspondence to Roberts in 7101 - 2J- 222 
Rober ts on the arme blanche controversy . 
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He was clever enough to appreciate (as no other theorist 
had) . that the Cavalry's beliefs in German and French 
theorists, the lessons of history, the authority of experts 
and the value of the arme blanche in promoting morale were 
a seamless whole: he attacked all these points simultane-
ously. Written as an extended critique of Bernhardi, his 
book rejected the evidence of all wars but South Africa 
and Manchuria; he aimed it at 'all thinking men, whether 
professional soldiers or not', 1 and dismissed defence of 
the arme blanche as 'the incalculable influence of purely 
sentimental conservativism upon even the ablest Cavalry 
soldiers', from which neither French, de Lisle, nor even 
Henderson was immune. 2 Finally, having no official termi-
nology for the debate, he invented his own. 
Childers realised from South Africa that 
Cavalry charges against Infantry were undoubtedly possible. 
He insisted, however, fuat the 'charge' should be in loose 
order, in imitation of the Boer rifle charge . He attri-
buted the success of this tactic to the morale effect of 
saddle fire, and rejected the ~ blanche charge up to the 
point of physical contact as an attempt to p r oduce 'shock', 
the impact of solid bodies hitting each other, as no longer 
possible against dispersed Infantry formations. He denied 
completely the possibility of the hybrid . 'The Cavalry 
1. Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, p 3 
2 . Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, pp 8,14; Childers to 
Roberts, 8 March 1910. 7101 - 23- 223- 6 Roberts 
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spiri t', he wrote, 'in its inmost essenc.e, means the 
spirit of fighting ~ horseback with a steel weapon, in 
contradiction to the spirit of fighting on foot with a fire -
1 
arm. ' Since the ' terror of cold steel' did not exist, for 
the Infantry were taught not to fear it, Childers argued 
that the theory was unsound. 
Two crucial points were mSsing from Childers' 
book. He omitted the condition of the Cavalry horses in 
South Africa as unimportant,2 and accepted completely 
Roberts' version of their failure there. He also assumed 
that the rifle charge which had worked against novice vol -
unteers would succeed against trained Infantry. He allowed 
only two troop types, the obsolete 'cavalry', obsessed with 
the arme blanche, and 'mounted riflemen' - all other horse-
men - so defining the hybrid out of existence. For Childers 
the lesson of Klip Drift was nO.t that the arme blanche 
brought the desire to attack, but that : 
mounted men not only can pass a fire - zone 
unscathed, but make genuine destructive 
assaults upon riflemen and guns . But •• othe 
mounted men who do these things must be 
mounted riflemen, trained to rely on rifle 
and horse combined, and purged of all 
leanings towards shock.3 
Childers wrote with the 'extremely cocksure,4 style of one 
1. Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, p 37 
2. Childers to Roberts, 20 February 1910, 7101 - 23- 222 
Roberts 
3. Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, p 105 
4 . James in discussion of Battine, 'The Proposed Changes in 
Cavalry Tactics', JRUSI Vol 54, p 1428 
-26J-
who enjoyed being 'a controversialist'; He attacked French 
for holding up Bernhardi as 'a conclusive answer to the 
English critics 2 of shock manoeuvre' • French used no such 
words; he sought an antidote to 'the increasing tendency of 
umpires and superior officers to insist on Cavalry at man-
oeuvres and elsewh~re being ultra-cautious',J hence his 
support of the ~ blanche. Roberts was warned when 
Childers' book was still in draft that 'The tone, for an 
unknown civilian, is too didactic and absolutive. A very 
little change in the wording would do away with this and 
would prevent the writer arousing angry and hostile feelings 
4 
at the outset'. Childers' tone was indeed irreverent. 
When Bernhardi recommended dismounted action, he commented 
'One can almost hear the ghost of Frederick the Great 
whispering in the impious General's ear, "what is this 
despicable talk ab out dismounting ? Betray the steel ? 
Never 1",5 He dismissed counter-arguments grandiosely as 
containing 'the logical hiatus, so familiar in all writers 
6 
on shock'. Yet he was totally unaware of the effect his 
words would have. He told Roberts: 
I am sorry to hear that Cavalry officers seem 
likely to take offence at certain passages. I 
1. Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, p 129 
2. ibid, p 10 
J. French, introduction to Bernhardi, Cavalry in Future 
Wars, p xxvii 
4. Unsigned, undated ms notes on War Office notepaper in 
7101-2J-22J-2 Roberts. The phrase 'it was agreed the 
other day at the General Staff Conference', (of 17-20 
January 1910) suggests a date of late January or early 
February 1910. 
5. Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, p J09 
6. ibid, p 14 
1 1 
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have taken ••• the utmost care to prevent this 
••• But the whole history of the subject so far 
is that of a tentative over-deferential 
-advocacy of change which is sneered down with-
out argument at once by ex cathedra pronounce-
ments of the arme blanche-school. 1 
Childers' tone was so violent his book was interpreted, both 
at the time and later by his own biographer,2 as an argument 
to abolish Cavalry. 
War And The Arme Blanche was an anachronism, 
a throwback to the arguments of the 1860s, fervently denying 
the hybrid, and linking the Cayalry with the ~ blanche 
completely in order to condemn both. Its single innovation, 
the use of saddle fire, had been advanced by Conan Doyle, 
Churchill and Childers himself in the immediate aftermath of 
the Boer war.J The Japanese had experimented with it in 
Manchuria, and found it as ineffective as the Austrians had 
in 1866. 4 Childers' book owed its massive impact, on the 
Army, the Press and the public, entirely to Roberts' patro-
nage. 5 Roberts wrote the preface to the book, after con-
suIting with Rawlinson and Wilson. Rawlinson, unhappy at 
the whole notion, declined to take part,6 but Wilson, still 
Commandant of the Staff College, became actively involved. 
1. Childers to Roberts, 2 February 1909, 7101-2J-222 Roberts 
2. Boyle, The Riddle of Erskine Childers, p 1J6; Barrow, The 
Fire of Life, p 111 
J. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, p 519; Kitchener to 
Roberts, 5 May 1904, 7101-2J-JJ Roberts on Churchill; 
Charteris, Douglas Haig, p 29 on Childers c1904-6 
4. "A"958 'Reports on the War in Manchuria', Report of Major 
Home, p 14 (War Office) 
5. The impact has been equally massive on historians. 
6. Wilson Diary entry, J1 January 1910, Wilson 
1-
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In February 1910 he discussed the book with a College in-
structor, John Gough, (Hubert's brother, soon to be Haig's 
Chief Staff Officer at Aldershot) arguing that Childers' 
1 
case was unanswerable. According to his diary Wilson then: 
persuaded the Chief to entirely alter his 
preface and instead of comparing the present 
Cavalry Training with his own of 1904 to strike 
a higher note and ask his brother officers to 
read Childers' book and either refute or agree . 
I am sure this is the wisest course. To me 
there is something distasteful in the Chief 
crossing swords with a man like French, his 
inferior immeasurably in every way.2 
Wilson virtually re-wrote Roberts' preface,J which did in-
deed call upon 'my brother officers, in whateverp!rt of the 
Empire you may be serving, whether in the mounted or dis-
mounted branches ••• to study the facts for yourselves, weigh 
the arguments, follow the deductions, note the conclusions'~ 
Roberts himself suggested the Cavalry might keep a sword-
bayonet, for use 'at night, in a mist, or on other occasions 
when a fire fight might be impossible, . 5 Publicly this was 
the most extreme position on the arme blanche he had ever 
adopted . But as his preface declared: 
1 • 
2. 
J . 
My opinion on the subject ••• is already so 
well known throughout the army that I need 
not labour to say how entirely I agree with 
Wilson Diary entry, 4 February 1910, Wilson 
Wilson Diary entry, 5 February 1910, Wilson 
Wilson Diary entries, 7 February 1910 and 20 
1910, Wilson 
February 
4. Roberts preface to Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, 
p xvi 
5. ibid, P xii 
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the author's main thesis; indeed, anyone 
who will take the trouble to read 'Cavalry 
Training' (1904) will see that I anticipated 
the arguments which he has so ably developed. 1 
The Cavalry had been right to doubt him when Commander-in-
Chief. 
Roberts sent copies of Childers' book to the 
2 
editors of several newspapers, and to his Ring members. 
On Wilson's suggestion, he also sent copies to a number of 
senior officers, including some Cavalrymen (but not French, 
or Haig, who was again in India).J Responsffivaried from the 
polite acknowledgements from Allenby and Rawlinson to whole-
hearted support from Robertson and Wilson. 4 De Lisle, al -
though approving of the book, stressed its main flaw, 'he 
builds all his arguments on the assumption that Cavalry 
cannot be taught the tactical use of two weapons', adding 
that, still, ~a number of Cavalrymen believed the s~e.5 The 
1 . Roberts Preface to Childers, War And The Arme Blanche, 
p v 
2 . The covering letter, dated March 1910, of which there 
are six unsent copies in 7101-2J-22J-J Roberts; replies 
also in 7101 - 2J- 22J Roberts, came from Hamilton, de Lisle, 
Smith- Dorien, Wilson, Lord Esher, Lancelot Kiggell 
(future Chief of Staff to Haig 1915- 18), Hubert Gough, 
Charles Douglas (Inspector-General of the Forces 1912- 14), 
Allenby, Rawlinson, Robertson, a number of other officers 
and three newspapers . 
J. Wilson to Roberts, 9 March 1910. 7101 - 2J-22J- 10 Roberts 
suggests Allenby, Fanshawe (2nd Cavalry Brigade, future ' 
wartime Cavalry Corps commander), de Lisle, John Vaughan, 
Chetwode, Kavanagh, and Charles Douglas, along with the 
other Cavalry brigade commanders. 
4 . Rawlinson to Roberts, 25 March 1910, 7101 - 2J-22J-11 
Roberts; Allenby to Roberts, 2J April 1910, 7101 - 2J- 22J-
11 Roberts; Robertson to Roberts, 10 March 1910, 7101 ~2J-
22J- 11 Roberts; Wilson to Roberts, 9 March 1910, 7101 - 2J-
2 2 J - 10 Roberts 
5. de Lisle to Roberts, 29 April 1910, 7101 - 2J- 22J- 8 Roberts 
-267-
public response produced a Press uproar. 'There is', ob-
served one writer, 'no public journal of any standing which 
has not something to say on a question which has clearly 
1 
attracted public attention to a quite remarkable degree.' 
Reviews were generally favourable,2 although few writers 
understood Childers' argument, and several criticised his 
tone. J The reviewer of the Morning Post, who had supported 
Roberts six years before, wrote in Messianic terms of the 
Cavalry, 'To be freed from the consequences of the so-called 
"Cavalry Spirit", they must be delivered from its pa:taLysing 
faith, and Mr. Childers has written to bring them deliver-
4 
ance.' Several reviewers (aware of the Cavalry's opinion 
of Pressmen) simply fell back on the authority of senior 
Cavalrymen. Colonel Repington of The Times considered 'the 
question of t~e armament of Cavalry to be one which can only 
be determined by Cavalry officers with much experience in 
,5 peace and war'. Roberts collected all the reviews. Again 
the question of Cavalry focussed entirely on the merits of 
arme blanche or rifle; there was little discussion of the 
real problems of Cavalry, neatly summed up _in one letter to 
1. Westminster Gazette, 2 August 1910, preserved along with 
cuttings from eleven other papers reviewing the book in 
7101-2J-22J-5 Roberts 
2. Childers to Roberts, 27 May 1910, 7101-2J-22J-6 Roberts 
J. Army and Navy Gazette, 2 April 1910; Spectator, 21 May 
1910; Times Literary Supplement, 28 July 1910, all in 
7101-2J-22J-5 Roberts 
4. Morning Post, 29 March 1910, 7101-2J-22J-5 Roberts 
5. The Times, 26 March 1910, 7101-2J-22J-5 Roberts 
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a newspaper: 
In South Africa mounted action was not so 
often used as it might have been because 
(1) the horses were starved (2) the English 
Press advocated making war without risks 
(3) the higher commanders had never studied 
the use of Cavalry (4) the Boers would not 
chance it in the open when there were swords 
and lances about. 1 
There were, however, a number of sentimental defences of 
the ~ blanche, which, to a public unacquainted with the 
subtleties of the debate, only served (as Childers told 
2 Roberts) to strengthen the anti-arme blanche case. 
Three almost simultaneous semi-official re-
views challenged Childers' argument. In The Cavalry Journal 
a review attributed to Allenby maintained that 'It is the 
sharp point of the steel weapon in the hands of a skilled 
and resolute rider that counts in shock tactics', and that 
'all cavalry leaders who have seen war know that only con-
fidence in the steel weapon can keep alive the spirit of the 
eager offensive,.3 In the same issue the General Staff 
(whic4 with the single exception of French, contained no 
Cavalrymen)4 also stressed the professional knowledge of 
Cavalry leaders, and pointed out the shortcomings of the 
1. Letter 'Common Sense' to Spectator, 16 June 1910, 7101-
23-223-.5 Roberts 
2. Childers to Roberts, 13 June 1910, 7101-23-223-6 Roberts 
3. Review in CJ Vol .5, no 19, pp 283-7. The attribution to 
Allenby is made by the Westminster Gazette, 2 August 1910 
7101-23-223-.5 Roberts 
4. Review by General Staff, CJ Vol .5, no 19, pp 406-13. 
Strictly, one of French's aides-de-camp was in the 
Yorkshire Hussars Yeomanry, and the Staff had a Cavalry 
Staff Officer in lieu of the Inspector-General of 
Cavalry. 
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rifle charge . 'It seems to us', they wrote, 'that it would 
be more difficult for cavalry to pull up and dismount in the 
open, under close rifle fire, than to charge home led by its 
officers,.1 In the same month, with Allenby as Chairman, 
Cecil Battine delivered an almost identical denunciation to 
the RUSI, observing that such a consensus was 'very satis-
2 factory'. For good measure, The Cavalry Journal published 
a review by Bernhardi, who dismissed Childers as ignorant 
and his book as 'amateurish and illogical', concluding that 
Roberts must have supported him from some unfathomable per-
sonal motive. He attributed the success of the Boerrifle 
charges to the British 'militia' who 'lost their heads com-
pletely,.J Childers' reply railed against the German for 
daring to accuse British troops of 'cowardice,.4 
The General Staff's review, however, admitted 
that, for Infantry or Cavalry, the main value of the arme 
blanche was to encourage a desire to close with the enemy . 5 
Allenby told the RUSI 'everyone nowadays agrees tha.t the 
rifle will be the main arm of the cavalry in war, . 6 When , 
after his book's publication, Childers actually talked to 
Cavalry officers, he was~azed that they made no strong case 
1 . Review by General Staff, CJ Vol 5, no 19, p 408 
2 . Battine, 'The Proposed Changes in Cavalry Tactics' , JRUSI 
Vol 54, p 1416 
J . Revi ew in CJ Vol 5, no 20, pp 466-8J 
4 . Childers to CJ Vol 6, no 22, pp 2J4- 9 
5. Review in CJ Vol 5, no 19, p 410 
6. Allenby in discussion of Battine, 'The Proposed Changes 
in Cavalry Tactics', JRUSI Vol 54, p 144J 
I 
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1 for the arme blanche. Cavalry Training 1907, having done 
its job, was being discarded . Two months before Childers' 
book was published, a General Staff Conference had agreed 
on a revised Cavalry doctrine of the perfect hybrid, with 
Cavalry attacking or defending dismounted, but not up to the 
final assault .A JUs~ as War And The Arme Blanche appeared 
a new manual was being written, of which Allenby as Ins-
pector- General saw all the proofs, placing more emphasis on 
the rifleo 3 Roberts was told of this as it happened, but 
did not see fit to inform Childers. 4 
With the appearance of Cavalry Training 19125 
the reformers achieved everything Roberts had demanded nine 
years before, and which they themselves had been working 
steadily towards for much longer . As a reviewer in the 
United Service Magazine explained: 
In one respect [Childers'J book might have 
been written immediately after the South African 
war, since the author writes as though the 
defects then noticed in our cavalry training, 
and now once more brought forwa~d, still existed 
- that no improvement had since taken place, 
that the fire - action of our horsemen was as 
ineffective today as it admittedly was ten 
years ago. 6 
1 . Childers to Roberts, 15 July 1910, 7101 - 23- 223- 6 Roberts 
2. 'Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the 
Staff College 17- 20 January 1910', pp 7- 15 (War Office) 
3. Cavalr Trainin 1 12, P 286; Allenby to Vaughan, 2 March 
1919, Allenby 2 5 9 Allenby 
4 . The undated, unsigned notes on Childerp ' book (see fn 4, 
p 263 above) in 7101 - 23- 223- 2 Roberts, makes this clear, 
referring t Q the General Staff Conference decision . That 
Childers did not know of this is shown by Childers to 
Roberts, 15 July 1910, 7101 - 23- 223- 6 Roberts, expressing 
surprise on just hearing that the doctrine had changed . 
5 . This appears to have been released, in fact, in late 1911 
6 . Review in USM Vol XLI NS, p 234 
, \ 
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Childers did not re-open the ~ blanche controversy in 
the Army; Roberts' 'brother officers' firmly rejected his 
arguments. But he did introduce it, for the first time, 
to a large body of public opinion. Even more than in the 
1860s, to anyone unaware of the actual conditions of war, 
the case against the ~ blanche looked watertight; and 
Childers' portrayal of the Cavalry of the Boer war as in-
competent idiots, fit to be ridiculed, only reflected the 
Cavalry's popular image. But Roberts had learned his 
lesson. When, a year later, Childers followed the publi-
cation of another book by Bernhardi in English (again with 
a foreword by French, replying to Childers' criticisms) 1 
with a second book of his own on an identical pattern, he 
received no support from Roberts, and the book made no 
. t 2 lmpac • From a year's talking to Cavalry officers, however, 
Childers had considerably changed his views: 
The lance should go altogether. Whether the 
sword is retained, as the American Cavalry 
retain it, rather as a symbol than as a factor 
in tactics, or it is dispensed with altogether, 
as our divisional mounted troops [Mounted 
Infantry and Yeomanry] and our Colonial mounted 
riflemen dispense with it, is a matter of very 
small moment, provided that the correct principle 
be established and worked out in practice. It 
was because I doubted the possibility of estab-
lishing the correct principle in this country 
1. Bernhardi, Cavalry in War and Peace 
2. Childers, German Influence on British Cavalry; corres-
pondence between Childers and Roberts in the Roberts' 
Papers ceases abruptly with Childers to Roberts, 15 
August 1910, 7101-23-223-6 Roberts, in which Childers 
mentions that Roberts is going abroad shortly and 
suggests he talks to Bernhardi. 
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without abolition that in my previous book 
I advocated abolition, on the precedent of 
the South African War. 1 
Childers' whole case had been built on the impossibility of 
the hybrid, because of the attraction of the arme blanche 
for reactiDnary Cavalrymen. He now rejected this in favour 
of the hybrid that the Cavalry had nearly achieved. 
The distortion of the Cavalry reform pro-
gramme by Roberts between 1902 and 1910 not only delayed 
this reform, it damaged severely the understanding of, and 
respect for, the Cavalry by officers of other arms. Never-
theless, reform continued, although the Cavalry DiviSbn 
trained as a body only twice between 1910 and 1914.2 In 
the 1910 manoeuvres both French and Allenby were distressed 
by the lack of fire discipline shown by the Cavalry.3 
Allenby pressed successfully for a Cavalry officer on the 
, 
staff at Hythe to improve this. 4 A year before (and also a 
year before Childers would denounce him as a fanatical 
believer in the arme blanche) French told the Cavalry that 
'the chief use of the Cavalry Division in battle is its 
rifle fire,.5 Haig, listening, thought this one of French's 
'terrible heresies,.6 He alone, of the senior Cavalrymen in 
the Army, continued to believe in the superiority of the 
arme blanche. 
1. Childers, German Influence on British Cavalry, p 215 
2 . Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry, 1870-
1914' in Howard, The Theory and Practice of War, p 117 
3. 'Reports of the Inspector-General of the Forces 1904- 13', 
Report for 1910 (War Office) 
4. ibid 
5 . Haig Diary entry, 11 September 1910, Acc 3155.2 Haig 
6. ibid 
. I 
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French's successor as Inspector- General of 
the Forces in 1912, Sir Charles Douglas, an Infantryman who 
was recommended by Wilson to Roberts for a copy of War And 
The Arme Blanche, also saw the Cavalry in a different light 
to that in which they saw themselves. 'Our Cavalry com~ 
manders', he reported, 'are inclined to employ shock action 
whenever possible without reference to the circumstances in 
. 1 
particular cases.' Nevertheless, he considered Kavanagh's 
1st Cavalry Brigade, inspected in 1913, as liable to 'render 
a good account of itself in war, for which, in my opinion, 
2 it is in a state of preparedness'. Although standards 
varied between regiments, some Cavalry regiments of the 
B.EoF. had better shooting records than some Infantry batta-
lions . 3 By 1913 the 11th Hussars were all but eighty men 
either marksmen ' or first class shots, with no third class 
4 
shots . Even in the 19th Hussars, which, according to one 
soldier , hated musketry, 'daily we are taught that the rifle 
is our best friend,.5 1st Life Guards, in contrast, enjoyed 
6 their 'glorious outings' to the range s . Cavalry officers 
at the Staff College were taught 'a soldier who is not an 
1 . 'Reports of the Inspector- General of the Forces 1904- 13', 
Report for 1912, (War Office) 
2. 'Reports of the Inspector- General of. the Forces 1904-
13', Report for 1913 (War Office) 
3. The Question of Mounted Infantry by a Rifleman, p 61 
4. Spears, The Picnic Basket, p 77; Lumley, History of the 
11th Hussars 1908-1934, p 10 
5. Maitland, Hussar of the Line, p 29 
6 . Lloyd, A Trooper in the Tins, p 23 
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1 
expert with his rifle is an encumbrance to the Army' • In 
addition, Haig, French and Allenby all stressed the value 
2 
of the machine gun with the Cavalry, which, despite the 
comment of an Artilleryman that they needed 'nursing like a 
child and humouring like a woman',J had lost the tendency 
of earlier models to jam persistently. The Cavalry were 
also taught that their main duty was scouting: their offi-
cers trained them in road fighting, ambushes, demolttion, 
bridge building, night reconnaissance and above all horse-
mastership, all in small parties. 4 As Gough put it, 'if 
the Cavalry failed in every other duty but reconnaissance, 
and did get information, they would be a most valuable arm'~ 
Despite the time it took to learn, the 'Cavalry Fight' in 
manoeuvres was increasingly seen by Cavalrymen as a symbol 
of the lack of understanding from Generals of other arms of 
theirpot~tial. 'Nobody seemed to know what to do with it', 
lamented George Barrow, 'and got out of the difficulty by 
giving it a free hand,.6 After the 1912 manoeuvres, French 
observed that the Cavalry still had a lot to learn about 
1. Cecil, Staff College Notebook on Strategy, p 75, 7501-
20 Cecil 
2. 'Reports of the Inspector-General of the Forces 1904-1J', 
Report for 1910 (War Office) 
J. Vincent, 'Horse Artillery with Cavalry', CJ Vol J, no 12, 
p 559. The possible ways in which a Vickers-Maxim might 
jam covered nineteen pages of' the official manual. 
4. See the Diary of Captain Winwood, 5th Dragoon Guards, for 
this training schedule, 7105-J Winwood 
5. Gough, quoted in The Question of Mounted Infantry by a 
Rifleman, p 1J 
6. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 1JO; see also 'Further Letters 
on Cavalry - not by Prince Kraft', CJ Vol 5 no 18, pp 1J8-
58 
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1 
co- operation with other arms. 
After more than thirty years of effort, ten 
of them wasted, the British Cavalry had arrived at a 
tactical doctrine of the hybrid, emphasising the rifle but 
theoretically perfect with the ~ blanche also, trained 
in scouting, horsemastership/and squadron fire-and-movement 
tactics, as well as the massed charge. Even so, in those 
thirty years the trends which would eventually make them 
obsolete had caught up . As the RUSI was told in 1906, 'the 
age is undoubtedly becoming more mechanical,.2 The Cavalry 
was to have less than five years before the outbreak of war 
to respond to the challenge of the bicycle, motor- car and 
aeroplane. 
The Territorial Army absorbed ten Volunteer 
cyclist battalions on its creation . J The advantages of the 
bicycle over the horse were cheapness and simplic ity; its 
disadvantages were that the man supp~ied his own power - wind 
4 
or rain could more than halve the average speed - and move-
ment was restricted to roads or level ground. 5 But cyclists, 
unlike Mounted Rifles, knew they could not outrun a Cavalry 
charge, and were taught instead to shoot it down . If two 
1 • French, ~e Life of •• • John French First Earl of Y2res , 
p 187 
2 . 'The Use of the Motor Car in Warfare', JRUSI Vol 50, p 775 
J . 'The Future of Cavalry by a Cavalryman', USM Vol XLIII NS , 
p 655 
4 . Gill, 'Lessons f r om the Volunteer Cyclist Manoeuvres of 
1906', USM Vol XXXIV NS, p 106 
5 . Trapman, 'Cyclists in Conjunction with Cavalry', CJ Vol J, 
no 11, p J5J 
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Cavalry patrols spotted each other two hundred yards a-
part, to dismount with the rifle would take half a minute, 
while a charge could cover the distance in twenty seconds. 
But in the same time a cyclist could travel a further 
hundred yards and dismount to a firing position. 1 The 
cheapness of cyclists led the Adjutant-General's office to 
consider in 1904 replacing the Yeomanry's horses with bi-
2 
cycles. On the creation of the Territorial Army, Yeo-
manry commanders were told that the men who could not find 
horses might use bicycles instead; and the Mounted Brigades 
were in fact a mixture of Mounted Rifles and cyclists. J 
Haig pressed in 1906 for a specialist cycle unit with the 
Cavalry Division; the idea was revived in 191J, and a 
committee under Allenby was studying the idea when war 
4 broke out. Meanwhile, with the abolition of the M.I. the 
B.EoF.'s Infantry were given one cyclist company as well 
as one squadron of Cavalry to each division. This use of 
cyclists represented part of the Army's acceptance of the 
fact that Britain was an industrialised country. The 
Adjutant-General's staff noted in 1904 that 'a large 
number of Yeomanry are really townspeople with no 
1. Trapman, 'Cyclists in Conjunction with Cavalry', CJ 
Vol J; no 11, p J58 
2. Memo by DoA.A.G. to A.-G., 1 January 190~ on Yeomanry, 
7101-2J-221-10 Roberts 
J. Verdin, The Cheshire Earl of Chester's Yeomanr 1898-
1967, p 0 
4. 'Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at 
the Staff College, 9-12 January 1912, pp 19-29 (War 
Office); 'Report of a Conference of General Staff Offi-
cers at the Staff College, 1J-16 January 191J, pp 40-6 
(War Office); "A"1648 'Report of the Allenby Committee 
on Cyclists for the Cavalry Div.Eion 191J' (War Office) 
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intimate knowledge of, or feeling for, 1 horses' , Rimington 
thought only one-sixth of Cavalry recruits were natural 
riders,2 and traditionalist Cavalrymen scoffed at the idea 
that 'townbred men can be taught to scout like Buffalo Bill 
or ride like Cossacks,.3 Except for the foxhunting, polo-
playing gentry from which the majority of the officers still 
came, the Cavalry was an artificially pastoral graft on 
industrial Britain. 4 
In 1895 the latest Canstatt-Daimler motor-car 
did 4 m.p.h. on a slight incline and 16 m.p.h. flat out -
three quarters of the speed of a charging horse. Five years 
later the Royal Automobile Club had only two hundred members, 
and Parliament thought 12 m.p.h. a reasonable speed for 
British roads. By 1904 100 m.p.h. had been passed, and there 
were 8,500 motor vehicles in the country; ten years later 
there were 26,238 private cars and an estimated 132,000 
vehicles in total. 5 The Army was indifferent to this ex-
pansion at first. In 1903 a Motor Reserve of 1,500 hired 
cars was created - considered a luxury by the Treasury since 
they were used to ferry officers. 6 Not until 1912 were 
1. "A"756 'Report of a Committee on the Provision of Horses 
for the Imperial Yeomanry', p 3 (War Office); Memo by 
D.A.A.G. to A.-G., 1 January 1904, on Yeomanry, 7101-23-
221-10 Roberts 
2. Rimington, Our Cavalry, p 18 
3. 'Cavalry Training by X.Y.Z.', USM Vol XXXIII NS, P 192. 
He assumed the scouting role in any war would be performed 
by Colonial volunteers. 
4. See Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society, espe-
cially chapters five and seven, and Barnett, The Collapse 
of British Power, pp 428-35 
5. Bird, The Motor Car 1765-1914, especially pp 79, 119, 150, 
196, 200 
6. Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at 
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permanent mechanical transport columns created for the B.E.F. 
The . Cavalry Division possessed just fifteen staff cars. A 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Motor Reserve wrote in The Cavalry 
Journal in 1909: 
Armoured machine- gun wagons have of course been 
talked of, although we are not aware that any 
such vehicles have been built in this country; 
their advantages are small and their practical 
disadvantages many. If the machine guns are to 
be fired from the car they are confined to the 
road; if not, the armour is superfluous . 1 
The Cavalry, their own preservation founded on the authority 
of e xperts in a specific field, respected this judgement. 
The B . E.F. also possessed just under 150 motor- cycles; but 
they were thought too noisy for scouting, and awkward if 
carrying a rifle. 2 Nevertheless, if it did not touch their 
tactics, this mechanisation of transport in Britain put a 
severe str~in on the Cavalry's most important weapon - the 
hor se. The horse population of Britain declined between 
1904 and 1910 by over 11 per cent. J In 1908 it was suggested 
- r ather desperately - in The Cavalry Journal that motor-
buses and lorries should be limi ted in order to preserve the 
count ry's hors e population. 4 The Regular Cavalry employed 
t he Staff College 18- 21 January 1909', p 6J (War Office); 
Barnes, Tne British Army of 1914, p JO 
1. Mayhew, 'Motor Cars witb the Cavalry', CJ Vol 4, no 16, 
pp 4.'}8-42 
2 . "A"1507 'Report of the Advisory Committee on Motor Cycles 
1911', pp J - 7 (War Office) 
J . 'The Scarcity of Horses in the British Empire', CJ Vol 6, 
no 24, pp 472- 84 
4 . 'The Provisiori of Horses in War', CJ Vol J, no 11, p J41 
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from 1911 onwards a system of boarding out horses to civi-
lians, and had no shortage on mobilisation. The Yeomanry 
were le$lucky; on mobilisation in 1914 the Middlesex Yeo-
manry had 85 per cent of its horses, supplied by the dairy 
and transport companies of west London, rejected as unfit 
1 for Cavalry work. 
If motor- car development was fast, that of 
the aeroplane was phenomenal . In 1908 Major Bannerman-
Phillips, an aeronautics specialist, wrote that heavier than 
air machines, while they evoked admiration for their pilots, 
'remain interesting scientific toys, of little or no prac-
2 tical value for purposes of war'. A year later, Bleriot 
flew the Channel. One frequent contributor to the United 
Service Magazine reflected: 
It seems conceivable that the aeroplane may 
revolutl onise the functions of the mounted 
man in war, or even that the 'airman' may 
in time entirely supersede the horseman . The 
wheeled motor, or, indeed, the more anti-
quated man-driven cycle, would have already 
to a great extent hay~ taken the place of the 
saddle-hors~ if only either mechanism could 
have been made to leap fences and negotiate 
the varieties of rough and soft 'going'. But 
the cross-country cycle and 'auto' have failed 
to materialise, and it may be assumed that at 
least the fag end of the pre-aviation age is 
still in the future so far as military men are 
concerned. 3 
The two aeroplanes which scouted for the 1910 manoeuvres 
1. "A"1508 'Report of the Committee on the Horsing of the 
Cavalry Division 1911'. (War Office); Stonham and Free-
man, Historical Records of the Middlesex Yeomanry 1797-
l.2.n, p 129 
2. Bannerman-Phillips, 'The Future of Airships in War', USM 
Vol XXXVII NS, p 589 
3. 'Patrick Perterras' (pseud, of Colonel Henry Pilkington) 
'Reflections on the Future of Cavalry', USM Vol XLI NS, 
p 396 
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convinced Bannerman-Phillips of their value in war. Even 
so, he insisted: 
It would be fatuous to suppose for a moment 
that the time has come, or ever will come, when 
the air-scout by reason of his elevated position 
will be able to take the place of a reconnoiterer 
on terra firma, or that cavalry will no longer be 
employed for ~econnaissance. 1 
The experts told Cavalrymen that poor weather would ground 
aircraft on two days out of three in a European climate;2 
and that aeroplanes were so unstable that a single rifle shot 
would bring one down. 3 But not everyone agreed with the 
Major. Colonel Callwell, for example, proclaimed a revo-
lution in warfare after watching aircraft in the 1912 man-
oeuvres: 
The reconnaissance service is of such vital 
importance that the virtual sacrifice of the 
mounted troops in its interest is fully justi-
fied so long as no other means of obtaining 
the infGrmation exists; but if that service 
can be carried out by a totally different arm, 
the whole scheme falls to the ground. 
The hussar and lancer have no reason to 
regard their supplantment by flying corps as 
a dire calamity. Rather would such a develop-
ment in the art of war tend to relieve them of 
duties which are apt to virtually banish them 
from the battlefield. 4 
If their scouting role was gone, the Cavalry had little to 
1. Bannerman-Phillips, 'Progress in Aeronautics', USM Vol 
XLIII NS, P 92 
2. Bannerman-Phillips, 'Aircraft in Co-operation with 
Cavalry', 19th Century, Vol LXIX, p 810 
3. Haig recalled being told this before 1914. See Haig 
Diary entry 15 August 1915, Acc 3155.102 Haig 
4. Callwell, 'A Revolution in Land Warfare, Blackwoods, 
Vol CXCII, p 652 
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justify their existence but the battlefield fight and the 
~ blanche o In Repington's phrase, they were meant to be 
1 both the eyes and the fists of the Army, and the tension 
between these two roles had been a major factor in the ~ 
blanche controversy since its beginnings. It now looked as 
if it might disappear entirelyo But as one reflective 
soldier wrote in 1910: 
We see that its reconnaissance duties will be 
lessened, its shock action must be of infrequent 
occurrence, its protective duties can be carried 
out by less expensive b r anches, while envelopment 
is considered a waste of power, strength and co-
hesion. What, therefore, is left to our Cavalry ?2 
In 1914, as in 1899, all the theories would be put to the 
only practical test of any importance. Cavalry theorists 
before the First World War invited their readers to 'picture 
the state of two armies, each consisting of five or six 
corps, afte~ three or four days I desperate strife on the 
banks of the Meuse,.3 While the Infantry and Artillery 
fought, the Cavalry would be held in reserve until 'the 
right moment' when the enemy reserves were exhausted, his 
soldiers numb with battle fatigue, and a weak point could 
be created for the Cavalry to break through and complete the 
rout. 'This may not come, remember', wrote one cautious 
theorist, 'for two or three days'. 4 
1. Repington to The Times, 26 March 1910, 7101-23-223-5 
Roberts 
2. Fraser, 'Military Aircraft in the Light of Experience', 
USM Vol XLIII NS, p 653 
3. 'Cavalry in France and Germruy 1909', CJ Vol 5, no 18, 
p 225 
4 . 'Eques', 'Cavalry on the Battlefield', CJ Vol 3, no 10, 
p 143 
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CHAPTER SIX 
OUR MEDIEVAL HORSE SOLDIERS 
'C for the Cavalry who (so I've heard say) 
Have not seen their gee-gees for many a day . 
But soon they will mount them and gallop away 
And we'll all ' say goodbye to the trenches.' 
- The Wipers Times, 5 March 19171 
'Lessons. Thorough preparation ••• Deception ••• 
re-inforce where winning & accept losses ••• 
Trust your luck •• • Cavalry and Beersheba ? 
Water t' 
- Allenby's notes for a briefing before 
the Palestine Campaign, October 19172 
Allenby's responsibility as commander of the 
Cavalry Division in August 1914 was incredible. If his 
Cavalry were wrongly trained for this particular war, if he 
wrecked them in an ill-judged charge, he could lose the 
scouting forc e on which the B.E.F. depended in ten minutes. 
As he left for France he received the final shot in the 
arme blanche controversy from Lord Roberts: 
I congratulate you most warmly on having such 
a splendid command , and I shall look forward 
with interest to the doings of the cavalry in 
the war. May I say how earnestly I hope that 
the men may be made to understand that they 
should never be on their horses when they can 
be off them. I issued an order to this effect 
both during the Boer War and when I was 
Commander~in-Chief at home - but I fear the 
custom still is never to dismount except by 
order. J 
Contrary to these fears, the British Cavalry impressed the 
1 . Beaver, The Wipers Times, p 178 
2 ~ MS notes for a briefing in AllenbYJ/7 Allenby 
3. Roberts to Allenby, 11 August 1914, Allenby I/5/94 
Allenby 
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French with their horsemastership and their willingness to 
1 dismount and even entrench. They themselves had nothing 
but contempt for the poor horsemastership of the French and 
Germans, and mocked their short 'toy' carbines, heavy lances 
and cluttered equipment . 2 Allenby wrote to his wife in 
October that 'the French are much struck by the all round 
work of our Cavalry, but are rather shocked to see them in 
the trenches, as they think that's derogatory to the 
Cavalry Spirit !'.3 The British Infantry, in contrast, were 
impressed by the aggressive patrol work of their Cavalry, 
'always' looking for the chance to charge rival German 
4 patrols . For all their deficiencies and limitations, their 
tactics of mixed fire and shock were highly successful in 
subduing their more numerous German opponents (a complete 
Cavalry Corps of three divisions, or eighteen regiments) 
~ 
from first contact on 22 August. 5 The strategic recon-
naissance and intelligence gathering of both sides, however, 
bore little resemblance to pre- war theory. The BoE.F. 
gained incomplete warning of the German approach, and von 
1 . Allenby to his wife, 7 October 1914, Allenby 1/5/25 
Allenby; Bridges, Alarms and Excursions, p 81 
2 . Cook to his wife, 20 September 1914, Cook; Maze, A 
Frenchman in Khaki, p 22; Lloyd, A Trooper in the- Tins, 
p 92; Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 147; Haig War Diary 
entry, 21 August 1914, p 21, Acc .3155.98 Haig; French to 
Kitchener, 'German fighting characteristics', WA/28 
Kitchener; Spears, The Picnic Basket, p 142 
.3 . Allenby to his wife, 7 October 1914, Allenby 1./5/25 
Allenby 
4 . Terraine, General Jack's Diary, p 6.3 
5. Edmunds, ed, The Histor of the Great War from Official 
Documents, (hereafter Official History France & Belgium, 
1914, Vol I, especially p 126 
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1 Kluck's First Army none at all of the BoE.F. 
More importantly, in contrast to the effi-
cient British supply system (under William Robertson)2 the 
German horses were starving and sore-backed almost from the 
war's beginning. By 4 September scarcely a horse could 
move above a walk. 3 In November the Life Guards noted of 
some captured German Cavalry horses: 
The captured horses were reduced to skin, 
bone and sores. The saddlery was superior 
to that of our officers. The wallets were 
huge, and contained more odds and ends than 
a whole troop of ours. No wonder the much 
vaunted Uhlan is a poor Cavalryman. 4 
Outmatched in patrolling, and with their horses in poor 
condition, the German Cavalry fell back on their fire 
support. 5 Allenby thought them little more than an escort 
for their own Artillery, machine guns and Jagers. 6 The 
1. Liddell Hart, Reputations, p 241 
2. Robertson,~Private to Field Marshal, pp 201-10 
3. von Moltke, quoted in Barnett, The Swordbearers, p 81; 
van Creveld, Supplying War, pp 124-5; Coleman, From Mons 
to Ypres with French, p 140. The amount of fodder re-
ceived seems to have varied between regiments, but there 
is no evidence of horse starvation on the British side, 
see Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 87; Whyte and 
Atteridge, A History of the Queens Bays, p 219; Burnett, 
The Memoirs of the 18th Hussars, p 35 
4. Lloyd, A Trooper in the Tins, p 99 
5. Nash, Handbook of the German Army, April 1918, p 63, 
the assessment prepared by Haig's staff on that date, 
states that before the war German Cavalry was taught to 
rely on squadron-sized conflicts and dismounted fighting 
rather than the arme blanche. Although this view is not 
supported by the~man CavEi.l.ry Training 1909, it reflects 
the events of 1914. 
6. Allenby to his Wife, 30 August 1914, Allenby I/5/6 and 
14 October 1914, Allenby I/5/31 Allenby; Burnett, The 
Memoirs of the 18th Hussars, p 22; Gough, The Fifth Army, 
p 21. Haig was more concerned about possible attack from 
German Infantry in lorries than Cavalry, see Haig War 
Diary entry, 4 September 1914, Acc 3155098 Haig 
f 
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first major British Cavalry action of the war, in compari-
son, at Audregnies on 24 August, produced a charge which 
joined the Cavalry's legends . De Lisle's 2nd Cavalry 
Brigade, covering the retreat of the 5th DWision from Mons, 
came under increasing pressure from German Artillery and 
skirmishers,so that de Lisle told the Colonel of the 9th 
Lancers, if there were no other way to slow the German 
advance, to charge . In column of squadrons the Lancers 
(with two troops of the 4th Dragoon Guards) swept towards 
the Germans 1,200 yards away and into the fire of at least 
nine field batteries . The path of the charge was then seen 
to be blocked by a high wire fence between the Cavalry and 
their target . Wheeling to the right, they halted among some 
slag heaps and opened fire dismounted o Eventually, shell-
fire drove off the brigade, including the two regiments in 
reserve Q Casualties were less than two hundred , but the 
brigade was so badly scattered that troop dPicers believed 
for days later they had lost half their men. The German 
1 
advance was halted, and the 5th Division escaped . 
There could scarcely have been a more 
ambiguous incident . De Lisle praised the 'true cavalry 
spirit of the 9th Lancers in daring to charge unbroken 
infantry in order to save neighbouring troops' . The com-
mander of the 5th Division declared the charge had saved 
his men from disaster. Members of the brigade, however, 
1 . There is a detailed account of this, and a personal diary 
in Fraser; see also Haslam to his parents, 4 September 
1914, 26 September 1914 and J October 1914, 7612/21 
Haslam 
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felt the charge over-rated, one subaltern complaining that 
de Lisle 'lost half his brigade that day for no reason what -
soever'. The Colonel of the Lancers, in his official report, 
did not even mention the wire; he broke off the charge 'no 
object being discernible and on account of the terrific fire 
to which we were subjected'. The story spread that the 
charge had been bungled, a disaster, even (with echoes of 
the Light Brigade at Balaclava) a mistake. 1 
The charge was stopped by wire and Artillery, 
which between them ended traditional Cavalry - and for that 
matter traditional Infantry - tactics on the Western Front. 
Conservative Cavalrymen complained that the flat ground, 
the wire, the slagheaps, the cottages, the canals and river~ 
had ruled out massed charges. The argument was circular: 
where there was no cover a mass of Cavalry could not form 
for a charge, and where there was it might conceal enemy 
Artillery . 2 This had been recognised for twenty years . 
The British Cavalry did, however, regularly outfight their 
opponents in troop or squadron conflicts, both in the re -
treat and the subsequent advance to the Aisne. On 7 
September/in one notable contest, a troop of the 9th Lancer~ 
its machine- gun disabled, charged straight through a squadron 
of the German 1st Guard Dragoons; shortly afterwards, when 
another squadron of Guard Dragoons attempted to charge a 
1 . Coleman, From Mons to Ypres with French, pp 4, 7; 
Hamilton, The First Seven Divisions, pp 33- 4; Haig War 
Diary entry 17 September 1914, Acc 3155.98 Haig 
2. Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 126; Talbot- Rice 
to his parents, 23 October 1914, 7511 - 80 Talbot- Rice 
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troop of the 18th Hussars, the British dismounted and shot 
1 the charge down. This superiority in minor tactics pro-
vided in itself the 'morale dominance' meant to come from 
the massed charge. But these methods were a slow way to 
2 
make progress. The cyclist companies were often behind 
the Cavalry in retreat and ahead in the advance, and while 
the Cavalry provided local information, the crucial strate-
gic intelligence came usually from aeroplaneso 3 
The only serious threat from German Cavalry 
after the first day of the retreat came in the dawn fog of 
1 September, as the German 4th Cavalry Division came on the 
British 1st Cavalry Brigade in billets at the village of 
Nery. The German division, six regiments and four batterie~ 
was without its Jager battalion, and after virtually des -
troying the British Horse Artillery troop with shell fire 
made only a slow attack, held off by highly effective rifle 
shooting, while 4th Cavalry Brigade rode to the rescue of 
the Nery garrison. When the fresh brigade arrived, squadron 
and regimental charges -vrith covering fire drove off the 
German division, capturing four of its guns and dispersing 
it; three days after the battle it mustered only two 
1. Burnett, The Memoirs of the 18th Hussars, pp 40- 42; 
Official His.tQ1;"'y, France & Belgium, 1914, Vol I, pp 308-9 
The 9th Lancers claimed their machine- gun jammed, the 
Germans that they drove off the crew and wrecked it. 
There was also disagreement on the numbers involved . 
Fraser Diary entry, 7 September 1914, Fraser 
2 . See Official History, France & Belgium, 1914, Vol I, pp 
53, 60, 214, 216, 277, 316 for e x amples of these combats;also 
Brande r , The 10th Royal Hussars, p 10 
3 . Hamilton, The First Seven Div.Eions, p 78; Official His -
tory, France & Belgium, 1914, Vol I, pp 99, 299 
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squadrons . This confused action, primarily a test of basic 
training, was cited, with understandable British smugness, 
as displaying 'the excellence of our Field Service Regu-
lations and Cavalry Training Manual' . More importantly, for 
the first time a dismounted defensive action had joined the 
1 Cavalry's ~ore of morale- building legends . 
When the advance to the Aisne began, regi-
mental officers felt the Cavalry missed a chance to break 
the German lines, blaming their superiors. 2 There was every 
excuse. The retreat had worn out the horses and horse shoes 
on both sides. Most British Cavalry had no more than three 
hours' sleep a night; the 11th Hussars once had to ride for 
twenty- seven hours without a rest; French caught the Scots 
Greys literally asleep in the saddle . 3 But this was not the 
whole story . Haig was dismayed to find the Cavalry posi-
tioned behind his own I Corps for the advance, and unim-
pressed by the apparent lack of urgency in Philip Chetwode's 
5th Cavalry Brigade . 4 The effort that had gone into the 
~ blanche controversy produced superbly confident 
1 . Spears, The Pi cnic Basket, p 134; 'The Action at Nery', 
CJ Vol 10, no 3 6, pp 56- 70; Official History, France & 
Belgium, 1914, Vol I, pp 256- 8 
2 . Charrington to Clark, 14 March 1935, Charrington I/7/1 
Charrington; Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 105; 
Gough , The Fifth Army, pp 43- 7 
3. Whyte and Atteridge, A History of the Queens Bays, pp 
2 19 , 271; Blacklock , The Royal Scots Greys, p 77; Bolithq 
The Galloping Third, pp 200- 1; Lumley, History of the 
11th Hussars, p 36; Barrow; The Fire of Life, p 148 
4 . Haig War Diary entries, 7 September 1914,p 72 and 9 
September 1914, p 79, Acc 3155 . 98 Haig 
~ 
I 
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tactics but hesitant strategic use of Cavalry. The one 
major Cavalry failure of 1914 was Allenby's confession that 
he could not screen II Corps properly on 26 August, making 
the battle of Le Cateau on. the following day necessary. 
Allenby had completely lost touch with two of his brigades 
on this date. Chetwode and Barrow both believed this was 
due to Hubert Gough deliberately taking his own and another 
brigade 'as far away from the Bull [Allenby] as possible', 
without orders, and that only Gough's friendship with 
French and Haig saved him from dismissal. 1 Gough's defence 
was that he had received no orders, and the whole emphasis 
of Cavalry doctrine was on initiative and rapid decision. 2 
He managed to get his de facto independent command confirmed 
as 2nd Cav~y Division, and Haig (who indeed had no confi-
dence in his own superior, French, at this date)3 continued 
~ 
to promote Gough's career. Allenby himself remained loyal 
4 to French even after the war. The 'Cavalry Generals' of 
1914-18 were in fact no more a homogeneous group than the 
Cavalry. Haig accused French of open jobbery over Allenby's 
appointment to an Army command in October 1915,5 and ignored 
Allenby's advice at Army commanders' conferences. 6 
1. Chetwode to Wavell, 20 June 1938, Allenby 6/VI/26 Allenb$ 
see also Barrow to Wavell, n.d., Allenby 6/VI/10 Allenby 
2. Gough, The Fifth Army, pp 12-29; see also Smith-Dou2en 1 s 
own ms account, vol I, pp 31-3 Smith-Don2en 
3. Marshal-Cornwall, Haig as Military Commander,pp 91-2 
4. Allenby, foreword to French, The Life of ••• John French, 
First Earl of Ypres, p xxi 
5. Haig War Diary entry, 24 October 1915, Acc 3155.103 Haig 
6. Wavell, Allenby: A Study in Greatness, p 170 
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These rivalries were minor compared to he 
hangover of the conflict between the Roberts Ring and the 
Cavalry 0 Roberts himself died of pneumonia in November 
1914, 1 but Rawlinson was completely frank that the divi-
sions created by the Ring still existed: 
The appointment of Pulteney to the command of 
the III Army Corps and the selection of Monro 
for the command of the 2nd Division in place 
of Murray were clear indications that I was not 
in favour with Sir John [French]. However, when 
on August 4th it seemed likely that Lord 
K[itchener] would be appointed Secretary of 
State for War my hopes revived and altogether 
I was not sorry to find myself working under 
his direct orders. 2 
Despite French's protests, Kitchener gave Rawlinson an 
independent Corps command (including Jrd Cavalry Division 
under Byng) to attempt the relief of Antwerp.J Kitchener 
had already enraged French by ignoring his request for a 
replacement' when Grierson, commanding II Corps, died sudden-
lyon 17 August. Significantly, French did not ask for a 
Cavalryman - there were none remotely senior enough - in-
stead he wanted Herbert Plumer. Kitchener, aware of the 
long-standing antipathy between French and Horace Smith-
Do~en, nevertheless appointed him to II corps.4 In 
November 1914 Kitchener suggested to Joffre that Ian 
Hamilton might replace French, and through Henry Wilson 
1. While visiting troops in France. 
2. Rawlinson Diary entry, 7 September 1914, Rawlinson/WW1 
J. Maurice, The Life of Lord Rawlinson of Trent, p 101 
4. Smith-Domen's ms account, volT, p .2, Smith-Domen; the 
reason for the intermittent feud between Smith-Douien and 
French is unknown, French fluctuating between the highest 
and lowest opinions of him. Harrington, Plumer of Mess-
~, p 69 
s 
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. 1 
French learned of it. Subsequently, Kitchener gave 
Hamilton the Gallipoli command,2 with another subordinate 
of long standing and veteran of Egypt and South Africa, 
William Birdwood, in command of the ANZAC Corps.3 Kitchener 
was attempting to re-create the team which had served him 
in South Africa, and with it promoting old opponents of the 
Cavalry over the objections of French. Although, of 
course, the past arguments on Cavalry tactics went unmen-
tioned in debate on strategy, the conflict between Kitchener 
and French, and the larger conflict between 'Easterners' and 
'Westerners' in the Army, must be seen against the back-
ground of mist-rust generated by the ~ blanche contro-
versy. By the end of 1915, however, Hamilton and Smith-
DOu2en had been dismissed and branded as failures, while 
Kitchener's own powers as Secretary of State for War had 
, 4 
been curbed. The lasting result of his attempt to re-
create the Ring was Rawlinson's rise to command the Fourth 
Army in 1916, and William Robertson's appointment as 
C.IoG.S. in the same year to balance Kitchener's own in-
fluence. 5 (Birdwood eventually also rose to command the 
Fifth Army in May 1918.) Rawlinson and Robertson, by these 
two very different rOutes, both came to have a major in-
fluence on the big offensives of 1916-18 on the Western 
1 . Hamilton, The Happy Warrior, p 268 
2. Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, Vol I, pp 1- 2 
3. Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, for his own career. 
4 . RobertsoniwPrivate to Field Marshal, pp 236- 43; Hamilton, 
The Happy Warrior, p 424; Smith- Don2en, ms account in 
vols I & II, Smith-Do~en 
5 . Robertson,~Private to Field Marshal, pp 236- 43 
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Front. Neither had any faith in the Cavalry. 
The Cavalry themselves concluded 1914 at the 
Aisne and the First Battle of Ypres with the one tactic for 
which they were untrained, orthodox Infantry defence in 
trenches, holding seven miles of front at Ypres with a 
Corps of all three divisions. Fortunately, in contrast to 
the French Cavalry, fighting dismounted with inadequate 
carbines,1 the British found their shooting sufficient. 
Haig thanked Allenby, commanding the new Cavalry Corps, 
2 deeply, while the Cavalry were themselves told that they 
had done 'the finest thing Cavalry have done in history, 
as you had an Army Corps against you,.J A puzzled subaltern 
modestly recorded that 'for a matter of fact we only did 
what the Infantry always do, except for the fact that we had 
no supports or big guns,.4 As with the rest of the B.E.F. 
at Ypres, losses damaged this force of Cavalry beyond re-
pair: one brigade lost all three regimental Colonels; the 
18th Hussars mustered only a strong squadron after the 
battle; the 9th Lancers had all but two of its twenty-nine 
officers killed or wounded before Christmas. 5 The Household 
Cavalry, long-service troops with no reservists, used up 
1. Gough, The Fifth Army, p 66 
2. Haig War Diary entry, 2J September 1914, p 12~ Acc J155. 
98 Haig 
J. Talbot-Rice to his parents, 4 November 1914, 7511-80 
Talbot-Rice 
40 ibid 
5. Fraser Diary, notes at start of diary on 9asualties, 
Fraser; Brande r , The 10th Royal Hussars, p 92; Burnett, 
The Memoirs of the 18th Hussars, p 74; Lumley, History 
of the 11th Hussars, ,p 188; Lloyd, A Trooper in the Tins, 
p 1JO 
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the whole Line Cavalry reserve of trained men to replace 
their losses. 1 Replacement horses came largely from America 
and Australia, inferior to the fully trained troop horses 
which were the basis of the Cavalry's mobility.2 To make 
up the three divisions of the Cavalry Corps, Yeomanry regi-
ments volunteered to serve in France, while one brigade was 
composed of Canadian Mounted Rifles (who, despite Dundonald, 
had regained the ~ blanche).3 In October 1914 an Indian 
Cavalry Corps of two divisions, Indian and British regi-
ments, also arrived in France. These five divisions trained 
for the trenches, being given bayonets, Lewis guns and, in 
early 1916, Hotchkiss automatic rifles. 4 From December 1915, 
on Haig's orders, they formed every winter dismounted bri-
gades from each division for trench duty.5 Divisional 
Cavalry squadrons were grouped into regiments at Corps level 
in early 1915, and employed as orderlies, snipers, traffic 
controllers, working parties and other duties before being 
1. Lloyd, A Trooper in the Tins, p 75 
2. ibid, p 254; Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 247 
3. See the official publication, Order of Battle of Divi-
sions in the Great War, Vol 1, pp 1-23 and Vol 2a, pp 1-
34 for the changes in the composition of the Cavalry 
during the war (I.W.M.) 
4. Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p 218; Wbyte and Atteridge, 
A History of the Queens Bays, pp 306, 385; Lloyd, A 
Trooper in the Tins, p 102 
5. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission three works -
The 1st Cavalry Division in France and Flanders, The 2nd 
Cavalry Division in France and Flanders, and The 3rd 
Cavalry Division in France and Flanders - give a day to 
day account of the location, composition and casualties 
of the divisions, including working parties and dismounted 
brigades. (I.W.M.) 
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. 1 
phased out in the summer of 1917. The two Cavalry Corps 
tried to keep their horses fit outdoors in all weathers - a 
fUll time occupation2 - and, as well as serving in trenches, 
were largely employed to dig them . 'No doubt this was 
necessary work', one officer complained, 'but nothing could 
have been devised to dampen the spirits of Cavalrymen more.~3 
Their officers went on training courses, practised sports 
and organised horse- shows. In December 1914 Gough, Byng, 
and all their Brigadier-Generals, along with members of the 
two divisional staffs, took an afternoon off to play football 
before Prince Arthur of Connaught. Haig was disgusted, 
visiting Rimington's Indian Cavalry Division in early 1915, 
to find its commander playing bridge with his staff. 4 How-
ever, although not regularly exposed to trench duty like the 
Infantry, the three British divisions saw enough fighting 
during the war to lose 16,000 casualties, or two-thirds of 
their strength . 5 
1. Moynihan, A Place called Arma eddon, p 124; Pease, 
Histor of the Northumberland Hussars Yeomanr, p 52; 
Haig War Diary entry, 18 March 1915, p 31, Acc 3155 . 105 
Haig 
2 . Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 258; Lloyd, A 
Trooper in the Tins, pp 152, 175; Tylden, Horses and 
Saddlery, p 38; Haig War Diary entry, 19 January 1915, 
p 44, Acc 3155.100 Haig 
3. Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 258 
4 . Stotherd, Sabre and Saddle, p 294; Allenby to his wife, 
13 December 1914, Allenby 1/5/76 Allenby; Fraser Diary 
entry, 23 March 1915, Fraser; Haig War Diary entry, 
1 September 1917, p 2, Acc 3155.117 Haig; Talbot- Rice to 
his parents, 6 December 1914 and 3 April 1916, 7511 - 80 
Talbot- Rice; Haig War Diary entry, 18 April 1915, p 44, 
Acc 3155.101 Haig 
5 . See Tables, Part Three, Table 1 
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The Cavalry were under-employed while the 
Army expanded, and the circumstances which had attracted 
competent officers to the Cavalry in the 1890s were there-
fore reversed: promotion was significantly more likely 
through transferring out of the Cavalry than staying in it.1 
There was considerable variation between regiments in this 
matter, and also in the promotion of N.C.O.s to commis-
sioned rank outside their own regiment. None of the eleven 
2nd Lieutenants in the 2nd Dragoon Guards in June 1915 was 
still with the regiment on the same date three years later, 
the majority transferring to Staff work, the Machine Gun 
Corps and the Royal Flying Corps (Royal Air Force from April 
1918). The Jrd Hussars kept four of its eleven 2nd Lieu-
tenants over the same period; the 5th Lancers kept six out 
2 
of seven. Of the 12J officers who passed through the 11th 
Hussars in France, only one served with it from the begin-
ning of the war to its end . J Nearly twenty N. C . O.s and 
privates of the same regiment were given commissions outside 
4 the regiment; of the 1st Life Guards, not one . Between 
January 1915 and January 1916 the number of Cavalrymen in 
the Royal Flying Corps increased from four to forty-seven; 
two years later sixty-three were serving as flight commanders 
1. See Tables, Part Two, Table 7 
2. These figures are taken from a comparison of the monthly 
Army List for J"une 1915 and June 1918 (War Office) 
J. Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 2J2 
4. Brett- Smith, The 11th Hussars, p 161; Lloyd, A Trooper 
in the Tins, p 75 
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or higher ranks. Cavalrymen in fact made up only about 
5 per cent of the R.FoC o; but the Cavalry, short of officers 
before the war, could not afford to lose these men, nor the 
twenty-three ex-Cavalrymen who had reached the rank of 
Captain or higher in the Tank Corps by January 1918 0 1 In 
Egypt, the Duke of Westminster's armoured car patrol column, 
fighting rebel Sudanese, acquired so many Cavalry officers 
that it was 2 nicknamed 'the petrol hussars'. As .might be 
expected, those who sought, or kept, commands in the Cavalry 
were seldom the best men available. 3 As both standards and 
morale declined, Cavalry officers fought a losing battle to 
teach their men 'to lift their heads and think again at 
4 fifteen miles an hour'. 
Surprisingly, the Cavalry brigade commanders 
all survived the First Battle of Ypres, so placing a block 
on promotion inside the Cavalry below Brigadier-General's 
rank. Taking January 1915 as a starting point, the Corps 
commander, Allenby, and two of his divisional commanders, 
Byng and Gough, rose by the end of the war to join the group 
of ten who had commanded Armies on the Western Front. The 
third divisional commander, de Lisle, and two brigade com-
manders, were eventually to lead Army Corps, while a third 
Brigadier-General, Kavanagh, rose to lead the Cavalry Corps, 
1. See Tables, Part Two, Table 8 
2. Buchan, The Long Road to Victory, pp 63-4 
30 Wbyte and Atteridge, A History of the Queens Bays, p 272; 
Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 229; Lloyd, A 
Trooper in the Tins, pp 219, 275 
4. Wbyte and Atteridge, A History of the Queens Bays, pp 
296- 7 
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and two more to command Cavalry Divisions. Of the Cavalry's 
regimental Colonels at the same date, January 1915, however, 
only one had after three years been promoted to command an 
Infantry Division; two more became Major-Generals and eight 
Brigadier-Generals, mostly on non-operational duties. A 
Cavalry Colonel would have done slightly better than average 
to receive any promotion at all over these three years of 
war, but quite exceptionally well to be still commanding 
fighting troops after promotion. It was less likely that 
such a man would reach Major-General than that his brigade 
commander would become a Lieutenant- General, or his divi-
sional commander eventually lead an Army. Of the twenty-one 
men who, by January 1918, filled the Cavalry regimental 
commands made vacant by promotion, dismissal or death, no 
fewer than fifteen were Majors of the same regiment in-
heriting the post by seniority, and a further five were 
M · f th Cl' t 1 aJors rom 0 er ava ry reglmen s. Neither signs of 
favouritism nor outstanding ability were shown in the ranks 
reached by most Cavalrymen during the war. When it ended 
there were just eighteen Cavalrymen with the rank of Major-
General, and only in seven cases did this mean more than one 
promotion since 1914. Eleven of these Major-Generals served 
in more than one regiment of Cavalry, four in another arm of 
the service, 2 and seven were Staff College graduates. There 
1. These figures are taken from a comparison of the monthly 
Army Lists for January 1915 and January 1918, and from 
The Order of Battle of Divisions in the Great War, Vol 1, 
pp 1-2J (IoW.M.) 
2. See Tables, Part Two, Tables 4, 5 & 6 
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was a single case among Cavalrymen of promotion from Major 
to temporary Lieutenant-General between 1914 and 1917. 1 
Most of these promotions were achieved in non-operational 
duties and staffwork; at the war's end only five Cavalrymen 
2 
commanded divisions and only one commanded an Army Corps. 
Although a large number of junior Cavalry officers also 
received promotion through staff duties, they produced no 
significant number of successes. By the end of the war, the 
most prestigious staff grouping in the Army, the first 
echelon of Haig's GoH.Q., 326 officers, contained just 22 
Cavalrymen. 3 
Nevertheless, the highest ranks of the Army 
contained a far greater number of Cavalrymen than could be 
accounted for by chance. French and Haig commanded on the 
Western Front, Allenby in Egypt, Robertson was CoI.G.S. for 
two years, and five of the ten Army Commanders on the 
4 Western Front were also Cavalrymen. Beneath these, the 
number of Cavalrymen appointed as temporary Lieutenant-
Generals was far higher than the proportion of Cavalry in 
the Army, either before the war or during it, could explain? 
This represented the rise of the exceptional Cavalrymen of 
the 1890s, a fact whichPhilip Chetwode took for granted 
1. G.T.M. Bridges; see his own account, Bridges, Alarms and 
Excursions 
2. Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire, p 163 
3. 'Composition of Headquarters of British Armies in France, 
1 February 1919', copy in Acc 3155.220j Haig 
4. Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire, pp 161-8 
5. See Tables, Part Two, Table 4 
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after the war in assessing the ability of Cavalry officers. 
'The average British officer', he wrote, ' unless he has 
been trained in the cavalry, or is a very exceptional man, 
enters into an operation, whether in peace or war,without 
having made up his mind what he intends to do.,1 But these 
men were not at all average, they were a tiny elite. 
Robertson and Birdwood, both from Cavalry regiments, owed 
their rise at first to Roberts and Kitchener, later to skills 
in staffwork and the complex politics of the relations be-
tween the Army and the Government (in Birdwood's case the 
government of Australia, of which, as commander of the 
Australian Imperial Force, he was the representative). 
Allenby showed considerable military skill at First Ypres, 
and put his reputation beyond question in Palestine. Byng, 
who commanded successively the Canadian Corps and the Third 
Army, was known in France as a sensible, careful, even slow 
and pessimistic soldier,2 in contrast to the myth of the 
fire-eating Cavalryman. Gough decided soon after the war's 
opening that Infantry would be considerably more important 
in it than Cavalry,3 but found the popular image of the 
Cavalryman hard to shake. After his removal in March 1918 
from command of the Fifth Army he noted a Press report 
1 . Chetwode to Liddell Hart, 11 March 1930, LH I/166/2 
Liddell Hart 
2. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 164; Cavan, unpublished auto-
biography, no pagination, description of Byng mid- 1917, 
Cavan; Haig War Diary entry, 8 May 1915, p 91, Acc 3155. 
101 Haig; Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, Vol I, p 303; Byng 
to Chetwode, 30 May 1917, folder three, Chetwode 
3 . Gough, The Fifth Army, p 74 
that: 
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being a cavalry officer I knew nothing about 
the handling of all arms, and had only one idea, 
which was to charge about the field and hurl my 
cavalry at the enemy. 'With this end in view' 
- so one correspondent who was explaining 'how 
we lost the battle' actually asserted - I 'had 
all the wire on the army front pulled up in 
order to enable my cavalry to charge unhampered 
by obstacles' t t t 1 
Like Allenby and Byng, Gough had commanded Infantry since 
1915. 
The Western Front commander most consistently 
criticised as a 'Cavalryman' is Douglas Haig. This criticism 
ignores his work in co-ordinating the tactics of Cavalry with 
other arms,2 his staff work, and the fact that for two years 
before the war he held, at Aldershot, the single largest 
Infantry command in the British Army. Only one of the four 
Infantrymen who commanded Armies in France, Smith-Don2en, 
could claim as much; and along with two others, Rawlinson and 
Plumer, Smith-Don2en owed much of his rept:iation to his 
command of Mounted Infantry.J All were equally unprepared 
for a war dominated by Heavy Artillery. The hierarchy of 
the Royal Artillery itself placed the Horse Artillery at its 
peak and the Garrison Artillery far below; the only gunner 
to command an Army, Horne (who had served with the Boer War 
Cavalry Division) proved neither noticeably more nor less 
1. Gough, Soldiering On, p 176 
2. See especially Haig, Cavalry Studies 
J. The fourth was General Sir Charles Monro, . who held, 
briefly, command of both First and Third Armies during 
the war. 
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competent than his fellows. 1 But if Haig's time in the 
Cavalry left a lasting impact on his behaviour, it was a 
subtle consequence of the ~ blanche controversy . He 
distrusted unproved theory, was impatient with rhetoric, 
and suspected glib or easy theoretical solutions, prefer-
ring methods tested in practice. 'All I require', he had 
written at the height of the controversy, 'is people of 
average intelligence who are keen to do their work properly.~ 
He placed great reliance on his own experts, both his Army 
commanders and his Staff, where closer control might have 
corrected their mistakes. He also kept the Cavalryman's 
belief in morale: in April 1916 he noted of the new Fokker 
monoplane, 'It is strange how with such a comparatively poor 
machine the enemy has been so successful', and therefore 
that 'this again shows that the man who controls the machine 
has more than anything to do with gaining success,.3 Most 
importantly, alone among Western Front commanders, Haig never 
lost faith either in the value of Cavalry or of the ~ 
blanche, and continued to look for ways to employ them. 
In September 1914 the British were informed 
1. 'Notes' by Liddell Hart, 15 January 1965, LH I/305.28b, 
and 'Talk with Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine, 
LH 11/1930/18, both Liddell Hart 
2. Haig to Henrietta, 
Haig 
1 September 1904, Acc3155 . 6D 
3 . Haig War Diary entry, 11 April 1916, Acc 3155.105 Haig ; 
and for recent assessments of Haig's personality, see 
Terraine, Haig: The Educated Soldier; Marshal- Cornwall, 
Haig as Military Commander 
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of a change in German Cavalry doctrine. 'The dismounted 
Cavalryman', pronounced the German War Minister, 'should be 
able to fight exactly as an Infantryman; Cavalry charges no 
1 longer play any part in warfare~' There would never be a 
charge of Cavalry against Cavalry on the Western Front. 
The British Cavalry's replacements still learned mounted 
2 
charges at squadron and regimental level, but most officers 
in France thought a quick breakthrough remote. J At best 
they hoped that other arms would create a gap in the German 
trench line so the Cavalry might, in the contemporary catch-
phrase, 'ride for the G,.4 The problem first considered 
thirty years before here presented itself: after the Infantry 
attack the Cavalry, each division occupying nine miles of 
road space, 5 had to be brought rapidly through the rear 
areas, guided through the confusion of battle by communi-
~ 
cations based, at their most sophisticated in 1917, on non-
portable wireless, despatch riders, aeroplanes, signalling 
f k . t b 11 d h' . 6 d b I f t rom lea oons an omlng plgeons; an y n an ry 
1. Quoted in Editor's Notes, USM Vol LI NS, p 226 
2. Wingfield, Lectures to Cavalry Subalterns of the New 
Armies, pp 62-6; Notes on Modern Cavalry Tactics by a 
Cavalry Officer, p 4 
J. Marling, Rifleman and Hussar, pp J41, J5J; Seely, 
Adventure, p 247; Haslam to his parents, 21 September 
1914 and 8 August 1916, 7612-21 Haslam 
4. This phrase derives from the Army in South Africa 1899-
1902 working on sketch maps without map grids. To des-
cribe an otherwise featureless location, the lettering 
on a map was treated as if it existed physically on the 
ground, for example, 'Half a mile due South-West of the 
second E in Zand RiveE'. 
5. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 172 
6. Official History, France & Belgium, 1917, Vol III, p J7 
-JOJ-
officers taught to regard Cavalry with contempt. Waiting 
to move forward, Cavalry rode at only nineteen stones, with 
virtually no supplies; any delay in movement required more 
to be transported for them, increasing the congestiono The 
problem looked insoluble, and the Cavalry's morale plum-
metted at the thought that they were fit for nothing but 
d . . 1 1991ng. In mid-1915 Haig thought it necessary to tell the 
17th Lancers that they must be perfectly efficient mounted 
as well as dismounted, an ironic reversal of his position 
2 twenty years before. 
In the first major British attack on the 
Western Front, at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, Haig's First 
Army, with Rawlinson's IV Corps in its centre, made a gap, 
but confused staffwork and communications delayed the 
Cavalry's advan~e and the chance was lost. Rawlinson, 
sharing his thoughts with Kitchener and Henry Wilson, felt 
that: 
[Haig] looked for too much. He expects to 
get the Cavalry through with the next push, 
but I very much doubt if he will succeed in 
doing more than kill a large number of 
gallant men without effecting any very great 
triumph. I should be content with capturing 
.another piece out of the enemy's line of 
trenches and waiting for the counter attack. 
I am not a believer in the Cavalry raid, 
which even if it comes off will not effect 
very much. J 
1. Burnett, The Memoirs of the 18th Hussars, p 120 
2. Haig War Diary entry, J1 July 1915, Acc J155.102 Haig 
J. Rawlinson Diary entry, 14 March 1915, Rawl ins on/WW1 , see 
also Wilson Diary entry, 15 March 1915, Wilson and 
Rawlinson to Kitchener, 2J March 1915 and 1 April 1915, 
WB/17-18 Kitchener 
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This echoed the traditional views of the Roberts Ring . In 
fact, Rawlinson's time on the Western Front closely paral-
leled his earlier career: he made a poor start at Neuve 
Chapelle, and his handling of the Somme offensive of 1916 
remains controversial; but he learned from experience, and 
by 1918 showed considerable military skill . 1 The old rifle 
theories of the Roberts Ring proved even more out of place 
on the Western Front than massed Cavalry charges; troops in 
trench combat preferred to rely on hand- grenades, machine-
guns and mortars, and in mid-1917 it was felt necessary to 
impress on them the need to employ their rifles at ranges 
greater than bomb throwing distance - about twenty- five 
2 yards. 
According to Haig, John French, who had shown 
such uncertain faith in the Cavalry in September 1914, had 
decided even before the battle of Loos a year later that the 
Cavalrybreakthr.ough would never take place on the Western 
Front. 3 Loos was another failure, but marked a step forward 
in Cavalry doctrine : Haig told his Corps commanders to 
employ their own Cavalry with machine- guns and cyclists to 
fight their way forward in the Infantry's wake, rather than 
1. Marshal- Cornwall, Haig as Military Commander, p 145; 
Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, pp 271 - 3; 
Terraine, To Win a War, pp 108- 12 
2. Rawlinson documents 1/10 3g and 5, Rawlinson/WW1; Lloyd, 
A Trooper in the Tins, p 271. Haig War Diary entry, 26 
December 1914, p 1, Acc 3155 . 100 Haig gives grenade 
throwing range as about this distance . 
3 . Haig War Diary entry, 9 July 1915, P 221, Acc 3155 . 101 
Haig 
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1 
wait for a perfect gap. But again, G.H.Q. failed to re-
lease the Cavalry divisions, along with three Infantry divi-
sions, to First Army in time to exploit the initial attack. 2 
Once more, the Cavalry were left unused; and once more it 
was doubted whether they could be of any value. B~lts of 
barbed wire, a material invented to restrict the movement of 
animals, Heavy Artillery and an enemy troop density of three 
men to a yard of front (eighteen times that at Diamond Hill) 
were formidable obstacles. Infantry firepower was less so: 
the dictum (quoted with approval by Edmunds in the Official 
History) that 'you can't have a Cavalry charge until you 
have captured the enemy's last machine gun' proved false. J 
But if the Cavalry were to break through, it would only be 
at heavy loss. Still, this was what they had always known 
and trained for; it was what 'Cavalry Spirit' and the arme 
1. Haig War Diary entry, 8 September 1915, p 94, Acc J155. 
102 Haig; Pease, History of the Northumberland (Hussars) 
Yeomanry, p 122 
2. Marshal-Cornwall, Haig as Military Commander, pp 162-7; 
Official History, France & Belgium 1915, Vol II, p J97 
J. Official History, France & Belgium 1918, Vol V, p 196, 
quoting an anonymous American officer. On p 216 of the 
same volume there is a description of a Canadian ilivalry 
charge capturing 2JO prisoners, one howitzer, two field 
guns and 40 machine guns. Haig War Diary entry, 1 March 
1916, plan p 2, Acc J155.105 Haig, shows British and 
German forces both as having between 2 and J.5 rifles 
per yard on the Western Front, the British average being 
J.08 and the German 2.25. Stone, The Eastern Front, 
1914-17, gives the troop density of both sides on the 
Italian Front as J rifles to a yard. For comparison, 
according to Lascelles, 'The Influence of Ground on Shock 
Action', CJ Vol 5, no 19, p 492, concentration of men per 
yard at the following battles was: English at Waterloo, 
1J.25; Prussians at Gravelotte/Mars la Tour, 16·5; English 
at Diamond Hill, 0·9; Russians at Mukden, J·O 
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blanche were all about. 
Following his replacement of French, Haig 
told his Army Commanders in January 1916 that the first 
stage of his strategy would be a wearing out fight in which 
the Cavalry breakthrough would play no part. For the 
planned summer offensive he issued instructions on the 
Cavalry's role in exploiting a gap: 
We cannot expect to do this by at once 
pushing mobile troops through the breech to 
operate at any great distance beyond it. 
The first gap will probably not be wide 
enough to pass great forces through, even 
if they were immediately available; while 
small forces, however mobile, pushed through 
beyond suppporting distance would, under the 
existing conditions of the enemy's reserves, 
certainly be held up, and eventually enveloped 
by superior numbers ••• The operations to be 
undertaken will entail both attack and defence, 
mounted and dismounted, and the closest co-
operation between the cavalry and the other 
arms will be essential. 1 
Haig therefore rejected the main tenet of Cavalry strategic 
doctrine since the 1890s, the belief that Cavalry should be 
independent of the other arms. Instead, in March, the two 
Cavalry Corps were broken up, and three of the divisions, 
along with three Infantry divisions, given to Gough to 
create, in his words, 'a striking force composed of all arms 
with cavalry predominating,.2 This was to come under the 
orders of Rawlinson's Fourth Army, which was to make the 
attack, and be inserted behind the first advance to fight 
1. Haig War Diary entries, 8 January 1916, p 39 and 18 Janu-
ary 1916, p 56, Acc 3155.104 Haig; Haig War Diary paper 
32(b), p 31, Acc 3155.105 Haig 
2. Gough, The Fifth Army, p 138 
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its way forward . If successful, the leading Cavalry divi-
sion was intended to reach Bapaume, an advance of just ten 
miles, and a far cry from the raids envisaged in earlier 
1 theory. Haig instructed Gough to improve the Cavalry's 
training and dismiss incompetents. 'Above all', Haig wrote, 
'he is to spread the "doctrine" and get cavalry officers to 
believe in the power of their arm when acting in co- opera-
tion with guns and infantry . I am told that there are some 
ff ' h th'nk th t l l ' d ,,2 o lcers W 0 1 a cava ry are no onger requlre • 
Just prior to the attack, Haig told Rawlinson 'to impress on 
his Corps commanders the use of their Corps cavalry and 
mounted troops, and if necessary to supplement 't"hem with 
regular Cavalry units,.3 Rawlinson, unimpressed, recorded 
that although the Cavalry were 'dying to get at the Boches', 
. he would not use them 'unless there is a really good chance 
4 for them' . Such a chance in fact occurred on the fi:rS:; day 
of the attack, 1 July, on the right flank, where in contrast 
to the rest of the line, by mid- afternoon considerable 
success had been achieved. However, a t mid- day Rawlinson 
had already decided there was no use for the Cavalry, and 
they received no orders . Gough with the reserve Infantry 
1 . Official History, France & Belgium, 1916, Vol I, p 267; 
Gough, The Fifth Army, p 132 
2 . Haig War Diary entries, 9 April 1916, p 71, Acc 3155.105 
and 18 June 1916, p 61, Acc 3155 . 106 Haig 
3 . Haig War Diary, secret memo to Rawlinson, 13 April 1916, 
p 76, Acc 3155.105, and entry, 27 June 1916, p 71, Acc 
3155 . 106 Haig 
40 Rawlinson Diary entry, 30 June 1916, Rawl ins on/WW1 
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was instead sent to restore order to the shattered left wing 
of the Fourth Army, a command which was to grow into the 
Fifth Army by the end of the battle . In this sense, Gough 
was the one Army commander to owe his position to the 
1 Cavalry. Shortly afterwards, the Cavalry Corps of all five 
divisions was reconstituted under Kavanagh, the experiment 
having apparently failed. 
The next major push, on 14 July, only showed 
the impracticality of the existing method of keeping Cavalry 
rigidly separate from the rest of the Army. At 7.40 a.m. 
Rawlinson, directing the attack against High Wood, called for 
the 2nd Indian Cavalry Div-sion, and at 8.20 a.m. it began to 
move forward. At 1.30 p.m. the German Artillery began to 
withdraw safely before the attack. 'If only', Rawlinson com-
plained, forgetting himself, 'we could get the Cavalry 
, 
through to charge them l' Finally, at 7 p.m., nearly twelve 
hours after beginning its advance, the leading brigade 
crossed the old British trench line, and its leading squadron 
was able to charge through German Infantry and machine- guns, 
quite successfully, retiring with thirty- two German prisoners 
for twenty- four casualties, before darkness fell . 2 Rawlin-
son's prophesy of the uselessness of Cavalry was becoming 
self- fulfilling. At the next major attack on 15 September, 
1. Rawlinson Diary entry, timed at 12.15 p.m., 1 July 1916, 
Rawlinson!WW1; Gough, The Fifth Army, p 138 
2. Rawlinson Diary entry, 14 July 1916, Rawlinson!WW1; 
Official History, France & Belgium, 1916, Vol II, pp 85- 7; 
Scott, Records of the Seventh Dragoon Guards During the 
Great War, pp 71 - 5 
.............................. _-
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after the Cavalry Corps had been re-created, Haig again 
stressed to him the need to employ the Cavalry in a major 
role. 'I think that there is a fair chance of getting the 
Cavalry through', Rawlinson noted, 'but I am a little 
anxious lest Kavanagh should act prematurely, and thus com-
promise the actions of the other arms.' 1 Again on the day 
of the attack Haig visited Rawlinson to impress on him the 
use of the Cavalr~ and again they received no orders. 2 The 
Cavalry, who were taught that 'it is better to act quickly 
and chance a mistake than not to act at all',3 were, to the 
disgust of regimental officers, left 'still waiting about 
in the mud,.4 The one improvement in the theory of using 
Cavalry to come from the Somme offensive was Rawlinson's 
agreement with Kavanagh that 'the leading regiment must 
settle the moment for the Cavalry to go through,.5 But this 
method of control depended very heavily on the quality of 
regimental officers, and this quality was steadily decliningf 
The War Comnittee, and later War Cabinet, 
were educated civilians who, like Arnold-Forster in 1904, 
knew little about Cavalry and only the public face of the 
arme blanche controversy. They saw no reason to keep useless 
1Q Rawlinson Diary entry, 14 September 1916, Rawlinson/WW1; 
Haig War Diary entry, 14 September 1916, p 16, Acc 3155. 
108 Haig 
2. Rawlinson Diary entry, 15 September 1916, Rawlinson/WW1 
3. Bateman, Cavalry School Notebook, p 27, 7910-87 Bateman 
4. Talbot-Rice to his parents, 20 September 1916, 7514-80 
Talbot-Rice 
5. Rawlinson Diary entry, 11 September 1916, Rawlinson/WW1 
6. Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 281 
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troops in France. In May 1916, anxious over British shipping 
losses to mines and submarines, they told Robertson, as Chief 
of Imperial General Staff, to investigate the possibility of 
reducing the number of Cavalry in France or sending them 
1 
elsewhere. Shortly afterwards, George V intervened, in an 
echo of his father's approach to Roberts, to ask Haig if the 
number of Cavalry could not be reduced. To the King Haig 
insisted that the mobility of Cavalry was essential 'to 
2 
shorten the war and reap the fruits of any success'. To 
Robertson he replied that 'if we can't effect economy then 
some must go, but I have an inward feeling that events will 
make us regret the reduction in mounted troops,.3 This ex-
plains Haig's anxiety to employ the Cavalry during the Somme 
offensive: he needed to justify their existence. But at the 
same time, i f used wrongly, or prematurely, they could be 
fatally weakened; the British Empire had no Cavalry reserves. 
On the outbreak of war, as a reserve to the 
Cavalry, two Mounted Divisions had been formed from the Yeo-
manry Brigades, each with a cyclist battalion per brigade 
(so regularising the position of the Yeomanry CYClists).4 
Yeomen who declined to serve overseas were replaced by 
1. Haig War Diary, Robertson to Haig, 19 May 1916, notes 
26-7, Acc 3155.106 Haig 
2. Haig 
Haig 
3. Haig 
note 
note 
War Diary entry, 7 June 1916, p 48, Acc 3155.106 
War Diary, Haig to Robertson, 29 May 1916, p 30, 
108, and see also Haig to Robertson, 20 May 1916, 
30, both Acc 3155.106 Haig 
4. Order of Battle of Divisions in the Great War, Vol 2a, 
pp 1-34 ( I • W • M. ) 
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volunteers, characteristically of the urban artisan classes, 
men such as railway trainees, teachers, clerks, and shop 
. 1 
assistants, with no experlence of horses. To compensate for 
this, up to four regular Cavalry officers were transferred 
to each regiment going overseas. 2 The first line regiments 
of 1st Mounted Division were sent to France to make up the 
Cavalry Divisions or act as Corps Cavalry; but the second 
line formations had scarcely acquired horses, Artillery or 
even rifles when, in June 1916, Robertson converted them in-
to cyclists. Haig was angry at being robbed of his reserve? 
but with prevailing views on the training of Cavalry the 
change made sense, and was greeted with only mild grumbling 
by the recruits. One regiment, in a mixture of humour and 
sentimentality, erected a monument, 'Sacred to the Memory 
of Spurs'. 4 
In August 1915 the 2nd Mounted Division was 
sent, dismounted, to Gallipoli, where it was effectively 
destroyed by losses. Two more complete brigades had to be 
added to the original three during the fighting. When in 
early November the original contingent was withdrawn, one 
brigade numbered only 854, and a regiment just 127 men. 5 
1. Moynihan, A Place Called Armageddon, p 107 
2. Stonham and Freeman, Historical Records of the Middlesex 
Yeomanry 1797-1927, p 1J1 
J. Haig War Diary, Haig to Robertson, J February 1916, p 86, 
Acc J155.104 Haig 
4. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, p 2JJ 
5. Order of Battle of Divisions in the Great War, Vol 2a, 
pp 1-J4 (I.W.Mo); Rowe, The 2nd County of London Yeomanry, 
p 59; stonham and Freeman, Historical Records of the Mid-
dlesex Yeomanry, pp 140-9; Fox, The History of the Royal 
Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry, pp 77, J17 
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In Egypt, two months later, the division was broken up, some 
regiments going to Salonika, some remaining dismounted, and 
others being re-mounted, along with regiments of Australian 
Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles (neither of 
which carried the ~ blanche) to form the Imperial Mounted 
Division and ANZAC Mounted Division, opposing the Turkish 
forces in Sinai. The regimental system provided a central 
cadre and a tradi tio1Jl.!, but the maj ori ty of officers and men 
in the Yeomanry were by 1916 either wartime soldiers or 
regular Cavalrymen. This gave the Empire a total of seven 
Cavalry or Mounted Divisions, not counting independent bri-
gades or Corps troops. (In fact the Cavalry in Mesopotamia, 
which were, all but one regiment, Indian troops, were formed 
into an eighth, the Indian Cavalry Division, in 1918.) These 
divisions wer~ composed of British Household and Line Cavalry, 
Indian Cavalry, Canadian Mounted Rifles, British Yeomanry, 
Australian Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, with-
out a common tactical doctrine and with every gradation of 
belief in the ~ blanche. As in South Africa, this made 
almost no difference. On the Western Front the Cavalry be-
came Mounted Rifles in all but name; in Palestine the Mounted 
Rifles became Cavalry. 
On 9 November 1916,in the aftermath of the 
Somme offensive, the War Committee again discussed the 
Cavalry's fate. They heard from David Lloyd ,George, Secre-
tary of State for War, that there were 54,828' Cavalry horses 
in France, 45,900 of them in the Cavalry Divisions. 
--J1J-
It was his intention at the proper time to 
raise the question of whether we need these 
cavalry in France. Was there ••• the sLghtest 
chance that the cavalry could be used for a 
breakthrough? He was told that on the 
Eastern Front, where the cavalry had several 
times gone through, they had invariably been 
roughly handled and driven bact often badly 
shattered by a few machine-guns. 1 
The Russian Cossacks were indeed still poorly led troops, 
and the Austrian Cavalry, imbued with the doctrine of the 
2 
massed charge, not much better. Neither resembled British 
Cavalry in standards or tactics. Lloyd George, like the rest 
of the War Committee, did not understand such subtleties; 
while the Committee's ignorance of the Cavalry itself was 
remarkable. Haig's G.HoQ., replying to their suggestion that 
the Cavalry might be wintered in Britain to save shipping 
over forage (now 1J pounds of oats for each horse) pointed 
out that where~s the transport of rations and horse forage 
for the three British divisions would require, for a three 
month period, 74,620 ship tons, it would take 480,000 ship 
tons to move the divisions from France to England and back 
again. J Lord Curzon suggested that the Indian Cavalry might 
be sent to Egypt on grounds of economy: 
The consequent saving would be eight ships 
of 4,000 tons for two months and eight ships 
a year for forage. This might appear a negli-
gible quantity, but he wished the War Committee 
to realise that we had come to such a pass that 
we had literally to scrape up ships.4 
1. CAB/22/65 pp 4-5 
2. Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-17, pp 50, 80 
J. Haig War Diary entry, 2J November 1916, p 30, Acc J155.109 
and Memoranda on Cavalry, Acc J155.214h, Haig; CAB/2J/1 
p 82; CAB/22/7J, pp 1-7 and p J of the conclusion. 
4. CAB/22/7J p 5; Memoranda on Cavalry, memo by Curzon, 14 
November 1916, Acc J155.214h Haig 
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In truth the Cavalry, about 2t per cent of the B.E.F.'s per-
sonnel and 6 per cent of its horses, was too small a force 
1 to have any great effect on supply and manpower problems . 
As an arm of exploitation its value was simply unknown, but 
there was no apparent alternative . 
The trench crossing tank, a slow moving 
vehicle, was not an alternative nor meant to be one. Even 
the 'Whippet' medium tanks, which did not come into action 
until the spring of 1918, were, with a speed over normal 
2 ground of 8 m. p . h., regularly outpaced by the Cavalry. 
Armoured cars were invaluable in open country: Yeomanr y prac-
tising manoeuvres against them in 1914 and 1915 found that 
they had no real answer to them other than Artillery,J and 
Haig looked forward to their being used against machine- guns 
in co- operation with Cavalryo4 They were used in this manner 
following up the retreat to the Siegfried Line in 1917,5 and 
in Palestine . 6 But, unlike Cavalry, they could not easily 
1. Memoranda on Cavalry, memo 14 November 1916 from Q.M.G. 
to C. in C. , B.E . F., Acc J155 . 214h Haig; Terraine, The 
Smoke and the Fire, p 162; -ra. b-1 w, Parb- --rhree, --Ja. lrl~ 3 
2 . The War His tory of the 6th Tank Battalion, especially 
p 1J2 
J . Moynihan, A Place Called Arma eddon, p 111; Verdin, The 
Cheshire Earl of Chester's Yeomanr 18 8 - 1 6 , pp 49- 50 
In the abortive South African rebellion of September-
November 1914, a small party of horsemen under de Wet was 
captured by using constant pursuit by light cars to deny 
the horses any rest until they collapsed . See Sampson, 
The Capture of de Wet, p 204 
4. Haig War Diary entry, 8 March 1915, p 144, Acc J155 . 100 
Haig 
5 . Official History, France & Belgium, 1917" Vol I, P 1 J6 
6 . See below p J40 
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clear the broken ground of a battlefield to reach open 
country. Aeroplanes had taken part of the Cavalry's role in 
1 
scouting, but were sometime rendered useless by the weather 
and tended to detect formations rather than identify them; 
Cavalrymen gleefully collected anecdotes of aerial misidenti-
f · t· 2 J..ca J..on. But Cavalry had no answer to attack from the air 
(any more than to Heavy Artillery) other than to hope their 
own aircraft would achieve air superiority.3 When in the 
last days of 1918 this was achieved, Haig drew up plans for 
a force of 300 ground attack aeroplanes to co-operate with 
the Cavalry in the event of a breakthrough. 4 
Lloyd George, in raising the question of the 
Cavalry's value, ignored its known successes in defence. 
This was perhaps understandable, as Haig's plans were offen-
sives which looked for ways to use the Cavalry on the attack, 
but he himself expected their dismounted defensive abilities 
to be of use even in these operations . 5 After consulting 
with Robertson he replied to Lloyd George's criticism: 
The point was , was there a reasonable possi-
bility of using the cavalry: had the enemy's 
moral [sic] been so shaken that there was a 
chance of breaking through and letting the 
cavalry get to work ? •• [Haig and Robertson] 
1. According to Whyte and Atteridge, A History of the Queens 
Bays, p 215, a heavy dawn mist prevented aerial reconnais-
sance before the battle of Le Cateau. 
2. 'Summary of Information, 2nd Cavalry Division, Christmas 
Number 1914, Charrington 1/2 Charrington 
3. Lloyd, A Trooper in the Tins, p 259. Transport horses 
were also extremely vul~erable to air attack . 
4. Haig War Diary entry, 7 October 1918, p 15, ' Acc 3155.132 
Haig 
50 See above p 306 
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were satisfied that the moral [sic] of the 
enemy had been so far reduced that there 
appeared to be a reasonable prospect of the 
use of cavalry. He reminded the Committee 
that the cavalry were the only force left 
which consisted of seasoned soldiers. 1 
Given the stam of the Cavalry, this was highly questionable. 
It amounted to Haig'-s 'feeling' that the Cavalry would be 
needed. But Haig knew, and explained to the Committee, how 
weak the Cavalry force was: nearly 9,000 short of Lloyd 
George's estimate. 2 The problem causing the crisis in ship-
ping was forage, and this depended on the number of horses 
in the Army, not in the Cavalry. Horses were needed for 
Artillery, Engineers, and Transport, and their number would 
continue to increase as the Army in France expanded. At the 
highest point, in June 1917, there were 460,000 horses and 
mules in the B.E.F o , over 128,000 of which needed replacing 
by the following month . It was later calculated that a 
greater tonnage of fodder was sent to France than of ammuni-
tion. 3 Robertson's most pressing problem was the damage done 
to stone-flagged roads in the Army's rear areas by motor-
vehicles, he wanted more Transport horses to ease this;4 
1. CAB/22/78 p 3 
2. ibid 
3. Official Publication Statistical Abstract of Information 
Regarding the Armies at Home and Abroad 1 October 1 1 
I.W.M. , p 77 shows that between 9 August 191 and 
2 August 1919 the British forces in France received 
5,269,302 tons of ammunition and 5,916,104 tons of oats 
and hay across the Channel. These and similar figures 
have been mistakenly used as a criticism of the Cavalry. 
See Liddell Hart, A History of the First World War, p 35; 
Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-17, p 49 . 
4. Haig notes, 20 November 1916, 'Notes on a letter from 
C.I.G.S. to C-in-C. dated 18 November 1916', Acc 3155. 
214h Haig 
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while Haig had already saved over 18,000 horses by 'combing 
out' the divisional ammunition columns, more than would have 
been saved by sending the Indian Cavalry, nearly half the 
Cavalry in France, 1 to Egypt. 
For the Arras offensive of April 1917, Haig 
planned for a possible breakthrough with the Cavalry. But at 
the same time he issued orders that 'they should be carefully 
handled so that their value may remain unimpaired; it is 
essential that the Cavalry Corps should be in a condition to 
deliver an effective blow against the enemy in battle; this 
moment has not yet arrived. ,2 To attack and not to take 
casualties were mutually exclusive objectives. Both Haig 
and Kavanagh expressed deep concern when a Cavalry brigade, 
pressing hard on an apparently successful assault at Monchy, 
was counter-attacked and lost heavily holding the village 
dismounted. 3 Byng wrote gloomily to Chetwode (thmin Sinai 
commanding the Desert Mounted Column, including the two 
Mounted Divisions) that 'it seems rather a pity to lose all 
these chaps who were perfect Cavalrymen for the sake of a 
village which is a complete shell trap for the British side' ~ 
Byng, like Rawlinson, had ceased to believe in the decisive 
breakthrough, 'we gave up that catchword some time ago',5 he 
1. CAB/22/78 p 6 
2. Haig War Diary, 20 March 1917, p 29, note 337, Acc 3155. 
111 Haig 
3. Official History, France & Belgium, 1917, Vol I, pp 263-5; 
Haig War Diary entry, 11 April 1917, p 18, Acc 3155.112 
Haig; Fraser Diary entry 9-11 April 1917, Fraser 
4. Byng to Chetwode, 30 May 1917, folder three Chetwode 
5. ibid 
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told Chetwode. In fact, Cavalry losses at Monchy were about 
500 killed and wounded, but even these could not be spared. 
By February 1917 the Cavalry regiments were noticeably below 
strength, and some Corps Cavalry units were too weak even to 
train effectively. Haig's GoHoQ. discovered that Robertson, 
more anxious about the weakness of the Infantry divisions, 
had been sending Cavalry recruits to France as Infantry or 
Engineers, and they were impossible to recover for the 
Cavalry. The Cavalry reserve in Britain, theoretically 
1 15,000 men, was less than 5,000 all told. 
The Third Battle of Ypres was launched later 
in the year with no plan to use the Cavalry until after the 
2 Passchendaele ridge was captured. This occupied the rest 
of the battle while the Cavalry waited. In the later stages 
of the offens~ve, Robertson, still worried about Infantry 
manpower, stopped Cavalry recruiting; it was not resumed 
for the rest of the war.J During September, when it ap-
peared that the ridges in front of Ypres might be taken 
quickly, Haig instructed Kavanagh to train the Cavalry in 
4 
co-operation with tanks. This was a new departure, tanks 
1. Haig War Diary entry, 20 December 1916, p 58, Acc J155. 
109 and Note 79 of Army Commanders' Conference, J Feb-
ruary 1917, p 2; also entry, 1 February 1917, p JJ, Acc 
J155.110 Haig. See also Tables, Part .Three, Table 2 
2. Haig War Diary, 22 July 1917, note 111, 'Note on possible 
employment of the Cavalry Corps during the forthcoming 
operations', Acc J155.115 Haig 
J. Terraine, The Road to Passchendaele, p 2J5 
4. Haig War Diary entry, 24 September 1917, p ' 48, Acc J155. 
117 Haig 
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1 being previously regarded as Infantry support weapons. 
Following the failure at Ypres, nearly four hundred tanks 
were available to attempt this co-operation in November at 
the battle of Cambrai. Attacking this late in the year pre-
sented its own problems. There was no reserve if the attack 
succeeded; first light on the day of the attack, 20 Novembe~ 
was after 6 a.m., the Cavalry advanced at 8.30 a.m., and 
dusk was less than nine hours later, with heavy rain in the 
2 
afternoon. Quite exceptional co-operation was needed be-
tween Byng's Third Army, III and IV Corps, which would make 
the attack, the Tank Corps, and the Cavalry Corps • . This 
now consisted of average or poor officers and men, who rode 
indifferent horses (gettirgless than 10 pounds of oats a 
day because of the shipping shortageYand, after three years 
of inactivity, were despised by the rest of the Army, parti-
cularly the ultra-modern Tanks. 
Haig, remembering his own experiment before 
the Somme, recommended to Byng the formation of 'detachments 
of all arms, lightly equipped A to lead the attack. But, as 
in the 1880s, this represented a personal belief, not an 
Army doctrine. Byng and his planners ignored it. In the 
1. Haig War Diary entries, 5 April 1916, p 66, Acc 3155.105 
and 19 August 1917, p 36, Acc 3155.116 Haig; CAB/23/1, 
p 146 
2. Woolcombe, The First Tank Battle, pp 68, 135 
3. CAB/23/5, p 105. rhis was the official rate; according 
to Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, p 267, winter 
forage rates were cut to 9 pounds of oats and 6 pounds 
of hay, and often fell below that rate. 
4. Haig War Diary, Haig to Byng, 3 November 1917, note 6, 
Acc 3155.119 Haig 
-J20-
centre IV Corps planned to make its main attack with two 
separate brigades from different divisions, while one tank 
commander summed up his orders as 'we go straight in and 
1 
sit on the Germans until the Cavalry come', rather than 
co- operating in the advance. On the right flank, the bulk 
of the Cavalry Corps, led by the 5th Cavalry Division (pre-
viously the 2nd Indian Division) and the 2nd Cavalry Divi-
sion, was to pass over the Canal de l'Escourt and advance 
towards Cambrai itself. But as Brigadier- General Seely of 
the Canadian brigade complained, his men were faced with an 
impassable obstacle . 'Horses can cross almost anything', he 
wrote, 'they can even swim broad rivers, as they have often 
done in war. But the one thing they cannot get over, unless 
they can bridge it, is a canal with perpendicular banks . 
They can get in but they can't get out . ,2 It was compara-
tively easy for the Germans to destroy or defend the existing 
bridges before the slow- moving tanks could reach them. One 
tank commander, finding his target bridge already damaged, 
recalled: 
1 • 
2. 
J . 
Then a most ludicrous thing happened . There 
was a great deal of clattering, galloping and 
shouting and a lot of our medieval horse soldiers 
came charging down the street ; I yelled at them 
that the bridge was gone but they took no notice 
of me and went right up to it, one m.g. would 
have wiped out the lot, and then they turned 
about and with a very pious air trotted back 
the way they had come . ] 
Official Historz, France & Belgium, 1917, Vol III, 
279 - 80 
Seely, Adventure, pp 27J- 4 
Quoted in Woolcombe, The F::il:B t Tank Battle, p 85 
pp 29, 
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These were probably not British Cavalry but Canadians of the 
Fort Garry Horse . Finding the bridge down, they sought for 
another, and came to a narrow undefended footbridge. One 
squadron crossed with half an hour of daylight remaining, 
and charged successfully through the German rear areas be-
fore, having lost half their numbers, the men stampeded their 
horses and re- crossed the canal on foot. Another undefended 
bridge was missed altogether by the Cavalry. In the mid-
afternoon the commander of 2nd Cavalry Division, assuming 
local command and finding his target bridge not secure, 
ordered the rest of the Cavalry off their horses to start a 
fire-fight, ending Cavalry operations on the right flank . 
In the centre there was no such obstacle, 
but neither was there the enterprise shown by the Canadians 
under Seely, an ex-Yeoman and Boer War veteran who believed 
1 firmly in the mounted charge. The commander of the 1st 
Cavalry Division, uncertain in his dual responsibility to 
the Cavalry Corps and IV Corps, and frustrated by orders 
that took more than an hour to arrive, hesitated to commit 
his troops. Headquarters of IV Corps was convinced that 
for two hours they had made a clear gap that the Cavalry 
failed to find, and after the battle made a formal complaint 
to that effect. 2 Again, only one squadron (of the 4th 
Dragoon Guards) found its way through into the open before 
dusk, and charged in the pouring rain through German 
1. Seely, Adventure, pp 213, 254. Seely was 'also a Liberal 
Member of Parliament who had served as Secretary of State 
for War, 1912- 14 
2. Woolcombe, The First Tank Battle, pp 126- 35 
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ammunition columns and foot patrols, returning with fifty 
prisoners for the loss of fifteen men and thirty horses. 1 
But that was all. 
At Cambrai, as at previous battles, there was 
no solution to the communications problem, and no attempt 
to use Cavalry in co- operation with other arms. Disappoint-
ment after the failure on the first day (with the subse-
quent loss of surprise) was immense, and most of it focussed 
on the Cavalry itself. A junior Cavalry officer reported to 
Haig on the 1st Cavalry Division: 
When the Infantry gained their first objective 
with hardly a casualty the dreamed of 'gap' 
was there ••• why did the cavalry fail? for fail 
they did to justify their traditions • • • 
1) Incredultty on the part of many senior 
officers • •• 
2) Lack of enthusiasm ••• due to stagnation which 
now obtains in the cavalry; due to slow pro-
motions, boredom, and the waning of the fire 
whicn must always burn in good cavalry . 
J) Lack of 'drive' ••• 
It was the one chance the cavalry have had in 
the war, to date, and it failed from lack of 
offensive spirit, amongst the leaders, not, as 
a rule, the regimental officers • • • it failed as 
a result of three years in the back areas, in 
'intensive training' usually of the wrong de-
scription ••• It failed because the offensive has 
entirely given way to the defensive spirit, and 
because failure is not visited with the drastic 
penalty it deserves . 2 
Another, more senior, observer blamed the lack of success 
on the complete lack of liaison between the Cavalry, Infantry 
and Tanks, and lack of vigour on the par t of the commander 
and Brigadier- Generals of 1st Cavalry Division. Haig felt 
1 . Gibb, Records of the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards in 
the Great War, pp 51 - 2 
2 . Haig War Diary, note 111, 'Private', Acc J155 . 119 Haig 
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there was 'much truth' in this. 1 The argument was, in 
effect, that too much dismounted action produced poor 
Cavalry, as Haig had believed before the war. 
In contrast to the Western Front, in 
Palestine the main problems were heat and the shortage of 
water, and the lessons of South Africa in horsemastership 
and tactics of direct value. 2 The 1917 campaign depended 
on the Beersheba water supply being taken intact; in fifteen 
days fighting the Egyptian Expeditionary Force consumed 
610,900 gallons which otherwise would have had to have been 
transported twenty miles from the railhead. 3 Forage was an 
average of 9i pounds of barley a day, about 75 per cent of 
the nutritional value of the ration in France. Horses and 
camels were vital, since although light cars and lorries 
were widely used their engines could not stand constant work 
in semi-desert conditions. However, after June 1917, be-
cause of shipping problems, the mounted troops in Palestine 
received no remounts at all. 4 The Turkish Army, formi-
dable in defence and high in morale until the last months 
of 1918, was below European standards in training, leader-
ship and equipment. In fact, the Palestine campaign was a 
1. Haig War Diary, note 115, 'Personal narrative', Acc 3155. 
119 Haig 
2. For the theory of wars between alliances resembling mul-
tiple separate wars with different characteristics, see 
Blainey, The Causes of War, pp 235-7, 271 
3 . Returns for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force 27 October 
1917-11 November 1917, folder six, Chetwode; Preston, The 
Desert Mounted Corps, p 13 
4. Dawney to Chetwode, 6 February 1917, folder two, Chetwode; 
Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, pp 311-21; but see 
also below, Appendix Two 
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colonial war, in which by comparison with South Africa 
there was no altitude problem, few diseases, and the theatre 
of war was tiny: only fifty miTes from the coast to the 
Jordan Valley, and barely four hundred from Gaza to Aleppo. 
The Turks had by April 1917 been driven back to a defensive 
line from Gaza to Beersheba, with an open flank towards the 
desert, held by a troop density of less than one man to a 
yard with few reserves. More importantly, their trenches 
were never wired. By October the British and Australians 
had 56,000 Infantry opposing 50,000 and 550 guns to 360, 
along with a massive superiority in mounted troops, 20,000 
against 1,500 poor quality Turkish Cavalry who gave no 
opposition. There would be no Cavalry against Cavalry charges 
in Palestine, but all the factors which inhibited the use of 
Cavalry against Infantry on the Western Front were also 
1 
absent. 
Chetwode considered his ANZAC Mounted troops 
lacked the flexibility of British Regular Cavalry, and their 
commanders the dash of true Cavalry officers. He insisted 
on referring to them, and to the Yeomanry, officially as 
Mounted Rifles. This was partly a trick: it enabled Chetwode 
to keep the 18-pounderField guns with which his Mounted 
Divisions were equipped, rather than the 13- pounder guns of 
Horse Artillery. 2 The Yeomanry and an Independent Indian 
1. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, p 43 
2. Whigham to Chetwode, 17 January 1917, Lyqden-Bell to 
Chetwode, 22 January 1917, folder one; Chetwode review 
20 April 1917, Chetwode to Lynden-Bell, 8 May 1917, Lyn-
den-Bell to Chetwode, 30 May 1917, folder three, Chetwode 
- 325-
Cavalry brigade in his force carried the arme blanche, the 
ANZAC troops only the rifle and bayonet on the principle 
advocated by Childers. Nonetheless, as an American study 
of the campaign refreshingly put it, 'however they may have 
been classed prior to 1917, they had by training and ex-
perience in war in fact become Cavalry, and there is no good 
purpose gained by splitting hairs about the meaning of the 
1 
word Cavalry'. In July 1917 Allenby arrived in Palestine 
with reinforcements. This was not the deliberate placing of 
a Cavalryman with a large Cavalry force: Smut$ , Horne, Lord 
Cavan and even Birdwood had all been previously considered 
2 for the post. Along with Allenby came two Cavalry Major-
Generals, George Barrow and J.M. Shea (who had been a Major 
in Barrow's regiment in India before the war) both of whom 
gave up Infantry divisions in France to do so.3 The extra 
troops made it possible to form two complete Army Corps, XX 
and XXI Corps, and a Desert Mounted Corps under the Austra-
lian Major-General Chauvel. This contained a Yeomanry Divi-
sion under Barrow (all of the brigades and five of the nine 
regiments of which were commanded by British or Indian 
regular Cavalrymen), an Australian Mounted Division under 
another British Cavalryman, Major-General Hodgson, and an 
ANZAC Mounted Division under the New Zealander, Major-General 
Chaytor, plus two independent brigades. Chetwode was given 
1. The Palestine Campaign, monograph by the United states 
Cavalry School , hereafter Cavalry School Narrative , , p 66 
2. CAB/22/2, pp 129, 156; Haig War Diary, Robertson to Haig, 
15 April 1917, Acc 3155.112 Haig; Lloyd George, War 
Memoirs, Vol II, p 1087, writes that Allenby was Robert-
son's recommendation. 
3. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 165 
F 
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th XX C d Sh I f t d '" 1 e new orps, an ea an n an ry lVlSlon. 
In order to achieve the necessary concentra-
tion of troops for his plan, which involved pinning the 
Turkish force at Gaza while turning their other flank at 
Beersheba, Allenby left a seventeen mile gap between his 
Infantry Corps, covered only by mounted patrols. On 31 
October Chetwode's Corps attacked Beersheba while Chauvel's 
men, with the Australian Mounted Division leading, out-
flanked it from the desert. This division, coming under 
increasing Turkish fire, found itself pinned an hour before 
dusk a few miles from the town. The water supply was vital; 
the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade was ordered to charge 
through the Turkish trench lines, two trenches deep, and 
take it. Reconnaissance showed that the ground was clear of 
obstacles, and the brigade could deploy concealed from the 
enemy. Machine guns and Artillery gave covering fire from 
a flank as, two regiments in front and one in reserve, the 
brigade formed three successive lines of squadrons, with 300 
yards between lines and four yards between files. As dusk 
fell the Australians, holding their bayonets like swords, 
charged over and through the unwired Turkish trenches for 
the loss of sixty~four killed and wounded, causing the 
defence to collapse and the town to fall with more than a 
thousand prisoners. The Turks had not lowered their rifle 
1. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, pp 331-6: Order of 
Battle of Divisions in the Great War, VQl 2a, pp 1-34 
(I~W.M.) compared with past Army Lists for previous 
careers of brigade and regimental commanders. 
F'" 
1 
sights below 800 yards. 
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Before Allenby's arrival, it had been argued 
that the sword should be abandoned as it had been in South 
Africa. 2 The charge at Beersheba, so similar to Klip Drift, 
renewed the Cavalry's faith in the ~ blanche. It was 
not, however, by any means the most spectacular charge in 
the campaign. For months the possibility of mounted troops 
'rushing' unwired trenches had been discussed and practised? 
With, again, no official doctrine, methods varied between 
brigades, the guidelines being that fire support should 
always be used if available, as near to right angle's to the 
charge as Possible. 4 In Palestine the ideas worked out be-
fore the war and on the Western Front were put into prac-
tice: co-operation between all arms, the leadership of 
junior comm~nders, directing from the front, and the use of 
mobile troops to reinforce success. These are the essential 
elements of the German 'expanding torrent' tactics which 
provided an answer to trench defences, and which they them-
selves worked out in semi-mobile warfare on the Eastern 
Front. 5 The Germans, of course, evolved these tactics with-
out Cavalry, and it is not suggested that the British could 
not have done the same. However, if the British had paid 
1. Allenby to Robertson, J November 1917, Robertson I/21/74 
Robertson; Cavalry School Narrative, pp 72-5 
2. Official History, Egypt & Palestine, Vol I, p 12J 
J. Hampton, memoirs, p 11, Hampton 
4. 
5. 
Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, p 55 · 
Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, pp 207, JOJ-8; 
Modern Warfare, p 194 
Bidwell, 
-J28-
more attention to the value of Cavalry, had there been more 
Cavalry and more Cavalry Generals on the Western Front, of 
the calibre of Haig or Allenby, it is possible they might 
have reached these tactics first. 
Gaza fell to XXI Corps on 6 November, and 
the Turks retreated, followed by the Cavalry and XX Corps. 
Most of the pursuing horses were without water for two days, 
and one Yeomanry formation endured 84 hours. 1 Yet, although 
the horses were weakened, there were virtually no deaths. 
The pursuit lasted only 19 days, and the lessons of South 
Africa had been learned by the Cavalrymen and Colonial 
officers of the Desert Mounted Corps. Sore backs were 
almost unheard of; as one Yeoman said, 'these men do not 
want telling how to make things easy for ''the old 'oss'~ they 
2 have I earned , by experience and a genuine sympathy for horses, 
a remarkable tribute to the training of townsmen who were 
thought incapable of such understanding in peacetime. They 
began to create their own Cavalry legends. At Huj on 8 
November Major-General Shea, his division facing 2,500 yards 
of open plain to .cross under shellfire, called for mounted 
support. A hundred and seventy Warwickshire and Worcester-
shire Yeomanry moved under cover to within 900 yards of the 
flank of three defending Turkish batteries, and charged be-
fore more than two guns could be turned against them. For 
60 per cent losses, they captured all the Turkish guns, four 
1. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 174 
2. Quoted in Tylden, Horses and Saddlery, p 42 
pi 
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machine guns and 70 prisoners o 'We had to mourn the loss 
of many a good Yeoman whom we could ill spare', wrote one 
traditionalist Major, 'but they had at least upheld the 
tradit i ons of British Cavalry, they had accomplished the 
end-all of a Cavalryman's training. ,1 They had also cleared 
the way for Shea's advance far more quickly, and at far less 
cost, than he could have done for himself. Five days later 
at El Mughar the 52nd Division, held up by Turkish trenches 
on a ridge behind 4,000 yards of open ground, asked for the 
same assistance. Two Yeomanry regiments, concealing their 
approach, charged uphill into the flank of 1,200 Turks in 
the trenches, killing or capturing nearly all for the loss 
of 129 men and 265 horses killed and wounded o About twenty 
wounded horses charged across the trench line before 
collapsing. 2, 
On 8 November, as the Turks retreated into 
the hills north of Jerusalem and reinforcements began to 
arrive from the north, Barrow ordered the Yeomanry Division 
off its horses to press the pursuit on foot against four 
times its own number of Infantry. Two days later, wheeled 
vehicles and guns, unable to cope with the hill paths, were 
sent back. Heavy rain turned the black cotton soil of the 
plains into a quagmire, paralysing camel and motor trans-
port, and, three days after that, the horses were withdrawn 
1 . Hampton, memoirs, p 22, Hampton; Preston, The Desert 
Mounted Corps, pp 53- 4; Adderley, The Warwickshire Yeo-
manry in the Great War, pp 123-32 
2. Falls, Armageddon, p 104; Freston, The Desert Mounted 
Corps, pp 80- 4 
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as they could no longer be fed. After four more days the 
division, under repeated Turkish counter attacks, having 
taken more than 40 per cent casualties fighting dismounted 
after riding 170 miles, was fought to a standstill, cold and 
wet, holding four miles of front with 800 rifles, no Artil-
lery, and the rock too hard to dig in. But by ceaseless 
pursuit they had prevented the Turks from forming an orga-
nised defence. They were relieved by two Infantry brigades, 
1 
and Jerusalem fell a few days later. After the war Allenby 
commented: 
Armed with modern weapons of precision, rifle 
and machine gun, in addition to its old-time 
equipment of sword and lance, Cavalry can adapt 
itself to any conditions. We used to hear, 
especially in peace manoeuvres, that such or 
such a tract of country was suited to Cavalry 
action. The truth is, that Cavalry can and 
will fit its tactics to any country. This has 
been shown repeatedly during the war just 
ended ~ in the wire-enclosed fields of Flanders, 
the holding clay of Picardy, the deserts of 
eastern and western Egypt, the alluvial areas 
of Mesopotamia, the rocky hills of Judea, the 
plains of the Palestine coast, the deep valley 
of the river Jordan, and the Mountains of Moab. 2 
The contrast between Allenby's confident and successful 
troops and those in France was absolute. 
The declaration of unrestricted submarine 
warfare by Germany in February 1917 greatly increased the 
shipping crisis, but new methods, notably the convoy system, 
eased the problem considerably, and by September, despite 
the anxiety of the Ministry of Shipping over horse trans-
1. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, pp 9'3-116; Chetwode 
to Dobell, 31 December 1917, folder six, Chetwode 
2. Allenby, quoted in Cavalry School Narrative, p 277 
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port and predictions of a new year cereal shortage, the 
crisis was clearly over. Lloyd George, who had become Prime 
Minister in December 1916, felt able, under pressure from 
the Jockey Club, to over- rule the War Cabinet and allow 
18,000 pounds of grain a day from July to December (enough 
for three Cavalry regiments) for use in training racehorses.1 
Nevertheless he was intent on removing the Cavalry from 
France. At a meeting of the War Cabinet Committee on Man-
power in December, Lloyd George argued from the Chair that 
Cavalry would never be used ther~ and (taking up an idea of 
Churchill's) that its personnel should be transferred to 
aircraft, tanks or armoured cars; a suggestion with which, 
2 Lloyd George said, Robertson was 'in substantial agreement'. 
On 7 January Haig defended his Cavalry to the War Cabinet: 
Sir Douglas Haig stated that he considered 
the value and importance of cavalry to be 
very great not only in offensive but also in 
defensive operations. This was due to their 
superior mobility and the ease with which 
cavalry could be moved from one sector to 
another and then used dismounted. He pointed 
out that the British Cavalry resembled highly 
trained mobile infantry rather than the old 
cavalry arm. 
The Prime Minister pointed out that the 
cavalry question vitally affected shipping, 
and that, in view of the shortage of shipping, 
he hoped that every effort would be- made to 
economise the requirements of the Army in the 
matter of horses and their maintenance. It 
would be most helpful if some of the. ships 
now utilised for the transport of horses and 
1. CAB/23/4, p 251; CAB/23/2, pp 140, 192; CAB/23/3, p 67; 
CAB/23/4, p 251. For a general description of the crisis, 
see: Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol II, pp 667- 712, and 
Churchill, The World Crisis, pp 830- 51 
2. CAB/23/13, p 187; CAB/27/14, p 14 of report, pp 3-4 of 
4th meeting; CAB/1/25/26, memo by Churchill, p 4 
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hay could be used for the purpose of bringing 
over American troops. 
Lord Curzon added that it would appear 
that the character of warfare during the en-
suing few months would present few opportunities 
for the use of cavalry. 
Sir Douglas Haig stated that once the 
cavalry had been disbanded it would be difficult 
to build up again so highly trained and technical 
an arm, and ,it would be many months before the 
cavalry, once dissipated, could be re-created. 1 
It made no difference. The Manpower Committee recommended 
the reduction of the Cavalry in France, on the argument that 
there were 13 Allied Cavalry divisions there facing two 
German Cavalry divisions, a clear indication of their 
opinion of the value of Cavalry. Following Curzon's sugges-
tion, the eleven Indian Cavalry regiments from 4th and 5th 
Cavalry Divisions2 were sent to Palestine, where the Yeo-
manry Division and separate brigades were broken up and the 
regiments used to re-form the two divisions. 3 The nine 
Yeomanry regiments left over from this process were con-
verted into machine gun battalions and sent to France, not 
to arriv8 until May. In France itself four British Cavalry 
regiments freed from the Indian divisions, along with the 
three Household regiments and two Corps Cavalry regiments 
which had so far escaped disbanding, were earmarked for con-
version to cyclists or machine gunners. The result was 
twenty regiments of Cavalry less in France for two more in 
1. CAB/23/13, p 187 
2. Before the single Cavalry Corps was formed in the summer 
of 1916 these had been known as 1st and 2nd Indian Cavalry 
Divisions 
3. Order of Battle of Divisions in the Great War, Vo1 2a, 
pp 1-34 (I.W.M.) 
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Palestine: Allenby was not substantially re-inforced. 
Robertson approved, but as he had already told the War 
Cabinet, sending the Cavalry to Palestine would not save on 
shipping. On the contrary, it took six times the amount of 
shipping to supply troops in Palestine from Britain as in 
1 France. The apparent saving of this re-organisation was 
the supplies of eleven Indian Cavalry regiments, or less 
than 2 per cent of the 2,700 tons of oats consumed daily by 
2 the B.E.F. But the tonnage of shipping required to move 
the various regiments to Palestine and France in fact ex-
ceeded the shipping saved in this manner. 3 Further,when 
the American troops did arrive, they were severely handi-
capped through lack of transport, and in October Pershing 
4 had to ask Haig for 25,000 horses. 
The Household Cavalry and Yeomanry had just 
surrendered their horses, and the Indian Cavalry embarked at 
Marseilles, when the German offensive began on 21 March, a 
fact for which Gough never forgave Robertsono 5 Haig had 
given Gough the remaining three Cavalry divisions as a mobile 
reserve for defence, on the lines he had already explained to 
6 Lloyd George. In the emergency, the Yeomanry regiments 
1. CAB/22/78, p 6; Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal, 
p 324 
2. Haig War Diary entry, 27 January 1918, p 39, Acc 3155. 
123 Haig 
3. See Appendix Two 
4. Haig War Diary entries, 23 June 1918, p 50, Acc 3155.128 
and 23 October 1918, Acc 3155.132 Haig 
5. Gough, The Fifth Army, p 254 
6. See above p 331 
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(with one exception) also reclaimed their horses, and be-
tween them the Cavalrymen fought a successful mobile defence 
mainly dismounted in small groups, in a close co-operation 
with the other arms born of necessity.1 To check the rapid 
German advance, however, the surprise of an ~ blanche 
charge was sometimes employed. In this manner a squadron 
of Seely's Canadians re - took the vital Moreuil Ridge, sac-
rificing 70 per cent of their number, killing about 70 
Germans with their swords and 300 with supporting fire, and 
2 halting the German advance. Had the Canadians followed 
Dundonald's doctrine of always dismounting, the ridge would 
not have been re- captured, the Germans would surely have 
broken through to Amiens, and the battle - perhaps, at this 
crucial stage, the war - would have been lost: an interesting 
commentary on the ~ blanche controversy . In contrast, the 
Germans made no use of their own Cavalry. British officers 
subsequently felt this a mistake, arguing that their men 
would have probably run from a Cavalry attack; indeed at 
Nesle one battalion panicked and retreated at a false report 
of German Cavalry attacking . 3 
1. Official History, France & Belgium, 1918, Vol I, p 185, 
Vol II, p 33; Haig War Diary entry, 1 April 1918, p 2 
Acc 3155.125 Hai ; Pease, The History of the Northumber-
land Hussars Yeomanr 181 - 1 2 , P 181 
2. Seely, Adventure, p 303 . This was not the only charge of 
the battle; see, for example, Brander , The 10th Royal 
Hussars, p 98 
3 . Toland, No Man's Land, p 45; Terraine, To Win a War , p 72; 
Haig and Gough both felt that with Cavalry the Germans 
would have broken through. See Haig's final d espatch of 
21 March 1919, paragraph 5, quoted in notes by Lady Haig 
on Jessel to Lady Haig, 16 February 1930, Acc 3155 . 254, 
Vol 1, P 3, Haig; Duff Cooper, Haig, Vol I, p 102; Gough, 
The Fifth Army, p 323 
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After the crisis was over, the Household regi-
ments were converted into lorry-borne machine-gunners, and 
for the rest of the war provided fire-support for the Cavalry 
Corps. The Yeomanry were broken up' to make up the numbers 
of the now severely depleted regular Cavalry regiments. 
Meanwhile, Haig worked to re-vitalise the Cavalry. At the 
start of the year he had planned with Kavanagh to remove the 
promotion block in the Cavalry by replacing some divisional 
and brigade commanders; Kavanagh was also considered for re-
placement, but finally kept his command. 1 Before his major 
counter-offensive opened with the Battle of Amiens on 8 
August Haig impressed upon Kavanagh 'the training of the 
troop under its leader' as the basic tactical unit, and 
direction from the front in the attack. 2 At Amiens, for the 
first time on the Western Front, there was co-operation be-
tween the arms (learned during the German offensives) and 
the Cavalry broke through to open ground: squadrons of two 
leading regiments delivered successful charges, although a 
third was stopped by wire. 3 For the loss of under 1,000 men 
and 1,800 horses the Cavalry Corps took over 1,300 prisoners; 
1. Haig War Diary entries, 1.5 January 1918, p 20 and 27 Jan-
uary 1918, p 39, Ace 31.5.5.123; 19 March 1918, p .40, Acc 
31.5.5.124 Haig 
2. Haig War Diary entry, 1 August 1918, p 1, Acc 31.5.5.130 
Haig 
3. Official History, France & Belgium, 1918, Vo1 IV, pp .53, 
69, 100; Haig War Diary note 63, Acc 31.5.5.130 Haig; Scott., 
Records of the Seventh Dra oon Guards Durinthe Great 
War, pp 1 9-.50; Whyte and Atteridge, A History of the 
Queens Bays, pp 440-1 
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a major success, but one which inevitably weakened the force, 
with no way to make up the losses. 'I feel sure', Haig 
wrote, 'that without the rapid advance of the Cavalry the 
effect of the surprise attack on the 8th would have been 
1 
much less.' Even Raw1inson admitted that the Cavalry had 
done 'splendid work',2 despite another pre-batt1e disagree-
ment with Haig about their value and the scale of use in-
tended for them. 3 But neither Raw1inson nor Byng, whose 
Armies woul_d lead the offensives through to November, be-
1ieved in Cavalry, 4 or the possibility of victory that year. 
The one major failure in co-operation in the 
battle was between the Cavalry and the new Whippet medium 
tanks, to which a number of Cavalry officers had been trans-
ferred in January precisely to encourage co- operation. 5 The 
Whippet crews complained that the Cavalry outpaced them in 
open country, and lagged behind them when under fire . The 
difficulty was genuine, but the complaints unjustified . The 
problem of co-ordinating tanks with more vulnerable but more 
mobile supporting troops e x ists to this day; it requires no 
more than correct tactics and co-operation to solve it. As 
at Cambrai, the tankmen showed little concern fbr an arm 
1 . Haig War Diary entry, 13 August 1918, Acc 3155.130 Haig 
2 . Raw1inson Diary entry, 8 August 1918, Raw1 ins on/WW1 
3. Haig War Diary entry, 5 August 1918, p 9, Acc 3155 . 130 
Haig 
4 . Byng quoted in Haig War Diary, 29 November 1918, p 54, 
Acc 3155.131 --=:; Raw1inson Diary entry, 11 November 
1918, Raw1ins~W1 
5 . The War History of the 6th Tank Battalion, p 97 
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which, after all, many had left since they considered it ob-
1 
solete . 
When the Third Army resumed the attack on 
21 August Haig found Byng just as reluctant to use the 
Cavalry as Rawlinson: 
Byng had only arranged to use about a brigade 
of Cavalry . I told him that the Cavalry Corps 
is now 100 per cent better than it was at 
Cambra.i . He must use the Cava lr to the fullest 
extent possible ••• I ordered him to detail a 
Cavalry regiment to each Corps taking part in 
the attack, because the enemy's line of resistance 
may have been withdrawn some distance from our 
front trenches, and it will be necessary to push 
forward Advance Guards of all arms to reconnoitre . 2 
To one Corps commander, Haig (echoing Allenby) instructed 
're- inforce where we are winning, not where we are held up 1'3 
He supported the Cavalry Corps with an Infantry brigade in 
buses and the motorised machine guns of the re- named House-
hold Machine ' Gun Regiment. But there was still a conflict 
between employing the Cavalry and keeping it up to reason-
able strength . On 1 September the Cavalry Corps was pulled 
out of action to keep it as strong as possible should the 
4 German fighting retreat collapse completely . To Henry 
Wilson (who had replaced Robertson as CoI.G oS . at the start 
1 . The War History of the 6th Tank Battalion, p 132; Offi-
cial History, France & Belgium, 1918, Vol IV, pp 52 - 5, 
156; Lumley, History of the 11th Hussars, pp 366- 9; 
Liddell Hart, The Tanks, V61 I, pp 183- 4; Luttwak and 
Horowitz, The Israeli Army, especially pp 365- 70 
2 . Haig War Diary entry, 19 August 1918, p 46, Acc 3155 . 130 
Haig 
3 . Haig War Diary entry, 21 August 1918, p 51, Acc 3155 . 130 
Haig 
4 . Haig War Diary entries, 25 August 1918, p 61, Acc 3155 . 
130 and 1 September 1918, p 1, Acc 3155 . 131 Haig 
p 
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of the year) Haig wrote demanding more mobile troops, and 
compl~ining that 'Our shortage of Cavalry is daily becoming 
, more noticeable, and there is no doubt that your predecessor 
committed a serious error in sending off to Palestine two 
Cavalry Divisions last February. I hear that they are doing 
1 little or nothing there.' By this date the three divisions 
still in France mustered fewer than 14,000 men, or less than 
2 60 per cent of their nominal strength. With remarkable 
irony, the Imperial War Cabinet, hearing Wilson's complaints 
on the difficulty of finding ships to supply Allenby's force, 
only narrowly decided in June against sending the Australian 
Mounted Division to France. 3 
Largely through Robertson's and Lloyd George's 
belief in the valuelessness of Cavalry, Allenby had in Sep-
tember 1918 ~our Cavalry divisions, two of them composed of 
Yeomanry and Indian Cavalry , Moreover, the Australian 
Mounted Division, during its operations in the Jordan Valley 
that summer, had persistently and successfully pressed to 
be equipped with swords. As one Australian brigade com-
mander sai4 'One of the chief values of the sword is the 
spirit of progress that it inculcates in the carrier',4 a 
classic expression of the ~ blanche theory. Allenby 
1. Haig War Diary entry, 18 September 1918, p 20, Haig to 
Wilson, personal, 1 September 1918, Acc 3155 . 131 Haig 
2. See Tables, Part Three, Table 4 
3. CAB/22/44, pp 2, 6 
4 . Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, p 335; Official His -
tory, Egypt & Palestine, Vol I, p 123; Fox , The History 
of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry 1898-1922, 
p 177 
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planned to use this division, along with his two Indian divi-
sions, in a rapid advance based on declining Turkish morale 
and a superiority of 95,000 Infantry to 85,000, 540 guns to 
1 400 and 25,000 Cavalry to 5,000 Turkish horsemen. The 
Indian Cavalry believed they were chosen to lead the advance 
by virtue of their superior faith in the importance of th8 
2 ~ blanche. One traditionalist even claimed that 'Our 
tactics were the same as those which had invariably proved 
successful in France, viz: to charge at the gallop, no 
matter what disparity of force there might be,.3 Three years 
of transfers and promotions had drained both the Indi·an and 
British Cavalry of their most competent officers, and of 
progressive believers in the hybrid. In Palestine, however, 
the Indian Cavalry met these men again in the Yeomanry, and 
as their brigade and divisional commanders, in particular 
Barrow as commander of the 4th Cavalry Division. 
On 19 September XXI Corps attacked the Turkish 
line, which had been re-established north of Jerusalem after 
its capture, at its coastal edge. A gap was made for the 
three Cavalry divisions to pass through to the plain beyond, 
rush through any enemy on the plain, advance through the 
Musmus and Sindiane passes in the hills beyond, and take the 
key locations blocking the routes through the hills through 
which the Turkish forces would, pressed by Allenby's Infantry, 
attempt to retreat. Only hybrid Cavalry were capable of this 
1. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, pp 193~8 
2. Tennant, The Royal Deccan Horses in the Great War, p 68 
3. ibid 
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operation, which required the speed and surprise of the 
arme blanche charge for the advance, as well as dismounted 
firepower to hold the trap. At Birket Ata in the plains 
9th Hodson's Horse, leading the 5th Cavalry Division, 
charged frontally and captured 250 prisoners with four guns. 
36th Jacob's Hors~ charged and broke a Turkish battalion at 
Jett. Most importantly, 2nd Lancers, supported by two 
armoured cars, as it emerged on the far side of the Musmus 
pass successfully engineered a charge in front and flank of 
an approaching Turkish battalion, destroying it. 1 Barrow, 
conscious of the argument that only poor Turkish morale . 
made such charges possible, asserted: 
The depot regiment, the force engaged by the 
advance guard [2nd Lancers], had not yet been 
previously engaged and its morale had not 
suffered from defeat or retreat. What was it 
that enabled this small, tired mounted force 
to ove~-ride a fresh infantry battalion at so 
small a cost to itself? It was the result 
of a happy combination of the principles of 
surprise, fire, movement and co- operation. 2 
As Barrow candidly admitted, if the battalion had occupied 
the pass, two machine guns could have held the Cavalry up 
for hours. 3 Again, this was a revealing commentary on the 
respective views of Haig and Roberts on the training of 
Indian Cavalry. 
The 4th Cavalry Division managed the 70 mile 
advance in thirty-four hours, with the loss of just 26 horses. 
1 . Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps, pp 204, 209-10; 
Whitworth, A History of the 2nd Lancers, pp 139-43 
2. Barrow, The Fire of Life, p 201 
3. ibid, p 197 
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In contrast, the small French Cavalry contingent with them 
1 
was almost unhorsed by sore backs. A few armoured cars 
came through the Musmus pass with the Cavalry, but staff 
cars broke down repeatedly on the rocky ground, and the 
Sindiane pass was found to be unfit for wheeled vehicles of 
any kind. 2 Once in position, the Cavalry set a dismounted 
trap which captured 13,000 demoralised and retreating Turks 
in two days.3 Then on 23 September they remounted to con-
tinue the advance against a virtual rout. So poor was 
Turkish morale by this time that one Lancer regiment managed 
to charge a hill position capturing 800 prisoners with 25 
machine guns, which unsurprisingly shot high. 4 But such 
success bred carelessness: when 2nd Lancers again charged, 
at Irbid on 26 September, they failed to reconnoitre or use 
supporting fire, and the charge was shot down by machine 
guns - one of the very few occasions in the war on which this 
actually happened. 5 By the end of the month the Desert 
Mounted Corps had reached Damascus, covering 200 miles·, cap-
tur ing 60,000 prisoners, 140 guns and 500 machine guns. 6 
At Allenby's orders they pressed on to Aleppo by 25 October 
and six days later Turkey signed an armistice . The value of 
strategic Cavalry divisions in colonial war had been proved. 
1- Preston, The Desert Mounted CorEs, p 319; Tylden, Horses 
and Saddlerz, p 157 
2. Pr eston, The Desert Mounted CorEs, p 205; Falls, Arma-
~eddon, p 90 
3 . Preston, The Desert Mounted CorEs, p 225 
4. ibid, pp 230- 1 
5 . ibid, p 253; Whitworth, A Historz of the 2nd Lancers, 
pp 156- 60 
6. Preston, The Desert Mounted CorEs, p 283 
p 
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Haig hoped to add to this on the Western 
Front. On 17 September the Cavalry Corps was given a major 
training exercise in locating bridges across waterways, in 
the face of a rearguard of Infantry and machine gunners. 
Results were disappointing: one brigade commander took ninety 
minutes to learn from his scouts that a key bridge was un-
1 defended. Nevertheless, Rawlinson dutifully held the 
Cavalry Corps behind his lines from 1 October, and seven 
days later the chance came to put them through again. In 
three days, for the loss of 604 casualties, the Corps took 
over 500 prisoners, 10 guns and 60 machine guns. Edmonds 
in the Official History considered the Infantry could have 
done as much for themselves at less cost - an indication of 
2 how much had come to be expected of Cavalry - but there was 
no German rout and breakthrough. On 10 October Rawlinson, 
, 
feeling the Cavalry were 'sticky,3 pulled them out of the 
line. As with the Indian regiments, the weak British Cavalry 
now contained too many officers either of poor quality, or 
with traditionalist views on the ~ blanche. A Sergeant-
Major in one of the leading regiments, who had himself turned 
down the chance of an Infantry commission,4 recorded this 
attitude: 
8th Oct. 6 p.m. Col. Franks D.S.O. sends for 
the sergeants and myself of C Squadron. He 
explains to us that we are for battle tomorrow 
1. Haig War Diary entry, 17 September 1918, p 29, Acc 3155. 
131 Haig 
2. Official History, France & Belgium, 1918, Vol V, p 235 
3. Rawlinson Diary entry, 9 October 1918, RawlinsonjWW1 
4. Brunton Diary entry, 10 January 1916, Brunton 
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and that the Cavalry Corps is to be in Le 
Cateau by 5 p.m . C Squadron will be as 
advance guard to the regiment, who in turn 
are advance guard to the corps. We are to 
push on as fast as possible up the main Le 
Cateau road. It is a case of 'death or glory' 
and no turning aside come what may. His words 
were 'I am the man to drop the flag, and off 
we go to Death or Glory'. If successful it will 
be a bigger thing than the Palestine affair.1 
Against the German defence such crude tactics would not work. 
On the following day: 
About four in the afternoon Col. Franks DoS.O. 
formed the regiment up for the charge as our 
position was getting desperate. Our objective 
was two batteries of field guns and a nest of 
machine guns about 1000 yards away on high 
ground . The charge was sounded, squadron formed 
line, and away we rode hell for leather; it was 
a mad ride through shell fire. We rode clean 
through the guns, killing many gunners with the 
sword. Those we spared bombed us as we passed 
through . We rode through the second time coming 
back ••• One troop of B Squadron came back with 5 
men alive out of about 30 men. Altogether we 
lost 4 officers killed [including the Colonel] 
9 offiQers wounded, 2 taken prisoner (wounded) 
96 men killed and wounded, 120 horses killed . 
Altogether a bad day's work for the regiment, 
but it clearly shows that the true cavalry 
spirit still lives. 2 
There was no further chance for the Cavalry Corps before 
the armistice, both Byng and Rawlinson letting transport for 
their Infantry divisions take precedence over Cavalry in 
their rear areas. Consequently, according to Edmonds, 'the 
absence of mounted troops was severely felt' in the last 
days of the war. 3 The Cavalry's career in France ended, as 
1 . Brunton Diary entry, 8 October 1918, Brunton 
2 . Brunton Diary entry, 9 October 1918, Brunton 
3. Official History, France & Belgium 1918" Vol V, p 535; 
Haig War Diary entries, 5 November 1918, p 9 and 9 Nov-
ember 1918, p 18, Acc 3155.133 Haig 
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it had begun, with ambiguity. 
To the Cavalrymen these achievements seemed 
to justify their pre-war faith in their arm. Haig wrote in 
December 1918: 
Cavalry has been, is, and will continue to be 
indispensabl~ in modern warfare • •• It is my 
considered opinion that had I had at my dis-
posal a much larger force of cavalry the fruits 
of victory would have been more rapidly gathered 
... In rearguard actions, when fighting becomes 
loose and units scattered, the value of Cavalry 
has been constantly proved both in the retreat 
from Mons and during the retirement of the 
Fifth Army in the Spring of the present year ••• 
In open country, such as the theatre of war in 
which General Allenby's forces were operating, 
Cavalry may well still exercise a decisive 
influence. 1 
When, in 1919, a revision of the Cavalry T:r:'airiing Manual was 
again mooted, Allenby wrote to John Vaughan: 
I'm sorry that they have started to revise the 
Cavalry Training. I don't think there is any-
thing ~n it that needs revising. I have never 
found any reason, during the war, to find 
fault with it; and I have had as much experience, 
in this war, of cavalry fighting - mounted and 
dismounted - as anyone. I also saw all the 
proofs of the present book before it was 
printed. 2 
The 1920 revision, however, did no more than confirm 
Allenby's experience: 
Cavalry develops its maximum power only when 
acting mounted, supported by the fire of its 
guns, machine guns and automatic guns. Not-
withstanding the fact that the destructive 
power of modern mechanical weapons tends ever 
to increase, the moral effect of a mounted 
attack remains as great as ever, where the 
enemy is not protected by physical or mecha-
nical contrivances.3 
1. Haig to Prothero, 1 December 1918, Acc 3155.134 Haig 
2. Allenby to Vaughan, 2 March 1919, Allenby 2/5/9 Allenby 
3. Cavalry Training 1920, Vol II War, p 10 
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The new Cavalry Division was planned as three brigades with 
a tank battalion of 48 tanks. Each squadron kept a Hotchkiss 
1 gun troop of four guns, with two more in regimental reserve . 
The Desert Mounted Corps, however, was disbanded. Barrow, 
to~that the horses would be sold off in Egypt, since there 
was insufficient shipping to justify bringing them home, and 
aware of the cruelty with which Egyptian workhorses were 
treated, allowed some of his men to shoot their horses in-
2 
stead . The decision not to bring the horses home only 
served to increase resentment in the Cavalry which, as after 
the Boer War, felt it was due for some credit after its 
successes. When in 1921 the disbanding of four regular 
Cavalry regiments, and most of the Yeomanry and Indian 
Cavalry was proposed, Seely protested: 
It is the strangest £££ seguitur in military 
history that, as a result of a great war in 
which the cavalry on the Western Front twice 
saved our Army from ruin, while the lion-
hearted Philip Chetwode with a great part 
of the cavalry of the Empire struck the 
decisive blow to end the war on the Eastern 
[P~lestineJ Front, the cavalry should have 
been reduced to half their previous number . 3 
The exaggeration was pardonable. On achievement the Cavalrys 
defenders still had a good case . But the 'Cavalry' they de -
fended had changed beyond recognition from the brightly-
uniformed, understrength, overloaded, poorly trained force 
of the 1870s with its muzzle- loading carbines and reluctance 
to dismount. 
1. rrArr2209 'Report of a Committee on the Reorganisation of 
the Field Army', 1919 (War Office) 
2 . Barrow, The Fire of Life, pp 12, 217- 20 
3 . Seely, Adventure, p 298 
TlI 
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In April 1920 The Cavalry Journal resumed 
publication, containing the first of a series of articles, 
'The Influence of Tanks on Cavalry Tactics, by Brevet Colonel 
J.F.C. Fuller o Bursting with confidence, Fuller began his 
exposition on Cavalry in the traditional manner with the 
Ancient Greeks. He told his readers that in the mid-nine-
teenth century the rifle musket with 'a range of over a 
thousand yards' had sealed the doom of the Cavalry charge; 
that the American Civil War Cavalry had been 'Mounted 
Infantry pure and simple', and that the Second Boer War also 
was ' a rifle war pure and simple, the ~ blanche play[ed] 
practically no part in it'. ~uller also took the opportunity 
to insult his readers. 'Forethought', he wrote, 'has seldom 
formed part of the soldier's intellectual outfit.' The arme 
blanche controversy had re-emerged, in a form that was de-
p r essingly familiar. But so little did Fuller understand 
the background to the controversy that he could write of 
Cavalry in Palestine in 1918 that' the use of Cav,alry in 
Palestine was masterly, but it was the moral threat and not 
the arme blanche or even the rifle and machine gun which was 
1 their strongest weapon'. The Palestine campaign of 1917 
he ignored altogether. Cavalrymen replied with a mixture of 
sentimental and traditionalist defences of the ~ blanche, 
and precise historical references which cut Fuller's case 
1. Fuller, 'The Influence of Tanks on Cavalry Tactics', 
Part I, CJ Vol 10, no 36, pp 109-32 
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to ribbons. 1 This led at the end of the year to a full debate 
at the Senior Officers' School, where, as Fuller put it, 'I 
2 
spoke for the Tanks, Philip Chetwode for the cavalry'. The 
meeting was chaired by Winston Churchill as Secretary of 
State for War. At the end of an inconclusive debate Churchill 
told Fuller privately that though he supported his views, it 
was important to 'go easy on this question,.3 Neither Fuller, 
who believed the opposition to him came entirely from a 
sentimental view of Cavalry, nor later Liddell Hart, could 
understand why so competent a soldier as Chetwode supported 
the Cavalry. They could only assume that his judgement had 
4 been distorted by a love of horses. This was the final 
tragedy of all the debates about the ~ blanche. When in 
, 
the 1920s and 1930s Cavalrymen were told their arm was ob-
solete, they had long ago heard it all before. 
1 . See in particular the two contrasting articles: Bird, 
'Years versus Ideas', CJ Vol 10, no 37, pp 331 - 3 and 
Howard- Vyse, 'A Defence of the Arme Blanche', CJ Vol 10, 
no 37, pp 323- 9, which clearly show the 'sentimental' 
and 'historical' approaches to the controversy. 
2. Fuller to ffrench- Blake, n.d . , ffrench- Blake, LH I/282/5b 
Liddell Hart 
3. ibid 
4. Liddell Hart to ffrench- Blake, 5 October ' 196o, LH I/282/2 
Liddell Hart 
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CONCLUSION 
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
'There are always indefinite factors, unknown 
quantities and indeterminate effects to be 
contended with. Nevertheless, by constant 
application of trained minds, judicious ex-
periment and a sharp observation of events, 
a tolerably accurate forecast of conditions 
is procurable 0 , 
- Major Dening, R.E., The Future of the 
British Army1 
'A vivid and correct imagination, though it 
sees clearly the course of future events, 
almost invariably antedates results.' . 
J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System2 
The ~ blanche Cavalry charge against 
Infantry was not obsolete in 1918, or at any point before 
that date. In the conditions of colonial war, that is to 
say an enemy troop density of one man to a yard or less, 
with little or no Artillery support, indifferent firepower, 
no wire, and where manoeuvre and an attack from the flank 
were permitted, it was possible by formations of between two 
and three British regiments or the equivalent - between 
1,000 and 2,000 horsemen o In the conditions of European war, 
faced by a troop density of two or three men to a yard of 
front with a higher standard of shooting, wire, and Artil-
lery support, it was possible in troop or squadron strength 
- between 50 and 250 horsemen. In both cases it benefited 
1. Dening, The Future of the British Army, ,p 18 
20 Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p 104 
- J 49-
greatly from covering and suppressing fire, either from the 
Cavalry's own support weapons or from other troops, and in 
the second case these were absolutely necessary . As such, 
it did not differ markedly from Infantry tactics as de-
veloped by the end of the First World War. 
Why this tactic worked is altogether another 
matter. Theorists of the time laid the greatest emphasis on 
the psychological impact of the charge, the mental stress it 
laid on the Infantry soldier attempting to fire at a target 
the range of which was constantly changing at high speed. 
In doing so, they probably underestimated the value of purely 
physical factors, the terrain, the technical problems in-
volved in accurate shooting at unknown ranges under any 
circumstances, and the effects of a bullet wound on a horse . 
They also underestimated the value of suppressing fire, al -
though not by a great deal. However, it is doubtful if 
such factors alone could explain the results achieved by the 
Yeomanry in 1917 or the Indian Cavalry in 1918 . Behavioural 
research into the conduct of American Infantry in the Second 
World War showed that, of troops in combat with a clear 
target to shoot at, only 25 per cent actually fired thei.r 
1 
weapons. The change from volley fire to individual mark-
manship, on which Ian Hamilton had laid such stress, almost 
certainly reduced the actual volume of fire from any 
Infantry formation . It has also been noticed that in 
Napoleonic battles temporary truces, or 'chivalrous' 
1. Marshal, Men Against Fire, especially p 9 
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behaviour, occurred between rival Cavalrymen, and Infantry-
men, although not between the Cavalry on one side and the 
1 Infantry of another . There has been recent speculation 
that such behaviour was primarily social, rather than psy-
chological, in origin. 2 It is hard to envisage a simple 
motive, either social or psychological, for an Infantryman 
not to shoot at a Cavalryman coming towards him. However, 
there has always, in most cultures, been less moral odium 
attached to killing a horse than a man. The classic anti-
Cavalry tactic of shooting at the horses of a charge3 was 
intended as a method of discouraging shooting high. But 
its effect might have been due more to a willingness of 
soldiers to shoot horses rather than men, and therefore to 
an increased volume of fire. Indeed, the more accurate 
such shooting, the more hits on the horses and not their 
riders, the less likely that the charge would be stopped . 
This is all speculation. Since the matter is now of only 
historical, or at least academic, interest, it is unlikely 
that an answer will be found to this question in the im-
mediate future . The shock charge itself still remains a 
valid tactic . Its most recent well-documented appearance 
was in the Vietnamese war, in which South Vietnamese 
soldiers, rather than dismount from their armoured personnel 
carriers, chose to drive them directly at the enemy, firing 
1 . Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp 154, 200 
2 . Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914- 18, pp 214~ 18 
3 . Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp 153- 9; Wyndham Crole, 
Questions and Answers for Cavalry Non-Commissioned 
Officers, p 191 
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from the top. To the bafflement of American military theo-
rists, they achieved swift victories with few casualties to 
themselves, and many to their opponents . The tactic was 
adopted by the Americans themselves later in the war. 1 
The Cavalry charge against Cavalry also re-
mained valid as a tactic until 1914 . After that date, since 
their principal enemy had abandoned it, the British Cavalry 
found no opportunity to use it themselves . As with the 
charge against Infantry, it was used successfully by groups 
of 50 to 250 men, benefiting from supporting fire. The 
massed charge of division against division did not take 
place. Like a fleet action in naval warfare it had to be 
deliberately sought by each side, both in the belief that 
they were stronger; and also like a fleet action its object 
was to determine superiority in manoeuvre and protection of 
other forces. From their first contact with the German 
Cavalry on 22 August 1914 the British discovered that in 
minor actions they alre ady had such superiority . They 
therefore had absolutely no motive for undertaking such a 
charge . In fact, four days later (three days after the 
Battle of Mons) Allenby lost touch with the two of his four 
brigades under Gough, which never came back under his 
divisional command. Only in those four days was the divi-
sional charge of all four brigades even possible. In prac-
tice the threat of the massed charge worked as a deterrent, 
1. starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, especially pp 21 - 3 
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an action with a high risk of disaster to each side, which 
both sides were therefore reluctant to employ. It is pos-
sible to argue both that this failure to use the massed 
charge shows that it was unnecessary, and that the same 
failure shows that training for it to a high standard by the 
British Cavalry had been completely successful. 
The Cavalry of Britain and its Empire were 
equally not obsolete by the end of the waro Allenby1s men 
had, in the first three days of the 1918 campaign, achieved 
the highest measured rate of opposed advance in two centuries, 
fractionally faster than the Israeli tanks in 1967, twice as 
fast as the breakout from Normandy in 1944 or the Barbarossa 
offensive of 1941.1 On the Western Front the Cavalry had for 
three years been drained of their best officers, reduced to 
well below their effective strength, and ignored in the 
plans of battles. Any troops will fight badly in such circum-
stances; it is surprising that in 1918 they proved themselves 
still to be so effective. The suggestion of obsolescence 
merely adds insult to injury . Cavalry, or horsed soldiers, 
became obsolete at times and in places where the mechanical 
vehicle, less vulnerable to fire, became also as manoeuvrable 
over all terrain, easier to supply and maintain, and cheaper 
to keep. In western Europe this happened at some date be-
tween 1919 and 1939, probably about the middle of the period. 
In eastern Europe it did not happen until after 194.5. In 
1. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War, p 16 
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the Wars of Intervention1 and the Russo-Polish war2 between 
1918 and 1922 all sides made extensive use of horsed troops. 
In the Second World War on the Eastern Front all sides again 
made wide use of horsemen in rough country, and a number of 
successes'. were claimed over tank formations. 3 In other parts 
of the world it has not happened yet. The Israeli Army, not 
noted for its stupidity o~ conservatism, disbanded its last 
horsed units in 1956. 4 Mounted patrols were used in the 
jungles of Portuguese Angola in 1972.5 At the moment a 
number of South American states keep mounted forces for 
6 patrol work. The last horsed soldiers to see combat, to 
date, were probably the 250 strong Grey's Scouts of the 
Rhodesian Army in 1979. 7 
These facts should have formed the basis for 
any assessment of the motives, or the abilities, of defenders 
of the Cavalry and the ~ blanche before 1918. But the 
whole complex problem of the ~ blanche controversy was 
riddled with paradox. Simple calculations clearly showing 
the charge to be impossible were themselves faulty, for no 
obvious reason. The failure to agree a terminology for the 
debate meant that men who wanted the same kind of horsed 
1. Boustead, The Wind of Morning, pp 52-63 
2. Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, especially p 148 
3. Piekaliewicz, The Cavalry of World War Two; Liddell 
Hart, The Soviet Army, pp 337-43 
4. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p 117 
5. Lawford, The Cavalry, p 9 
6. Mollo, McGregor, Smith and Chappell, World' Army Uniforms 
Since 1939, p 146 
7. ibid, pp 145-6 
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troops could find themselves opposed o The British Mounted 
Infantry was never an alternative to the Cavalry, but a 
supplement to it; and Cavalrymen like Fraser and French 
opposed Mounted Infantry not because they scorned dismounted 
fighting but because they believed in it. While in the 
1890s the standards of the Cavalry declined it nevertheless 
attracted the most capable officers o The apparent reform of 
employing firearms and machine guns in co- operation with the 
charge was actually a retrograde step; by encouraging the 
belief that Cavalry could be independent of the other arms 
it hampered co-operation with Infantry and Artillery. Haig 
realised this by early 1916, others never did so. The 
Cavalrymen in the aftermath of the Second Boer War did not 
oppose 'reform' in the abstract but the attempt by Roberts 
to alter their own reform programme o While the reforming 
movement in the Cavalry rose to dominance, it remained 
virtually unperceived by the public, and by all but a 
minority of the rest of the Army. Cavalrymen, in an age 
unfamiliar with deterrence, spent a considerable time prac-
tising a tactic which might never be used. The British 
Cavalry entered neither the Second Boer War nor the First 
World War 'wedded to shock tactics', 1 by 1899 they had worked 
out a doctrine of fire and movement tactics considerably in 
advance of that of the Infantry, and by 1914 this docUine 
was chief among their tactics. Finally, the whole massive 
~~ blanche controversy thoroughly obscurect,and relegated 
1 . See above, p 10 
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to a minor issue, the fact that the effectiveness of Cavalry 
depended primarily on the maintenance and care of its horses. 
Neither the Cavalry nor the rest of the Army took steps to 
improve this before 1899; when the controversy was at its 
height between 1902 and 1904 the Cavalry had already learned 
the necessary lessons, and between 1914 and 1918 they owed 
their successes as much to superior horsemastership as to 
any other factor. 
Above all, the public image of the foolish 
or reactionary Cavalryman still remained after the war . The 
term 'Cavalry General' had threefold implications. First, 
by suggesting a member of a Cavalry regiment it implied 
identity with the rich, privileged sportsmen who made up the 
majority of Cavalry officers, low in intelligence and uncon-
cerned with their profession. Secondly, it implied belief 
in the Cavalry, which had been condemned as obsolete as far 
back as the 1860s, and for four years had apparently re-
mained inactive on the Western Front while the other arms 
fought . Thirdly, it implied belief in the massed arme blanche 
charge, the classic public display of the Cavalry, with its 
emphasis on 'smartness', and a naive and sentimental con-
servatism . Drawing on this stereotype, which bore no resem·-
blance to the ex-Cavalry officers who had risen to prominence 
before the war, Si egfried Sassoon, in his fictionalised auto-
biography, described one of the Army commanders of 1916: 
He had taken the salute from four hundred 
officers and NoC oO.s of his Ar my . How many 
of them had been killed since then, and how 
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deeply was he responsible for their deaths ? 
Did he know what he was doing, or was he 
merely a successful old cavalryman whose 
peace-time popularity had pushed him up on 
his present perch ?1 
In reality the officer in question was Rawlinson. The 
novelist C.S. Forester in 1936 created his character of 'The 
General',2 in a novel which portrayed as the typical Western 
Front commander a Cavalryman who had not served outside his 
own regiment prior to the war, despised the Staff College, 
and was ignorant of staffwork or science. A thinly dis-
guised portrait of Allenby appeared in the novel, dismissed 
by his biographer, Lord Wavell, as 'a grotesque caricature,.3 
Forester's novel was greeted with wide acclaim as repre-
senting, according to The Times, 'the real thing' ,4 and con-
tinues to be cited in factual works on war to this day as an 
example of the typical Cavalry General's mentality.5 
Those who criticised the conduct of the war 
on the Western Front were able to draw on this stereotype in 
condemning Haig, Robertso~ and the 'Cavalry Generals'. Lloyd 
George in his own war memoirs cited as evidence of their in-
competence their 'ridiculous cavalry obsession,.6 Churchill, 
who had himself been closely involved with the controversy, 
1. Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, p 163 
2. Forester, The General 
3. Wavell, Allenby: a study in Greatness, pp 158- 9 
4. Review in The Times, 5 June 1936; see also The Manchester 
Quardian, 5 June 1936, and The Observer, 7 June 1936 for 
agreement. 
5. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p 307; 
Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg, p 11 
6. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol II, p 2038 
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understood more of the truth, but nevertheless could not 
resist referring to the presence of supposed 'large masses 
of Cavalry' at Loos as due to 'the absurd misconceptions of 
1 the Staff'. The advocates of the tank in the 1920s and 
1930s also, finding themselves opposed by the reactionary 
sportsmen who still composed the bulk of the Cavalry officer 
corps, made the assumption, in criticising the conduct of 
the war, that the 'Cavalry Generals' had been represen~ive 
of the majority, of whom Seely wrote that 'a love of the 
horse and of hunting seems to blunt all their reasoning 
faculties,.2 This was most unfortunate. The Cavalry re-
formers of the 1890s, under excessive and largely unjust 
condemnation from the rest of the Army, had boldly pro-
claimed both the superiority and independence of Cavalry, 
only to learn in the First World War that co-operation with 
the dher arms was essential to their success. Although the 
parallel is by no means exact, the tank theorists fell into 
virtually the same trap in the 1930s. It is possible, if no 
more, that had they understood the ~ blanche controversy 
they might have avoided this. 3 Instead, they failed to 
accept the possibility that the reform movement had ever 
existed in the Cavalry. Liddell Hart wrote in 1928 of Haig: 
Despite the experiences of the South African 
and the Russo-Japanese wars, he declared him-
self the champion of the ~ blanche and of 
1. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-18, p .583 
2. Quoted in Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol I, p 242 
3. For the changes in tank doctrine before and during the 
Second World War see: Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol II; 
Messenge:', The Art of Blitzkrieg and Keegan, The Face of 
Battle, pp 28.5-9.5 
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shock tactics, and was so determined and 
sure of his opinion that he did not hesitate 
to remove subordinates who dared to maintain 
-more realistic views. Basing himself on 
history, he was convinced, rightly, that the 
cavalry charge had ever been the decisive in-
strument of the Great Captains. His failure 
was that he could not, or would not, realise 
that modern firearms had made the cavalry 
charge impossible in its traditional form, and 
that this essential factor could only be revived 
by finding a substitute for the excessively 
vulnerable horse. 1 
Even forty years later, when the battle to achieve accept -
ance of the tank was long over, Liddell Hart's understanding 
of the nature of the controversy had not improved. He wrote 
that the most remarkable feature of the Elgin Commission 
'was the way that French and Haig discoursed on the para-
mount value of the ~ blanche, implying that so long as 
the cavalry charge was maintained all would be well with the 
2 
conduct of war'. Fuller himself wrote of Haig in 1958: 
Unlike so many cavalrymen of his day, he had 
studied war, and, strange to say, this proved 
to be his undoing, because he was so unimaginative 
that he could not see that the tactics of the 
past were as dead as mutton. We are told that 
he held that 'the role of cavalry on the battle-
field will always go on increasing' and that he 
believed bullets had 'little stopping power 
against horses'. This was never true, as an 
intelligent glance at past battles would have 
made clear to him. Yet it must -be true, other-
wise how could he employ his cavalry? Thus, in 
spite of fire, wire and mire, cavalry figured in 
all his battles.3 
Given this lead, and the established stereotype, it is 
1 . Liddell Hart, Reputations, p 86 
2 . Liddell Hart, A History of the First World War, p 35 
3. FuTIer in introduction to Woolfe, In Flanders Fields, 
p xiii 
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necessary for a military historian to do no more than refer 
to the 'Cavalry charge' mentality of the First World War 
British Army to condemn its leaders instantly . 1 The image 
of the charge against machine guns in particular has become 
a common tool of criticism. One distinguished and able 
military historian has in fact described the charge on 24 
August at Audregnies as 'the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars 
[sic] attempted a flank attack near Valenciennes, only to 
2 be mown down by machine guns'. A biographer of Henry 
Wilson has compressed Fuller's interpretation of Haig's 
arguments in 1907 into 'Haig's famous maxim, "Bullets can't 
stop Cavalry". ,3 The metaphor of the charge against machine 
guns, or of the . incompetent Vic torian Cavalry General 
4 
attempting to control a tank battle, has spread beyond 
military studies into the general vocabulary of historians 
and readers of history, as a touchstone of all that is 
reactionary, foolish and futile. It is probably too well 
established ever to be removed. 
1. Carver, The Warlords, pp 139-40 
2. Ellis, Cavalry: a History of Mounted Warfare, p 174 
3. Collier, Brasshat, p 96 
4. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, p 451 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Application of the 'Scientific' Model to the Charge of the 
Prussian 1st Guard Dragoons on 16 August 1370 at Mars-la- Tour 
During the battle the 1st Guard Dragoon Regi-
ment was ordered to sacrifice itself in order to save a re-
treating Infantry brigade from further pursuit, by charging 
against the three battalions of the French 13th Infantry 
Regiment, which had the 43rd Infantry Regiment in close sup-
port behind it. The final charge was sounded about 80 paces 
from the French line, and it was remembered that the French, 
equipped with Chassepot rifles, had time to fire two volleys 
before contact. The Cavalry had already taken casualties 
from fire before the charge and would take more from fire by 
the 43rd Infantry Regiment. Since the number of these is 
~ 
unknown it will be ignored. The charge hit the front of the 
13th Infantry Regiment, halting it, so fulfilling its pur-
pose in enabling the Prussian Infantry to escape, but not 
breaking it. The Cavalry subsequently rallied, and at the 
end of the day were recorded as having lost, of 426 all 
ranks, 15 officers, 123 men and 216 horses killed and wounded. 
It will be assumed, however unlikely, that all these casu-
alties were taken from the two volleys under consideration. 
It will further be assumed, although again extremely unlike-
ly, that no officer or man who was killed or wounded also 
had his horse either killed or wounded. The maximum number 
of officers, men and horses whi ch could have been killed or 
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injured by these two volleys is therefore 354 out of 426 or 
83 per cent of the regiment. But the three battalions of 
the 13th Infantry Regiment did not muster fewer than 2,000 
men . Presuming that all of these were in a position to fir~ 
and did so, then each volley of 2,000 bullets caused an 
average of 177 hits on the Cavalry, or 8 · 85 per cent of all 
bullets fired were hits. 
This example is, of course, extremely crude . 
Yet nothing like it was attempted at the time, and the 
'scientific' arguments were seldom subject to the same kind 
of analysis. 
Source: Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, pp 193- 204 
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APPENDIX TWO 
The " Shipping Cost of the Cavalry Redeployment of February 
1918 
In December 1916 the Quartermaster- General of 
the B.E.F. calculated that the three British Cavalry divi-
sions in France required between them 49 tons dead weight of 
rations and 246 tons dead weight of fodder daily. These 
calculations were clearly based on the standard wartime esti-
mate of a Cavalry Division as 8,000 men and horses, and the 
forage allowance in war of 14 pounds of oats and 8 pounds of 
hay for horses, along with an allowance for men of a little 
over 4t pounds of all foodstuffs daily. For a period of 
three months, or 93 days, this weight of supplies required 
74,620 ship tons to transport it from Britain to France. On 
this basis, one Cavalry d i v i s i on woul d r equ ire approx imately 
267·5 ship tons daily to keep it supplied . 
Between December 1916 and March 1918 the 
strength of the Cavalry divisions dropped by an unknown 
amount, varying between divisions. Since this would, if any-
thing, weaken the argument advanced by Curzon and Lloyd 
Geor ge, it will be ignored. 
In March 1918 the 4th Cavalry Division was 
broken up in France . The Artillery and all support troops 
remained in France along with the British regiments, only 
the Indian regiments being sent to Palestin~, where the divi-
sion was re- constituted using some of the regiments, the 
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Artillery and support troops of the Yeomanry Division. The 
5th Cavalry Division left France for Palestine as an intact 
entity, but without its British regiments . What actually 
left France therefore, were eleven Cavalry regiments plus 
the supporting troops of one Cavalry division - in effect, 
a strong division. The war strength of an Indian Cavalry 
regiment was in fact slightly greater than that of a British 
regiment, with four medium-sized squadrons instead of three 
strong ones. On transfer to the British Cavalry divisions 
those British regiments which had previously served in Indian 
divisions absorbed their extra squadron to bring them into 
line with British practice, indicating that by 1918 the dif-
ference in numbers was not significant. At a maximum, the 
Indian Cavalry force which left France represented the equi-
valent of one and a quarter British Cavalry divisions. By 
the Quartermaster-GeneralIs calculations, the forage and 
food saved for this force in France would be, for the approx-
imately 260 days between its leaving France and the end of 
the war, at most the equivalent of 87,000 ship tons in trans-
port. Making allowance for unknown or variable factors, this 
might be stretched to 90,000 ship tons. 
Against this must be set the shipping costs 
of moving the Indian Cavalry to Palestine and the Machine Gun 
battalions converted from Yeomanry to France. Field Service 
Regulations, cited by the Quartermaster-General, laid down 
that for sea transport eight ship tons should be allowed for 
each horse in these circumstances and two ship tons for each 
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man. Taking this time a minimum, it is unlikely that the 
eleven Cavalry regiments and divisional troops which left 
France amounted to a force weaker than 8,000 men and horses. 
This would therefore require at least 80,000 ship tons to 
transport it. The five Machine Gun battalions sent from 
Palestine to France were formed from nine Yeomanry regiments. 
Even if these were considerably under strength it seems un-
likely that the battalions mustered fewer than 800 men each 
or 4,000 al toge:ther. This force would therefore have re-
quired at least 8,000 ship tons to transport it. This left 
at least 4,000 horses still in Pa.lestine, and requir.1.ng to 
be fed. These were apparently used as remounts for the 
Cavalry still left in the country. In addition, the British 
Cavalry regiments in France released from Indian Cavalry 
divisions (or their replacements) and earmarked for con-
version to cyclists or machine gunners, represented no saving 
in supplies. The men clearly still required to be fed. It 
seems improbable, given the constant demand for horses in 
France, that they were shipped out of the country. If it 
had been done, presuming the nine regiments involved were 
considerably under strength at 500 horses and men each, this 
would have required 36,000 ship tons. 
To this cost must be added the cost of feeding 
the MO extra Cavalry regiments in Palestine (eleven Indian 
less nine Yeomanry) following the re-deployment. At a low 
average these might have been 500 men and horses each. 
(Indian Cavalry regimental histories suggest that this 
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figure is almost certainly too low.) The horses, being fed 
on the Palestine scale of 9i pounds of barley and 6 pounds 
of hay daily, would consume a little under Ji tons for each 
regiment daily. The men's rations would have amounted to a 
li ttle over one ton for each regiment daily. An unknown 
amount of this, probably the bul~ came from Egypt rather 
than Britain. Making no additional allowance for the weight 
of rurununition, equipment or any other factor, it will there-
fore be assumed that each regiment received no more than one 
ton of supplies each day from Britain. Bringing in the 
Quartermaster-General's calculations, this would have re-
quired 2·719 ship tons each to transport it to France, or by 
Robertson's estimate six times the amount, or 16·J ship tons 
to Palestine. For the 260 days remaining of the war this 
would have required a total of a little more than 4,000 ship 
tons for one regiment, or 8,000 for two. 
The maximum saving of shipping which could 
have been achieved by the re-deployment was therefore 90,000 
tons. It was probably considerably less. The immediate ship-
ping cost was 88,000 ship tons, plus a further 8,000 ship 
tons for the rest of the war, at a minimum. 
By Curzon's estimate, a reasonable sized 
transport ship was 4,000 tons. British shipping losses for 
April 1918 were 214,426 ship tons, and for May 179,J95 ship 
tons. 
Source: Memoranda on Cavalry, memo. by QoM.G. to C.-in-C. 
B.EoF., 14 November 1916, Acc J1550214h Haig 
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TABLES 
PART ONE 
1 : Total of Regular Cavalry (Guards, Line and Depot) in the 
British Army from 1871-2 to 1914-5 
1871-2 1872-;2 187;2- 4 1874-:2 187:2-6 1876-7 1877-8 
12,952 12,9JJ 1J,519 1J,500 1J,521 1J,521 1J,502 
1878-2 1872-80 1880- 1 1881-2 1882-;2 188;2-4 1884-:2 
1J,50J 1J,48J 1J,510 1J,165 1J,117 1J,297 1J,J02 
188:2- 6 1886-7 188Z-8 1888-2 1882-2 0 1890-1 1891 -2 
1J,297 14,951 15,061 14,901 14,66J 14,685 14,577 
1822-;2 182;2-4 1824-5 182:2-6 1826-Z 1897-8 1828-2 
14,868 14,715 14,719 14,884 14,884 1J,575 14,J04 
1822- 00 1200-1 12 01 - 2 1202-;2 120;2-4 1204-:2 120:2-6 
14,682 14,428 14,748 14,759 17,081 1J,J7J 16,171 
1206- 7 1207-8 1208-2 1202- 10 1210-11 1211-12 1212-1;2 
17,244 14,722 1J,717 14,467 15,J28 14,427 15,J24 
121;2-14 19 14-1:2 
15,260 15,26J 
2: Number of Regular Cavalry as a Percentage of All Regular 
Troops 1871-2 to 1914-15 
1871 -2 1872-;2 187;2-4 1874-:2 187:2-6 1876-7 1877-8 
9·2J 9·J9 10·51 10· 50 10·44 10· 15 10·21 
1878-2 1872-80 1880-1 1881-2 1882-;2 188;2-4 1884-:2 
10· 10 10· 09 10·45 9·82 9·88 9·74 9·55 
188,2-6 1886-1 188Z-8 1888-2 1882-20 1820-: 1 1821-2 
9·4J 9·52 9·68 9·74 9·JJ 9·J5 9·25 
1822-;2 182;2-4 1824-5 182:2-6 1826- 7 1897-8 1898-2 
9·4J 9·21 9·11 9 ·11 9·17 9·27 8 ·14 
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1822-00 12 00- 1 12 01 - 2 1202-,:2 120,:2-4 1204-2 1902-6 
8·06 3·38 3·24 3·48 7·21 6.17 6·59 
1206-7 1207-8 1208-2 1202- 10 12 10- 11 1211-12 1212-1,:2 
7·72 8·10 7·99 8·53 8·26 8·22 8·15 
19 1,:2-14 1214-12 
8·28 8.25 
3: Trained Troop Horses as Percentage of Regular Cavalry 
1871-2 to 1914-15 Actually Serving with Regiment 
1871-2 
58 
1872-,:2 
58 
1873-4 
56 
1878-2 
57 
1872-80 1880-1 
57 57·5 
1882-6 1886-7 
55·5 51 
1822-3 
52 
182,:2-4 
53 
1899-00 1200-1 
61 62 
1206-7 1207-8 
62 72·5 
121,:2-14 1214-12 
83·5 86 
1887-8 
50 
1824-5 
53 
1901-2 
61 
1908-2 
78 
1874-2 
57 
1881-2 
57 
1888-2 
51·5 
1822-6 
53 
1202-,:2 
61 
1872-6 
57 
1882-,:2 
56 
1876-7 
57 
188,:2-4 
55·5 
1882-20 1890-1 
52 53 
1826-7 
52 
120,:2-4 
67·5 
1827-8 
61 
1904-2 
83·5 
1877-8 
57 
1884-2 
55·5 
1891-2 
53·5 
1828-9 
60·5 
12 0 5-6 
66 
1202-10 1210-11 1911-12 1212-13 
73 71 83·5 80 
4: Cost of the Regular Cavalry as a Percentage of the total 
Gross Army Estimates 1888-9 to 1914-15 
1888-2 
7·07 
1882-20 1820- 1 
n.a. n.a. 
1822-6 1826-7 1897-8 
6·20 6·03 6·04 
1891-2 1822-,:2 
n.a. 6·33 
182,:2-4 
6·33 
1828-2 
6·06 
1822-00 1200- 1 
6·00 n.a. 
1824-2 
6·41 
12 01 - 2 
n.a. 
1902-3 1903-4 
n.a. 4·34 
1904-5 
5·45 
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1905-6 
5·24 
1906-7 
5·21 
1907-8 
5·31 
1908-9 
5· 18 
1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-1J 1913-14 1914-15 
5·22 5·38 5·47 5·56 5·60 5·41 
Note: n.a. means not avarrable 
No figures available before 1888-9 
5: Net Army Estimates 187~-J to 1914-15 as a Percentage of 
the Net Estimate for 1871-+, corrected for Real Prices 
1871-2 
100 
1872-3 1873-4 1874-5 1875-6 1876-7 1877-8 
88·5 83·1 78·2 81·8 84·8 91·1 
1878-9 
101 • 8 
1879-80 1880-1 
108·3 103·7 
1885-6 1886-7 1887-8 
148·8 161·2 166·3 
1881-2 
109·6 
1888-9 
147·5 
1882-3 1883-4 1884-5 
108·0 111·1 124·9 
1889-90 1890-1 
149·9 152·9 
1891-2 
148·0 
1892-3 1893-4 
155·8 160·9 
1894-5 1895-6 1896-7 1897-8 
173·7 177·3 182·7 181·0 
1898-9 
184·7 
1899-00 1900-1 
200·6 54~·7 
1906-7 
263~3 
1907-8 
234·5 
1913-14 1914-5 
216-9 
1901-2 
814·4 
1908-9 
239·8 
1902-3 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 
642·0 317·2 263·9 272·8 
1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-13 
237·0 229·5 226·4 216·4 
6: Net Army Estimate for Cavalry 1893-4 to 1914-15 as a 
Percentage of the Net Estimate for 1892-3, corrected 
for Real Prices 
1892-3 1893-4 1894-5 1895-6 1896-7 1897-8 1898-9 
100 102·8 112-0 110·2 110·6 110·5 112·7 
1899-00 1900-1 1901-2 1902-3 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 
120·5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 130·9 139·9 138.6 
1906-7 1907-8 1908-9 
126·3 125·9 124·8 
1913-14 1914-15 
118.6 115.9 
1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-13 
119·4 120·0 120·5 116·9 
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7: Approximate Cost per annum of Soldiers of other 
Branches as a Percentage of the Cost of a Line Cavalry 
Soldier 1888-9 to 1914-15 
Household RHA Gunner RFA Driver Guards Infantrl 
1888-9 12609 104.0 95.3 90.7 84.3 
1889-90 126.9 104.1 95.4 92.6 85.0 
1890-1 126.6 104.0 95.3 94.3 87.3 
1891-2 125.1 103.4 95.2 93.9 87.8 
1892-3 126.5 104.3 95.9 94.9 88.6 
1893-4 126.5 103.5 95.3 93.6 87.3 
1894-5 126.4 103.9 95.9 94.2 87.6 
1895-6 126.6 103.8 95.9 94.3 87.6 
1896-7 -------------no data available-------------
1897-8 127.0 104.0 95.5 93.4 87.0 
1898-9 126.7 104.3 96.0 93.4 87.1 
1899-00 126.3 104.5 96.0 93.0 86.9 
1900-01 126.5 103.9 95.6 92.2 86.0 
1901 -2 125.7 104.0 96.0 92.3 87.1 
1902- 3 125.0 104.2 96.8 92.4 88.3 
1903-4 12;;;09 103.0 97.0 93.5 88.5 
1904-5 122.0 102.9 97.2 94.1 89.5 
1905-6 121 • 1 101.7 98.0 96.1 92.2 
1906-7 123.0 102.9 98.9 98.2 92.3 
1907- 8 123.8 102.3 98.3 98.5 92.8 
1908-9 124.2 102.4 97.6 98.5 92.6 
1909- 10 124.1 102.0 98.1 98.6 93.0 
1910-11 124.0 102.0 98.1 98.6 92.8 
1911-12 124 . 1 102 .2 98.2 98.6 92.9 
1912- 13 124 . 4 102.0 98.0 98.7 92.9 
1913- 14 124.6 101.8 97.7 99.6 93 . 2 
1914-15 124.2 102.2 97.8 99.3 93.2 
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8: Nwnber of Yeomanry on Muster Rolls 1871-2 to 1913-14 
1871-2 1872-;2 182;2-4 1874-,2 187,2-6 1876-7 1877-8 
15,773 15,455 15,086 15,378 15,130 15,078 14,830 
1878-2 1872-80 1880-1 1881-2 1882-;2 188;2-4 1884-,2 
14,614 14,614 14,614 14,458 14,404 14,404 14,405 
188,2-6 1886-7 '1887-8 ,1'888-2 1882-2 0 1820- 1 1891-2 
14,405 14,405 14,405 14,255 14,139 14,086 14,086 
1892-;2 189;2-4 1894-5 189,2-6 1896-7 1897-8 1898-9 
14,095 11,790 11 ,790 11,678 11,678 11 ,891 11 ,891 
1892-00 1900-1 12 01 - 2 1902-;2 120;2-4 1204-,2 1205-6 
11 ,891 11 ,907 35,000 35,164 35, 196 28, 114 27,638 
1206-7 1907-8 1908-9 1909-10 12 10- 11 1211-12 19 12- 1;2 
27,638 27,638 27,638 26,545 26,447 26,447 26,433 
121;2-14 
25,993 
9: Nwnber of Yeomanry Training per annum 1878-9 to 1913-14 
1878-9 1872-80 1880-1 1881-2 1882-;2 188;2-4 1884-5 
10,508 none 9,176 8,645 9,089 9,220 9,548 
188,2-6 1886-7 1887-8 1888-2 1882-2 0 1890-1 182 1- 2 
9,779 9,585 9,479 9,273 9,262 10,830 8,885 
1892-;2 182;2-4 1894-,2 182,2-6 1826-7 1897-8 1828-2 
9,113 9,113 8,498 8,493 8,498 8,498 8,914 
1822-00 1200- 1 1201 - 2 1202-;2 190;2-4 1204-,2 1205-6 
10,114 8,657 11 ,096 19,570 23,779 26,811 23,036 
1906-7 1207-8 1208-2 1209- 10 12 10- 11 12 11 - 12 1212-1;2 
23,498 23,471 27,638 26,545 26,447 26,447 26,433 
121;2-14 
25,993 
Note: no figures available before 1878-9 
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10: Annual Yeomanry Estimates 1872-3 to 1908-9 as a 
Percentage of the Estimate for 1871-2, corrected for 
Real Prices 
1871 -2 
100 
1878-9 
91.1 
1872-3 
88.2 
1873-4 
83.9 
1879-80 1880-1 
61.9 92.7 
1881-2 
93.8 
1885- 6 1886-7 1887-8 1888-9 
108.9 120.7 123 . 6 120 . 8 
1875-6 
90.2 
1876-7 
87.2 
1882-J 1883-4 
86.8 88.4 
1889-90 1890-1 
118.1 115.6 
1877-8 
85.1 
1884-5 
97.4 
1891 - 2 
111 . 9 
1892-3 1893-4 1894-5 1895- 6 1896-7 1897-8 1898-9 
118.3 121.1 128.6 129.5 132.9 136.4 129.6 
1899-00 1900-1 
252.2 603.1 
1906-7 
672.4 
1907-8 
623.1 
1901-2 
799.8 
1908-9 
20.4 
1902- 3 
974.8 
1903- 4 
799.8 
1904- 5 
770.5 
1905- 6 
721 .1 
Note: After 1908 the Yeomanry cost was included in the 
total cost of the Territorial Army 
Source: All figures in Part One derived from the 
Army Estimates 1870-1 to 1914-15 (War Office) 
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PART TWO 
1 : Branch of Senior Officers in the British Army 
January 1895 
Generals Lieutenant-Generals Major-Generals 
No % No % No % 
Infantry 8 42 13 29 37 35 
Artillery 2 11 7 15 14 13 
Cavalry 0 0 7 15 11 10 
Marines 3 16 5 11 6 6 
Engineers 2 11 4 9 7 7 
Indian Army 4 21 8 18 31 29 
Total 19 44 106 
2: Average Age of General Officers in the British Army 
January 1895 
Generals (excluding Royal appointments) 64 years 
Lieutenant- Generals (excluding Royal appointments) 60 year s 
Lieutenant-Generals of Cavalry 61 years 
Major- Generals (excluding Royal appointments) 57 years 
Major- Generals of Cavalry 57 years 
3: Staff College Graduates among General Officers in the 
British Army January 1895 
No % 
Generals 1 5 
Lieutenant - Generals 6 13 
Lieutenant- Generals of Cavalry 0 0 
Major- Generals 14 13 
Major- Generals of Cavalry 1 9 
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4: Branch of Senior Officers in the British Army 
January 1919 
Lieutenant- TemEorary Major-Lieutenant-Generals Generals Generals 
No % No % No % 
Infantry 23 50 14 42i 79 31i 
Artillery 1+ 8.1.. 2 3 9 33 13 
Cavalry 4 8.1.. 2 9 27 18 7 
Marines 3 6.1.. 2 0 0 6 2.1.. 2 
Engineers 3 6.1.. 2 5 15 25 10 
Indian Army 8 17 0 0 52 2W 2 
Others 1 3 2 6.1.. 2 39 15i 
Total 46 33 252 
5: Average Age of General Officers in the British Army 
January 1919 
Lieutenant-Generals 
Lieutenant-Generals promoted to that 
rank after July 1914 
Lieutenant- Generals of Cavalry 
Temporary Lieutenant-Generals 
Temporary Lieutenant-Generals of Cavalry 
Major-Generals (including temporary 
Lieutenant-Generals) 
Major-Generals promoted to that rank 
after July 1914 
Major-Generals of Cavalry (including 
temporary Lieutenant-Generals) 
59 years 
58 years 
57 years 
55i years 
55 years 
56 years 
55 years 
53 years 
6: Staff College Graduates among General Officers in the 
British Army January 1919 
Lieutenant-Generals 
Lieutenant-Generals promoted to that 
rank after July 1914 
Lieutenant-Generals of Cavalry 
No % 
21 
15 
3 
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No % 
Major- Generals 90 36 
Major- Generals promoted to that 
rank after July 1914 72 3 6 
Major- Generals of Cavalry 7 38 
Note : All ages correct to the nearest half-year; all 
percentages correct to the nearest half a per cent 
7: Promotion Prospects for Regimental Cavalry Officers 
betwee~ June 1915 and June 1918 from a Sample of 
Six Regiments 
Total number of Officers in sample June 1915 144 
Total number promoted June 1915-June 1918 81 
Total number still with regiment June 1918 50 
Number still with regiment receiving promotion 
before June 1918 29 
Number serving with reserve of regiment June 1918 11 
Number with reserve of regiment promoted by June 
1918 6 
Officers transferred to Staff work by June 1918 14 
Officers on Staff work promoted by June 1918 11 
---Officers trans ferre d to R.F . C. by June 1918 6 
Officers in RoF.C . promoted by June 1918 6 
Officers transferred to Tank Corps by June 1918 4 
Officers promoted in Tank Corps by June 1918 2 
Officers transferred to Machine Gun Corps by June 
1918 5 
Officers promoted in Machine · Gun Corps by June 1918 
Officers transferred to Infantry by June 1918 
Officers promoted in Infantry by June 1918 
Officers transferred to Artillery by June 1918 
Officers promoted in Artillery by June 1918 
Officers transferred to other branches including 
4 
3 
3 
1 
o 
those achieving General rank by June 1918 14 
Officers promoted in other branches by June 1918 11 
Total number transferred from regiment by June 1918 47 
Number transferred from regiment receiving promotion 
by June 1918 39 
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Number seconded or retired by June 1918 12 
Number dead or left the Army by June 1918 23 
Percentage of all officers promoted June 1915-
June 1918 56 
Percentage of officers still with regiment promoted 58 
Percentage of officers having left regiment promoted 83 
Note : Sample taken from the following six regiments, 
chosen from all three Cavalry divisions as 
representative of the various types of Cavalry: 
1 st Life Guards; 2nd Dragoon G'!.IQ.rds; 2nd Dragoons; 
3rd Hussars; 5th Lancers; 1st Essex Yeomanry 
8: Cavalry Transfers to the R oFoC o and the Tank Corps 
1914- 18 
January 1915: 
Staff 
Officers under 
instruction 
January 1916 : 
Wing Commanders 
Squadron Commanders 
Flight Commanders 
Equipment Officers 
Flying Officers 
Balloon Officers 
Total 
January 1918: 
Staff 
Wing Commanders 
Squadron Commanders 
Flight Commanders 
Lieutenant- Colonels 
Majors 
Captains 
Total RoF oC o 
13 
25 
11 
43 
139 
28 
593 
2 8 
942 
57 
50 
198 
783 
Total Tank CorEs 
10 
65 
68 
Cavalrymen 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
30 
3 
47 
3 
5 
14 
41 
Cavalr~en 
1 
10 
12 
Note : the R oF oC. was not dependent upon transfers but also 
recruited direct 
Source: All tables in Part Two derived from the Monthly 
and Quarterly Army Lists (War Office) 
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PART THREE 
1: Casualties of the Regular Cavalry and Yeomanry 
August 1914- September 1919 in Various Theatres of War 
France & Belgium Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
Italy 
Mediterranean 
(Gallipoli) 
Salonika 
Mesopotamia 
Egypt 
(Palestine) 
Totals 
Grand Total 
Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
Cavalry 
Yeomanry 
killed wounded missing total 
3,500 
663 
11 
17 
710 
9 
89 
214 
14 
40 
939 
3,780 
2,426 
6,206 
10,997 
1 ,981 
9 
21 
1,609 
3 
116 
275 
6 
14 
1,434 
11,310 
5,155 
16,465 
1,506 
121 
107 
8 
30 
3 
5 
352 
1,541 
591 
16,003 
2,765 
20 
38 
2,426 
12 
213 
519 
23 
59 
2,725 
16,631 
~, 172 
2,132 24,803 
2: Official~ Strengths of Regular Cavalry Reserves in All 
Stages of Training October 1914 to July 19 17 
Officers Other Ranks 
October 1914 949 32,729 
January 1915 1,061 33,128 
April 1915 1,072 34,760 
July 1915 891 2 1 ,808 
October 1915 926 20,316 
January 1916 825 17,139 
April 1916 775 18,242 
July 1916 794 18,894 
October 1916 728 18,976 
January 1917 838 14, 162 
April 1917 899 20,056 
July 1917 1,134 22,621 
Note: after July 1917 Cavalry recruiting was stopped 
permanently until the end of the war 
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3: Cavalry in British Forces in Various Theatres 1914-1918 
as a Percentage of the Total and Combat strengths in 
these Theatres 
France Medi- Salon- Meso-Italy terranean ika Egypt potamia 
September 1914 
Total 
Combat 
September 1915 
Total 
Combat 
September 1916 
Total 
Combat 
September 1917 
Total 
Combat 
September 1918 
Total 
Combat 
7.72 
9.28 
3.20 
3.88 
2.55 
3.02 
2.15 
2.77 
0.98 
1.49 
0.65 
0.87 
8.27 
9.48 
3.71 
4.65 
0.41 
0.51 
1.02 
1.62 
6.51 
8.06 
3.67 
5.03 
Note: Cavalry in this table includes Yeomanry and all 
Brit~sh Mounted forces 
4: Combat strengths of Various Branches of the Army in 
France and Belgium on 1 September 1918 
3.12 
4.11 
1.90 
2.30 
2.50 
3.68 
Cavalry 
13,644 
Cyclist Corps Machine Gun Corps Tank Corps 
4,733 52,030 11,723 
Source: All tables in Part Three derived from Statistical 
Abstract the Armies at 
Home and Imperial War 
Museum) 
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BRITISH UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Currency: Before 1971 the Pound (£) was subdivided into 
twenty shillings (s) each of which was divided into twelve 
pence (d). There were thus 240 pence to a pound, one 
shilling was the equivalent of five (modern) pence and one 
old penny of 0·41 pence. 
Length: One inch is the equivalent of 25·4 mm. There are 
twelve inches to each foot (305 mm), three feet to each 
yard (0·914 metres) and 1,760 yards to each mile (1,609 
metres). For bullet calibres the following are approxi-
mate conversions: ·577 inches is 14.655 mm; ·45 inches is 
11·43 mm; ·303 inches is 7·696 mm. For approximate con-
version when judging long distances, three feet or one 
yard may be taken as equal to a metre, and a mile as equal 
to 1·5 kilometres. 
Weight: One ounce is the equivalent of 28·35 grammes. 
There are sixteen ounces to each pound (0·454 kilogrammes), 
fourteen pounds to each stone (6.36 kilogrammes) and 160 
stones to each ton (1,016 kilogrammes). For approximate 
conversion a pound may. be taken as just under half a kilo-
gramme, a stone as a little less than 6i kilogrammes, and 
a ton as a little more than 1,000 kilogrammes. Twenty 
stones is just over 127 kilogrammes. 
Temperature: On the Fahrenheit scale the boiling point of 
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water is 212 degrees, and its freezing point is 32 degrees. 
To cqnvert to Centigrade subtract 32 from the temperature, 
multiply the result by 5 and divide by 9. One hundred 
degrees Fahrenheit is therefore almost 38 degrees Centi-
grade. 
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